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The Foreign Policy of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Great Britain

from the appointment of Count Gyula Andrassy to the events of the

Congress of Berlin (1871-1878)

Doctoral (PhD theses)

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I. Research subject, and the objectives of the doctoral thesis

After the Prussian-French War of 1870-1871, which determined the last decades of the 19th century, a new crisis emerged in international relations, during which the great powers of the pentarchic system¹ had the opportunity to change the standing status quo. At the beginning of the era, the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck wanted to avoid a French attempt for revenge, therefore saw a safeguard in the League of the Three Emperors. A treaty was concluded by the Eastern powers in 1873, a guarantee for the preservation of the newly achieved German unity. Five years later at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 however, the Austro-Hungarian (with British support) and German parties went against the interests of their former ally, the Russian Empire. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was particularly interested in this diplomatic turn of events, as the Slavic movements threatened both the internal integrity of the Empire and its interests in the Balkans. The Great Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878, which can be interpreted as an episode in the almost century-long British-Russian confrontation over the Eastern Question, led to a radical change in the constellation of great powers, and resulted in a number of minor diplomatic negotiations and alliance-building between the powers. The international diplomatic and informal relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Great Britain in the period 1871–1879 can be described as part of these alliance-seeking or alternative alliance relations.

The leaders of the Monarchy were not only afraid of the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, which had been the gatekeeper of trade routes in Asia and the Mediterranean. As well as seeing the Balkan expansion as a chance to compensate their Empire for the previously lost provinces of northern Italy, they also saw the Slavic unity movement and the Slavic client states rising along the southern borders as a threat to the integrity of the Monarchy. Franz Joseph, Emperor of the Cisleithanian realms and the King of Hungary, and Count Gyula Andrassy, the foreign minister, as well as the bureaucratic and military circles of Vienna, could not, however, fully commit themselves to an anti-Russian or even a pro-Russian policy, solely based on concessions. The anti-Turkish, slavophile policy was followed up by public anger in Hungary, and the reverse of the policy threatened to break up the League of the Three Emperors. Therefore, a policy of status quo seemed the most appropriate. An intermediate solution could have been the Andrassy Note of 1875, which sought to defuse Russian intervention in the name of Slav solidarity by promising extensive administrative reforms and guarantees for the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The plan would have been guaranteed by the Great

¹ The five Great Powers are the British Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Russian Empire, France, and the newly created German Empire. The system has also been described as a 'concert' of European powers.

Powers without jeopardising Ottoman sovereignty over the Balkan territories. After the failure of this plan, the 1876 Conference of Constantinople offered the Great Powers another opportunity for a peaceful settlement, but this attempt also failed. The changes in Turkish domestic politics led to the escalation of Russo-Turkish hostilities and war (1877–1878). After the long months of the conflict, the Russian forces defeated the Ottoman army defending the fortress at Plevna. Hostilities ended temporarily on 31 January 1878 with the humiliating armistice of Adrianopolis. The peace and settlement reached at San Stefano shortly after, have shocked Austro-Hungarian foreign policy decision-makers, who tried to prepare for different scenarios. During the first two years of the conflict, the Russian Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had interests in the Balkans, continued to cooperate in the form of secret treaties of the Reichstadt (1876) and Budapest (1877) convention. In the course of these agreements, the peninsula was divided into western and eastern spheres of interest in case of a breakdown of the status quo. With the peace conditions set at San Stefano however, the Russian side came quite close to unilaterally carving out the sphere of interest from Turkey. The Russian victories encouraged the decision-makers of the Dual Monarchy to reach out to other Great Powers – in addition to existing allies – with which they shared common interests. This was done in order to secure their interests in the East. Great Britain then presented itself as a clear possibility. A maritime power that had long supported the Ottoman Empire, which was weakening against Russia.

The dissertation focuses on international history and aims to highlight the relations between Britain, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Furthermore the dissertation aims to explore how the foreign policies of the two countries evolved during the Great Eastern Crisis and the years preceding it. The time period justified in the title is relevant to the relationship of the countries and serves a practical purpose: following the Franco-Prussian War, bilateral negotiations intensified, and the period of intense alliance-building was set under the office of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Andr ssy. As far as British policy is concerned, the time limit would be more obviously indicated by the premiership of Disraeli, but diplomatic rapprochement was already attempted after the Hungarian aristocrat's debut in office, during the Gladstone government. As a closing date, the Congress of Berlin is a clear caesura for the subsequent events of the period, as the alliances and strategies that emerged as a direct result of the Congress determined the Great Power politics of the following decades. This doctoral thesis aims not only to enrich our existing knowledge by involving new sources, but also to provide an alternative interpretation by shedding light on the *Realpolitik* of the late 19th century.

Furthermore, the aim of the dissertation is not only to present the mere history of relations, but to apply the methodology inspired by the *neoclassical realist* approach of *Foreign Policy Analysis* through a historical example. Foreign Policy Analysis is not only a multi-disciplinary method for gaining a more detailed insight, but a well-known known from the fields of political science and international relations theory, which in our case complements the cognitive method of historiography by allowing the analysis of events along the lines of prior categories. The method interprets foreign policy not only through systemic international processes, but also by considering the role of leaders, institutional bureaucracies, interest groups, public opinion and the media. In other words, it analyses the levels which actors influence the foreign policy of individual states. In this interpretive framework, it therefore becomes necessary to analyze the factors that limit the leaders, whether it be public opinion, the ruler, other actors of state control, lobbying groups, or the bureaucrats and ambassadors of a given country. The internal institutions of a given state's foreign policymaking can also be analysed, since it is within these institutions that foreign policy is conducted.

The aim of this work is to use the aforementioned approach to paint a more authentic picture of the foreign policy associated with Gyula Andrásy. It can be hypothesised that the image of Andrásy has been greatly distorted by earlier works. Eduard von Wertheimer and Béla Lederer wanted to create an image of Andrásy's genius, while at the same time continuing the cult-building begun by Lajos Dóczi and Manó Kónyi. Fitting in the process, they have inevitably excluded significant actors in foreign policy decision-making from their interpretation. In turn, later authors who participated in the cult-building and built on these works, have distorted the agency and potential of the Hungarian aristocrat, who played a key role but was constrained by other spheres of state practice and foreign policy decision-making. From the English sources and other accounts analysed in this thesis, an alternative image of Andrásy emerges, as well as a portrayal of a foreign policy in which the ruler, Franz Joseph, and many members of the *Ballhausplatz* bureaucracy were actively involved. In addition, the above actors were influenced by the imperial press and media, as well as the intertwining factor of public opinion of the time.

Current doctoral thesis will also seek to clarify the picture of British foreign policy as it has been presented in the past. The thesis starts from the premise that after 1874, British policy makers were open to alternative policies influencing continental policy, as they recognised their country's isolation in continental affairs. As authoritative works, such as István Diószegi's monograph, have focused on Bismarck's Germany and judged Britain's policies as frivolous, often examining events exclusively through the lens of the archive materials of Austria, and

Beust's ambassadorial dispatches from London. The works that have partially uncovered British documents and the Montgelas connection—such as the work of Rainer F. Schmidt—have exaggerated Andrásy's role, weaving a fantastical narrative from the knowledge at their disposal, a narrative that is directly contradicted by contemporary English accounts.

II. *Methodology, research questions and sources used in the doctoral thesis*

Foreign Policy Analysis serves as a tool for expanding the range of sources examined by diplomatic historians. We consider the analysis as a sub-discipline of the international relations discipline, which not only allows us to ‘randomly’ include new sources due to the internal references found in the sources, but also, like other social sciences, to consciously develop concepts and categories of inquiry that help us to better understand the subject of the thesis.

Thus, the three major theoretical divisions and methods of analysis apply simultaneously to the analysis of foreign policy. According to the levels of analysis, we distinguish between the macro level (including the international system and international society), the meso level (e.g. the state, a particular society), and the micro level (the individual, the decision-maker, etc.).

The theory considers the heads of state and government as the chief negotiators of foreign policy at the level of the top *decision-making*. At the micro level, the decisions, psychological and biographical characteristics of individuals can also be the subject of research. This category can also include prominent figures in the official foreign policy decision-making process, such as foreign ministers and various members of governments and cliques. The meso level includes state *bureaucracies* and various *interest groups*, even competing with each other. Several theories have been put forward about bureaucracies and institutions, as they can exert different influences on decision-makers. Theories include the *Bureaucratic* and *Open Process Paradigm* theory, based on historical case studies. Also, to this group belongs the theory of bounded rationality within organisational constraints, according to which a decision cannot be fully rational as long as it must also conform to the logic of a particular organisation. In the third circle, social factors such as *lobby groups* and the *media* influence foreign policy. The fourth and broadest group is society as a whole, *public opinion* and *transnational actors* beyond the state.

On the basis of the methodological considerations described above, the adaptation of *Foreign Policy Analysis* to historical work seems to be the most appropriate tool for the study of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy's relations and foreign policy with Britain. My primary research question (following István Diószegi's *Bismarck and Andrásy*) is: I . *What kind of*

diplomatic relations existed between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Britain in the period 1871-1878? Considering the official bodies determining international interactions and the methods of foreign policy analysis mentioned above, further questions arise. II/a. *What characterised the general foreign policy of the two states (in relation to other European states) and in relation to each other during this period?* II/b. *What were the independent foreign policy objectives of the states (and sub-state actors) under study and how did they change?*

The first question establishes the basic historical relevance of the thesis, as it shifts the focus of examination to a less discussed aspect, overshadowed by the extensively studied German and Russian relations. Taking into account the second question of the thesis, the dissertation takes a new approach to the relationship between the two countries. According to the theoretical approach regarding decision-making theaters, foreign policy is not a homogeneous factor, but is influenced by various actors operating at different levels. It should be noted that, while it is necessary to touch on all the different dimensions of foreign policy in order to address these issues, the constraints of the paper do not allow us to go into all the details of the source material on the relations between the two countries. We will limit our analysis to those factors that are considered relevant in influencing the mutual political relationship and determining foreign policy.

Having clarified this, the second question leads to a further research question on the actors: III. *Which external and internal actors influenced the foreign policy of the two countries?* In the analysis, I distinguish between the following levels: 1. *heads of state and statesmen at the top of foreign affairs*, 2. *government officials and ministers*, 3. *bureaucracy - professionals in the foreign affairs apparatus*, 4. *lobbyists and interest groups*, 5. *media and public opinion, domestic affairs*. These categories are, of course, not absolute, not impenetrable and, although they seem as they offer a possibility for comparison, do not exclusively serve political comparatism. Nor can they form the basis of a comparison, since, as we shall see later in the discussion of the power of the ruler or the influence of bureaucrats, no clear hierarchy can be established between the categories of analysis – Foreign Policy Analysis is characterised by ‘methodological individualism’. The hierarchy of categories depends on the object of analysis, as interactions are varied and constant across the different theaters. The third question also addresses the need to filter out errors arising from reconciling historical facts with the categories of analysis, specifically that I not only work with the categories of foreign policy analysis but, by supplementing them with my own perspectives, I have sought to avoid the error of complete ‘alignment’ and distortion. In keeping with the tradition of historical narrative, I

intend to present events chronologically and not to restructure the essay according to categories of analysis.

The dissertation is a work based on the research of primary sources. The British archives and the public collections of the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy provide written sources on high politics and bureaucratic policy for the exploration of the foreign policy of individual countries. The relevant documents can be found in the *Foreign Office* (FO) records of *The National Archives* (formerly the *Public Records Office*), which collects national, and state material. In addition to telegraphic reports, the documents include private correspondence and drafts of politicians and officials, as well as fragments that provide insights into organisational functioning, hierarchy and influence. Documents relating to the Monarchy can be found under FO 7 and FO 120 (*Foreign Office and predecessor: Political and Other Departments: General Correspondence before 1906, Austro-Hungarian Empire (formerly Holy Roman Empire)*). Other FO fonds under different numbering include documents relating to countries relevant to the context of the research, such as the Ottoman Empire (*TNA-PRO FO 78. Foreign Office and predecessor: Political and Other Departments: General Correspondence before 1906, Ottoman Empire, TNA-PRO FO 424. Foreign Office: Confidential Print Turkey*), or documents relating to the German Empire (*TNA-PRO FO 244. Foreign Office: Embassy and Consulates, Germany (formerly Prussia): General Correspondence*). In the documents, under FO 881, we find contemporary summaries of the most important cases extracted for the government. CAB (*Cabinet Papers*) 40-41², are important for their subject and period, as they contain official communications between the Government and the Queen. *The National Archives* also hold secret treaties and copies, copies or translations of international treaties sent to the British side.³ Some of the former private archives and legacy documents are kept in separate fonds. These include the *Hammond Papers*, marked FO 391, the *Russell Papers*, marked FO 918, and the *Cairns Papers*, marked PRO 30/51. Other private correspondence and ego documents are held in the *British Library* or in separate collections. British sources include the private Disraeli letters (*Hughenden Papers*) held once in Hughenden Palace, currently held separately in the *Bodleian Library*, Oxford.⁴ In the case of private letters, there is a substantial amount of source publications available that can aid in research. Among these, Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson's volume, *Foundations*

² CAB - Photographic Copies of Cabinet Letters in the Royal Archives

³ TNA-PRO FO 93/11/45B. Secret Agreement. Berlin Congress.

⁴ For example, the Bodleian Library houses the Disraeli collection from Hughenden Castle, which includes correspondence with Queen Victoria.

of *British Foreign Policy*, is particularly noteworthy. When referencing letters and telegrams, for clarity, I include the letter numbers where applicable and when multiple reports were published on a given day.

One of the most important groups of sources is the correspondence between the head of the Foreign Ministry's press department and its secretary. The papers in the Kónyi and Lónyay Collection in the *University College London Library* provide a glimpse behind the scenes of Andrassy's myth-making. Similar documents of the Austro-Hungarian side are held by the *Hungarian National Archives* (under the reference X869) and the Austrian Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (Ministerium des Ausßern, Politisches Archiv – VIII. England). In the Hungarian archives, the *Rotbuchs*, that contain the instructions and correspondence of the Vienna envoys, is available on microfilm, while the documents missing from the microfilm are held by the aforementioned archives in Vienna. Several documents or copies of documents relating to the Andrassy period (such as P4 and P301) are in the possession of the *Hungarian National Archives*, and the remains of the archives of the Andrassy families are in Levoca, Slovakia.

The paper does not explicitly use Viennese sources beyond the findings of the previously available source collections and the existing literature, which already utilised the vast of Austro-Hungarian sources. One reason for this is, on the one hand, that the sources in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv concerning England have been partially processed by Schmidt, Rainer F. in his book *Die gescheiterte Allianz: Österreich-Ungarn, England und das Deutsche Reich in der Ära Andrassy (1867 bis 1878/79)* (Austrian-Hungarian-English-German relations) and almost entirely in Franz-Josef Kos's work on Austro-Hungarian policy decision-making, *Die Politik Österreich-Ungarns während der Orientkriese 1874/75-1879. Zum Verhältnis von politischer und militärischer Führung*. On the other hand, source material concerning other countries was dealt with in detail by Diószegi (*Bismarck und Andrassy. Ungarn in der deutschen Machtpolitik in der 2. Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*), by Rupp in his work on Austro-Hungarian-Russian relations (*A Wavering Friendship. Russia and Austria 1876-1878*), and by Alexander Novotny (*Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Berliner Kongress 1878. Österreich, die Türkei und das Balkanproblem im Jahre des Berliner Kongress*).

In the context of bureaucratic figures involved in high politics and foreign policy decision-making, we can also find sources that were written by the person concerned directly after the events under investigation. These are either diaries or memoirs decades – written after an event. Regarding the British side, we have contemporary writings such as the diaries of Derby, Gladstone, Carnarvon, Elliot's memoirs and Arthur Evans' travelogues. From the Austro-Hungarian side, the writings of Apponyi, Josef Schwegel, and Friedrich Beust's memoirs are

notable works. However, these were used only to a limited extent in this thesis, as the available biographical works already deal selectively with the political aspects of the aforementioned egodocuments.

As far as the Austro-Hungarian press is concerned, we have investigated the relevant issues of *Egyetértés*, *Ellenőr*, *A Hon*, *Pesti Napló*. Most of the journals are available online in the *Arcanum Digital Database*, and real copies and microfilm copies are available in the National Széchenyi Library. As for British newspapers, all newspapers are available from *The British Library* through local terminals, however, *The Times* and *The Daily Telegraph* maintain archives for various online subscriptions. The *British Newspaper Archives* include *The Spectator*, *The Pall Mall Gazette*, *The Daily News*, *The Globe* and smaller papers available by subscription.

III. Conclusion and findings

The history of diplomacy and international relations has been determined by states and decision-makers at the highest levels. Using the 'theatre method' adopted from International Relations theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, we have examined the sources in this dissertation. From these, we observed the unfolding of the relationship between the two countries, their foreign policy ideas, the realization or failure of their objectives, as well as the role of external and internal factors..

The characteristics of the international system in the period can be said to have inherited many similarities from the first half of the century. The religiosity and authoritarian political prudery of the Holy Alliance was replaced after 1849 by a practice of alliance-seeking and alliance-switching. Following the example of Italian and German unification movements, nations sought unity transcending imperial borders. They made their armies more effective through the introduction of universal conscription, and made them permanent and mobile through railway improvements and other innovations. The bureaucratized and efficient state apparatus allowed the almost unlimited use of mass armies in the international arena. With the rise of the (international) press and the democratisation of foreign policy, public opinion on foreign affairs also emerged. Diplomats and statesmen therefore found their new role in seeking alliances and identifying temporary interests. In the years between 1871 and 1879, the idea of seeking alliances and the democratisation of foreign affairs affected the foreign policy of both the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Great Britain. Under the banner of modernisation, in both countries – almost in parallel – the state apparatus and the internal ratification spaces were reorganised around these elements.

In reviewing the relationship between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Britain and analysing their foreign policies between 1871 and 1875, we have shed new light on the Great Power landscape of the mid-century. With the new common foreign minister coming to power, the policies of the old Monarchy changed. The old and new elements of the foreign policy of the Dualist Empire were mixed in Andrassy's vision: the basis of the Eastern policy laid down by his predecessor in office (Friedrich F. von Beust) was present, which was complemented by the Hungarian aristocrat's specific anti-Russian vision of Hungarian liberal foreign policy. By January 1872, against the seemingly inevitable option of a Russian-German alliance, Andrassy with the help of the deputy chargé d'affaires of the Viennese embassy, Lytton, was able to carve out his own vision, an anti-Russian alternative. The offer was called "*confidential understanding*" in their correspondence. But serious foreign policy intentions were lacking

behind the initiative, from both the liberal London cabinet and the decision-makers in Vienna. Therefore, the Viennese decision-makers were increasingly moving towards the Russian-German axis. The Emperor, Franz Joseph, was particularly committed to the legitimist policy of the three emperors. Thus, in the spring of 1873, the League of the Three Emperors was established and consequently, the Balkan policy towards the Ottoman Empire was also determined by the partnership with Russia. Until 1874, apart from brief episodes of offers of alliance and world political developments, British and Austro-Hungarian cooperation was thus limited to monitoring Balkan actors and affairs in the Danube Principalities. The change of government in Britain in early 1874 could have been a new opportunity for Andrassy, but as foreign minister Derby continued the policies of his liberal predecessor. As the middle of the decade approached, the position of the head of the *Ballhausplatz* became increasingly precarious, and with it the Monarchy's international role weakened. Vienna's relations with the Porte gradually deteriorated, and Austria-Hungary sought to limit its actions to involving Britain in Ottoman affairs. By 1875, the position of the two countries had become solid: the Monarchy had to manage its policy on the Balkans within the League of the Three Emperors, while Britain made attempts to break the alliance from the outside, and preserve the authority of the Porte. Disraeli attempted to lure both Russia and Austria-Hungary out of the alliance – without much success for the time being. By the end of the year Andrassy had achieved the political minimum: he was seen as a partner at the Tsar's court, as much as in Berlin and in London: decision-makers wanted to avoid his downfall – so they assured him of their support in Eastern affairs.

At the end of 1875, the tensions between the Porte and its subjects escalated into a civil war, and the Great Powers involved in the region developed various reform proposals to avoid further escalation. While the three emperors were sorting out their ranks, Andrassy presented Europe with the idea of a reform charter to change Ottoman internal affairs. The Porte, in order to avoid external interference, drew up its own decree. At the end of 1875, Andrassy made spectacular gestures to London before sending the note. Initially, the Andrassy Note had similar content to the Sultan's firman: it envisaged a joint Christian-Muslim commission, which promised a number of reforms for the inhabitants of the Christian territories of the Balkans. It then declared, on the basis of the Porta's previous fermán and its commitments, in line with the 1856 provisions, denominational equality between Muslims and Christians, the investigation of abuses of tax leases, the improvement of the situation of Christians in Bosnia, and the use of the money collected by the Porte as tax for the development of the provinces. However, on a

number of points it only outlined very general measures for the future of the troubled Balkan territories.

In the years of the *Krieg-In-Sicht* crisis and the uprisings in Herzegovina, mutual distrust defined the relationship between the *Foreign Office* and *Ballhausplatz*. At the same time, both powers benefited from the international crises of 1875. The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister emerged from the ‘replay’ of the Franco-Prussian situation with an advantage, as he forged closer links to Bismarck in the politics of the three emperors. The end of the crisis also marked Disraeli's success, as he prevailed in establishing antagonism between the German and Russian chancellors. London, on the other hand, became increasingly concerned about the development of the Austrian–Russian negotiations, as it felt that the British cabinet was being deliberately misled, whether on matters relating to the Ottomans or the arming of the Slavic peoples. At the outbreak of the uprising, each of the Great Powers initially saw the crisis as a local problem. Therefore they involved only the ambassadors of two particular powers. While the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared to maintain the status quo in the Balkans, London remained suspicious of Andrassy's Balkan ambitions. The Austro-Hungarian side, however, came up with a special proposal in the form of the Andrassy Note. Even if the document did not offer an immediate solution to the years-long crisis, the interests of the Great Powers in the Balkans in the future of the protracted conflict were clearly outlined: the Austro-Hungarians were interested in the moderate reforms offered in the Note, while the Ottomans, with their own solution in mind, readily accepted the firman's proposal (to the recommendation of Russia) to undermine the international initiative. Britain was almost powerless under these circumstances and felt the urgency to cooperate with a continental ally. Although Derby, as an advocate of a simpler, noninterventionist policy, saw no point in discussing the matters with other powers, Disraeli on the other hand – through his separate negotiations with the Russians, Germans and Austro-Hungarians – sought to ensure the future break-up of the tripartite treaty of the Eastern powers.

The events of the following year thus followed the political fault lines that had emerged at the outbreak of the crisis. Although the great powers supported the Vienna initiative, the Andrassy Note failed in the spring of 1876 and, as events were not considered closed, neither the rebels nor the Porte were willing to consider its contents. The British thus saw a chance to break up the bloc of Eastern powers. Bismarck, however, in order to forestall this attempt, drew up a new memorandum that brought together the will of the three: this was the so-called Berlin Memorandum. During the Berlin negotiations, Andrassy tried to keep pace with his partners

and did not want the Monarchy's views to be ignored. The British refused to join to the memorandum, as they had not even been invited to the talks.

Relations between the Monarchy and Britain were only strained, not severed, and continued along two lines: one was to persuade the Porte to grant amnesty to the Bosnian rebels, and the other was to limit arms supplies to Montenegro. While the former was partially achieved through French intercession with the Porte and the new Sultan, the latter was not reached. Russia and Britain were then engaged in intensive negotiations, while Andr ssy outlined possible scenarios for Disraeli and Derby. These included one in which they anticipated a declaration of war by Serbia and Montenegro, but also one in which they were prepared in the event that the rebels were defeated by the Porte and the local population was willing to accept the position of the reforms promised earlier.

The declaration of war by Serbia and Montenegro took place that summer, and the Eastern powers agreed on the so-called "Reichstadt clauses". After the failure of the British negotiations, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy's room for manoeuvre had become rather limited, and in July 1876, at the meeting in the Reichstag, it was again forced to ask Russia for guarantees. Andr ssy began talks with the intention of discouraging the British and Russians from reaching a common solution, and he could count on the concession of Bosnia and Herzegovina being included in the agenda, which topic also had been raised in earlier negotiations. On the other hand, Andr ssy could thus satisfy the pro-Russian tendencies of the Viennese military party as well as the wishes of the Emperor regarding his dynastic policy.

Even before the meeting Andr ssy made it clear to the British that it would be preferable to abandon the policy of non-intervention, even if the Monarchy must necessarily follow it at the present moment. On the British side, however, Disraeli expected the Turks to invade Serbia, so that all the Great Powers would seek the favour of England. But his expectations did not materialise. In 1876, from early July to September, *The Times* featured a series of articles on 'The Bulgarian Atrocities' committed by the irregular troops of the Ottoman Empire. The genocide thus set the political and press agenda for the following months. The political circles of London were shocked by the news that thousands of Bulgarians and Christians had been massacred by irregular Ottoman forces. The agitation over the atrocities damaged the reputation of Her Majesty's Government, and Queen Victoria was impatient to hold members of her cabinet to account for their decision to remain neutral at the Berlin Memorandum. The journalists behind the *Times* articles were discredited for a while by the Tory government. However, news of the massacres reached the highest echelons of politics. The Liberal camp demanded that the British fleet be allowed to board Constantinople. In view of public opinion,

the government could not issue statements warning Russia and supporting the Turks after the atrocities. News of the cruelties of the Ottoman troops also began to leak into the Hungarian press after a delay of a few weeks. *The Hon* cited *The Times* and other London news sources in this regard. In its June issues, *Ellenőr* also speculated about a possible British involvement, and published reports from the British and bellicose German newspapers. *The Pesti Napló* wrote about the infiltration of pan-Slavism into European public opinion, which it attributed to the Monarchy's permissive, friendly Russian relations. The turning point for British and Austro-Hungarian political newspapers was Disraeli's speech in Aylesbury. It was this speech, that attracted the attention of Hungarian newspapers and had a major impact on the anti-Russian manifestations of the Hungarian press, along with pro-Turkish opinions in the British conservative media. Disraeli's Aylesbury performance simultaneously rescued the pro-Turkish policy, condemned the Christian sentiment of the opposition, i.e. Gladstone, and the Liberal Party.

After Austria-Hungary seemed inactive, Derby returned to the line of negotiations with Russia and sought to reach an agreement in a conference. Thus the proposal for a conference in Constantinople was born, in which Austria-Hungary was to be presented with a *fait accompli*, and the British and Russians were to try to resolve the crisis in favour of Montenegro and Serbia. In a situation of total isolation, Andrassy had to buy time, mainly in the face of the military party in Vienna and Franz Joseph, with whom the Russians had begun negotiations. In Vienna, they received the Sumarokov-Elston mission and discussed plans for a joint invasion of the Balkans. However, the British documents show that the mission was doomed to failure, as Bismarck wanted to persuade Franz Joseph not to negotiate with his eastern partner.

It was also at this time that Andrassy began to negotiate secretly with Britain: bypassing his ambassador and former rival Beust, he negotiated a possible alliance with the British government through Montgelas. This was confirmed by a separate meeting with the British envoy to the Constantinople Conference and later Foreign Secretary, Salisbury. During the talks the envoy had lengthy discussions with the count. With little chance of an agreement, the Disraeli's cabinet sent Salisbury and the notorious turcophile, Elliot to the Constantinople Conference. Disraeli shortly after decided to explore the potential of the Austro-Hungarian alliance himself. He asked his personal secretary, Montague Corry, who was also assisting him in Suez, to enter into secret negotiations with Andrassy and his circle through his secret contacts at the London Embassy, Count Montgelas. The two countries were initially unable to reach an agreement. In his letters to the British, Montgelas also made the mistake of outlining the tensions within the Austro-Hungarian foreign policy decision making. The document revealing

the internal relations of the Monarchy did not write about the influence of the military circles without some justification: in mid-November, Archduke Albrecht, bypassing AndrÁssy, tried to persuade the Emperor to conclude a direct Russian alliance, and argued against AndrÁssy's British approach with several historical examples, and also by arguing the island's disadvantageous geostrategic position. The private correspondence between the ambassador to Vienna, Buchanan, and his chief, Derby, shows that AndrÁssy was personally and officially on the road to an English alliance, and was making increasing overtures towards Derby.

AndrÁssy summarized the principles of the Austro-Hungarian policy on which cooperation could be based, and concealed the fact of the Budapest Convention (15 January 1877), as well as the former Reichstadt Treaty, both of which tied the Monarchy to Russia. The existence of the latter conventions was not revealed to Beust. However, the British-Austrian-Hungarian rapprochement was interrupted at the end of the Constantinople Conference in early 1877 and could only be resumed in the summer. In the spring of 1877, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy received guarantees from Russia. The Budapest Agreement demarcated the Russian and Austro-Hungarian spheres of interest and, in return for the occupation of Bosnia, guaranteed the Russian side the benign neutrality of the Monarchy. Nevertheless, AndrÁssy sought additional assurances from Germany and England in the event of Russian treachery. When he asked Bismarck for assurances in the event of a possible Russian defection, Bismarck advised him to find a solution with England. However, AndrÁssy initially refused to seek favour with the British, as the Budapest Agreement was also intended to isolate the Russian and British governments from each other.

On 24 April 1877, following the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War, as British and Austro-Hungarian interests converged, the press of the two countries increasingly reported on the possibility of an alliance between Britain, and Austria-Hungary. It was this moment, when the secret negotiations between AndrÁssy and Disraeli deepened. When the British cabinet, after much debate, came to the conclusion that it would remain neutral in the event of the outbreak of war, it took the initiative in making overtures to the Monarchy. The British wanted to know whether the Monarchy was willing to take joint action to defend Constantinople. Both Derby and AndrÁssy were distrustful of each other. Mostly because AndrÁssy was aware that Disraeli was supported by the Queen in the divided cabinet, and therefore did not consider the British proposals serious enough. Derby also expressed his doubts about Vienna's willingness or if the country would ever go to war for the British interests in Asia Minor. Yet the only option left to the St. James cabinet remained the tried and tested method of British foreign policy: joint action with a land power. Given the division of continental powers, the only option in this case was

the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The British Foreign Secretary enquired whether the Monarchy would be willing to act jointly and defend Constantinople, even with armed force, and whether it would be interested in joint secret negotiations.

Since 1872, however, much has changed, above all the policy set at the military conferences, which determined the common foreign minister's policy of three emperors. The Russians were acting within the framework of the agreement, and the memorandum issued by the British made it appear that Britain wanted to use the Monarchy as a land power or to use it to gain negotiating position, in order to contain the Russians. At the same time, however, Andr ssy did not want to miss the opportunity of obtaining an English guarantee in the event of Russian defiance, as he expected the Russian government to break its promises under external pressure. Andr ssy was ready to enter negotiations, but he also warned Britain, that he had formulated his Austro-Hungary policy in seven points. The memorandum, although with minor changes, formed the basis of a joint secret agreement in August. Five of the seven points were considering the possible Russian territorial conquests, and prohibited the creation of a large Slavic state in the Balkans. These points also denied Russian expansionism into the region. The British considered the most promising point to be the prohibition of the Russian possession of Constantinople, and wondered whether Austria-Hungary was willing to consider it *a casus belli*. Andr ssy, however, gave an obscure answer, and the negotiations on the part of Vienna were exhausted by a call for '*joint, but independent*' action. The split in the Monarchy's decision-making created a serious crisis of confidence, effectively ending the harmony of Austro-Hungarian and British cooperation that had been achieved previously. The two powers, on the other hand, continued to be linked by the political opinion that appeared in both the international and their respective national press. Public opinion portrayed the two countries as obvious allies with similar interests. The temporary victory of the Turkish armies at Plevna, however, delayed the actuality of an agreement, and it was only after the Russian breakthrough that a change occurred.

The pressure of pro-Turkish public opinion increased on both the pro-humanitarian members of the British government and the Monarchy's common foreign minister. By early November, Disraeli had regained the support of his pro-war voters and, along with the sympathy of the jingos, condemned the Liberals. By the winter of 1877, it was clear that British moderates like Derby were losing out to bellicose opinion. In the Monarchy, outlets like *Egyet rt s*, *Ellen r* and other Hungarian daily newspapers had to concede defeat to the Turks. With the fall of Plevna on 10 December, the pro-Turkish British press took the view that conference and mediation were reasonable, but by mid-January 1878 (with the new Austro-Hungarian and British negotiations) war was on the table, and even seemed a desirable alternative. It was also

in these days that the anti-Andrássy mood in the Monarchy reached its peak. The end of the siege of Plevna was a clear sign that the Russians could have either double-crossed the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister or he had become Russian-friendly. To avoid total political defeat, Andrássy had to defend his decisions before the parliamentary delegations of the Dual Monarchy.

The negotiations in the summer of 1877 were characterised by mutual distrust, and this distrust determined the two countries' attempts and search for alliances in the remaining months of the crisis. It was not until the spring of 1878 that a new rapprochement between the two countries could take place, when the Russians created a '*fait accompli*', and thus both countries were on the brink for war. In Britain, Queen Victoria expected Lord Derby's immediate resignation, and Disraeli was ready to join the Queen in threatening the pro-Russian and pro-peace cabinet members. For the pro-peace politicians, another warning sign was that the parliament was convened for January 17, which meant that the Russian war threat could necessitate immediate action, requiring parliamentary authorization.

The British asked Andrássy to join an anti-Russian memorandum, and on 14-15 January a military conference was held in the Monarchy, where Andrássy received instructions from Franz Joseph to obtain a British war loan. Andrássy – alluding to the possibility of an English alliance – protested to Gorchakov about further Russian expansion, telling that there were other means of asserting Austrian interests. Meanwhile, Bismarck supported the Anglo-Austrian-Hungarian rapprochement, but advised Andrássy that the Monarchy could only undertake war with Russia, if it allowed Britain to advance in the conflict. The attempted rapprochement in January was also followed by the tension of Austro-Hungarian public opinion.

On 17 January, Disraeli told Beust that Britain was ready to support Andrássy, if he wanted to make a "*big pull*", and the fleet was sent to the straits, where it awaited Austria-Hungary's "land response". The British fleet was able to enter, as the British premier cited the Sultan's previous treaties and alluded to the principle of the protection of Christian subjects. Britain was ready by then, but Disraeli would have needed the assistance and the first move of Andrássy to ask House of Commons for the £6 million loan. Both efforts, however, failed. Despite offers of loans and alliances from the Monarchy, members of the British government disagreed: Salisbury supported the naval action while Derby opposed it. Therefore, Andrássy rejected the British offer of a loan and military alliance on 21 January. The Hungarian aristocrat argued that it was only an offer by the cabinet and the premier, but the House of Commons had not yet voted on the Austro-Hungarian loan issue, and therefore saw no security behind the British offer. Disraeli, on the other hand, was only willing to hand over the British fleet and treasury to

Andrássy if a defensive alliance was first concluded. Shortly after, the British premier was willing to take the first step and brought the British fleet within close proximity of the Ottoman capital. Andrássy, on the other hand, was still not willing to concede and go to war, and thought only of deterrent measures. The Russians, however, – fearing the tense situation – entered into negotiations with Great Britain, and thus, the Monarchy was isolated.

Following the January episode of the rapprochement, Andrássy's aim was to propose the idea of a new international conference, and his policy, like Disraeli's, was one of *'war or conference.'* The news of the armistice at Adrianople proved to be true, and the treaty contained serious provisions: Russian patronage over the Balkan nations, an independent Bulgaria without definite borders, independence for the Balkan principalities, and clauses on the straits to the advantage of Russia. Gorchakov, fearing that he would drive Austria into the arms of Great Britain, was prepared to accept Andrássy's and Disraeli's proposal, according to which parts of the treaty should be subject to a conference. Derby and the Russian ambassador Suvalov exaggerated the threat to the Russian chancellor. The highlighted the danger posed by Austria-Hungary: they thought that if Gorchakov could be persuaded of his western neighbour's belligerent intentions, a treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Gallipoli could be concluded. On 16 February, Derby sent a circular to all ambassadors about a conference to be convened of the Great Powers.

In order to avoid a failure of Russian diplomacy, and to prevent the intervention of the great powers in the East, a preliminary peace was concluded between St. Petersburg and the Porte. The Treaty of San Stefano, signed on 3 March by the Russian and Ottoman parties, was detrimental to the interests of both Britain and Austria, as it legitimised the Russian occupation of the Ottoman Empire's territories in Asia Minor, and the creation of a large Slavic state, Bulgaria, stretching from the Danube to the Aegean. With this document, Russia presented the other great powers a *fait accompli*. The option of a conference thus very quickly became the most acceptable scenario for the various governments in Europe. In this set-up, Bismarck wanted to play the role of *'honest broker'* to prevent war between the three emperors. Therefore, Gorchakov's preliminary peace agreement was revised in Berlin. The location of the conference was acceptable to all the countries invited. In March, Austro-Hungarian-British communication mainly focused on the revision of the treaty points. According to Andrássy's position, an agreement with Great Britain was desirable in the event of a conference or congress. Meanwhile, the Russian leadership was annoyed that the British were contemplating a complete revision of the treaty. Having been informed that the Anglo-Austrian-Hungarian negotiations had broken down, the chancellor and the Tsar sent Ignatiev, the father of the peace treaty to

Vienna. The Russian diplomat, however, met with resistance from Andr ssy. Russian diplomacy was then forced to reach an agreement with the British before the Congress was convened.

Disraeli has quickly realised the opportunity to corner the Russians in their newly found diplomatic isolation following the Ignatiev mission. The Salisbury circular from Derby's successor also represented a political shift, as the British message expressed the nation's willingness to fight Russia on all frontiers. The new Foreign Secretary was a believer of active diplomacy, and sought to bring Austria-Hungary onside with Britain, thus abandoning the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as a redline in British foreign policy. Similar to Andr ssy's wishes, the circular also invoked European law and interests, criticising in particular the clauses of the Treaty of San Stefano regarding the matter of the straits, while demanding a revision of all points. However, no agreement was reached with the British, and London eventually waited for the Russians to make a counter-offer. The British cabinet also voted in favour of the Tsar's guarantee to revise Bulgaria's borders, partition its territory and compensate the British in the Mediterranean. As Salisbury had already put certain checks on the Russian alliance plan, efforts were made to involve the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the preparation of the conference.

With Andr ssy isolated from Britain by the treaty, Bismarck foresaw war and the disintegration of the League of Eastern Powers. Consequently, the Chancellor wanted to convince St. Petersburg of Austria-Hungary's *bona fide*. In response to the Russo-British treaty, Andr ssy could send an impactful message to the British only through Bismarck: he was concerned about the Russo-British alliance and Vienna was ready to resume negotiations. Salisbury therefore on 27 May, authorised the ambassador in Vienna to conclude an immediate treaty, which was signed on 6 June by the British and Austro-Hungarian parties. The long-drawn-out document contained the following points: (1.) The contracting parties agreed to define the frontiers of Bulgaria by congress, delimiting them as far as the Morava Valley; (2.) To secure the Sultan's sovereignty and political influence; (3.) The limitation of Russian occupation in six months, and altogether in nine months concerning the withdrawal through Romania. (4.) The Russo-Turkish commission promised in the earlier peace was replaced by a European body. (5.) The British promised to assist in the cession of Bosnia. (6.) The last point was made conditional on an objection to the Russian annexation of Dobrogea.

At the Congress of Berlin, held from 13 June to 13 July 1878, this document was finally used as the basis for cooperation between the two countries in preventing Russian conquest. Disraeli would not have left the political laurels to anyone else, so he travelled to Berlin with Salisbury. The British delegation arrived early and found itself in a particularly good position: a

provisional treaty had already been concluded with the Russians and the Austro-Hungarian trump card was to be used at the right moment.

Disraeli's meeting with Bismarck was significant, as the architect of the League of the Three Emperors was able to talk to the politician, who had strived to torn the alliance apart during the Great Eastern Crisis. The British delegation also had to meet the Austro-Hungarian delegation before the first session of the Congress. The joint Foreign Secretary then pledged Britain's full support for the duration of the Congress and spoke at length about the need for cooperation between the British and Austro-Hungarian governments, while both expressing the hope that they would not be held to account on most of the six points of the June agenda.

In the course of the Congress sessions, despite prior agreements, Britain and Russia increasingly became hostile. The details of their preliminary agreement, were leaked by the British press. Subsequently Andrassy and Salisbury agreed to cooperate more closely: the Monarchy supported Britain in the matter of Bulgaria and the invasion of Cyprus, as the Monarchy became increasingly indebted to Britain, due to their mediation in the Bosnian cession. As to the result of the Austro-Hungarian mediation, instead of a Russian supervision, a European commission took over the administration of southern Bulgaria, also known as Eastern-Rumelia. Adopting Andrassy's concept, the proposal was accepted by all parties concerned. According to Salisbury, Andrassy had the support of all the major powers in his pocket, but was still reluctant to take the issue of Bosnia, for fear of criticism from the public at home. Both Kálmán Tisza the Hungarian premier, and the Hungarian public were in a pro-Turkish and anti-Slavic mood, as they rejected the annexation of an additional Slavic territory to the Monarchy. The situation in Hungary must therefore have made it appear, as if the Turks were asking for the invasion of Bosnia. Salisbury thus proposed to the Congress that the Monarchy should occupy Bosnia. Although the Ottoman delegates challenged the motion, after Bismarck and Disraeli had both spoken of the need for occupation, they were forced to agree to the occupation of Bosnia.

The Treaty of Berlin was signed on 13 July by the great powers and, by modifying the Treaty of San Stefano, the Monarchy achieved the occupation of the Sandzak of Novipazar, additionally to the occupation of Bosnia. On the other hand, Britain, by intervening in continental affairs, curbed Russian expansionism in both the eastern Balkans and in Asia. Expanding its territories in the Mediterranean, due to Andrassy's mediation Britain gained Cyprus in their separate convention with the Ottomans.

Regarding the first research question (*I. What diplomatic relations existed between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Great Britain in the period 1871-1878?*), the results of the

thesis show that there was a neutral, almost allied relationship between the countries, which corresponded well to the logic of the international system outlined in Chapter III, and to the balance of power mechanism. This is what Rainer F. Schmidt, in his book, considered to *be* the *failed alliance*, including Germany in the web of these relations. If we had to use one word to describe the existing relationship, perhaps a more appropriate one would be '*distrustful alliance*'. Nevertheless, in this essay we have tried to show that diplomatic relations and the international space were much more complex than mere documents would suggest regards to the relationship between these two countries. Palmerston's foreign policy principle of 'no permanent allies' was rather opaquely maintained by Britain.

As the plans for alliance of 1877 and the treaty of 6 June show, there were steps towards alliance, but they were all realised only half-hearted. It was due to the actions of Montgelas, and his intervention that the promise of '*joint but independent*' action was included among the seven points on which the subsequent cooperation was based. Although this agreement, like the points of 6 June 1878, was referred to in later correspondence as the basis for cooperation. In reality, its points were not taken into account by the decision-makers at the Berlin Congress. A verbal agreement was reached in the days preceding the meetings at congress, which brought the Great Eastern Crisis and this period of almost seven years of international relations to an end.

The cooperation at the congress was almost as determinate, as the harmony between Austria-Hungary and Germany. Thus, the teleological argument that Hungary necessarily drifted towards the German-Austrian-Hungarian *Dual Alliance* that preceding the First World War – can be refuted. Indeed, cooperation between states was extremely volatile and fluid at the time. It was not exclusively the position of states in the international system and their strategic ideas based on the system's logic that determined cooperation, but the behaviour – the strength of norms, the actions of the various actors and their ideas – that influenced the foreign policy of each state.

During the years covered by the analysis, both states underwent relative changes in foreign and domestic policy. In Britain, the Gladstone government was replaced by the Disraeli conservative premiership. In the Monarchy, the Beust administration was replaced by the Andrassy-led Common Foreign Office. Similarly, in the Monarchy's domestic politics, the Constitutional Party dominated Cisleithanian politics, while in Hungary the Liberal Party emerged. While these two countries acted effectively and jointly against Russia, their relationship was underestimated and understudied, perhaps because of the teleologism of the First World War. What is novel about the choice of topic of this work is that it does not

exclusively explore the diplomatic history of one country. Instead, it aims to identify the factors that helped the two countries to meet at the Berlin Congress.

Leaving the state level, I looked for answers at the level of decision-makers and individuals to the second group of questions: II/a. *What characterised the general foreign policy of the two states (in relation to other European states) and in relation to each other during the period?* and II/b. *What were the independent foreign policy objectives of the states (and sub-state actors) and how did they change?*

In the case of Britain, the country's geopolitical location, free-market capitalism, trade policy and the 'Palmerstonian generation', which explicitly set wealth accumulation as its goal, have influenced its foreign policy for decades. Palmerston, Gladstone and even Derby – the conservative foreign secretary, who came to power after three decades – pursued virtually the same liberal and noninterventionist policy of soft tools (trade concessions, naval fleet, and diplomacy). Disraeli brought about the change in the policy-making ranks, embodying in every respect the ideal of the Victorian outsider, and as much attracted to the East in his foreign policy as in his private letters or political novels.

The strategy and international political objectives of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were also determined by the experience of the mid-19th century. The territorial defeats in the Italian and German quests for unity, Franz Joseph's anti-revolutionary attitude and his chancellor's policy all contributed to pushing the Empire towards the Hungarian compromise. Having Gyula Andrassy sit at Metternich's desk, he did his utmost to keep the Empire together. However, the different foreign policy concepts were not linked to party politics or constitutional practices, but to the person who held the common foreign ministerial position, and who determined the path, according to which the Empire turned to the East. While Beust looked towards the Rhine, and wanted to restore the empire there, Andrassy was forced to turn the attention of the Dual Monarchy towards the Drava and the Danube, and seek compensation. The continuity of these concepts, and the way in which they were to be executed, were reflected the most in the forums of military conferences and joint councils of ministers. These arenas of decision-making also ensured that Andrassy could only implement his own ideas in accordance with the plans of Beust made in 1871. In the following February, he also received the compensation programme and policy of the military party and the Emperor, from which he could not deviate, however much he wished to do so.

We have answered the main question at the heart of the thesis (*III. Which external and internal actors influenced the foreign policy of the two countries?*) by using a methodological novelty to show that the history of diplomacy is no longer a one- or two-dimensional genre, but

that historians must take into account the aspects of *Foreign Policy Analysis* and the clash of multiple theaters. The decision-making of state actors and their chief-negotiators (Disraeli, Derby/Salisbury, Andrassy) were influenced by the heads of state (Victoria, Franz Joseph) and the people who served them in the bureaucracy (Buchanan, Beust, Monson, Layard, Orczy, Zichy, etc.). Lobby and interest groups (such as the military party and ministers of the British cabinet), and the information channels of various agents also influenced the direction of foreign policy between Austria-Hungary and Britain.

The levels of foreign policy analysis have not only helped to reconstruct a piece of international history more accurately, but have also contributed to the depiction of cause and effect relationships, and to the explanation of the interactions between different actors, and to the "validation" of historiographical narratives. One hypothesis of the dissertation is that, instead of a conscious 'mouse-catcher policy', Andrassy often reacted to the events of different levels (imperial policy, Russian intervention, etc.), while keeping the British 'at arm's length' and exploiting the possibility of cooperation with them against Russia at the Congress. Even if one agrees that Andrassy may have had some kind of foreign policy vision, which he tried to put into practice, there were still a number of other factors which influenced this foreign policy activity, and which ultimately led Andrassy's foreign policy to a course in which he was forced to implement forced solutions: i.e. to pursue an ad hoc policy instead of the grand designs. Decades later, his close friends and colleagues, however, presented the image of a genius to the domestic public, and retouched with rather strong brushstrokes those decisions that did not fit the image of the 'Boheme' genius. Although it was easier to follow the past historiographical account with the help of German and Austro-Hungarian archival documents, as well as to rely on Wertheimer's works, whenever the picture of Andrassy remained incomplete in the documents, this dissertation defies this picture. The British documents present the readers of this work with a critical picture of Andrassy, where the count was not always in control of the designs and did not always keep pace with his rivals. This was particularly true of the last two years of his office as Foreign Minister, and especially of the sacrifice-laden Berlin Congress and the occupation of Bosnia.

What can be said about British foreign policy at the time, is that it was far from the picture that *Ballhausplatz* had painted, and it vastly differed from the one, that the historians. Those accounts, which relied on the Viennese archives, adopted the cynical tone of their sources, judged British policy as inept. The relative inertia of British foreign policy was due to the influence of a doctrinaire Palmerstonian concept, that had been in place for decades, and which the country's political establishment as a whole was not prepared to change. The lack of

knowledge of the constitutional situation and the political possibilities that it offered, as revealed by Montgelas' sources, may have contributed to the mistrust. However, while in the case of the British it was clear that they expected more from Andrásy, than he could do without the consent of the monarch, Andrásy's assessment of Disraeli's domestic political position was also just partially right. When Disraeli and his government were held at bay by liberal agitation, the *Ballhausplatz* judged it to be frivolous or lacking in credibility. On the other hand, when Andrásy's promises to the ruler and the military circles prevented him from making overtures, the British also suspected an ulterior motive behind Andrásy's actions.

I think that by depicting the theatres of foreign policy decision-making, it has been possible to show that British foreign policy, far from being conducted within a formal, bureaucratic framework, has shown signs of parochialism. In Derby's and Disraeli's struggle, the overreach of authority is evident, as well as the combined influence of those involved in governance, public opinion and lobbyists on the country's relations. Disraeli, for example, relied on his secretary, Corry to plot against his own ministers, and to pursue a specific independent, personal foreign policy. The key actor in terms of unofficial British foreign policy was Montgelas, who also had his own vision and held a latent ambassadorial post in the embassy, which was in fact headed by Beust.

The result of the Great Eastern Crisis in British domestic politics was that Disraeli took advantage of the wartime atmosphere, and governed almost single-handedly during the worst months of the crisis. He took advantage of Derby's illness, and managed to eliminate the strongest point of opposition - the Foreign Secretary - for a short period of time, and then finally replaced him by March 1878. The cross-party turkophile and russophobic sentiments and ideas essentially laid the foundations of modern party politics in the country. Political tours, speeches to the masses, proved to be an increasingly effective tool, and rural branches of the parties proliferated throughout the country. The political debate that unfolded during the Great Eastern Crisis thus contributed significantly to the emergence of the British democratic economy, even if there were violent scenes at mass rallies of jingoists, and humanitarian demonstrators.

Although there is no direct evidence of a link between the change in trends in Hungarian public opinion and the opinions expressed in the press, the adoption of articles from British conservative newspapers by the Hungarian press was accompanied by a parallel unease in Hungarian public opinion. By adopting the British news coverage of the crisis in the East, the Hungarian newspapers also imported the political narrative of the British publications inspired by the Conservative Party elite. The British elite thus set the agenda for both the pro-government, and the opposition press in Hungary through anti-Russian articles.

Despite the fact that subsidisation was a well-established means of influencing the press in the Dual Monarchy, the Hungarian press organs deviated significantly from the line that was comfortable for decision-makers, and created a serious domestic political crisis. The 'pressure' of Hungarian public opinion (or at least its influence) was directly felt when Andrassy and Tisza voted in favour of preventive war at the military conference of 14-15 January 1878. They used the spectacular expressions of Hungarian public opinion in their arguments to justify the idea of a preventive war against Russia, rather than the invasion of Bosnia. In the end, Franz Joseph and the military circle advised Andrassy to prepare for the peace negotiations, and thus for the subsequent Berlin Congress. In 1878, the Austro-Hungarian leadership and influential military circles had to contend with opposition from the Austrian public, which opposed military action because of the expected costs, and the disapproval of the Hungarian public, which was preparing for a war in the East, but instead got the occupation of Bosnia – the occupation of the territories of the 'brotherly' Turkish people.

The story of the Hungarian count's downfall is an excellent illustration of the pressures of public opinion. In the summer of 1878, the Austrian Liberal newspapers went on the offense. Of the Hungarian papers, *Pester Lloyd* (a German-language paper) and *Pesti Napló*, although formerly approved the Andrassy's Eastern policy, almost in a manner similar to the oppositional *Egyetértés*, joined the chorus of liberal newspapers in criticising him, while the liberal *Neue Freie Presse* and *Neue Wiener Tagblatt*, as well as the Czech *Bohemia*, joined the campaign. On 30 November 1878, Andrassy finally managed to resolve the situation by putting the fate of the Bosnian occupation's budget in the hands of the parliamentary delegations. The representatives then did not dare to take responsibility for the unsupplied army, and its press coverage, and voted in favour of the occupation budget. However, the delegations compromised Andrassy enough that he offered his resignation. The press criticised him incessantly for the half-hearted results of the Eastern policy. At times the news outlets urged the Empire to act as a Great Power, at other times they condemned the aristocrat. In reality, however, Andrassy did not have the confidence of the emperor: Francis Joseph had already adopted the position of the military circles, and Andrassy had become unwanted to the Emperor's circles. In the end, he offered once again his resignation citing his health issues, which was then accepted by Franz Joseph.

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