AFRIKA

Beyond Foreign Aid in Africa –
Is a New Narrative Emerging
Goran Hyden, USA

Creating and Enhancing Capacity in Africa
for Efficient Economic and Social Development
Lawalley Cole, African Union

Securitization and Militarization of the Border
Meressa Tsehaye Gebrewahd, Ethiopia

Social Media Dynamics
as a New Factor in African Politics
Jędrzej Czerep, Poland

Narratives drive politics. Controlling how reality is understood and can be changed gives power and influence over development. For the last four decades African countries have to a large extent lived off the generosity of the international donor community. The cost of doing so has been obvious: the imperative to follow policy prescriptions that have worked elsewhere and for that reason alone have been treated as relevant and helpful also for Africa. This liberal internationalist approach has been centred on the twin principles of free market and democratic governance. It has served as dominant policy narrative with many governments in Africa embracing it as the way forward. It still has its supporters but the interesting thing about Africa today is that cracks are emerging in this intellectual edifice, thus rendering the narrative less compelling and less attractive.

The lack of development in developing countries and the examination of the underlying societal problems that are in close causal relation have been providing fertile ground for research to present an extensive historical background. Economic challenges, the backwardness in growth or modernization, and the disorders of society and democratization are collective research subjects for multiple disciplines. Within this multidisciplinary field, the system of international development and aid is an important branch which has grown into a set of independent research and policy standards.

INTRODUCTION:

AFRICA'S CHANGING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND REALITIES

AFRICAN STUDIES ON THE RISE IN CENTRAL EUROPE
AND THE PÉCS AFRICAN STUDIES CONFERENCE SERIES

ISTVÁN TARRÓSY

UNIVERSITY OF PÉCS

Commemorating the 55th Africa Day (after the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963), the University of Pécs hosted the 5th Pécs African Studies Conference between May 24–26, 2018. Almost 60 scientific papers were presented by scholars representing over 20 countries of the globe. The co-organizers of the event, the Africa Research Centre and the Centre for International Relations embedded the conference into the annual International Spring run by the university, in particular, its closing Africa Week, which was designed with the aim to make citizens become more familiar with African history, cultural heritage, contemporary trends and developments across the continent. The University of Pécs hosts a growing number of students from 18 African countries, and as part of its Internationalization Strategic Programme, the institution pays focussed attention to African partnerships and the recruitment of talented young Africans. At present, it has bilateral cooperation agreements (also within the Erasmus+ International Credit Mobility scheme of the European Union) with universities in Ethiopia, South Africa, Morocco, Botswana and Kenya. The Africa Research Centre furthermore fosters collaboration with universities in Tanzania, Rwanda and The Gambia. The Centre hosts the biannual international conference of the country, as well as publishes the Hungarian Journal of African Studies (in Hungarian: Afrika Tanulmányok). In addition, it has been running ongoing field research projects mainly in the member states of the East African Community (EAC) and Ethiopia.

The fifth conference had 15 panels under the title "Africa's Changing International Relations and Realities". The Africa Research Centre invited many of its partners to act as co-hosts, thus, the Metropolitan State University of Denver (USA), the Polish African Studies Centre at the University of Wroclaw, together with the Jagellonian

Research Centre for African Studies in Cracow (PL), the Centre of African Studies at the University of West Bohemia (CZ) and the Center for West African Studies of UESTC, Chengdu (PRC) joining forces all contributed to the interdisciplinary conference.

The keynote address was delivered by Lawalley Cole – a Gambian scholar having worked decades in many African and international organizations, currently based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia at the African Union Commission Headquarters –, who gave an overview of the much-needed capacities of African countries for efficient economic and social development.

In close collaboration with the Department of African Affairs of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the conference accommodated a first-time-ever symposium of the Visegrad Four countries with two round-tables centred around the Africa Policies as well as African Studies education and research activities of the four Central and Eastern European countries. Heads of department and other diplomats of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia all presented their countries' engagements across the African continent in detail. In the academic field all university representatives confirmed that for some years there has been a rise both in terms of collaborative efforts within the region, and as far as research and education projects are concerned. Contemporary researchers, first of all, can relate back to the first Africanists of these countries of the 19th and 20th centuries, but most importantly, can become active participants of the vibrant global community of African Studies with their niche research projects and results.

When the Pécs African Studies conference series was initiated in 2010 as part of the European Capital of Culture year of the City of Pécs (the first Hungarian city with this prestigious title), a memorial lecture was also launched paying tribute to Géza Füssi Nagy (1946–2008), a Bantu philologist, author of the first Hungarian–Swahili grammar book and dictionary, who truly was one of the decisive figures of the revival of Hungarian African Studies in the second half of the 20th century. In 2018, one of his former students, a leading Anthropologist today, Tamás Régi delivered a lecture entitled "The Problem of Symbols: Language and Tradition in Africa".

The two-day conference also embraced several cultural programmes, including a Senegalese African drum and dance show and an African music night. Undoubtedly, the event has become one of the leading scientific events of African Studies in Central and Eastern Europe. With the publication of this English-language Special Issue of the Hungarian Journal of African Studies a selection of the conference papers will also be important for further academic developments and collaborations – thanks to the generous support of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the rotating Presidency of the Visegrad Four Countries.

As a direct continuation of the 2016 international conference, which addressed the central topic: *"Emerging Africa – Old Friends, New Partnerships and Perspectives for the 21st Century",* analyzing the role and opportunities of Africa from the perspective of old colonial relations and emerging economies in our transnational global world, which is becoming increasingly multipolar in the course of the 21st

century, the 5th event in 2018 focused on discussing Africa's potential place and role in international politics and the interconnected global economy, as much as how the enhanced dynamics of external actor engagements affect daily realities across the continent. It offered the ground to present both macro and micro perspectives and to analyze the various interactions among different entities and stakeholders. One of the key questions put forward was: how a confident 'African agency' can determine the most desirable path of development for Africans and what types of partnership African peoples want for their own future.

After a successful national conference on African studies in 2007, and the first international event in the year of 2010 when Pécs was a European Capital of Culture, the Africa Research Centre is committed to hold a bi-annual conference for Hungarian and international scholars with the aim to foster regional co-operation in the field of African research, together with gradually integrating into the global community of Africa research.

Many hail that Africa has been "on the rise" in a number of different ways, as the continent and many of its states have a growing weight in the transnational global politico-economic arena of today. According to recent surveys, up until 2030 the African continent will keep a strong annual growth rate of around 5–7%, parallel to which, it will continue stabilizing its political frameworks and processes, therefore, will be able to transmit a new "image", which is inevitable for any long-term investment and development at large. Many others, including Ian Taylor – one of the invited speakers of the Pécs African Studies conferences, too – draw our attention to the numerous critical dimensions of the "Africa rising" mantra.

There is undoubtedly a new wave of dynamism coming from the emerging economies of the semi-peripheries of the international system. In the academic community there has been a recent debate not only about the re-emergence of actors of the Global South – for instance, China, India, Brazil, or Turkey and South Korea –, but also about the return of the political economy of the 1970's. Taylor's *Africa Rising? BRICS – Diversifying Dependency* book from 2014 is a firm scholarly piece to raise awareness not about the new forms of dependency, but rather the extended group of entities that – as external forces – create more dependent linkages for African actors. One of the most important questions starts ticking in our head: has any of the obvious political developments, improvements in governance and high economic growth documented with massive GDP figures resulted in 'real' local development for societies at large? Also, have these emerging powers, especially the BRICS countries, presented an alternative (model) – not only as opposed to the U.S.-dominated neoliberal Washington Consensus, but also amongst themselves, compared with one another – to Africa?

Among the most intriguing issues of current narratives and debates we find the changing African cities, which have a substantial influence on the changing social and physical environment, as well as the transforming dichotomy between urban and rural areas, traditions and human relations; the growing middle class across the continent, which will have the strength to support and/or drive fundamental changes

in their societies in the long run; or the new type of competition among actors with historic ties with Africans, and other, sometimes more dynamic and pragmatic entities of the semi-peripheries of the Global South, such as the members of BRICS.

In light of all these it is time to further discuss the relations of African states with global key actors, the development of regional organisations, the future of the African Union, etc. We need to look into different African states and the challenges they need to understand and meet.

This Special Issue of the Hungarian Journal of African Studies (Afrika Tanulmányok) collects a number of interesting papers, which may help us understand the "changing relations and realities" better. Renowned Africanists publish together with young investigators from 8 countries, including the USA, Ethiopia, The Gambia, South Africa, Turkey, Russia, Poland and Hungary. Their contributions deal with development policies, the changing narrative of foreign aid, creating capacities for efficient economic and social development, the role of education, together with the potential of female political representation in African progress (via the cases of East African states), as well as a number of case studies ranging from securitization issues in the post-1998 Ethiopian–Eritrean bilateral context, currency devaluations, the role of youth in South African politics, the issue of sovereignty in the French– Sub-Saharan bilateral relations' context, Turkey–South Africa trade relations to the political influence of the Lebanese diaspora in West Africa, the anti-genocide movement in the USA, and social media dynamics as a new political factor in Africa, to language-policy paradigms. A wide array of important topics and fine research, which hopefully will add to more discussions, and even more so, better solutions to African questions.

We will definitely continue contributing to nuanced academic exchanges: the 6th Pécs African Studies Conference will host scholars from all over our regions and beyond in May 2020! See you in Pécs!

BEYOND FOREIGN AID IN AFRICA:
IS A NEW NARRATIVE EMERGING?

GORAN HYDEN

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Introduction

Narratives drive politics. Controlling how reality is understood and can be changed gives power and influence over development. For the last four decades African countries have to a large extent lived off the generosity of the international donor community. The cost of doing so has been obvious: the imperative to follow policy prescriptions that have worked elsewhere and for that reason alone have been treated as relevant and helpful also for Africa. This liberal internationalist approach has been centred on the twin principles of free market and democratic governance. It has served as dominant policy narrative with many governments in Africa embracing it as the way forward. It still has its supporters but the interesting thing about Africa today is that cracks are emerging in this intellectual edifice, thus rendering the narrative less compelling and less attractive. Two factors have been instrumental in causing this apparent change. One is the decline in the role of foreign aid in these countries – especially government-to-government official development assistance (ODA). Foreign aid is still flowing to Africa, but it has changed character and opened the door for new thinking. The second factor is the growing presence in Africa of new actors – new donors that do not insist on policy conditionalities but also many private actors, both investors and charities. The result is that African governments are reconsidering their past development strategies while in search of a fresh move forward. It can be argued that for the first time since the early years of independence, African countries are discovering themselves – what it means to stand on their own legs and taking pride in what they achieve. As part of this self-actualization, the dominant narrative is changing from being "a nation among nations" guided by globally valid norms adopted through such instruments as the United Nations to being "a nation standing alone" driven by a patriotic sense of pride. This paper will trace this change in narrative on the African continent and analyse its implications for its governance and development.

Balance of power shifts in the aid relationship

In the early years of independence, Africans and others shared in the euphoria of independence. There was little scope for a critical perspective. Instead, the general assumption was that now that these countries had gained their independence, they

would control their own way forward. Radical notions of creating a "new personality" and locating development in ideas generated by the Pan-Africanist movement emerged all over the continent. Few of them became reality but in some places like Tanzania they were translated into a socialist ideology emphasizing the need to base national development on a communal philosophy such as *ujamaa*. The interesting thing about the relations with the donors at that time is that they largely accepted the notion of local ownership of development in African countries.

Since those early days, the principles of international development cooperation have evolved through a period of donor control in the last two decades of the 20th century to one of partnership where the ambition has been to balance the concerns and interests of partner countries with the objective of donors to achieve an effective outcome of their aid. Partnership has enhanced the influence of African partner governments in decisions concerning the nature and use of foreign aid in their respective countries. For example, one significant change under the partnership umbrella has been the use of budget support, an instrument that gives partner governments much greater leverage in directing external aid for purpose of meeting national priorities. The partnership principle has stabilized the aid relationship in the last couple of decades, but because it is political rather than legal, its practical application is not without its own controversies (Edgren, 2003). This has become evident especially after the High-Level Meeting in Busan, 2011, where decisions seemed to favour a stronger emphasis on national or local ownership. The question, therefore, is whether African countries are ready for a new phase in which their own initiatives and resources inevitably play a greater role in determining national development. Can they create a new narrative to drive national development beyond foreign aid?

To fully appreciate the dynamics of the aid relationship and where African countries may be heading it is worth examining it a little closer beginning with a sketch of how it has changed over time since the 1960s.

Ownership	Donorship	Partnership	Beyond foreign aid?
1960-70s	1980-90s	2000-10s	2020-

Figure 1. The dynamics of the partnership relations since 1960.

As suggested above, the relationship to date can be divided into three periods. Each has had its dominant theme but has also harboured the seeds of its own demise; hence its dynamic nature. These seeds grow largely from the experience accumulated in each phase.

1960-70s: ownership

In the first two decades, the premise for giving foreign aid was that recipient countries had their basic framework of governance and public institutions in place. The institutional legacy left behind by the colonial powers was deemed appropriate enough to serve the needs of the newly independent states. The role of foreign aid, therefore, was primarily to fill gaps in human and financial resources to enhance the capacity and efficiency of government institutions. For example, expatriates were hired to work as planners and advisors as well as in executive positions such as engineers and doctors to overcome insufficient manpower resources in the partner country. Large numbers of young people were sent for training to acquire managerial and professional skills. In Africa, these efforts were boosted by the euphoria and optimism about the future brought by political independence – a sentiment that was shared not only by locals but also by governments and people elsewhere. Charismatic leaders committed to nation-building and development helped confirm the legitimacy of country ownership. Donors adopted a low profile and without a fixed and finite global agenda of their own, their support was given in response to country-specific five-year plans which, even if they were produced by expatriate consultants, were treated as marks of country ownership. From a partner perspective, these were the "golden years" of ownership. Donors literally had to beg for influence. The 1969 Pearson Commission which made the first official assessment of the partnership relation summarized the situation in the following words:

> The formation and execution of development policies must ultimately be the responsibility of the recipient alone, but the donors have a right to be heard and be informed of major events and decisions (127-28).

In a nutshell, the big difference between then and now is that in the first period donors were expected to support recipients viewed as pursuing the "right" policies while today, recipients are being asked to adopt

The institutional legacy left behind by the colonial powers was deemed appropriate enough to serve the needs of the newly independent states. The role of foreign aid, therefore, was primarily to fill gaps in human and financial resources to enhance the capacity and efficiency of government institutions.

the "right" policies produced by the donors. It is no coincidence that, for example, Tanzania emerged during this period as a donor favourite because it seemed to have in place those "right" factors that would ensure not only aid but also development effectiveness.

The expectations placed on recipient countries, however, proved to be too high. Ownership gradually fell from its high pedestal due to the presence of bureaucratic red-tape, corruption, and other forms of professional ineptitude. Even the "right" policies came into question as the case was with Tanzania's *ujamaa* (e.g., McGillivray et al., 2016). The donor response was to increase their control through such measures as project management structures outside the official government framework. Towards the end of the first phase, the arrow pointed with growing emphasis in the direction of greater donor influence and control.

1980-90s: donorship

The lead publication in this period was the 1981 World Bank report on 'Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa'. It set the tone for the launch of a multitude of *ex ante* conditionalities, first in the form of economic conditions attached to Structural Adjustment, later political conditions attached to a new global "Good Governance" agenda. To the extent that ownership existed at all in the development policy discourse at the time, it was on explicit terms set by the donors. The inequality in the relationship was there for everyone to watch. Among developing country partners, the response was often to play along with the rhetoric of the new reform agenda but stall when it came to implementation. The result was that fundamental reforms of public administration and public enterprises, including the banking system, proved to be largely cosmetic (Jerve, 2002).

As the experience of donorship increasingly turned sour, the idea of a more equal balance in the relationship began to emerge (Nelson, 1996; Maxwell and Riddell, 1998). The first steps were taken already in the 1990s with the introduction of the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), followed later by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The idea behind these initiatives was to help partners negotiate with donors within a comprehensive policy framework to facilitate the alignment of foreign aid with national priorities. There was also an academic critique of the notion that aid effectiveness – and above all, development in partner countries – would benefit from the application of strict conditions for the disbursement of foreign aid money (e.g., Mkandawire and Olukushi, 1995). Similarly, there was scepticism raised about the extent to which donors would learn fast enough to meaningfully support democratization based on their own good governance agenda (e.g., Carothers, 1999). In short, the balance was tilting in favour of a more equal partnership.

2000-10s: partnership

Fomenting such a relationship has been the primary objective of the third period. It was achieved through a series of international conferences beginning in Monterey,

Mexico in 2002, a meeting devoted to recasting development financing in ways that would foster greater partnership equality. The official declaration of the new aid architecture came at the Second High-Level Forum in Paris in 2005. The Paris Declaration made ownership one of five principles identified as fundamental to making aid more effective. Two follow-up High-Level Forums have been held to assess the progress of implementing the Paris Declaration. At the first of these – in Accra 2008 – a monitoring survey showed that progress had been made – but not enough (OECD, 2008). With specific regard to country ownership it was noted that the following measures were needed: (1) broaden country level policy dialogue on development, (2) strengthen partner capacity to lead and manage development, and (3) strengthen and use country systems to the maximum extent possible. A similar progress report was submitted at the next follow-up meeting in Busan, South Korea, 2011 (OECD, 2011). The Busan Partnership statement again noted the progress made but in attempting to democratize the concept, also expanded it to include non-governmental actors. The most recent follow-up is the 2016 Progress Report (OECD, 2016), which draws on data collected from a record number of low- and middle-income countries, development partners, and a massive number of other actors engaged in development cooperation, and points out that some progress has been made in realizing the Paris Principles, but it has been mixed (OECD, 2016). With specific reference to ownership, the Report points out that there has been little advancement in strengthening and using country systems for public finance management and procurement. A narrow definition of how to pursue results management is part of the reason. Balancing this orientation with the ownership principle has proved to be a hard nut to crack (Nunnenkamp et al., 2016). Somewhat paradoxically according to the OECD report, the most positive news about the promotion of country ownership come from fragile and conflict-affected states as well as small island states where uses of country systems for financial management had advanced most.

Beyond foreign aid: challenges and opportunities
The inclusiveness agenda that has gained prominence with the adoption in 2015 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has broadened the notion of how to assess ownership since it calls on governments to demonstrate how far they involve civil society and other private actors in the policy process. It is difficult to assess how sincere and meaningful government response is on the ground in partner countries but the call for inclusive participation has had the effect of turning ownership into a political matter, not just another tool to implement the Paris Declaration. This democratization of the ownership concept has made it more complex to measure but it has also helped giving partner countries a boost in their relations with the donors. It also strengthens public demands for a development strategy that builds on local resources and skills.

Although some stakeholders have expressed fears that the ownership concept is losing its significance in the implementation of the Busan Partnership (e.g., UK Aid Network, 2013), this paper argues the opposite. Over the next years, ownership

is likely to emerge as a key principle opening the way for countries to choose their own development models and paths – regardless of how they relate to the "right" policies of the donors. There are many factors that point in this direction. Low- and middle-income countries now have more diverse economies in which foreign aid plays a less significant role than in the past. With direct foreign investments coming overwhelmingly from Asia (notably China, South Korea, and Malaysia) and the Middle East (Kuwait, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates), these countries are diversifying their partnership relations. Within the international donor community, they have a growing influence, for instance, in the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. Furthermore, there is a realization in these circles that reform initiatives rarely succeed unless propelled by national or local actors (Andrews, 2013) and that an emphasis on results-based management is not enough to ensure greater aid effectiveness (Shutt, 2016). These insights have crystallized into a call for "Working with the Grain" (Levy, 2013), i.e., changing institutions from within rather than through imported models. And an evidence-based discussion in the 2017 World Development Report (World Bank, 2017) suggests that if something works and enjoys legitimacy at national or local level, leave it. The new motto, therefore, seems to be: function is more important than form! Against the background of this changing scenario, the rest of this paper will be devoted to discussing the challenges and opportunities that African countries face in an era beyond foreign aid and how these may shape a new African development narrative.

Challenges

The list of challenges is long and can be divided into two categories: substantive and instrumental. The former ranges from climate change to gender equality with many others in-between. These are formidable, but the most critical challenges are still the latter. How well equipped are African countries in taking on these substantive policy challenges? This is the focus here.

The first challenge is that policies are rarely realistic. This is an issue not only in Africa but wherever the promise of a better life prevails, yet it is particularly pronounced there. People's expectations are high that governments deliver on their promises. Politicians realize the need to respond to these expectations in order to stay in power. The international community has added its own pressure by issuing timelines for achieving such complex objectives as "education for all" or "health for all". Little attention has been paid to how such policies can be sustained. Ministerial budgets are insufficient and there is far too much emphasis laid on reaching quantitative targets such as how

> **The first challenge is that policies are rarely realistic. This is an issue not only in Africa but wherever the promise of a better life prevails, yet it is particularly pronounced there.**

many children are enrolled in primary school education, how many girls graduate from secondary school or how many new school buildings have been completed. This rush to meet unrealistic policy targets has had the effect of reducing the quality of education and health care. Pupils drop out because they realize the limited value of schooling compared to other options. Those who finish school find that they lack the qualifications – in some cases even basic ones – needed for employment. The result has been that a rapidly increasing number of school leavers end up in a frustrating self-employment cycle which is hard to break out of. Even more important is the collective sense of failure that afflicts a country where the potential of the young generation continues to be unrealized. As a nation among nations it is compared to others on a series of indicators that are meant to monitor progress towards democracy and human welfare. Despite faring well on these indicators and an accompanying rhetoric of "Africa rising" in international development circles, the reality of more – not fewer – Africans remains grim.

A second challenge is the limited role of cost-benefit and feasibility criteria in public policy-making. This is not because African governments lack technical and economic expertise but because political leaders generally overrule such criteria in favour of discretionary political considerations. Power trumps rationality. For example, it is not uncommon that personal or party preferences determine allocation of scarce resources without consideration of how it affects the realization of public policy objectives. To be sure, this phenomenon is not an exclusively African challenge, but it tends to be especially pronounced in these countries because demonstrating personal power in public office is an integral part of governance. It is no surprise in this kind of situation policy implementation also suffers. Technical considerations tend to be set aside and bureaucratic rules that typically would apply to a well-functioning public service are bent to serve special interests and thus the production of "club" or community rather than public goods. In short, the government machinery tends to underperform leaving behind an image of government as incompetent or not caring enough.

Yet another challenge is the tendency in so many African countries of marginalizing non-state actors. They may participate in policy consultations but their presence at the table rarely translates into a direct influence on the objectives and content of policy. The relatively open approach to civil society that prevailed in the early years of democratization has since become more confined and in some countries outright oppressive. For example, some have used a State of Emergency law which is justified in the interest of national security but has as its most immediate consequence a slapping down on free speech and association. In other countries, the measures have been more abstruse, yet with the same outcome. In Tanzania the Government has selectively arrested representatives of the political opposition sending a clear message to civil society that it does not overstep its role as "non-political" associations. Civil society organizations that engage in defending and promoting human rights

are among the most likely targets of state oppression. In Burundi recently, a human rights activist, Germain Rukuki, was imprisoned for 32 years charged with having threatened state security by leading an investigation into violence that erupted in conjunction with the country's president, Nkurunziza, seeking a third term as head of state. A Nigerian observer, Abiodun Owolegbon-Raji (2018) summarizes the situation in the following words:

> *As with many other aspects of political and economic life on the continent, there is a complexity to African civil society and grassroots activism that escapes the international eye. Civic engagement in Africa has much in common with the West, although there is ultimately one key difference that works to Africa's detriment. Civil society groups in most Western countries can articulate their views in an environment of respect for the physical safety of individuals, tolerance of opposing viewpoints and identities, and commitments to transparency. Their counterparts in the even the freest of African countries cannot say the same.*

Opportunities

If the challenges of African countries with a much lesser role for foreign aid tend to lie in the way their political systems are working, the emerging opportunities seem situated in the way that African society is changing. Governance analysis to date has emphasized institutional reforms, initiated and implemented as donor-funded projects or programs. These have largely ignored attention to underlying structural conditions in these countries. As suggested above, however, there is a growing realization even among the donors that institutional reforms lead nowhere if they fail to include a cultural and behavioural change in society. Unlike institutional changes that are treated as possible to accomplish in a short time span, the cultural and behavioural changes that are increasingly being contemplated are slow-moving variables. They take time to mature and need to be driven from the inside – by local "champions" who possess legitimacy as public figures. Even with local champions taking the lead, however, the process may take more than a generation to complete.

The opportunities that will set the parameters for African development in a period of declining foreign aid are already emerging and will crystallize into more permanent structures as the process of social change continues. For African governments, it is necessary to latch on to these opportunities and turn them into positive outcomes. The most important such opportunities that governments must seize are discussed below.

The first is *urbanization*. As suggested above, African countries are exposed to continuous social change but governments are not really in control of the process. Change rather than development characterizes what happens in these countries. Nowhere is this more evident than in Africa's rapidly growing cities. Planning is impossible without substantial loss of capital in the form of houses and other struc-

tures that must be demolished because they stand in the way of an officially approved plan. Correcting this type of spontaneous social change to give room for a more rational solution to urban development is costly yet it must be carried out to pave the way for a modern and workable city environment. This is already taking place in many of Africa's megacities where, for instance, rapid transport systems are being built to ease traffic congestions caused by too few or too narrow streets to cope with increased demands by motorists of all kinds. Dar es Salaam has its *Mwendo Kasi*, a system of special lanes for rapid bus transport. Addis Ababa has a similar system, though rail-based, which allows passengers to move in spacious tram cars. These are just the beginning and other cities are introducing their own improvements by adopting modern road and bridge design. For example, the construction of flyovers at key junctions has become an increasingly popular solution to traffic gridlocks.

The opportunities that will set the parameters for African development in a period of declining foreign aid are already emerging and will crystallize into more permanent structures as the process of social change continues. For African governments, it is necessary to latch on to these opportunities and turn them into positive outcomes.

The second opportunity is *the rise of an indigenous professional and commercial middle class.* African countries have since independence relied on a bureaucratic elite that has lacked the ability to drive development because it has been subjected to a form of political rule that has failed to tap its talents. As a result, bureaucrats in Africa have remained an unproductive group in society. The emergence of an elite outside the state with its own vision of the future and a demand of government to serve its interests, African countries are only now beginning to have the social forces to create and drive a national form of development. To be sure, many African economies still rely on foreign companies for capital but with a growing number of local business leaders, their integration into economy and society is a much greater prospect than if they are obliged to work with and through the administrative elite alone. The latter tend to hold a wait-and-see, if not an outright suspicious view of foreign investors while the commercial and professional elite sees them as partners and is willing to engage in a productive give-and-take approach to development. Holding back the growth of the private sector and by extension the rise of this commercial and professional elite outside the state amounts to missing an opportunity for countries to move ahead on their own with declining – and perhaps eventually no foreign aid.

A third opportunity is *youth mobilization*. Like the commercial and professional elite, youths in Africa are increasingly based in the cities. They constitute perhaps the most untapped potential for the future but because of their numbers and lower social and economic position in society, they constitute a complex collective action problem. Situated in the informal sector, young entrepreneurs are more often competitors than collaborators. Although there are examples of youth succeeding in creating companies or cooperatives of their own, the challenge is of such proportion that turning it into an opportunity requires a mobilizational approach. Some countries like Tanzania have created a national youth service in which recruits learn skills that allow them to become employable or ready to start their own business. Others have introduced similar types of youth brigades ensuring that young men and women after graduation from high school can learn productive trades. Many business enterprises participate in these schemes or have their own youth training programmes that help tap the talents of the youth. The same is also the case with many charities that focus on training youth as part of their contribution to national development in African countries. Sustaining and expanding these ventures is necessary in a context where external aid is playing a much less prominent role and the market rather than the government is likely to produce and allocate resources.

The fourth opportunity is *continued democratization*. Efforts to democratize Africa in recent decades have been largely misguided because they have treated the process in terms of projects that need to be monitored and evaluated by outsiders. This has led to an unrealistic rush to institutionalize democratic forms of governance. No country in the world has ever become democratic through such pressure to perform. As suggested above, a true institutional change takes time because it relies on changes in human behaviour and cultural outlooks. It cannot be accelerated through a sole focus on changes in organization and management or constitutional reform. Democratization takes time and it has its ups and downs or advances and backslides. The latter may be a concern in the short run but are often exaggerated as they are not a perennial phenomenon but one that contains their own lessons for moving forward. As it turns out in global perspective, African countries have fared reasonably well although there have been few eye-catching leaps forward. The point, however, is that expectations of what can be accomplished have generally been excessive both among African and foreign observers. Democratization creates its own winners and losers. As such it is a political and contested process, the outcome of which must be settled by stakeholders in these countries. This is how democracy has come about in other regions of the world and there is reason to give African countries the same opportunity to move ahead, learning as it takes two steps forward and often one backward. There is also reason to consider an approach to democratization that does not strive to introduce all aspects of it at one and the same time. European countries, for example, did not become democratic in every respect at one single point in their history. Democracy evolved one aspect at a time. In Sweden, transparency and accountability in public life preceded electoral democracy. Neighbouring countries

followed a similar path. The history of democracy, in other words, demonstrates that the institutionalization of democratic norms tends to become much more solid if the demand for it follows an organic process. As opinion surveys like the Afrobarometer have shown: Africans do indeed want more democracy but their own perception of what it means differs from the indicators that Western democracy experts and analysts have in mind (Bratton, 2010). Through its dominant discourse over the years, Western donors have kept African countries on too short a leash leaving them little scope for trial and error. With donors retreating, the opportunity will no doubt grow for African governments to take the governance issue into their own hands.

A new narrative?
As part of this process of finding their own way, African countries are also likely to recognize that they need to develop a new narrative, one that better represents the status of standing alone. To date, Africa's development challenges have been largely viewed through a nationalist lens. These countries have engaged in nation-building and as members of the international community expectations have been that they adhere to norms and values of a liberal international order. The story of Western foreign aid centres on strengthening these norms and values so that they do to end up in chaos. During the foreign aid regime, there was no alternative except possibly excommunication. African governments were not always in agreement with what they were told to do, but the situation in which they found themselves meant that their acts were reactive. By being treated as cases of charity, their response was often generated out of a sense of inferiority. Political leaders felt that their countries were not given enough respect. They adopted a nationalist approach indicative of the protection of national sovereignty. There is evidence that this tendency to have to "strike from below" is beginning to give way to a fresh approach that is both proactive and imbued with a growing measure of self-confidence rarely seen before. This points to the development of a new narrative that emphasizes patriotism rather than just nationalism, a pride drawn from positive achievements by the countries on their own.

This narrative has been evolving gradually since the early years of this century. It may be hard to identify its precise origin, but one important marker was Thabo Mbeki's speech at the United Nations University in April 1998 on the African Renaissance and especially its follow-up – the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and the accompanying reinvention of African unity in the form of the African Union in 2002. Notable steps more recently include the reformation of the legal regime to enable African countries to earn a larger share of the exploitation of their natural and mineral resources, Tanzania being a case in point. Another involves setting policy priorities that truly reflects strategic visions for the next couple of decades. Yet others centre on the nature of development agenda for these countries. As Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta, told Western government representatives in April 2018 in a dialogue over the nature of political regime in African countries: "We do not want to follow your agenda; we have our own!" In

Ghana, the newly re-elected President, Akuffo Addo, has labelled his development strategy "Beyond foreign aid".

Conclusions

With Western foreign aid playing a less important role in Africa and other actors are making their presence felt, the conditions for development in these countries are changing. The new patterns that emerge are not uniform but can be summarized in a number of challenges and opportunities that African governments and other local stakeholders must consider. In this new context where African governments increasingly demonstrate a readiness to stand on their own feet, a fresh narrative is also emerging. Unlike past narratives it has a distinct patriotic tone and content. There is pride of what Africans can do on their own. This patriotic narrative reflects trends in other regions of the world where politics is becoming increasingly patriotic. The underlying discourse suggests that it is not so much the liberal international order that matters as it is a pragmatic and practical approach to accelerating development through more decisive local initiatives. What is important to African leaders today is that things work, not the form it takes. This obviously leaves the door open to greater diversity in terms of how African governments approach development which includes incorporating lessons from the "developmental state" experience in East Asia. ✳

Bibliography

- Andrews, M. (2013). *The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Bratton, M. (2010). The Meanings of Democracy: Anchoring the D-Word in Africa. *Journal of Democracy* **21 (4)**, 106-13.
- Carothers, T. (1999). *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*. The Brookings Institution, Washington DC.
- Carothers, T. (2015). *The Deeper Struggle over Country Ownership, A Governance Practitioner's Notebook: Alternative Ideas and Approaches*. OECD, Paris.
- Collaborative African Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI). 2014. *Towards a Greater Use of Country Systems in Africa: Recent Trends and Approaches. Synthesis*. CABRI, Pretoria.
- Jerve, A. M. (2002). *Ownership and Partnership: Does the new rhetoric solve the incentive problems of aid?* Chr. Michelsen Institute.
- Levy, B. (2013). *Working with the Grain: Integrating Governance and Growth*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- Maxwell, S. and Riddell, R. (1998). Conditionality or Contract? Perspectives on Partnership for Development. *Journal of International Development* **10 (2)**, 257-68.
- McGillivray, M. et al. (2016). *Swedish Development Cooperation with Tanzania: Has It Helped the Poor?* EBA Report 2016: 10.
- Mkandawire, T. and Olukushi, A. (1995). *Between Liberation and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa*. CODESRIA Press, Dakar.
- Nelson, J. (1996). Promoting Policy Reform: The Twilight of Conditionality? *World Development* **24 (9)**, 1551-59.

- Nunnenkamp, P., Sotirova, A. and Thiele, R. (2016). Do Aid Donors Specialize and Coordinate within Recipient Countries? The Case of Malawi. *Development Policy Review* **34 (6),** 831-49.
- OECD. (2008). *2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration: Effective Aid by 2010? What Will It Take.* OECD, Paris.
- OECD. (2011). *2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration.* OECD, Paris.
- OECD. (2016). *Making 'Development Cooperation More Effective', 2016 Progress Report.* OECD, Paris.
- Owolegbon-Raji, A. (2018). Across Africa: Political activism comes with a hefty price tag. *Fair Observer* 25 May.
- Pearson, L.B. et al. (1969). *Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development.* Praeger, New York.
- Shutt, C. (2016). *Towards an Alternative Development Paradigm?* EBA Paper 07.
- The World Bank. (1981). *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.* The World Bank, Washington DC.
- The World Bank. (2017). *Governance and the Law, 2017 World Development Report.* The World Bank, Washington DC.
- U.K. Aid Network. (2013). *Country ownership: the only way forward for development cooperation.* U.K. Aid Network, London.

DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN AFRICA

DÁNIEL SOLYMÁRI

THE HUNGARIAN CHARITY SERVICE OF THE ORDER OF MALTA

The lack of development in developing countries and the examination of the underlying societal problems that are in close causal relation have been providing fertile ground for research to present an extensive historical background. Economic challenges, the backwardness in growth or modernization, and the disorders of society and democratization are collective research subjects for multiple disciplines. Within this multidisciplinary field, the system of international development and aid is an important branch which has grown into a set of independent research and policy standards. Among the classical sectors, it is considered relatively new, barely seventy years of age; however, it has developed with remarkable speed: it has been viewed as the only true path of closing up as well as the misleading track of the crossroads of irreconcilable interests. This paper, somewhat unconventionally, considers the principle resultants that define the character of the system and the manner of operation, and raises critical questions as well. It aims to explain the historical and human context that shaped development policy and could serve as key background elements for the sometimes seemingly irresolvable contradictions that affect even these days.

Introduction

Just as the Middle East is synonymous with an unending war or crisis in the eyes of the public and, in general, for the majority of the developed world's population, so is Africa, or primarily its sub-Saharan region, associated with poverty and privation. This unilateral and extremely simplified picture of Africa suggests perhaps one additional comment: the well-known fact of the steady stream of aid and assistance; the support of the "hungry and thirsty Africans" and the adopted poor orphan children is often the only synonym associated with the ancient source of our humanity. And it is indeed true: it is nearly impossible to estimate the amount of individual, corporate, ecclesiastical or state dollars, euro, yuan, pounds, dirham or yen – mentioning only the largest donors – which have found new owners in the form of aid in Africa. While the positive changes they made are indisputable, their effectiveness and extent and the proportionate measure of disbursements are strongly questionable. Lay donors committed to helping individual countries and development professionals too are more and more frequently asking the question that may not be politically correct but is all the more adequate: "Where is the flaw in the system?"

The current study, distancing itself from the present, concisely introduces the span that the system of international development has encompassed during the past half century. My aim is to highlight its determined fate, resulting from its inception, which hinders the realization of good will, field-level implementation – and the deeper understanding of the difficulties of others and their differing life situations.

In the labyrinth of perceptions

"Bottomless sack", "a drop in the ocean", "wasted money", "endless process" – just a few individual opinions that passers-by in Budapest told the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta during its informative but poorly comprehensive street campaign[1]; this is how they responded to the question inquiring about their opinion on providing continuous aid to distant "poor" countries. It is no coincidence that the organization posed this question, as the year 2015 was designated the European Year for Development, which had among its main goals to focus on this subject area, to showcase the achievements accomplished by the EU, and to sensitize the increasingly skeptical general public. Furthermore, the European Union's campaign goal was nothing less than to make 2015 the boundary of an era in the history of development. In the background of this ambitious statement was in fact the intent to close an era, as this was "the year when the appointed deadline of the accomplishment of the future millennium development goals accepted by the countries of the world expired and when the international community had to develop a global framework for their future efforts concerning the elimination of poverty and the promotion of sustainable development goals." (European Year for Development, 2015) We will later examine to what extent were these goals fulfilled and what such definitions as 'specified deadline' really mean. The message of the proprietors of the idea of the designated year also included encouraging more and more citizens to participate (European Year for Development, 2015) in the European Union's battle dedicated to end worldwide poverty. This is, indeed, a battlefield; it is not even questionable for professionals working within this discipline. However, the interest and awareness of the European Union's population towards distant and overseas countries, in general, could in no way be called uniform, it is difficult to formulate general statements and define common objectives to be achieved. The "outward" openness of countries active in the international scene, speaking world languages, perhaps having a colonial past, such as France or the United Kingdom, or other welfare societies with global powers, such as Germany or the Scandinavian states, is not comparable with that of the Hungarian population. Thus, the "spirit of participation", the intention to donate, phrases often echoed in the EU, differ greatly across countries. This is what the national research project entitled "The Level of Solidarity of the Hungarians" examined, based on the Publicus Institute's data supported by the Foundation for Development of Democratic Rights, V4Aid, and the EU. (Publicus, 2015) The analysis dissected the interest towards international public affairs, the inclination towards giving and lending a helping hand, and, in general, the commitment towards global solidarity. The research data validates the supposition according to which Hungary

is a country less open towards the problems of the world and is generally inward-turning. While the public affairs of the country are of special interest to the local population, with a ratio of roughly 8 out of 10 people, foreign events are less likely to grab our attention, approximately 5 out of 10 people are interested. (DemNet, 2015)

This Hungarian work, willingly or not, fits into the international wave, which specifically examined the population's and individuals' interests and opinion with regard to foreign aid (Czaplińska, 2007), in opposition to the motivation of states (Lumsdaine, 1993), like the United Kingdom's Department for International Development did over a decade ago in its documents entitled the White Paper, then in its later studies as well. (Lindstrom, 2011) Its motivation was no chance coincidence: increasingly greater parts of the population are critical of the aid pouring into far away countries, more and more people are questioning its usefulness. Many are those who outright urge the halting of international aid, saying that it only disappears in the labyrinth of local powers, corrupt leaders, and bureaucratic systems, and those truly in need experience nothing of its effects – mentioning only the most negative voices. The United Kingdom's Independent Party has not stated less either during its notorious 2015 general elections campaign. In their election manifesto – although they acknowledged the importance of overseas aid and the welfare societies' responsibility towards the world's poor – they pointed out: too much relief funds flow into countries that "have their own space programs and nuclear weapons, and into the pockets of dictators." (UKIP, 2015) So they reduced grants from the gross national income by 9 billion pounds, from 0.7% to 0.2%; what is more, they considered shutting down the government agency responsible for the sector.

The research data validates the supposition according to which Hungary is a country less open towards the problems of the world and is generally inward–turning. While the public affairs of the country are of special interest to the local population, with a ratio of roughly 8 out of 10 people, foreign events are less likely to grab our attention, approximately 5 out of 10 people are interested.

Critical voices

Long was the journey from the practice of the early colonists to the aid that rests upon modern principles and is controlled by national standards. These early types of cooperation were not always painless for the collaborating parties. Often autocratic and unilateral relationships were formed that exploited the capacities of others. Like others, the Ugandan politician, President Yower Museveni, a prominent of the

"new African generation" stated that "The absence of ideological independence is a significant destabilizing factor. (…) The main problem was that our leaders were being besieged from time to time, by newer and newer recommendations, threats, at times by the West, other times by the East. (..) We can borrow principles, but nobody forces us to build them into our lives if those aren't compatible with our own systems." (Museveni, 1990, 241-244) In every age, the political and economic interests have fundamentally determined the direction and the functioning of the cooperation within international development. So, as long as unilateral relationships, which strengthen one side exclusively, exist, other cases are being built on concrete reciprocity, as Parag Khanna Indian economist said, "China (…) isn't subduing Africa but makes growth possible for her and helps her become more attractive for the global investors, among those for China as well." (Khanna, 2016, 119)

Within the major part of international cooperation, the uneven relation between parties is apparent, which stems from their differences (in advocacy and economic strength). An aid situation, however, could enlarge an eventual subordination, situational disadvantages, and any handicaps in power. What in peacetime is merely a dissimilarity, in an aid situation could very well become a critical factor. The aided recipient is always vulnerable, dependent on the one providing the aid. With an analogy: as on the individual level, the most vulnerable is always the infirm, who, in nearly all aspects, depends on the healing institution's staff and technical capacities. The beneficiary always depends on the donor: he receives his conditioned sources from it, he has to be accountable toward it, prepare reports, and meet visual and other expectations. This is indeed a vulnerability, a dependent situation.

The critical questioning of the international development aid system and its functional anomalies is not a new concept. Robert Cassen, Economics Professor at Oxford University has already posed the "million-dollar question" in the title of his book "Does Aid Work?", which has since become a classic on the topic. In his book (Cassen, 1994), Cassen examined the topic from the perspective of the so-called North-South phenomenon, in other words, the effectiveness of the aid provided by the wealthy North to the economically disadvantaged countries of the South. He critically pointed out that the majority of aid streaming into the world's poorest countries do not work adequately, it does not fulfill its desired role. Does aid work? – Cassen's former query is still being asked by subject-matter experts and those caring about the future of developing countries: for example, in Angus Maddison's famous research (Maddison Historical, n. d.), in which he compared GDP values across countries. Looking at his results, it is visible that in the majority of sub-Saharan countries the per capita income has not increased significantly; what is more, in some cases, it has actually decreased, despite the aid that has been streaming in during the past decades. Where do we really stand then? Could it be that the critics are merely "dissatisfied western voices", as the former directors of the development agency of the South African University refer to it in their textbooks? (De Beer and Swanepoel, 2014) We could endlessly quote writings of those who judge, and their opponents, those who support and are on the side of the current practice of aid. Where is the

"truth" then? Towards which direction should one turn in the endless labyrinth of theories, proofs, and contradictions, where the guiding signs and arrows often point back to themselves? In this fast-changing world, in the labyrinth of concepts that question the existence and functional mechanism of aid, one can pose the question: in the light of the reality of life situations, can such a writing be composed, can such a statement be expressed at all, which holds its ground and can be viewed as essentially valid by the actors involved? Or everything could only be viewed in the given momentary situation, in connection with the concrete context. Would it, perhaps, lose its validity as a result of a current political change or a new economic concept?

Before we continue the topic's critical examination, let us set the boundaries of the frequently mentioned target area of our subject, the circle of beneficiaries, and let us review briefly the progress curve of international development aid and some of its important stages. Through this brief examination, our goal is to point out the root of the twofold nature of the system of international aid, the seemingly unresolvable contradictions, and the historical resultants of the above-mentioned occurrences. My train of thought might seem removed from the realities of fieldwork, perhaps being even too theoretical. However, my purpose goes far beyond presenting just a brief outline of the background of the subject. It highlights a particular conceptual premise, which is continually being handed down by the individual systems and which determines to this day the relationship of the parties involved in the development aid cooperation.

So many countries, so many kinds of aid

The system of international development aid is not an isolated discipline. Economic challenges, shortfalls in growth and modernization, social and democratic anomalies are the collective research subjects of several sciences: traditionally, primarily of political science and of economics, too, which examines the different economic systems. Today, along with this classic division, sociology, anthropology, religious studies, even history, and security studies have legitimate existence in the field as they serve the deeper understanding of social structures and state institutions. More conservative professionals often find these "scissors" opened too wide, as they mainly view problems economic in nature and their proposed solutions are drawn solely from the "ivory tower" of economics. Although it is indisputable that the analysis of macroeconomic processes, the unveiling of structural deficiencies, and the re-thinking of the state administrative system is not primarily a theological question. However, let us observe: African and Middle Eastern, and, to some extent, Asian states are ab ovo organized on religious, tribal, and ethnic grounds, often even in our days. The operational mechanisms and logics that derive from their inseparable history and identity have an effect even on our present times. Generally, these complex structures are based on religious ideologies and traditional principles. Let us think, for instance, of the nearly 350-370 million souls (UNDP, 2012) of the Arab world (N. Rózsa, 2015: 19-24) from Morocco to the Iraqi-Iranian border, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Sahara and the Indian Ocean, where the question of character is

very closely linked to the sense of social cohesion of the "Arab identity". (UNDP, 2012) "This is the 'Arab identity,' which is the basis of the Arab nations' concept of individuality which excludes others. Arabs have viewed the world in the Arab-Ajam (refers to non-Arabs in general) division since the beginning of their history and recollection. And the Islam joining the Arab character in the 7th century further colored this world view." (N. Rózsa, 2015: 19-21) Primarily, the Sharia, the Islamic judicial system and substantive law, melts state and religious principles into one system. This is true also for the partially separated Arab population of the extremely heterogeneously inhabited countries of East Africa. Their identity is not equivalent to that of the animist or of today's Christian population, who can be considered the continent's indigenous inhabitants, nor is it identical to that of Africa's thousands of ethnic and tribal groups. Universal recipes hardly exist, every situation and community is unique, different in their own aspects. Let us think of the Bengali famine of 1943, during which nearly 3 million people lost their lives, and the similar events happened in 1973 and during the early 1980s in Ethiopia: the practice used in India could not be transferred directly to Africa, even though "simply" food shortage had to be addressed in both situations.

Thus, if we speak of international development and interactions based on multilateral relations, the individual situations will necessarily have to be viewed in their complexity and in their own intricate reality. In the following, I deal with the deficit and the necessity of this perspective, a vision that is sensitive to others' difficulties and diversities.

Changing perspectives

International development aid is a relatively new discipline. In colonial times, improving the living conditions of the local population was not a priority. Neither empathy towards their problems and struggles nor the respect-based approach, social integration, and, in general, the idea of strengthening-developing were in the focus, at least not on a general level. The model did not use the concept of value and interest in a neutral sense, and lacked a needs-based perspective and commitment towards the local populations. At the same time, we cannot say that, in colonial times, development did not take place in certain areas of Africa. On the contrary. Between 1880 and 1914, the period entitled as the 'race' or 'pursuit' for Africa, the competing European powers, with only a few exceptions, "annexed" Africa and divided most of the continent amongst themselves. (Fage, 2002: 276-298) In colonial times, Africa, the tropical areas in particular, became an important sphere of interest for European merchants and investors. French, German, and Portuguese colonies tried to catch up with the development that had begun in the largest

> **International development aid is a relatively new discipline. In colonial times, improving the living conditions of the local population was not a priority.**

British colonial territories along the downstream parts of the Niger and the delta regions, in Lagos, Sierra Leone, or Togo, on the Gold Coast, along the coastlines, and in the inner areas as well. During these times such iconic development projects were realized as the railway network between Uganda's Lake Victoria and Kenya's Mombasa, the Djibouti railway leading to the Ethiopian Highlands, the partially built railway and telegraph network connecting Cairo and Cape Town, which is still symbolic today, and, in general, the construction of the "western" state administration, the adaptation of cultural organizations, metropolitan "agora", and the establishment of buildings and institutions. However, these developments were not in the interest of the local population: the priority was always the interest of the colonial state. One needs only to think of the British-Egyptian dispute over Sudan: the aim was the greatest possible control of the water catchment area of the river Nile, the possession of the extensive commercial and agricultural land, and the British response to Egypt's geopolitical aspirations, its absolute demand for the river. The new country became the combined colony of the two great powers; however, in reality, it was governed by the British. They established the provincial seat in Northern Khartoum, the administration was carried out by the Arabized and Islamized northern elite. Unlike the southern Christian and animistic population, they received certain privileges, including becoming involved in the modern education system organized by the English. While the North was developing, hardly any changes took place in the South. Over time, the gap between the two parts has widened, and a particular center-peripheral relationship has developed. But the phenomenon was also true in general: the aim was never to convert the standards of local societies to "western" ones. During these times Africans typically played a subordinate role. (Morgan, 2014) The great and widespread colonial expansion could only be carried out by the Europeans with the conviction that only they knew what was best for the continent.

This vision is decisive in our days as well as within the ideology of the relationship between the states and parties with economically differing capabilities. We shall revisit this in connection with the works of the Nobel Prize-winner Indian economist, Amartya Sen. I mention this (already) richly researched historical period, because the early systems and theories of international development aid actually developed from the former colonial era's sphere of interest and its intergovernmental relations, and the contemporary concepts and motivations, show many similarities.

The era of development aid

Underdeveloped areas, the third world, newly industrialized countries, emerging markets, emerging economies, developing countries, the fourth world, the "two-thirds world", the Global South are expressions handed down in the system of international relations. Their historic resultants, analogies demonstrate well the dichotomy that fundamentally characterizes our topic's substantive difficulty: the unequal relationship between the parties of development aid cooperation which are still in evidence today with regard to target areas and beneficiaries. The question may arise: is it possible that an appropriate and realistic aid scheme between two par-

ties, which is devoid of interests and is based on true solidarity, cannot be evolved? Does not such international relief exist where the donor would try to contribute to the advancement of others purely out of altruism? Could "equality" exist between donor and recipient? In the following, I investigate this question, which fundamentally determines the quality and the content of certain relations.

Ever since countries and nations, national and governmental formations have been in existence, they have been in continous interaction with each other. Their relationships are determined by a myriad of circumstances: today, primarily, their political and economic power. In modern times, we speak only of equality among the parties – should such things exist in reality. In Renaissance Europe, and, in particular, during the preceding periods, if a ruler provided support to the other, he typically obtained authoritative and political influence as a result of his "help". Later, in colonial times, this worked in an institutionalized form; the development of territories under the jurisdiction of the European powers became the standard practice. However, these "capacity expansions" were carried out according to the donor's interests, since infrastructure modernization was necessary for colonial officials and, in general, travelers. In line with the terminology of the day, these were part of the so-called "civilization assistance": modern healthcare, and education and administrative systems were developed, of which I briefly spoke earlier. These types of assistance can be viewed as the prefiguration of modern-day development assistance, although we can hardly speak of a practice that is free of interests and is aimed toward the advancement of the local population. Unequal distortions were formed according to the best interests of the donor, fundamentally shaking up the hundred-, occasionally thousand-year-old social structures and ethnic systems. Therefore, African countries, which became independent during the era of decolonization, could develop and operate their modern (though unjust and faulty) governmental social organizations with the help of European sovereignties. Modern functioning mechanisms were unknown to them, as their daily routine contained archaic elements. It is not negligible that in certain African countries, despite all their pains and difficulties, they speak French or English fluently, with which they could become actively involved in the everyday life of the western world.

Both the support of contemporary international development and the interstate relief system received their practical implementation model from the European Recovery Program, which is linked to US Minister of Foreign Affairs George C. Marshall; then the promises made during the inauguration speech of President Truman in 1949 provided new momentum to the system. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation, OEEC, was established as the program's implementation and control body, which, in 1961, evolved into today's Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, which aims to harmonize the economic, commercial, and financial activities of its member states. The disbursement conditions of the proposed assistance within the framework of the Marshall Plan were that those must have been used for the purchase of goods and services delivered by American firms. Thus, the nearly 13-million-dollar liquidity transfer secured helped rebuild Western

European countries (those not belonging to the Soviet bloc), but many saw modern-day imperialism and conquest in its elements. The created multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, the OECD, or the World Bank developed their international practices from this intellectual tradition, which is viewed with suspicion by many recipient countries, saying that those did not serve the creation of circumstances necessary to enhance their own competitiveness, but rather they serve the donor's interests.

It is as if the former colonial advantage and logic were to repeat themselves, warning the professionals belonging to the so-called post-development flow. Approximately since the '70s and '80s, there has been strong criticism voiced that modern development practices do not serve the recipients and, in general, the interests of the developing world (properly). They allege that the character of the "supporting" scheme serving the donors' political and economic goals is overly powerful, which only recreates the dependence of former colonial countries, which existed prior to their independence. This paradox situation is indeed difficult to resolve. Especially when for the donor states' international relief is just a tool to further the interests of their own foreign policy. In addition, part of the relief funds is sourced from taxes. In other words, donors will spend it however they wish, so the question of how well the aid granted serves the recipient country's interests becomes devoid of purpose.

Above, I presented a brief overview of the historical and conceptual background and ideological framework of international development aid. In the past fifty-sixty years, significant material and human relief resources have been moved towards the direction of developing countries. Meanwhile, fundamental problems have remained unresolved and hundreds of millions of people are still struggling with difficulties that could long have been resolved

> **Therefore, African countries, which became independent during the era of decolonization, could develop and operate their modern (though unjust and faulty) governmental social organizations with the help of European sovereignties. Modern functioning mechanisms were unknown to them, as their daily routine contained archaic elements. It is not negligible that in certain African countries, despite all their pains and difficulties, they speak French or English fluently, with which they could become actively involved in the everyday life of the western world.**

with sincere efforts. The pivotal question still remains, "Could the schemes invented and orchestrated by the West function in the East even if Westerners are not able to or do not want to step out of their own perspectives and preferences?" Could it be that certain Western considerations are simply not compatible with Eastern systems? Could the problem be that concepts based on Western recipes cannot be applied in those areas where they were destined for? Could the cause of trouble be that such professionals are shaping the processes who unswervingly believe that all countries go through the same development process and thus the presently undeveloped ones must follow the already developed countires' social, judicial, democratic, economic, and, in general, state structures. These were the considerations pointed out by Indian philosopher Amartya Sen as well, for which he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1998.

About ethical development
The West has to abandon the approach assuming that the evolution of society follows the same path everywhere, and that the highest degree of development is the liberal state and liberal economy, the symbol and embodiment of which is democracy (see Fukuyama, 1992: 13-39; 55-71) – underlined Sen based on his progressive research during the end of the '90s. Examining primarily the Asian societies, he rebutted the generally accepted presumption that liberty and democratic elements (ultimately tolerance and social responsibility) are specifically and primarily Western values. His originality lies, among others, in the fact that as an economist he brought an ethical dimension to such areas that are typically defined by numbers and indicators. He established a new conceptual framework, which he thought was more suitable for developed countries to overcome inequality, the dramatic financial differences, society-wide unemployment, destitution, and hunger. Based primarily on his own experiences, he offered his model as an alternative to the developed West, as well as to the Arab world, Africa, and the long-suffering South America. He pointed out the erroneousness of the Western approach that believes that states with fundamentally different cultures are backward and are at the bottom steps of the stairs of evolution; but surely they are somehow problematic because they just cannot reach the Western level of development. He states that this is an unproven doctrine, from which inter-national development professionals and international relations experts are incapable of prescinding. He writes that societies do not follow parallel paths, and during this process, they do not necessarily come to the same (or similar) conclusions. Thus, the conceptual perspective is unsustainable, which suggests that our models, ideas, and scales of value have to take root "overseas", and if this does not happen, immediate intervention is required. We ought to notice, he warns, that not only our western type of democracy and social organizational systems exist, but there are also other approaches in the world; many of them are not viewed as legitimate, still, they do work within their own context. (Griffin and Knight, 1990) (About further sustain-ability-related issues see Tarrósy, 2010 and Vörös, 2010.)

Amartya Sen's (and others') ideas about "ethical development," the new conduct of relief, are widely known today. (Juhász, 2015) The latest theories accuse the former ones of not sufficiently taking into account the local circumstances and needs, but they place their own interests first instead, which results in their own goals prevailing and only replicating colonial logic. Looking at the previously demonstrated perspectives and field experiences, there is much truth to these assertions. As a result, beneficiaries of aid oftentimes view the schemes forced onto them only as a "civilizational intervention."

Though without precedent, this thought experiment is exciting: what if colonization did not happen, or at least European powers did not shake up the local ethnic and cultural systems? What if today's predominantly American-type mindset would not view the systems of the Arab and the African world as illegitimate and as a structure that "needs to be saved." Could we say that if certain powers had not destroyed early societies, today these would not have to be rebuilt? If foreign models and state systems had not been forced onto cultures different from ours, today's international relations would not suffer in the shackles of incompatibility. Could it be stated that the world would be more peaceful if we allowed those nations who, from our point of view, are less developed and less civilized (or merely "different") to walk their own ways? And along the systemic questions, we have not even considered the human and spiritual aspects. Let us just consider the seemingly bold parallel, which is not the least unfamiliar to our topic: what would have been the reaction, if the Soviet psychologists had offered mental hygienic support to the victims of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956? As the situation is often similar to this in certain parts of the developing world. Complex question, diversified answers. Especially as certain arguments and counterarguments oftentimes contain important elements of truth in the local context of values and perspectives as well. It cannot be said, even with the greatest tolerance and openness, that, for example, female genital mutilation, which still exists today, is not barbarism, or that it is right to send someone to a voodoo ritual when requiring life-saving intervention. As we also do not know (or at least it would be terrible to imagine) what would have been the outcome of the West African Ebola epidemic (or other similar infectious diseases) without western assistance. And it cannot be declared either, as we referenced before, that a country with a nuclear or space program (such as India or Pakistan) or, for that matter, the population of a country of which corrupt government embezzles millions of dollars, would not, despite all these, be in dire need of external assistance, that there would not be a need for international support.

What could be then the future of African development policy? Could its model be the developed Western society which is also searching for its identity and struggling with a moral crisis? Looking at the transformation of Africa, it is uncertain towards which direction this process leads. Both decision makers and the leaders of African countries need deep self-examination. The right direction of development has to be reconsidered by the Western world, while Africa, perhaps, should rethink it altogether. Africa can indeed be the continent of possibilities, so it is important

for us to realize that here certain nations live in countries in crisis, which cannot be compared to the crisis of the West. Thus, for the investors and decision makers of the developed world, local opportunities mean responsibility as well. It is not sufficient to view Africa only as the old-new grounds for their selfish business interests. And processes such as migration, regional conflicts, or the emergence of radical groups ought to be considered, and their own well-perceived interests should also correspond to an assistance that is just and lack of selfish interests. ☀

Note

1   "2015 was a special year for development. It was the first ever European Year to deal with the European Union's external action and Europe's role in the world." (European Commission, 2015)

Bibliography

- Ayittey, George B.N. (2005). *Africa Unchained*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Búr, G. (2005). A XXI. század Afrika évszázada? [Is the 21st Century the Century of Africa?] *Külügyi Szemle* **4 (1–2)**, 3-11.
- Búr, G. (2011a). *Afrika-történeti tanulmányok*. [African History Studies] Mundus Novus, Budapest.
- Búr, G. (2011b). *A szubszaharai Afrika Története*. [The History of Sub-Saharan Africa] Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest.
- Cassen, R. (1994). *Does Aid Work?* Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Czaplińska, A. (2007). *Building Public Support for Development Cooperation*. Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI), University of Madrid, Madrid. http://eprints.ucm.es/11859/1/PP02-07.pdf [02.01.2018]
- De Beer, F. and Swanepoel, H. (2000). *Introduction to Development Studies*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- DemNet. (2015): *Mennyire szolidáris a magyar?* [To What Extent Are Hungarians People of Solidarity?] http://www.demnet.hu/images/stories/B_kiadvanyok/szolidaris/DemNet_SzolidaritasKutatas_Osszefoglalo_HU.pdf [05.24.2018]
- European Commission. (2015). *European Year for Development*. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/eyd2015_en [05.24.2017]
- European Parliament. (2017). *Fact Sheets on the European Union, Development policy, A General Survey of Development Policy, Point D*. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/163/a-general-survey-of-development-policy [06.14.2018]
- Fage, J. D. (2002). *A History of Africa*. Routledge, London.
- Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. Avon Books, New York.
- G20. (2017). *G20 Africa Partnership – "Investing in a Common Future" conference in Berlin on 12-13 June 2017 and G20 Africa Partnership*. https://www.bmz.de/de/zentrales_downloadarchiv/g20/2017_03_Fact_Sheet_G20_Africa_Partnership.pdf [06.14.2018]
- Glied, V. (2016). *Vízkonfliktusok. Küzdelem egy pohár vízért*. [Water Conflicts. Fight for a Glass of Water] Publikon Kiadó, Pécs.
- Gömbös, E. (2008). *Globális Kihívások, Millenniumi Fejlesztési Célok* és *Magyarország*. [Global Challenges, Millennium Development Goals and Hungary] UN Association of Hungary, Budapest.
- Griffin and Knight. (Eds.). (1990). *Human Development and the International Development Strategy for the 1990s*. Palgrave MacMillan, UN.
- HAND. (2015). *A szakpolitikák fejlesztési célú koherenciája*. [Policy Coherence for Development] http://hand.org.hu/media/files/1450115572.pdf [06.14.2018]

- Haslam, P. A., Schafer, J. and Beaduet, P. (2017). *Introduction to International Development.* Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Juhász, J. et al. (2015). Szegénység, képességek, lehetőségek. [Poverty, Skills, Opportunities] *Közgazdasági szemle* **62**, 544–564.
- Lindstrom, H. (2011). *'A Mile Wide and an Inch Deep'? Understanding Support for Aid in the UK.* Institute of Development Studies. https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/UKPOMwpdraft. pdf [02.01.2018]
- Lipton, M. (1977). *Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development.* Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., New York.
- Lumsdaine, D. (1993). *Moral Vision in International Politics. The Foreign Aid Regime 1949– 1989.* Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Maddison Historical. (n. d.). *GDP Data.* http://www.worldeconomics.com/Data/MadisonHistoricalGDP/Madison%20Historical%20GDP%20Data.efp [06.25.2018]
- Magyar Máltai Szeretetszolgálat. [The Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta] (2015). 2015 a fejlesztés európai éve. [2015 is the European Year of Development] https://www.maltai.hu/cikk/hir/1629 [09.01.2018]
- Morgan, K. (2014). *Slavery and the British Empire from Africa to America.* Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Myres, G. (2013). *Afrikai városok.* [African Cities] Publikon Kiadó, Pécs.
- N. Rózsa, E. (2015): *Az arab tavasz – A Közel-Kelet* átalakulása. [The Arab Spring - Transformation of the Middle East] Osiris Kiadó, Budapest.
- Paragi, B. and Szent-Iványi, B. (2007). *Nemzetközi fejlesztési segélyezés tankönyv.* [International Development Aid Textbook] TeTT Consult, Budapest.
- Publicus (2015). *Different Aspects of Solidarity.* http://www.demnet.hu/images/stories/B_ kiadvanyok/szolidaris/KutatasiElemzes.pdf [05.24.2018]
- Rostoványi, Zs. (2002). *Nemzeti eszmék és folyamatok az iszlám világban.* [National Ideas and Trends in the Islamic World] Korona Kiadó, Budapest.
- Tarrósy, I. (2010). *Fenntartható Afrika.* [Sustainable Africa] Publikon Kiadó, Pécs.
- Tarrósy, I. (2010). Fenntartható Afrika – Lehetséges? [Sustainable Africa – Is It Possible?] In: Tarrósy, I. (ed). Fenntartható Afrika. Publikon Kiadó, Pécs. 13-30.
- Szigeti, Sz. and Frivaldszky, J. (2012). *A jó kormányzásról.* [About Good Governance] L'Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest.
- UKIP. (2015). *A UKIP Manifesto 2015.* http://www.ukip.org/manifesto2015 and http://www. ukip.org/ukip_manifesto_summary [06.25.2018]
- UN. (2010a). *United Nations Millennium Declaration.* http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm [06.13.2018]
- UN. (2010b). *Keeping the Promise: United to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals.* http://www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/pdf/outcome_documentN1051260.pdf [06.13.2018]
- UN. (2013). *Report of the UN Secretary-General: A Life of Dignity for All.* http://www.un.org/ millenniumgoals/pdf/SG_Report_MDG_EN.pdf [06.13.2018]
- UN. (2015). *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015.* http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf [06.13.2018]
- UNDP. (2012). *Human Development Data for the Arab States.* http://www.arab-hdr.org/data/ indicators/2012-3.aspx [05.24.2018]
- Vörös, Z. (2010). Segíti-e a fenntartható fejlődést Kína afrikai szerepvállalása? [Does China's African Engagements Help Sustainable Development?] In: Tarrósy, I. (ed). Fenntartható Afrika. Publikon Kiadó, Pécs. 105-150.
- White Paper. (2017). *White Paper on the Future of Europe - European Commission.* https:// ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_ en.pdf [09.02.2018]

CREATING AND ENHANCING CAPACITY IN AFRICA FOR EFFICIENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

LAWALLEY COLE

COALITION ON MEDIA AND EDUCATION FOR DEVELOPMENT AFRICA FORUM (CAFOR)

1. General overview and prospects for Africa

Introduction

Africa is the second largest and second most-populated continent in the world with an estimated population of 1.2 billion (World Population Review, 2019). It also has the most youthful and fastest growing population globally. More than 40 percent of Africans are under the age of 15, and 20 percent are between the ages of 15 and 24 (UN, 2015). We estimate that by 2050, one-third of the world's population will live in Africa: up from about one-fifth in 2012. Such growth will be imbalanced across Africa with Southern and North African countries characterised by slowing or even negative youth population growth, while West Central, and East African countries will experience significant youth population increases (Nyamongo and Shilabukha, 2017). Sub-Saharan Africa will have a considerably higher youth–to-population ratio over the next 35 years. The continent must, therefore, be ready for an increasingly young labour force.

Africa is currently just at the beginning of this demographic transition. Advances in healthcare and well-being have led to increased life expectancy and improvements in infant and child mortality rates. Fertility rates are also projected to fall as socioeconomic well-being increases but following a time lag. The result is an interim period of rapid population growth, which we now characterize as the 'youth bulge'. While there are considerable variations across the continent, Africa will continue to have a young workforce for this century. A good understanding of how young job-seekers engage with labour markets is crucial.

The 'youth bulge' may be concentrated in West, Central and East Africa, but young people in North Africa and Southern Africa continue to face high levels of low-wage temporary jobs that compound their poverty and sense of inequality. The rates of unemployment are higher in urban areas than in rural areas although they can also generate faster economic growth. Youth migration has contributed to the urban crisis. Opportunities are quite low for rural youths. Therefore, increasing opportunities for rural youths can help curb the urban crisis. Despite the relatively rapid economic growth, inadequate job creation for a 'youth bulge' of Africans with few skills relevant to the labour market and an underperforming educational system

has failed to prepare young people for existing jobs. There is also a significant gender discrepancy emerging as young women tend to enter marriage early and withdraw from the labour force and focus on rearing a family. Africa's widespread youth unemployment threatens to undermine social and political stability and means that young people are particularly vulnerable to radicalization (Atta-Asamoah, 2016).

Recent developments in Africa are spanning from economic growth
Africa's current economic growth is generating interest among global investors and is changing age-old perceptions of the continent as stagnant, high-risk and weak. Sub-Saharan African economies are expected to post an average growth rate of close to six percent in the next decade – exceeding the projected average of any other world region (FocusEconomics, 2019; The World Bank, 2018). Today we witness the highest flows of capital into the African continent. There has been a rise of Foreign Direct Investment from $10 billion in 2000 to nearly $80 billion in 2010. The United Nations tells us that this should by now have increased to over $150 billion (UN, 2017).

Africa has benefited from steady flows of commodity-driven growth in the past (World Economic Forum, 2016). However, all indications are that the continent's current economic expansion is qualitatively different from the growing emissions of the past. Some of the most critical constituents of this growth have been high commodity prices, which have been propelled by enduring high demand from China and other emerging markets, as well as new sources of energy and mining production. The paradox here is that several African countries remain heavily reliant on the revenues from unprocessed commodities. What is also important here is that the African continent's recent surge has been sectors outside of extractive industries. These include construction, transportation, telecommunications and wholesale and retail as well as financial services. Finally, Africa's consumer base, propelled by rapid urbanization and rising incomes, is expanding rapidly, with consumer spending projected to grow from $860 million in 2008 to $1.4 trillion by 2020 (Leke et al., 2010).

Not all countries have been pulled along by Africa's "rise" and several – impoverished, land-locked or poorly governed – will likely remain fragile and stagnant (Cooke & Downie, 2014). Nonetheless, the decisive issue here is that many African governments are rising to the challenge, and an increasing number are beginning to struggle more systematically with long-standing impediments to growth. Across these challenge areas, there are new opportunities and examples of positive progress that suggest how corporate and public actors can collaborate to over-

Sub-Saharan African economies are expected to post an average growth rate of close to six percent in the next decade – exceeding the projected average of any other world region.

come barriers to investment and structural transformation. Moreover, in partnership with private investors, governments are more actively seeking to address the linkages between investment, growth, local employment, skills transfer and value addition.

The challenges

There are complex challenges that African governments need to address successfully. African governments must overtly prove a strategic vision for growth and social development, as well as collaborative partnerships and long-term commitment (Newsday, 2017). If Africa fails to challenge these impediments, this will leave African economies unprepared to capitalize on the critical opportunities that will arise in the coming decades for industrial growth, diversification and fuller integration into global supply chains. The enormous challenge of generating employment for the continent's growing youth population makes this task even more urgent. An estimated 12 million young Africans will join the labour pool every year, over the next decade (African Development Bank Group, 2016), according to the World Bank. Without vastly expanded opportunities in agriculture and manufacturing, governments will face increasing and possibly destabilizing pressures from a frustrated and underemployed citizenry.

African governments must ensure the equitable distribution of the benefits of growth and transformation. They must also ensure that these translate to improved well-being of citizens, including the most vulnerable. For this to materialize successfully, governments will need to enforce regulations and other enforcement capacities to ensure that private-sector players adhere to acceptable standards in labour practices, environmental stewardship, integrity and transparency. African governments will also need to have sound revenue collection and management systems to support public investments that may not be commercially bankable but that serve vulnerable populations for the broader public good. Moreover, and most important, it will require accountable, transparent governance, a culture of open service among political leaders and influential domestic constituencies to hold institutions and investors to account. For all the optimism around Africa's rise, these broader objectives will ultimately be the measure of success.

The World Bank estimates that Africa has more than 200 million people between the ages of 14 and 24 which makes it the world's "youngest" continent (Dewan and Bernhardt, 2012). This figure should double by 2045. There is considerable apprehension about what this demographic youth bulge may mean for political stability and development if economic opportunities are not available. This possibility should spur African leaders to tackle the obstacles to structural economic transformation – power generation, infrastructural development, regional integration – with far greater urgency. But leaders should also look to Africa's youth cohort as a potential engine of growth and development, innovation and entrepreneurship, particularly as workforces in other parts of the world – China and Europe, for example – age.

Opportunities for African economies

Many African economies are at a turning point with no limits to available opportunities for sustained growth, structural change and accelerated development (Toh, 2016). Each African country is facing its unique set of economic, political and social circumstances. There can never be a single formula for success. However, across the 48 states of sub-Saharan Africa, we note three priority areas. These are:

- *Infrastructure development needs acceleration*: African countries will have to build an industrial base, draw much-needed investment, and compete in the global economy. To do so, businesses and citizens will need to have access to reliable, affordable electricity and a communication and transportation infrastructure that allows efficient and cost-effective movement of goods, labour and services. Linkages of African markets to one another and the global economy are crucial now more than ever before. (World Economic Forum, 2013)

- *Economies need integration*: Most African economies are too small to diversify and develop a competitive manufacturing base without expanding trade links to regional markets and deepening integration. As significant, potentially transformative investors consider basing operations in Africa, they will need relatively easy, efficient access to more extensive regional markets, supply chains and labour pools, if their investments are to be economically viable. (Twarmagazine, 2016)

- *Africa's Workforce must be capable*: Education is crucial for African economies to progress and lay the foundation for more sophisticated and competitive manufacturing and services capacity. African governments will need to invest adequately in educating their young citizens to have competent and capable participants in their future workforce. (Kirba, 2014)

2. Capacities for planning in Africa

Capacity development is a broad notion which is also a change process at the level of individuals, organisations and societies. Developing capacity is also about the many ways of sustaining capabilities, like Technical Cooperation, working with Non-State Actors, promoting multi-stakeholders processes and knowledge sharing.

Africa has good development plans at continental, sub-regional and national levels but efforts to implement these plans are being stumbled by severe capacity deficits often in the form of shortage of critical skills, deficiencies in leadership, inhibiting mindsets and weak institutions. The continent's skills shortage is acute in critical areas such as Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) as well as in Agriculture (*The STEM Workforce Challenge, 2007*). Many initiatives are currently being undertaken to create and enhance capacity at varying levels. These include plans and programs from government, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations to address capacity problems in many of Africa's lop-sided development enterprises. We know that the administrative capabilities of almost all countries in sub-Saharan Africa were weak at the time of independence, with weak human, institutional and organisational capacities. (The World Bank,

2016) Over time, such abilities further weakened with a multiplicity of policies that included the implementation of policy agendas of the donor community during the 1980s and 1990s. Also, many African governments lacked the foresight to express concern about the long-term development imperatives of their respective countries, sub-regions and the region as a whole in the 2000s.

Development Planning in Africa

1. Development planning has a long and complex history in Africa, with the continent's development course witnessing different methods and approaches from the 1960s when many sub-Saharan countries attained nationhood. Development planning in Africa started in the early 1960s with a centralised type of planning spanning from a three to a five-year planning phase. There were at least thirty-two African countries that produced a national development plan during the 1960s. This first generation of development plans continued to the 1980s (Lopes, 2013). These plans promoted state-engineered economies with resources allocated by governments. It was notably the time of state-owned enterprises operating in most of the productive sectors. Still, Africa's development plans of the 1960s met with limited success. There were many reasons for this. In the first place, plan documents had shortcomings. Also, countries failed to implement these plans because of ambitiously formulated targets. Moreover, there were institutional and bureaucratic weaknesses resulting in extreme shocks and other political factors

   Extensive neglect of home-grown planning under neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) marked the second phase in the evolution of planning in Africa. (Tsoungui et al., 1995) These SAPs emerged in the 1980s-1990s with the support of the Bretton Woods Institutions – the IMF and the World Bank. The primary goal of SAPs was to decrease the role of the State in production and service delivery. SAPs emphasised macroeconomic stability, the downsizing of public sector institutions, privatisation and cutting government spending and budget deficits (Grigsby and Perez, 2007). SAPs resulted in grave consequences for each country affected by massive social costs. The downsizing of the public-sector institutions and massive privatisations led to net job losses. The budget restrictions that went with SAPs compromised social service delivery and human capital development. Most importantly, SAPs failed to generate the expected growth outcomes as the annual economic growth for Africa over the 1990s averaged only 2.1 percent. (Soludo and Mkandawire, 2003)

2. What this proved to us all was that even the best-written development plans cannot succeed without an enabling domestic and external environment, backed up by institutional capacities and resources for implementation. The challenges that African countries have experienced in the execution of their development plans vary by state and period. But in general, the discontinuities and distractions in plan implementation coupled with the dysfunctional institutional architectures, and weak institutional capacities have played a critical role in undermining the

success of development plans in Africa. Also, the tenuous links between resource allocation and development priorities with overdependence on external resources and weak relationships between national and sub-national planning and implementation processes have also contributed grossly in sabotaging development plans on the continent (Ali, 2011). Discontinuities and distractions prompted by conflict, constitutional and unconstitutional regime changes have often derailed the implementation of development plans in Africa. An excess of externally imposed agendas and conditions that have consistently closed or narrowed down the policymaking space made matters worse. Undemocratic regime changes have been driven by conflict and coups d'état. Africa has seen at least 200 successful and failed coups since the 1960s (Al Jazeera. 2015).

Institutional arrangements for development planning in Africa have generally been dysfunctional, resulting in weak coordination between central planning bureaus, ministries of finance and other line ministries, and the failure to align resources with national priorities. Strong coordination between central planning agencies and ministries of finance is a prerequisite for aligning financial resources with national development priorities. Disproportionate power relations between central planning bodies and ministries of finance have unfortunately weakened planning agencies' capacity to fulfil their role in coordinating the planning process and ensuring the alignment of the programmes and projects of implementing agencies with the priorities of national development plans (Ngwenya, n.d.). Experiences in African countries suggest that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the role of the central planning agency. But to the extent that the finance ministry remains the "super ministry", planning will continue to be subservient to finance. African countries need a credible mechanism that assigns equal importance to finance and planning in the governmental hierarchy (UNDP Technical Support Team, n.d.). Explicit support from the highest level of government will be necessary in such a case, as in Malaysia, or by placing control of budgeted expenditure in the hands of the central planning agency. The latter option requires excellent coordination, to ensure the due consideration of the recurrent cost implications of all capital account expenditures.

Weak capacities in the use of planning tools have also contributed to implementation setbacks. For effective planning to take place, there must be cooperation between national and sub-national institutions and actors in the implementation process. Sub-national participation enhances comprehensive planning and facilitates continuity in the planning process. The implementation of development plans in Africa has, however, suffered from challenges in synergising national and sub-national systems. While there has been a shift toward more decentralised approaches to implementation, national and sub-national institutions have often not been adequately integrated into development programmes.

3. *Human capacity challenges*: There are two dimensions that we can identify with the human capacity challenge of Africa. First, there is a shortage of jobs to sat-

isfy the demands of an increasingly ambitious and expectant generation of young people. Much of this is due to the structural underdevelopment of African economies, which continue to rely on primary commodities' production and export and capital-intensive extractive industries. While the official unemployment rate was 8.3 % in 2011 (now over 12%), 70% of the African workforce was classified by the UN Economic Commission for Africa as being in vulnerable employment (ECA, 2017). Without accelerated growth, economic diversification and expansion of more labour-intensive sectors such as agri-business and manufacturing, this problem will not be resolved quickly as young populations continue to grow. Poor education could leave a generation of young school and college leavers without the skills required for them to compete in an increasingly competitive global digital marketplace (Karar and Pietersen, 2009).

At the same time, there is a shortage of suitably qualified workers to fill the limited number of skilled jobs available, stemming in large part from long-standing deficits in primary and secondary education systems in the majority of African countries, which are failing to turn out sufficient numbers of suitably qualified graduates. Africa lags badly behind the rest of the world in school attendance and educational performance (UNESCO Education 2018). School enrolment has risen dramatically in the last 20 years, but education deficit remains large compared with other parts of the world. In 2011, 22 percent of Africa's primary school-age children were out of school, compared with 11 percent in Arab states, seven percent in South and West Asia and five percent in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNESCO Institute of Statistics, Jan 2014). Africa has the lowest level of secondary school attendance as well, with 34 percent enrolment, compared with 65 percent in Arab states and 90 percent in Latin America (UNESCO, GMR 2010). Some seven percent of college-age youth are enrolled in a university in Africa, compared to 30 percent in the rest of the world.

Remedies to these challenges: the PRSPs and NDS etc.

Due to these experiences in planning, policymakers and decision-makers learnt considerably with better information about the need to develop a more comprehensive agenda for public sector reforms. They were also able to look into the importance of good institutions in the development process, especially in the new context of globalisation.

In the early 2000s, SAPs were replaced by Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs), which aimed at reversing the adverse effects of a decade of Structural Adjustment on welfare and social conditions. PRSPs emphasised strongly on reducing poverty as

In the early 2000s, SAPs were replaced by Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs), which aimed at reversing the adverse effects of a decade of Structural Adjustment on welfare and social conditions.

a condition for debt relief. Several African countries undertook PRSPs for at least two generations, with the aim of ensuring their eligibility for debt relief. However, many lacked credibility as the whole process was again externally driven, even when at the back of minds there was always the notion of ownership and consultations to strengthen PRSPs. Furthermore, PRSPs tended to place unbalanced emphasis on the social sector at the expense of the productive industry thereby raising questions about the sustainability of the poverty reduction agenda (IMF, 2016). There has recently developed a keen interest in, and a return to, more comprehensive development plans that go way beyond PRSPs, which many see as short-sighted. Indeed, several African countries have adopted long-term development visions and planning frameworks with far more aggressive growth and social development objectives.

The National Development Strategies (NDS) have now gone beyond the narrow objective of poverty reduction to encompass goals such as accelerated growth, employment creation, structural transformation and sustainable development. Contrary to what we witnessed in the 1960s, these plans engage a combination of state and market-based approaches. They also appreciate the critical role of both the public and the private sector in the development process (UNESCO, 2016).

Many African countries have developed Long Term Visions to guide their steps towards these ambitious objectives (Lopes, 2013). These long-term visions want to ensure that African actors assume stronger ownership as well as a more consultative and participatory process that would involve a broad spectrum of stakeholders. These will include civil society, the private sector, varying decentralised constituencies and development partners. These more extensive national development plans often take into consideration various global and continental development goals and frameworks such as NEPAD, which has since July 2018 become the African Union's Development Agency.

Monitoring national development plans

Monitoring and evaluation systems in Africa have improved over time but can still be considered immature and evolving (Porter and Goldman, 2013). Donor reporting requirements and conditions have generally often driven monitoring and evaluation activities on the continent. Most African countries are yet to fully own and appreciate the importance and relevance of monitoring and evaluation of evidence-based policymaking. The findings of monitoring and evaluation reports are consequently not fully exploited to inform and improve policymaking and budget allocations. But beyond internalising the culture of monitoring and evaluation, monitoring systems in Africa tend to be fragmented, suffering from weak institutional capacities and lacking robust statistical methods to provide the data necessary for control. There is also a disproportionate focus on expenditure tracking and activity level monitoring, as opposed to results-based monitoring. Furthermore, national and sub-national monitoring systems are often not integrated, which often omits essential information about local level performance in plan implementation. In most cases, institutional mechanisms exist only in theory with the lack of commitment and capacities hampering them.

3. Planning for Africa's transformation agenda –
AU Agenda 2063, SDGs and CESA 16-25

The transformation agenda

Africa has a transformation agenda, which it is pursuing, under the recognition of the African Union's vision of "an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena" (African Union, 2014.). Therefore, success will be elusive unless we purposefully harness the potential of the continent's young people, and taking into account all the planning-related issues raised in this paper. African leaders have given credibility to this view by identifying youth development and science, technology and innovation as the main pillars of Agenda 2063. I have already talked about how the African continent is today engulfed in what we now call the 'youth bulge' as the demographics on the continent change with many obvious challenges. I have also intimated that these challenges surface more in the education systems, where the question of relevance is increasingly becoming the subject of much conversation, as Africa's widespread youth unemployment threatens to undermine social and political stability with many young people becoming particularly vulnerable to radicalisation. The question now is how we as Africans can do better by reasserting the importance of planning and embarking on a different path to recreate and enhance existing capacity for efficient development through our education systems in this demographic transition.

Agenda 2063 is the African Union's Fifty-Year Vision and Action Plan for "the Africa that Africans want". Agenda 2063 is calling for action by all segments of society to work together and build a prosperous and united Africa "based on shared values and a common destiny". It is a strategic framework for the socio-economic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years. It builds on and seeks to accelerate the implementation of past and existing continental initiatives for growth and sustainable development.

Science, Technology and Innovation

The Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa (STISA-2024) developed during the critical period when the African Union was formulating its broader and long-term AU Agenda 2063. This strategy is to "accelerate the transition of African countries to innovation-led, and knowledge-based economies", by improving science, technology and innovation readiness in Africa and implementing specific policies and programmes in these areas which address societal needs holistically and sustainably (African Union, 2014b).

The STISA-2024 is the first of the ten-year incremental phasing strategies to respond to the demand for science, technology and innovation to impact across critical sectors such as agriculture, energy, environment, health, infrastructure development, mining, security and water among others. The strategy anchors firmly on six distinct priority areas that contribute to the achievement of the AU Vision. These priority areas are: Eradication of Hunger and Achieving Food Security;

Prevention and Control of Diseases; Communication (Physical and Intellectual Mobility); Protection of our Space; Live Together–Build the Society; and Wealth Creation (African Union, 2014b).

The strategy further defines four mutually reinforcing pillars which are prerequisite conditions for its success. These pillars are building and upgrading research infrastructures; enhancing professional and technical competencies; promoting entrepreneurship and innovation; and providing an enabling environment for STI development in the African continent (African Union, 2014b). The AU contends that STI will design, implement and synchronise continental, regional and national programmes to ensure that their strategic orientations and pillars are mutually reinforcing, to achieve the envisaged developmental impact as effectively as possible.

Education as a top priority

Education remains a top priority in Africa and is now contributing tremendously to the strengthening of capacities in various disciplines. It plays a pivotal role in enabling the continent to achieve the aspirations it laid down in its people-centred and long-term transformative change - Agenda 2063, through the development of competent and productive human resources. The global 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (UN Women, 2017) put strong emphasis to "ensure inclusive and quality education for all and promote lifelong learning". There is also the African Union's Continental Education Strategy for Africa 2016–2025, also known as CESA 16-25 (African Union Commission, 2017). It is through a strong political will and motivation that CESA 16-25 is premised to lift a large section of Africa's population out of poverty, reduce inequalities, gender disparity and empower the African citizens to be innovative, address continental challenges and promote global competitiveness. CESA 16-25 creates a conducive learning environment at all levels including informal and non-formal settings, while in the process revitalises education systems, and ensures quality and relevance. It further promotes access to education by reaching large numbers of students and professionals and taking advantage of nonconventional methods such as the use of technologies and ICTs. Strategic partnerships are key to the implementation of CESA 16-25. The African Union has set up a Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government Champions for Education, Science and Technology. The African Union has also established the Pan African University and has set up its E-University. The Union is also expanding Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) opportunities at both secondary and tertiary levels, and also institutionalise the School Feeding programme which the African Union celebrates on every 1st of March. Such is Africa's journey towards 2030 and beyond to 2063 for "the Africa we want" (UN Office of the Special Advisor for Africa, 2016).

Strategic partnerships

Through these strategic partnerships, those responsible for the implementation of CESA 16-25 are assigned to "reorient Africa's education and training systems to

meet the knowledge, competencies, skills, innovation and creativity required to nurture African core values and promote sustainable development at national, sub-regional and continental levels". The goal of CESA 1625 lies on the creation of a new context favourable to the full inclusion of education among the priorities of the AU, the RECs and member states. To this end, the African Union will examine and address the current communication gaps. These will include looking into the actual differences between ratifications, domestication and implementation of the various treaties on education, as well as the insufficient commitment on the part of governments to fully implement policies and plans in pursuit of the international targets of the SDGs, Agenda 2063 and CESA 16-25.

The African Union will work with traditional partners and will also emphasise on South-South cooperation for the implementation of the agendas (African Union, 2016). The AU will also ensure political leadership in the orientation and agenda setting of the activities of CESA 16-25, emphasising on communicating the principles of the Continental Strategy well to its member states and at the international level. The AU will also ensure the choice of priorities in investment and action, the formulation and adoption of the implementation of programs and projects, the mobilisation and the distribution of resources, and the monitoring and validation of results (RACA Report of Annual Continental Activities - African Union Commission HRST Department, 2017).

New challenges

Some challenges remain. These constitute ensuring that we have credible consultation processes. We must also prioritise our funding and keep it in line with our continental development aspirations. Donor coordination is another area that needs greater attention as Africans can no longer leave their fate to be decided by external donors. Finally, we must strengthen capacities at all levels and ensure proper implementation of projects and programmes, and develop active monitoring and evaluation systems that feedback into the policymaking process.

Planning implementation of global agendas at the national level

Planning experiences in many African countries point to some overarching and specific guidelines for development planners and policymakers.

We may bear the following issues in mind as we attempt to ensure that planning and implementation take place at the country level.

- "Development planning is vital for developing countries because the task of addressing market failure should not go to the invisible hand of the market.
- There is no substitute for an active and committed leadership to guide development planning in Africa. Such administration also must act to ensure inclusiveness and to involve all stakeholder groups. Moreover, commitment and ownership are of critical importance for good leadership.
- There is no one-size-fits-all approach to development planning. Strategies that work for one country may not necessarily work for another. Furthermore, for any

given country, procedures that work at one point in time may not be appropriate at another point in time.

- Stability is critical for successful planning. Discontinuities, including those caused by regime changes and changes of government, have contributed to implementation failures in Africa.
- Political commitment is crucial for nurturing a healthy central planning establishment. The primary stages of the planning process call for this as the effectiveness of the central planning body will depend on the political commitment to nurture and sustain it.
- A country can rely on aid while owning and leading its development process by constructing a sound development plan with a clear set of priorities and assigning donors to specific sectors of development. The country must also have a firm commitment to the defined development goals.

The specific planning-related guidelines fall into the following three categories: comprehensive planning, effective planning and corrective planning." (UNECA, 2016: XIV-XV)

Comprehensive planning enhances sustainability and can avert social unrest
- "Establishing traditional mechanisms for stakeholder engagement promotes and sustains inclusiveness.
- Large private companies should be given an essential role during consultations to design a development plan, as private sector associations do not always represent the full range of opinions within the sector.
- Predetermining a development agenda undermines the integrity of the consultation process.
- Restricting the scope for consultation on the macroeconomic framework is counterproductive and undermines ownership." (UNECA, 2016: XV)

Effective implementation
- "Central planning agencies must be assigned equal importance to finance ministries, to ensure the effective coordination and alignment of resources with development priorities.
- In designing a development plan, the central Government should provide broad guidance, and should then leave it to the lower levels of Government to develop detailed strategies for implementation.
- Decentralized approaches to planning promote grassroots participation and enhance continuity in plan implementation." (UNECA, 2016: XV)

Corrective planning: monitoring and evaluation
- "The coordination of a decentralised monitoring and evaluation system is the necessary precondition for satisfactory achievements in plan implementation; integrated monitoring and evaluation systems are key to the avoidance of frag-

mented planning implementation. Monitoring and evaluation systems must orientate to both domestic stakeholders and development partners." (UNECA, 2016: XV)

More work to improve planning

In short, more action is required to develop the planning frameworks in Africa to translate development aspirations and priorities into concrete results. We suggest further work in the following areas:

- Support the strengthening of national capacities to design, implement and monitor useful planning frameworks.
- There still exists data challenges. The effectiveness of national planning systems hinges mostly on the availability and quality of data. Reliable data are essential to inform the setting of priorities and to facilitate the tracking of performance.
- Another vital aspect is coordination. Coordination is essential between ministries of finance and the ministries or entities in charge of development planning, among others. Such coordination will ensure better linkages in the planning cycles to those of the budget, and hence providing effective implementation of the national development plan.
- We can also leverage our development planning capacities by developing mechanisms for peer learning and experience sharing.
- A network of development planners that includes an electronic platform that will serve as a repository of literature current research related to development planning is necessary. This platform will also include forums for discussion and exchange of ideas and experiences related to all aspects of the plan.
- Africa's rough experience with development planning in the past is ceding ground to a more positive outlook for the future. Indeed, there are some excellent examples of success stories among African countries, which graduated from low-income countries to middle-income countries (Cape Verde, Ghana, Zambia, and Botswana).
- Also, some African countries such as Ethiopia, Nigeria and Uganda have adopted long-term development visions and planning frameworks with far more aggressive growth and social development objectives with further detailed policies and strategies than what we typically see in PRSPs. (Based on Lopes, 2013)

4. Keys to success

(a) Encourage training collaborations: Large investors that are looking strategically at Africa have a strong incentive in building up the skill sets of potential employees to maximise commercial efficiency, and some companies are investing in collaborative partnerships with governments and educational institutions. More governments and private companies are looking to collaborate to expand training opportunities for midcareer officials and personnel in technical areas such as procurement, management and planning.

(b) *Build regional labour pools:* A core element of regional integration and economic competitiveness is the ability of labour to move smoothly across borders.

Visa requirements for intra-African migration are among the most restrictive in the world (African Development Bank Group, 2013). Large international companies that are looking at long-term engagement in Africa are willing to make considerable investments in local workforce development. But for newer players, in sectors that are less commercially certain, the substantial up-front investments in training and the constraints on hiring top-line personnel may serve as a deterrent. Visa restrictions and local content regulations limit opportunities to draw on a larger talent pool but also cost national economies in long-term competitiveness.

Intraregional labour mobility and local hire requirements are often politically charged issues, as policymakers seek to protect domestic employment opportunities. But restricting cross-border movement may also limit the entry of regional entrepreneurs and investors who can create jobs, bring expertise and know-how, and help develop new industries. Ultimately, the onus remains on African governments to be strategic and balanced in setting the terms of their relationship with international companies and investors, and these decisions must reside on sound analysis and understanding of short- and long-term consequences.

(c) *Reach out to the diaspora*: The African diaspora offers a significant pool of talent and technical expertise that can be harnessed to build capacity on the continent (Benton, 2007). As Africa's fortunes continue to rise, many in the diaspora are looking at investment and employment opportunities in their countries of origin, with global firms benefiting. Many in the African diaspora have the technical and managerial skills their home countries lack and can further support economic growth through their knowledge of foreign private sectors. Many programmes shape around short-term stints in the state of origin, for example, the Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association, which works to support health care in Ethiopia through biannual missions and transfer of knowledge, skills and state-of-the-art technology (*Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association Inc., n.d.*).

(d) *Invest in the workforce of the future:* Africa is not in reality short of talented individuals with entrepreneurial skills and business know-how. But investors often cite the lack of managerial and leadership skills, as well as a shortage of STEM skills (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) among the African workforce.

A central priority, if African governments are to lay the ground for long-term sustained growth and competitiveness, must be to improve the accessibility and quality of education at primary and secondary levels. Learning availability with quality is a fundamental requirement to nurture and build a pool of graduates with solid practical skills, capacity to adapt to new industries and a grounding in national development priorities. With increasing constraints on public funding and foreign development assistance, expanding both the reach and quality of the educational system will be a significant challenge and a fiscal burden. But the longer-term costs

of failed education systems should prompt greater urgency in finding efficiencies, strengthening quality assurance and oversight, and looking to new technologies and partnerships to expand educational opportunities.

Several new initiatives are underway to boost tertiary education levels in Africa at the regional level. I have already mentioned the Pan African University (*Pan African University, n.d.*). This university was launched by the African Union in 2011, creating centres of excellence at regional hub universities open to high-performing students from across Africa, in fields like science, technology, energy and earth sciences. The World Bank has taken a similar regional approach, working to strengthen elite higher education institutions in West and Central Africa to concentrate more on training and applied research in areas such as water, infrastructure, hospitality industries, banking and information and communication technology, the sectors of growth and opportunity in the coming decades (The World Bank, 2017).

5. The path ahead

African governments have a window in which to prepare the ground for long-term growth, and maximise current investment and finance opportunities, as well as make the up-front investments that will drive economic transformation. Our governments in Africa, the private sector and civil society all have a role to play. The government must help push the process through a clearly articulated long-term vision. Such a course must constitute a business environment that promotes economic competitiveness, regulatory rules and enforcement capacities that protect citizens and the environment. Governments must also have a robust investment in the well-being and education of their citizens. Private investors, too, should look to the long-term if they want to accelerate and ultimately benefit from the great opportunities on the horizon. Universities, think tanks and advocacy groups can play a critical role in providing strategic analysis and vision, informing public debate and highlighting emerging models of progress and success. And African citizens themselves can build constituencies for reform and oversight that ensure that benefits and opportunity get equitable distribution and which hold government and private sector to account.

Africa is at an exciting stage in its development journey, and the expectations are that the continent will soon become a new pole of global growth. Africa must, nevertheless, continue to plan its development trajectory and also increase its policy space. The continent's leaders must make prudent decisions about the appropriate strategies that the continent will need to attain economic growth and structural transformation. Failing to plan means planning to fail. ☀

Bibliography

- African Development Bank Group. (2016). *Leaders underscore urgent need to create jobs for African youth through agriculture, ICT, industry.* https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/leaders-underscore-urgent-need-to-create-jobs-for-african-youth-through-agriculture-ict-industry-15724/ [02.02.2019]
- African Development Bank Group. (2013). *Visa restrictions and economic consequences in Africa.* https://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/visa-restrictions-and-economic-consequences-in-africa-11987/ [02.02.2019]
- African Union. (2014). Agenda 2063. https://au.int/en/agenda2063 [02.02.2019]
- African Union. (2014b). *Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa.* http://africapolicyreview.com/science-technology-and-innovation-strategy-for-africa-2024-stisa-2024/
- African Union. (2016). *Implementation of the Continental Education Strategy for Africa.* Planning Meeting June 2016, http://download.ei-ie.org/Docs/WebDepot/ConceptPlanning-Meeting_CESA16-25.pdf [02.02.2019]
- African Union Commission (AUC). (2018). *Africa's Development Dynamics 2018: Growth, Jobs and Inequalities.* Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/africa-s-development-dynamics-2018_9789264302501-en#page1 [02.02.2019]
- African Union Commission. (2017). *Continental Education Strategy for Africa 2016-2025.* CESA Journal Online, https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33863-doc-cesa_journal_vol2_final.pdf [02.02.2019]
- African Union Commission, Human Development, Education, Science Technology and Innovation, and Youth, Report of Annual Continental Activities, 2017 - RACA_2017.pdf.
- AIMS. (2019). *The Science, Technology & Innovation Strategy for Africa 2024 (STISA-2024). AOSP & AGORA efforts in support of its implementation through facilitation of relevant data access.* https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/33178-wd-stisa-english_-_final.pdf
- Al Jazeera. (2015). *Why are coups common in Africa?* https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2015/09/coups-common-africa-150917161949909.html [02.02.2019]
- Ali, A. A. G. (2011). *Development Planning in Africa: Key Issues, Challenges and Prospects.* UN Economic and Social Council, https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-documents/CoM/cfm2011/com2011_developmentplanning-inafricakeyissueschallengesandprospects_en.pdf [02.02.2019]
- Ali, M. (2014). Youth unemployment: A global security challenge, *Harvard International Review*, http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=7296 [02.02.2019]
- Atta-Asamoah, A. (n.d.). *Youth of Africa: Unemployment, social cohesion and political instability.* UNICEF, https://www.unicef-irc.org/article/1060-youth-of-africa-unemployment-social-cohesion-and-political-instability.html [02.02.2019]
- Beegle, K., Christiaensen, L., Dabalen, A. and Gaddis, I. (2016). *Poverty in a Rising Africa.* The World Bank.
- Benton, S. (2007). *Harness African diaspora's expertise to benefit continent.* https://www.skillsportal.co.za/content/harness-african-diasporas-expertise-benefit-continent [02.02.2019]
- Cooke, J. G. and Downie, R. (2014). *Africa at a Crossroads – Overcoming the Obstacles to Sustained Growth and Economic Transformation.* CSIS, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140417_Cooke_AfricaAtCrossroads_WEB.pdf [02.02.2019]
- Dewan, S. and Bernhardt, J. (2012). *Creating Just Jobs Must Be Our Top Priority.* Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2012/11/15/45121/creating-just-jobs-must-be-our-top-priority/ [02.02.2019]
- Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association Inc. (n.d.) https://www.guidestar.org/profile/38-3520786 [02.02.2019]
- FocusEconomics. (n.d.). https://www.focus-economics.com/ [02.02.2019]

- FocusEconomics. (2019). *Sub-Saharan Africa Economic Outlook, 2018*. https://www.focus-economics.com/online-store/products/annual-subscription/sub-saharan-africa [02.02.2019]
- Grigsby, V. A. H. and Perez, F. J. (2007). *Structural Implications of Economic Liberalization on Agriculture and Rural Development*. RuralStruc Program – Phase I, Jan 2007. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/RuralStruc-NICARAGUA_phase1.pdf [02.02.2019]
- IMF. (2016). *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers* (PRSP). www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.aspx [02.02.2019]
- Karar, E. and Pietersen, K. (2009). *Challenges for human capital development and technological innovations in the South African water sector*. Development Bank of Southern Africa, Development Planning Division Working Paper Series No. 13, https://www.dbsa.org/EN/About-Us/Publications/Documents/DPD%20No13.%20Challenges%20for%20human%20capital%20development%20and%20technological%20innovations%20in%20the%20South%20African%20water%20sector.pdf [02.02.2019]
- Kirba, D. (2014). *The challenging opportunity of Africa's rising workforce*. https://www.devex.com/news/the-challenging-opportunity-of-africa-s-rising-workforce-84628 [02.02.2019]
- Leke, A., Lund, S., Roxburgh, Charles and Wamelen, A. (2010). *What's driving Africa's growth*. McKinsey & Company, https://www.mckinsey.com/.../whats-driving-africas-growth [02.02.2019]
- Lopes, C. (2013). *50 years of Development Planning in Africa: Retrospect and Prospects*. South Centre, https://www.southcentre.int/question/50-years-of-development-planning-in-africa-retrospect-and-prospects/ [02.02.2019]
- Munang, R. and Mgendi, R. (2004). *Addressing the Youth Bulge in Africa*. This is Africa, Fresh Insights on Africa by Africans, www.thisisafrica.me [02.02.2019]
- Newsday. (2017). *Role of government in addressing Africa's business challenges*. https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/08/role-government-addressing-africas-business-challenges/ [02.02.2019]
- Ngwenya, S. N. (n.d.). *Institutional Arrangements and Policy Issues in Regional Co-Operation in the Transport Sector in Africa*. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/AAPAM/UNPAN026477.pdf [02.02.2019]
- Nyamongo, I. K. and Shilabukha, D. K. (2017). *State of Africa's Population 2017*. The African Union Commission, https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/32187-wd-state_of_africas_population_-_sa19093_-e.pdf [02.02.2019]
- Pan African University. (n.d.). https://pau-au.net [02.02.2019]
- Persaud, A. (2016). *Integrated Planning for Education and Development*. Background paper prepared for the 2016 Global Education Monitoring Report, UNESCO & Global Education Monitoring Report.
- Porter, S. and Goldman, I. (2013). A growing demand for monitoring and evaluation in Africa. *African Evaluation Journal* **1**, 1-9.
- Soludo, C. C. and Mkandawire, T. (Eds.). (2003). *African Voices on Structural Adjustment*. IDRC, https://www.idrc.ca/sites/default/files/openebooks/888-0/index.html [02.02.2019]
- The STEM Workforce Challenge. (2007). *Employment and Training Administration by Jobs for the Future*. https://www.doleta.gov/youth_services/pdf/STEM_Report_4 07.pdf [02.02.2019]
- The World Bank. (2016). *Development Policies, Institutions Improve in Few African Countries*. http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/development-policies-institutions-improve-in-few-african-countries [02.02.2019]
- The World Bank. (2018). *Global Economic Prospects: Sub-Saharan Africa*. https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/brief/global-economic-prospects-sub-saharan-africa-2018 [02.02.2019]
- The World Bank. (2017). *Tertiary Education Overview*. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/tertiaryeducation [02.02.2019]
- Toh, K. (2016). *Emerging Growth Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa*. SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0569434516652041 [02.02.2019]

- Twarmagazine. (2016). *The Need for African Economic Integration*. http://twarmagazine.com/the-need-for-african-economic-integration/ [02.02.2019]
- Tsoungui et al. (1995). *Structural Adjustment and Sustainable Development in Cameroon*. Working Paper 83. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7002.pdf [02.02.2019]
- UN. (2015). Youth population trends and sustainable development. *POPFACTS* **1**, 1-4. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/YouthPOP.pdf [02.02.2019]
- UN Office of the Special Advisor for Africa. (2016). *Implementing Agenda 2063 and Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development in an Integrated and Coherent Manner in Africa: Moving Forward* (21 September 2016). https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/events/2016/mdg-tosdgagenda2063.shtml [02.02.2019]
- UN Women. (2017). *The Sustainable development Goals and Agenda 2063*. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2441UNWomenSDGReport.pdf [02.02.2019]
- UNDP Technical Support Team. (n.d.). *Needs of Countries in Special Situations – African Countries, Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, as well as the specific challenges facing Middle-Income Countries*. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2080TST%20Issues%20Brief%20on%20Countries%20in%20Special%20situations_Final_14_Nov.pdf [02.02.2019]
- UNECA. (2011). *Development Planning in Africa: Key Issues, Challenges and Prospects: A background paper.* https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-documents/CoM/cfm2011/com2011_developmentplanning-inafricakeyissueschallengesandprospects_en.pdf [02.02.2019]
- UNECA. (1996). *Overview of Economic and Social Development in Africa – ECA*. https://www.uneca.org/cfm1996/pages/overview-economic-and-social-development-africa [02.02.2019]
- UNECA. (2016). *Planning for Africa's Development: Lessons, Insights and Messages from Past and Present Experiences*. https://www.uneca.org/publications/planning-africa%E2%80%99s-development [02.02.2019]
- *UNESCO. (2016). Swaziland 2016 report. National Development Strategy (NDS) 2022*. https://en.unesco.org/creativity/policy-monitoring-platform/national-development-strategy-nds [02.02.2019]
- UNESCO. (2018). *Global Education Monitoring Report 2018*. Available at: https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/taxonomy/term/209
- UNESCO Institute of Statistics. (2014) *World Inequality Database on Education 2014* Available at: https://www.education-inequalities.org/; https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/statistics
- World Economic Forum. (2016). *3 reasons things are looking up for African economies*. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/what-s-the-future-of-economic-growth-in-africa/ [02.02.2019]
- World Economic Forum. (2013). *Strategic Infrastructure in Africa: A business approach to Project Acceleration*. https://www.weforum.org/reports/strategic-infrastructure-africa [02.02.2019]
- World Population Review. (2019). *Africa Population 2019*. http://worldpopulationreview.com/continents/africa-population/ [02.02.2019]

FEMALE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN EAC STATES[1]

JUDIT BAGI

UNIVERSITY OF PÉCS

Almost all East African Community (EAC) member states have more than 30 percent female MPs in their national parliaments: Rwanda (61.3%), Tanzania (37.2%), Burundi (36.4%), Uganda (34.3%), Kenya (21.8%), and South Sudan (28.5%). What could be the reason for the fact that all EAC countries, except Kenya, are above the so-called 'critical mass' in the field of female political representation? In the last decades, both conflict and political transition have emerged in EAC countries. During the post-conflict period, gender norms and values (with a focus on gender quota regulations) have been implemented into national policies. The newly established liberal constitutions and gender policy creation have affected the status of East African women positively, although there is a big difference between the states concerning the effectiveness of gender policy-making. My paper (with the help of my field trips in Arusha and Kigali in 2015 and 2016) intends to contribute to a better understanding of EAC countries in transition, with an emphasis on the changing role of women in society, particularly in the important fields of gender politics and political representation.

The female political representation of each country can only be understood and interpreted in its own context, especially in the case of Rwanda. It is very difficult to draw conclusions or find general principles that apply to all Sub-Saharan States. I still think that it is necessary to take a look at and elaborate on the female political representation in EAC member states, focusing on Uganda. The reason is that the EAC as a regional organization treats the five member states as a union, and it has a sophisticated gender strategy applied in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, and South Sudan.

The EAC is a regional cooperation between Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya (by this time South Sudan was not a member state). The EAC also defines reaching gender equality at all levels as one of its major priorities. The 4th EAC Gender and Community Development Strategic Plan contains the strategies and policies that are to be used in the period between 2012 and 2016 (East African Community, 2011). To increase the number of female MPs in the member states' national parliaments is also defined as one of the key principles or aims.

The figure below shows the ratio of female politicians in the national parliaments of EAC member states. Rwanda is not only the number one among EAC states, but also the world record holder with 61.3 percent of women MPs in its national parliament (IPU, 2018). Tanzania follows Rwanda with 37.2%, then comes Burundi (36.45%), Uganda (34.3%), South Sudan (28.5%), and Kenya (21.08%) (IPU, 2018). According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union's statistics, the ratio of female MPs in EAC member states is above (except Kenya) the so-called critical mass. (See the figure below).

In the next paragraph, I will give a short introduction to the quota policies of Tanzania, Burundi, Kenya, and South Sudan. The case of Rwanda and Uganda will be analyzed in more depth later.

Tanzania

According to the regulation of the constitution, since 2005, "women members must not make up less than 30% in the National Assembly. The special seats for women are distributed among the political parties in proportion to the number of seats awarded to them in parliament." (Constitution, Articles 66 (1b) and 78 (1)). As we can see from the wording of the constitution, Tanzania has a reserved seat quota type. The latest elections were in 2015. Currently, female MPs hold 145 seats among the total 390 mandates (IPU, 2018).

Burundi

As the constitution points out: "For every three candidates who appear consecutively on a list, only two can be of the same ethnic group and at least one out of every four candidates must be a woman" (Article 168 of the 2005 Constitution). "The National

Female Political Representation in the EAC States in 2018.
Self-Generated Figure Based on IPU Data
(Inter-Parliamentary Union World Classification, 2018)

Assembly is composed of 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi, including at least 30% women, as well as three deputies from the Twa ethnicity" (Article 164 (1) of the 2005 Constitution). Burundi, too, has a reserved seat quota type. The latest elections were held in June 2015. Right now there are 44 female MPs among the 121 representatives (IPU, 2018).

Kenya

Article 81 (b) of the Constitution of Kenya stipulates that the electoral system shall comply with the principle that "not more than two-thirds of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender". The Constitution also reserves 47 seats in the National Assembly for women deputies elected from 47 counties. The latest elections were organized in June 2017. Nowadays 76 seats out of 349 belong to female MPs. The Commonwealth Report criticizes Kenya's progress concerning female political representation. As the report points out, the "actualization of the two-thirds rule in elective bodies is still a challenge and the political landscape continues to be dominated by the men due to their big numbers in the parties." (The Commonwealth, 2016: 10)

South Sudan

South Sudan is the newest member of the EAC. The country joined the organization in 2016. As the Constitution of South Sudan states, 'All levels of government shall: promote women's participation in public life and their representation in the legislative and executive organs by at least twenty-five percent as an affirmative action to redress imbalances created by history, customs, and traditions' (The Constitution of South Sudan, 2011, Article 16 (4a)). '(…) twenty-five percent representing women members shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation at the national level from closed party lists and fifteen percent shall be elected through proportional representation at the national level from closed party lists' (Article 60 (2); National Elections Act of South Sudan, 2012). The latest elections were held in August 2016. There are 383 seats in the national parliament and 109 seats are currently occupied by women.

In the following section, the female political representation of Uganda and Rwanda will be analyzed. The comparison drawn between the female political representation of Rwanda and Uganda has already appeared in the works of Longman (2006: 139-140), Powley (2005: 159), and Burnet (2008: 367).

Uganda

According to the 1ˢᵗ clause of paragraph 78 of the Constitution of Uganda (1995), the 427 members of the parliament are elected as follows:
- 290 people: representatives elected directly by the majority in the constituencies
- 112 people: district female representatives
- 10 people: representatives of the Defense Forces of Uganda
- 5 people: representatives of handicapped people

- 5 people: representatives of employees
- (18 people: official representatives, ex-officio members. The deputy president or those ministers that were not elected as members of the parliament become ex-officio members. They have no right to vote.)

According to the new effective laws governing the elections in 1996, the inhabitants of the constituencies – instead of the electoral colleges – vote directly for the candidates; those are the 290 members mentioned above (Tripp, 2000: 231). The mandate of the unicameral parliament is for 5 years and the elections are carried out by simple majority voting. Officially, they have a multi-party system and hold democratic elections, but in reality, they have a sham democracy. According to paragraph 5 in the Constitution, all at least 18-year-old Ugandan citizens are allowed to vote. In fact, imprisoned and arrested citizens are not allowed to vote, even though the constitution does not restrict or forbid this right of theirs. Due to a modification in 2005, only those who register themselves are allowed to cast their votes (IFES, 2016: 1). Based on the same modification of the law, the president can be re-elected unlimited times.

Gender quota regulations and the status of women in Uganda
The first significant year concerning female political representation is 1989. During the elections that year, a party called National Resistance Council supported and encouraged women to become representatives in the parliament. As a result, 17% of their own politicians were women in the end (Kadaga, 2013: 8). This was a major breakthrough for women in Uganda, because, just like other African countries, the society of Uganda has also been strictly patriarchal. Women have had no possibilities to fill in any decision-making positions at both local and national level. 1989 made children-educating and family-feeding Ugandan women visible. The next important step was in 1995, when according to the 1b clause of paragraph 78 in the new constitution, every district had to elect at least one female politician. Since the country had 112 districts at this time (the number of districts and constituencies had been growing over the decades), female political representation had to mean minimum 112 representatives in the parliament (The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995). Female politicians are elected directly but separately from the 290 straight elected politicians. Every district that consists of 3 counties elects a

> **This was a major breakthrough for women in Uganda, because, just like other African countries, the society of Uganda has also been strictly patriarchal. Women have had no possibilities to fill in any decision-making positions at both local and national level.**

female politician (Kadaga, 2013: 10). In addition to the 112 mandates, minimum 2 positions out of the 5 representatives of the handicapped, employees and youth, respectively, had to be filled with female politicians. In case of the representatives of the defence forces, the number had to be minimum 3 out of 10. Apart from the prescribed number of positions for women, they also have the chance to get into the parliament from the constituencies with the majority of the votes. Unfortunately, there is still a considerable gap between the number of female and male candidates that are directly elected by the residents of the constituencies (WDG, 2016: 16). As it is shown, female representation in this area is only 15%. Based on the data from January 2017, there are 154 female politicians out of the 449 members of the parliament, which means 34% representation.

Tamale criticizes the quota system of Uganda as follows: The National Resistance Movement (NRM) is simply descriptive; it only provides a descriptive representation for female politicians. The state of Uganda was not developed enough to integrate a politician in the parliament that had real substantive representation and decision-making position. The problem of introducing the gender quota was enhanced by the fact that instead of keeping the number of mandates and share it again between men and women, they were simply keeping the original amount of male representatives and added female to it. The gender quota of Uganda was a top-down act, so female politicians had to integrate into a masculine political structure of a strictly patriarchal system. Most female politicians were appointed by the wise man of the districts in 1989. It is then clear that grass-root female movements were missing from the Ugandan society that would have helped women getting mandates through representing their own interests. The attitude of president Museveni is also not supporting the effective work of female politicians; he has several times emphasized that the gender quota in Uganda is not more than a symbolic gesture, just to show kindness to women (Tamale, 2004: 4-5).

The development of female politics of RPF and NRM
Powley and Longman separately analyze the relation between RPF and the women reacting to the genocide. They both agree that the government of Rwanda (RPF) treated the emancipation and integration of women into politics with high priority in the post-conflict peace-establishing process (Powley, 2005: 159; Longman 2006: 139). Women were not only appointed to high government positions but also to local decision-making ones. RPF opened the gate for female politicians, it has constantly been extending their rights to support the emancipation of Rwandan women. Both researchers draw a parallel between the RPF and the Ugandan National Resistance Movement led by Museveni. A strong aspect of this parallel is that RPF was formed in Uganda. RPF was set up by the Tutsi Rwandan refugees living in Uganda in 1980. In this period (the second legislative period of President Milton Obote), both Rwandan economical immigrants and refugees were continuously harassed. As an example, in 1982, many Rwandan refugees tried to go back to their home country from Uganda, but they were turned back by the soldiers of Habyarimana saying that there was not

enough land for them (Longman, 2006: 140). The importance of RPF being present in Uganda was that the Ugandan politics had an influence on them that resulted in parallel features in their structures and their gender politics (Powley, 2005: 159). The military branch of RPF, the Rwandan Patriotic Army had similar structures to the National Resistance Army of Museveni. RPA, just like NRA, defined itself as a party after taking the power in July 1994 (in the case of Rwanda). Both NRM and RPF made the extension of the rights of women and their integration into politics a high priority; and both states introduced a gender quota (Uo. 2006: 140). I discuss the comparison of the female political representation in the parliament of Uganda and Rwanda later.

It is sure that women did not only start to be an important part of the politics of RPF when they gained power in 1994, but also when RPF had still been a military organization in Uganda. (Powley, 2005: 159). Rose Kabuye was known as one of the confidants of Colonel Kagame, who served in the RPA. She was the mayor of Kigali in 1994, later she became a member of the parliament, where she was the leader of the Security and Defence Committee. Later on, she allegedly lost her position in Kagame's confidence circle, but she still held an influential position in the Political and Judicial Commission. Paul Kagame's first head advisor was also a woman, Soline Nyirahabimana. Apart from this position, she was also the member of the National Commission for Human Rights, and later on, she became an ambassador in Switzerland (Longman, 2006: 141-142). The strong female presence during the time spent as refugees in Uganda had created such a solid platform for women in Rwanda that made it possible to build on after the return of the RPF in the post-conflict period. As Powley mentions, liberal rhetoric and gender sensitivity were peculiar for the members of RPF, because Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda and Tutsi women experienced constant harassment, so they knew a lot about exclusion and discrimination (Powley, 2005: 159). The liberal constitutional process and gender-sensitive law-making were shadowed by the monocracy of the one-party system of RPF and NRM in Uganda. In this case, we can ask the question: to what extent did RPF and NRM want to legitimize their own authoritarian power by withholding the promotion of gender issues? Next, I discuss the steps taken in reality to extend female rights and female political representation.

Political role-taking of women in Rwanda[2]
I made field research in Rwanda in 2015 and 2016. I made in-depth interviews with the qualitative method and I chose my interviewees with the snowball method[3]. I made three groups based on a thematic structure. The third group contains interviews with national and international civil organizations, but they are not involved in this paper because of space limitations.

Interviews made with members of the parliament
I focused on finding out what motivated my interviewees to choose a political career (e.g.: Did the 30% quota have any influence on it?). Had they ever encountered any

situations where the fact that they were women was either an advantage or disadvantage? What gender equality programs were they working on and what civil organizations were they cooperating with?

Interviews made with government agencies
Apart from the questions asked about the activities of the institutions, I focused on the resistance to the gender programs and the effectiveness of the work in the rural, underdeveloped areas. Could each Rwandan citizen equally profit from the programs of the given institutions? It was important that according to my interviewees the main achievements (by the institutions) since the 1994 genocide were the biggest problems to be solved.

In the history of Rwanda and the advocacy of women, it is important to mention that gender equality and female advocacy have been highly emphasized since the genocide in 1994 and by the norms of the new, ratified constitution in 2003. One of the reasons is the demographic disproportion caused by the genocide because 70% of the society were women and girls (JEEAR4, 1996: 29). There were also several widows or women who lost everything, thus, they had to find a way to provide their remaining healthy or handicapped family members with everything they need. It must also be mentioned that apart from the abovementioned reasons it was very important for Paul Kagame to show the international community that Rwanda stood for democratic values where female political representation and advocacy had been an important element during the restoration period. The government had a lot to do to establish gender equality after the genocide since Rwanda was strictly patriarchal, where women were definitely subordinated to men before new laws and regulations in the 1990s. Women, apart from taking care of their family members, were not allowed to inherit or possess land or take a loan from a bank. A drastic and fast intervention was necessary in order to provide equal rights for Rwandan men and women at least on the legal level.

The period between 1994 and 2003 is called the post-conflict or interim period, during which huge steps were made towards establishing the legal and social equality between Rwandan men and women thanks to the active work of the international and local civil organizations and politicians. Rwanda was declared to be a presidential democracy in the new constitution in 2003. They held the first democratic elections. The constitutional quota prescribes a 30% female representation in the parliament. The Senate consists of 26 members, out of 12 are elected by local councils, 4 are appointed by the Forum of Political Organizations, 8 are

> **In the history of Rwanda and the advocacy of women, it is important to mention that gender equality and female advocacy have been highly emphasized since the genocide in 1994 and by the norms of the new, ratified constitution in 2003.**

appointed by the president, and 2 are delegated by the universities. Therefore, 53 out of 80 members of the House of Representatives are elected directly. 24 female representatives are elected by local organizations. (This alone ensures the 30% female representation. In addition to this, parties apply a quota for women on their party list.) Two representatives are appointed by youth organizations and one is delegated by the organizations of the handicapped. The example of Rwanda perfectly demonstrates that the most successful and effective way to increase the ratio of the female representatives is to set up a quota in the constitution (Rwanda's Constitution, 2003: Article 75).

Apart from the positive changes, it must be emphasized that the international community still doubts whether the political system of Rwanda is democratic. According to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the political system of Rwanda is reported to be oppressive and authoritarian, where the opposition has no real influence on the politics of Paul Kagame and his party in power since the genocide. On the other hand, the UN recognizes the achievements of Rwanda, Paul Kagame is a regular lecturer at events and conferences of these organizations about establishing gender equality. We can observe an ambivalent relationship between international organizations and Rwanda. Female politicians and members of civil organizations achieved several modifications in the legal system that supported the emancipation of women. I would like to highlight some of these modified laws (Government of Rwanda, 2016: 11):

1. Law 59/2008 states that violence against women must be punished;
2. Law 43/2013 states that man and women have equal right to use and possess land;
3. Law 27/2001 protects the rights of children and punishes violence against them;
4. Law 10/20/2013 forbids all gender, race or religious discrimination within the parties;
5. Law 13/2009 states that male and female employees have the same right at their working place and must receive the same payment for the same job, and sexual harassment at the working place must be punished;
6. Law 12/2013 states that the budget of Rwanda should be gender-sensitive, which means that the effect of the different resource allocations and program-efficiency must be measurable in the impact on society.

The Rwandan Gender Machinery
Establishing and sustaining gender equality in Rwanda are achieved by a system of institutions, the Gender Machinery, resting on 4 pillars that are the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, the Gender Monitoring Office, the National Women´s Council, and the Forum of Rwandan Women Parliamentarians. I will introduce their general activities briefly, then their current activities based on the interviews, and finally, I will summarize their achievements and their current problems to be solved.

1. Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEPROF): Gained its name in 2005, but the ministry itself was founded in 1994 after the genocide in order to create a frame of institutions for the organizations establishing gender equality.

My interviewee, Batete Redempter, Director of Gender Promotion in the ministry, told me that the most important activities in the ministry are the expansion of the capacities within each sector and the further professional education of the employees. According to Redempter, gender sensitivity is not an innate property of the society. The establishment of equality between men and women is a long process, so it is very important that the employees of the ministry are professionally well-educated. She named the involvement and the treatment of Rwandan men as partners as one of the main challenges. According to her, President Kagame is a very good example in this matter since he is one of the determining figures of the UN campaign "He for She", and he is a regular lecturer at international forums. The program was launched in 2015 and it focuses on three major areas: the support of participation of girls in the info-communicational market, their chance to attend vocational and technical schools, and to curb the violence against women. As a critical point, she mentioned the high rate of poverty among women, and illiteracy, especially among middle-aged women. The main problem with illiterate women is that they do not know their rights and they are not able to ask for help in case they experience violence. To my question concerning how the ministry reaches them the answer was the strong cooperation with NWC. As a structured institution, it is present down to the village level. For example, a village of 100 inhabitants has 7 representatives of NWC.

2. National Women's Council (NWC): organizes, mobilizes, and supports the participation of Rwandan women in national development. It has councils at local level.

3. Gender Monitoring Office (GMO): It is not only active in the state sector but also in the private, economic, political, and civil sector. They register and measure the effectiveness of national and international gender strategies and programs; then they write reports based on various indicators. I asked my interviewee, Cyizanye Allen (Director of Violence and Injustice Committed Against Women Monitoring Department) about the currently most important project. She highlighted the province-level monitoring of stopping violence against women. Their aim is to compare the effectiveness of different provinces. They are, of course, in a tight cooperation with the other institutions of the Gender Machinery and they also send data to the ministry to prepare a gender-sensitive budget. Allen also highlighted the organization of gender-sensitive audits in the private and civil sector, during which they control how a company or a hotel keep the laws and regulations concerning male and female equality. To my question concerning the situation of the women living in poverty in rural areas, she mentioned that a high number of these women endure violence, so they still have a lot to do in this area. According to her, the main goal is to make the whole society understand what male and female equality means. She mentioned that apart from the effective work, such stereotypes that women are homemakers are still strong. She said that the society still considers it taboo or even men express their displeasure if a woman, previously working in the household, starts a political career. The third

challenge next to poverty and cultural stereotypes is to integrate men in gender programs. Men still have the misunderstanding that gender questions are only the problem of women.

4. Forum for Women Parliamentarians in Rwanda (FFRP): It was founded in 1996. Its goal is to fight for women's rights, to support female role-taking in politics and in the society, and to take measures against the violence against women. This forum discusses only questions concerning women, and the male and female representatives are without political affiliation. FFRP has currently 91 members, out of these 29 are men. The 24 elected women to the parliament are automatically members of the FFRP. These female politicians are independent representatives as prescribed in the constitution, but during the interviews, I had the feeling that they were RPF sympathizers. Most of my interviewees felt the need to help their fellow citizens and local communities after the genocide. We can talk about the appearance of a sense of mission. Most women completed their university studies abroad (e.g. in Uganda or Senegal), but this sense of mission motivated them to return to Rwanda. Their Tutsi played a major role in staying and completing their studies abroad. The compulsory 30% quota was an additional motivation for them to choose a political career. They all had to face the problems deriving from the stereotypes of traditional female roles. One of my interviewees told me that she had to fight for a long time not to have stage fright when she had to talk in front of a crowd. Another representative's marriage ended in divorce, because instead of doing the household chores, she chose to be a politician. My third interviewee had to learn to drive the motorbike to be able to go to the neighboring village to campaign. They all said that there was no resistance against gender strategies in the rural areas. As the interviewees at other institutions, they also named the mindset as a need; the society must understand that the gender issue is not only the problem of women, but it is the interest of the whole society. They named Agathe Uwilingiyimana and Aloise Inyumba as female role models.

It is visible that these four organizations do an outstanding job in establishing equality between men and women. I highlighted only the critical points of the answers of my interviewees because of space limitations and because their strategies are available on the internet or in other publications. In the end, I would like to highlight that the laws

I would like to highlight that the laws and regulations of the past 20 years have redefined the role of Rwandan women in the society. The reason why the work to establish equality between men and women is so effective is that the all-powerful state considers it as one of its main tasks and stands fully behind it.

and regulations of the past 20 years have redefined the role of Rwandan women in the society. The reason why the work to establish equality between men and women is so effective is that the all-powerful state considers it as one of its main tasks and stands fully behind it. The emancipation of women is some kind of national image. The representatives of GMO, MIGERPRO, and FFRP were eager to talk about their achievements. My experience during the interviews was that my interviewees liked putting Rwanda in a position as if it would have managed all gender-related activities on its own, but in reality, the international community takes a big (financial) role also. The citizens of the country have not yet been able to adjust to this extremely fast progress. The institutions are conscious about this; that is the reason why all representatives of GMO, MIGERPROF, and FFRP said that "it is a procedure that has not yet come to an end".

As a conclusion, we can point out that Rwanda can be an example for other African countries in the sense of gender-sensitive policy-making. It is a fact that the Rwandan society still has to overcome traditional patriarchal beliefs. The shift from a strictly patriarchal society cannot happen in such a short time. It is also important to emphasize that there is still much work to do on the practical level to achieve gender equality. On the other hand, we can state that Rwanda has produced the best result not only among EAC countries but in the Sub-Saharan African context as well. ☀

Notes

1   EMBERI ERŐFORRÁSOK Supported by the ÚNKP-17-3 -IV.-PTE-277 New National Excellence Program of the Ministry of Human Capacities.
2   This part of the article is up to be released in Hungarian language in '*Afrikai nők politikai és társadalmi helyzete*' In Afrika a globalizált világban - lehetőségek és kihívások, Dialóg Campus Kiadó.
3   According to Earl Babbie, the snowball method is when the researcher collects data from a given group of the population and then asks them to provide them with the contact data of other known members of the same population. Babbie recommends to apply this method to examine political groups (Babbie, 2008: 206-207) , which is relevant in our case.

Bibliography

- Africa Election Guide. (2016). http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2754/ [05.02.2018]
- Amnesty International (2017). *International Annual Report on Rwanda (2016/2017).* https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/rwanda/report-rwanda/ [05.05.2018]
- Babbie, E. (2008). *A társadalomtudományi kutatás gyakorlata.* [The Practice of Social Science Research] Balassi Kiadó, Budapest.
- East African Community. (2011). *EAC Strategic Plan for Gender, Youth, Children, Persons with Disability, Social Protection and Community Development (2012-2016).* https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/MONOGRAPH/94021/110206/F705470476/INT-94021.pdf [03.25.2018]
- Electoral Commission Uganda. (2016). http://www.ec.or.ug/?q=content/2016-general-elections-statistics [28.04.2018]
- Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2016). *Uganda Parliament. Last elections.* http://archive.ipu.org/Parline/reports/2329_E.htm [04.25.2018]

- Inter-Parliamentary Union World Classification. (2018). http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm [03.25.2018]
- Kadaga, R. (2013). Women's political leadership in East Africa with specific reference to Uganda. In: Robertson and Jones-Parry, R. (Eds.). *Commonwealth Governance Handbook 2013/14: Democracy, development and public administration 2013-2014,* 32-36. http://www.commonwealthgovernance.org/assets/uploads/2013/11/6-Womens-political-leadership-east-africa.pdf [02.03.2018]
- National Elections Act of South Sudan. (2012). Act. No. 39. Juba, April, 2012. http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/SS/south-sudan-the-national-elections-act-no.-39-of/at_download/file [02.15.2018]
- Parliament of the Republic of Uganda. (n.d.). http://www.parliament.go.ug/new/index.php/about-parliament/composition-of-parliament [02.15.2018]
- Republic of Uganda Electoral Commission. (2016). http://www.ec.or.ug/docs/Report%20on%20the%202015-2016%20General%20Elections.pdf [04.20.2018]
- Steering Committee of Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR4). (1996). *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience: Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda*. Study 4, Copenhagen.
- Tamale, S. (2004). *Introducing Quotas in Africa: Discourse and Legal Reform in Uganda*. http://www.quotaproject.org/CS/CS_Uganda_Tamale-6-6-2004.pdf [04.20.2018]
- Tarrósy, I. (2011). *Kelet-Afrika a fejlődés* útján. [East Africa on the Road to Development] Publikon Kiadó, Pécs.
- The Commonwealth. (2018). *Uganda. Constitution and politics.* http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/uganda/constitution-politics [22.04.2018]
- The Constitution of Burundi. (2005). https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2005.pdf [03.25.2018]
- The Constitution of Kenya. (2008). http://www.kttc.ac.ke/images/Constitution_of_Kenya.pdf [03.25.2018]
- The Constitution of South Sudan. (2011). https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2011.pdf [03.25.2018]
- The Constitution of Tanzania. (2005). http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/tz/tz008en.pdf [03.25.2018]
- The Electoral Commission. General Parliamentary Elections 2016. http://www.ec.or.ug/sites/default/files/docs/Gazette%20List%20Elected%20MPs%202016.pdf [03.20.2018]
- Tripp, A. M. (2000). *Women & Politics in Uganda*. The University of Wisconsin Press, USA.
- Women's Democracy Group. (2016). *Report on Gender and Women's Participation in the 2016 Elections in Uganda (2016).* http://www.cewigo.org/sites/default/files/reports/second_report_on_gender_and_womens_participation_in_2016_elections-nov_2015-jan_2016.pdf [03.19.2018]

SNAPSHOTS ABOUT EAST AFRICA'S EDUCATION SYSTEM

REVIEWS FROM PRIMARY SCHOOL STUDENTS AND COLLEGE STUDENTS ABOUT THE SPIRIT OF FAIR PLAY

GABRIELLA HIDEG

ESZTERHÁZY KÁROLY UNIVERSITY

This paper focuses on the East African country, Kenya, and its education system, which is exotic from the Hungarian point of view.

The aim of my study was to present the historical development of education in Kenya, and the odds and limits appearing within it, based on the available literature. It becomes visible that access to education is not given equally to everyone, regardless of which level of education we examine. This becomes really interesting and unique if we ask primary school students and college students about fair play and its content in such an imbalanced and even unequal system.

As a test method, I used the analysis of literature and a questionnaire survey, which was based on a random sampling method. The questionnaire contains 17 questions including 15 closed and 2 open questions. Questions covers the content of fair play, interest in sport, and in addition to these, the responses about behaving in different competitive situations and judging actions as well. The data obtained were summarized with simple mathematical and statistical methods.

As an expected result, we get closer to a foreign, unknown country in an educational/historical and pedagogical point of view. The results of the questionnaire survey, which measure the segments of the two different levels of the Kenyan education system, show the opinion of students about fair play.

1. Introduction

Kenya was once a British colony, nowadays it is a rapidly developing country with world-class hotels and shopping centres on one side of the road, while privation and poverty show its cruel face on the other side. It is a country where internal fighting and political riots are ongoing, corruption creates significant challenges, and where terrorist organizations (which even break into universities and young people are slaughtered because of their religious affiliation) are increasingly appearing.

Kenya's education system can be approached from several sides: we can examine ethnic and territorial differences, financial expenditures, and the nature of Kenyan

free education, but all current achievements and consequences derive from the beginnings through educational policy development.

Our research questions were formulated as follows. What does education system mean? How is each level divided? Is education free? If it is free, what does that mean exactly? What are the chances and opportunities to progress in the education system?

In my study, I present the history of education in Kenya based on the available literature and compare it with reality, practice, and experience, and this helps to present the results of the questionnaire.

2. Historical antecedents

The development of Kenya's education history can be divided into three major overlapping stages, as set out in the works of Sheffield (1973), Nkinyangi (1982), Eshiwani (1993), Ssekamwa and Lugamba (2001), and Teferra and Altbach (2004). These three stages are traditional, missionary, and governmental stages.

2.1. The traditional stage

Kenya's society was initially built on nearly 40 tribes, so education was also realized within this tribal society. Herskovits (1962) states that each tribe had its own teaching method, according to the specific "specialization" of the given tribe, but they all followed the three main modes, which also meant some levels of education. These are the education by parents and the elderly, the education by craftsmen, also known as the apprenticeship system, and the education related to an old-age initiation rite. Today there are also tribes in Kenya that preserve traditions, for example, a boy becomes a man and a full member of the tribe when he hunts down a lion.

The effectiveness of the methods can now be questioned, but at that time young people gained very useful knowledge within the tribal society. Specific knowledge was acquired by children, they learned how to relate to their immediate and wider families, their ancestors, their contemporaries, and their gods.

Kenya's society was initially built on nearly 40 tribes, so education was also realized within this tribal society. Herskovits (1962) states that each tribe had its own teaching method, according to the specific "specialization" of the given tribe, but they all followed the three main modes, which also meant some levels of education. These are the education by parents and the elderly, the education by craftsmen, also known as the apprenticeship system, and the education related to an old–age initiation rite.

Overall, it can be said that this traditional form of education was successful in tribal society, young people gained a lot of practical knowledge to help to maintain the tribe. As time progressed, settlers from the West brought a new social order. As a result, the knowledge that young people acquired from their ancestors was no longer competitive and was clearly not relevant in the changing world. (Sheffield, 1973)

2.2. The missionary stage

Within this period, not only Christian missionaries played a big role, but also Great Britain stepped forward as it exercised colonial power over Kenya. Accordingly, we can speak of a pre-colonial period when actually missionaries had a greater impact and we can speak of a colonial period that lasted until 1963.

In the 1800s, the first missionary organizations arrived in Kenya. Their primary purpose was to Christianize the natives. To this end, schools were established and soon also practical training became a part of the curriculum, such as carpentry, horticulture, and literacy. (Sheffield, 1973)

They wanted to reach the members of the tribe through children and their school education. The competition was great between various Christian organizations for Christianizing natives, and as time passed, tension between these organizations and natives grew. As Sheffield (1973) describes in his study, it was a fundamental problem that the world of beliefs of natives was in many respects opposed to the teachings and aspirations of Christian organizations. It is a consequence of the disagreement that generations had been left out of the missionary education system and the return to education within the tribe was no longer adequate for the challenges of the age.

A country-wide range of activities of the missionaries could be discussed, and as Anderson (1970) also states, there were 35 schools in Kenya in 1910, so it is unquestionable that the foundation of Kenya's education system was laid down by missionary organizations.

Great Britain took power over Kenya in 1895. Among its first actions was to create schools for children of the so-called 'white colonists'. Meanwhile, missionary organizations were also present in the education system. As a result, an unprecedented conflict emerged. The government focused primarily on the education of white children, though it also founded a state school for black children, where they learned to write, read, and acquire practical knowledge as it was within the tribal societies as well. The British did not want to provide high-quality education for local young people because they did not want highly qualified adults who could later have senior leadership positions. Local children, if they would have liked to get higher education, stayed at Christian schools or they were left out of education. (Sheffield, 1973)

If we talk about high-quality education, we should also mention territorial disadvantages. The areas where there were schools of 'white colonists' received the largest financial support and the best-educated teachers taught in these schools, so the children of colonists received high-quality education, which cannot be said about local children. (Alwy, 2004)

The education measures taken during the colonial years are still a problem for the Kenyan government. The British government introduced recruitment examinations and tuition fees to prevent Kenyan students from applying. To demonstrate the uselessness of education for African students, the Government established the Beecher Committee working in the 1940s and 1950s. To limit the number of Kenyan students, the committee assumed that half of the students who had started primary school would stop learning in the first four years. Then the four-fifths of the remaining students would drop out during the exams and the rest would go to higher classes. At that level, half of the students would drop out because of the tuition fees or exams. Colonial governments tried to completely rule out Africans from the system, which led directly to today's problems. The costs of education have led to serious political debates. (Alwy, 2004)

The British set up a system that primarily focused on teaching the British ruling class and their families.

2.3. The governmental stage

It can be seen that some educational problems in Kenya are the results of colonization and measures taken before independence. Independence in Kenya meant that it had to build everything itself, with British pressure in the background. Thus, after becoming independent, one of the major tasks of Kenya was transforming a system that had resolutely excluded natives from education and all this had to be achieved by limited financial and human resources. After gaining independence, the Kenyatta government made several attempts to overcome the problems affecting the education system. (Alwy, 2004)

In 1964, a so-called Kenyan Educational Committee was set up to eliminate social differences and emphasize national unity. Missionary organizations, their educational system and methods were not involved in any of these activities and efforts, so their displacement started from the education system. (Ghai and Court, 1974)

In order to eliminate inequalities, disadvantaged settlements (for the reasons mentioned above) had to be helped catch up and the quality of education had to be increased. As the quality of education depends on the quality of teachers to a large extent, it was important to equally distribute appropriately qualified teachers in the country and possibly concentrate more heavily on regions where long-term educational disadvantages had previously been established. In practice, this was almost impracticable, as legislators did not comply with the principles of the endeavour point by point, and the best instructors was employed in areas where members of the government were interested. Alwy (2004) found that after the liberation, the Kikuyu tribe benefited from the distribution of government resources because Kenyatta president was a member of this ethnic group. Moreover, highly qualified instructors refused to move to a poorer village and teach there.

Kenya, along with most of Africa, turned to the World Bank for help. However, the Bank's objectives have caused many problems in the country, but we are talking about the effects of them on the education system in this study.

In the 1960s, when Africa moved to nationalism, the World Bank announced its investment in human capital, which emphasized education as the driving force behind social, political, and economic change. This plan emphasized higher education and neglected primary and secondary education. (Banya and Elu, 2001; Samoff and Carroll, 2004; Sifuna, 2007)

In the 1970s, the popularity of higher education grew. As a result, the World Bank shifted the focus from higher education to primary education. The bank sent promising students to study abroad as they considered it a "luxury" to concentrate on the Kenyan education system. The Bank reshuffled money, donations, and measures to primary education, which meant the decay of the higher education system and facilities for decades. (Banya and Elu, 2001)

By the 1990s, the World Bank realized that neglecting university-level teacher education had had a negative effect on primary education as well. Therefore, the bank began to focus on higher education, prioritizing technology, new inventions, governmental interventions, and a primary education supported by a strong higher education. As a result of these measures promoted by the World Bank, the education budget comprised 5-7% of the GDP between the 1990-1991 and 2002-2003 financial years. In fact, even the World Bank was not ready to solve the problems of the education system of Kenya. The measures that were the most cost-effective only delayed the progress of the weak system. (Banya and Elu, 2001; Samoff and Carrol, 2004; Teferra and Altbach, 2004).

2.4. Primary education in Kenya, the development of free primary education

So far, I dealt with the review of the history of education in Kenya, but as I have formulated the research questions, I consider it interesting and important to examine each level accordingly. As my empirical research focused on primary school students and university students in this paper, I present these two levels, free education, and the educational development in Kenya in more detail.

Kenyan primary education, its costs, and access to free education were investigated in detail by Nkinyangi (1982), Sifuna (2007), Somerset (2007), Vos et al. (2004), Oketch (2010), Banya and Elu, Mooko, Tabulawa, Maruatona and Koosimile (2009), and Samoff and Carrol (2004) in their studies. In 1963, with the advent of independence, the government promised to abolish tuition fees but these remained until the 1970s, which led many parents not to send their children to school for almost a decade. In 1971, the government made education accessible to everyone by abolishing these fees. In 1973, the first four classes were free, and for the remaining three years a uniform 60-shilling annual fee was imposed. By 1978, the eight-grade primary school system became free of tuition fees. This, however, proved to be an empty promise of the government, as the abolished charges returned, just under another names. The schools made the A compulsory student contribution to construction and equipment funds, including books and uniforms, was introduced. New costs continued to have a negative impact on poor families, and the more students went to school, the more money these institutions needed to maintain and expand their facilities and equipment.

By the 1980s, the government withdrew the provisions on the abolition of tuition fees, thus, terminated free education. Only in 2003 was the primary school tuition abolished again, bringing the number of people starting school from 5.9 million in 2002 to 7.2 million in 2004.

Making primary education free was not a bad decision but the education system is still not ready today to receive students. Infrastructure and equipment are insufficient and inadequate, and teachers cannot teach students at the appropriate level because classes are overcrowded.

The reality is that 70-80 students study in a classroom, which means that in the relatively small classrooms 3-4 students sit at the school desks. School desks are worn-out, battered, and books look much more like "lettuce" than books. Instead of wearing a branded schoolbag, students bring their minimal school equipment in plastic bags; so those who already have a brand logo on their bags can be considered "wealthy". The up-to-date composition of students is mixed. Students aged between 10 and 12 years are together with students between 16 and 18 years. The reason is not that these children do not learn and have to repeat a year, they are the ones who dropped out from the education system for years. Although education is free, families need to buy textbooks, writing instruments, clothes, and shoes.

Many Kenyan families have to consider a lot of things before sending their children to school. It is an important aspect whether schools provide students free meals or not, the better case if so, because children may take some food home, but at least one less meal has to be provided at home. Generally speaking, there are more generations in a family and a wage earner (usually one wage earner in one family) supports 8 to 10 people. Furthermore, parents need to consider when sending a child to school that one breadwinner will be missing from the family, one less person brings money home (though it sounds terrible, child labor exists in Kenya).

I want to note and emphasize that in my study I examine public schools. In private and ecclesiastical schools, the quality in every aspect is quite different. Despite the shocking reality, children are happy, and they do not have much desire, they only want to study.

> **The reality is that 70–80 students study in a classroom, which means that in the relatively small classrooms 3–4 students sit at the school desks. School desks are worn–out, battered, and books look much more like "lettuce" than books. Instead of wearing a branded schoolbag, students bring their minimal school equipment in plastic bags; so those who already have a brand logo on their bags can be considered "wealthy".**

2.5. Higher education or the tertiary system, transition to the tertiary system

Problems observed during the analysis of primary education are also true of secondary education, which continues to reach its end point in higher education. As the education system does not offer real, universal access to primary and secondary education, it does not help students get into higher education. If these students cannot go to high school, their progress is even more limited, thanks to the few university places and high costs. Only a small percentage of students can go to university-preparatory high schools, so only a small number of them can study at university. Between 2004 and 2009, only 24 percent of high school graduates achieved "good enough" results to be able to apply for admission to a university at all (Siringi & Ndurya, 2009).

It is important to note that higher education was free after the colonists left, and there was a need for well-trained professionals who could have the widest possible task coverage in society. According to Otieno (2004), this program lasted until 1974 when a student loan program was introduced to cover non-study costs. This was partly a failure because the government did not set up a proper repayment system so 81% of the borrowers could not repay it.

Since independence, the government has established six new state universities. All seven Kenyan state universities can quickly expand and grow, thanks to the government's goals of enhancing equal opportunities, improving the economic situation, and educating the population.

According to the statistical data of 2011 (Wanyama, 2011), the number of places at university increased from 16,629 in 2009 to 20,000, which is a record. In 2011, the number of admitted students was 32,645, and although this is a drastic increase, tens of thousands of high school students cannot go to university. (Wanyama, 2011)

In order to meet growing demands, the government has turned colleges or polytechnics into university colleges, which in time may even train teachers. This program was launched in 2007, and 15 institutions operating as external faculties of the seven public universities take part of it. These schools usually receive those students who do not have the right grades or financial resources to study at public or private universities. They do not only train skilled workers but also provide higher education, such as nursing or teacher training.

Yakaboski and Nolan (2011) conclude that the acceptance of teacher training by universities is problematic in many respect, mainly because university education is four years, while teacher training is only three, which raises concerns about costs and admission criteria. Furthermore, it is a big problem that there are already 61,000 teachers less in the country than needed. (Yakaboski and Nolan 2011)

3. Test methods and sampling procedure

Literature exploration was greatly facilitated by the fact that I had the opportunity to gather literature at a college in Kenya, the Shanzu Teachers Training College. This is why books from the 1970s and articles written in the 2000s, which are quite recent in Kenyan terms, are now being processed. The analysis of the content of this

literature and the presentation of the results of the questionnaire are also helped by the personal experiences gained during the time spent there.

My study includes the questionnaire survey already mentioned, the sampling procedure of which was based on random selection. The method of gathering information was based on the questionnaire used by a previous study, conducted by Papp (1995) on a similar topic, and was adapted to my own research. The questionnaire contains 17 questions, 15 of which are closed-ended and two are open-ended questions. In this paper, I have presented and analyzed the answers of five respondents due to space limits. The issues cover the content of fair play, assessing responses to various competitive situations, evaluating actions, and examining the relationship between corruption and sport.

The data were aggregated using simple mathematical-statistical methods, while data processing was done using Microsoft Office Excel spreadsheets and the IBM SPSS statistical program.

The sampling process carried out in two phases. The first stage was performed in January 2014. I managed to have the questionnaire filled in by 50 students from nine Kenyan primary schools. Sample taking was made difficult by the fact that there was no direct contact with schools and school leaders were not personally present at filling. Given that it is a closed community and exposed to terror threats every day, I was not surprised to find that they were reluctant regarding the personal encounter. to meet personally. The second phase was performed in January 2015. Based on my knowledge of the local conditions and the relationship network created by that time, I could continue my empirical research in a Kenyan elementary school. The conversation with teachers, the school principal, and personal experiences brought reality closer to me because though the things described in the literature are factual, these sources do not talk about the real circumstances in which children are taught and instructed by teachers.

The motivation was similar when I visited the college. In addition to collecting literature, I was interested in what young people were learning and who would be educators after completing school. 72 high school students participated in the study, in addition to the 133 primary schoolchildren.

4. Hypotheses

Knowing the development process and the challenges of the Kenyan educational system as well as morality and the norm system in this society, I formulated and tested three hypotheses.

H1: Due to inequalities in the education system and in the Kenyan community, students and schoolchildren have negative concepts related to the meaning of fair play.

H2: Within the framework of a game, they understand the importance of victory and they would also commit fouls to achieve this.

H3: Resulting from their social conditions, in their opinion, corruption appears to be within the sport as well.

5. Results

The first question group of my study tried to determine the theoretical level of sportsmanlike behavior in different competitive situations. My second question group examined the relationship between sport and corruption, and finally, I had a look at the students' knowledge about the meaning of fair play.

With my first question, I investigated whether students would consciously commit a foul in order to achieve victory. (*Figure 1*.) The difference between the two age groups, primary school students and college students, is significant. 54.1% of surveyed schoolchildren would consciously cheat for victory, whereas 84.7% of students in tertiary education participating in the study would rather be defeated than cheat for victory.

With my second question, I examined team spirit and the actions within the team. (*Figure 2*.)

Students had three choices. 42.9% of the primary schoolchildren interviewed would hand over the ball to their teammate if they were in a better position than he or she, 43.1% of the college students chose the same answer. Similarly, a high proportion (47.2%) of students would consider this action in acute competition. Taking into account local memories and experiences, it is not surprising that 21.8% of the schoolchildren would let themselves . Perhaps they would act selfishly, and for their own interests, they would even jeopardize the potential victory of the team.

Though I did not cover it during the investigation, later it would be worthwhile examining how schoolchildren and students, who would think about committing a foul, would handle this situation in the future.

Figure 1. Measuring Sportsmanlike Behavior in a Competitive Environment 1.
Source: Own elaboration

Figure 2. Measuring Sportsmanlike Behavior in a Competitive Environment 2.
Source: Own elaboration

With my third question, I examined how young people would act against their opponents in the event of injury. I looked into whether they would consider the interests of their own and or those of the team, regard victory as more important or they would help their opponents in trouble.

93% of the students in higher education would act in a sportsmanlike manner or deliberately stop the game (11.1%), or they would stop or even pass the opportunity to the opponent and help the injured (81.9%).

The proportion of schoolchildren (64.7%) who would take the chance to obtain a benefit is high. I have to refer to the results of the previous question, according to which the same age group would place their own interests before team spirit and cohesion in case of a team game. Given the previously presented inequality in the Kenyan society, we cannot be surprised that the students would use their opponent's injury primarily to obtain an advantage.

Looking beyond the results of the questionnaire, we face a dilemma. The interpretation of the answers given to our fourth question (*Figure 4.*) raises countless new questions. 84.7% of the surveyed college students and 73.7% of primary school children believe that there are bribery and corruption in sports. The question is whether to be happy that young people today are so sharp and clear about the problem concerning the fact that unsportsmanlike means are already appearing in the field of sport that was previously considered pure and inviolable or we should be frightened because young people see the trend, and the answers to previous questions

Figure 3. Measuring Sportsmanlike Behavior in a Competitive Environment 3.
Source: Own elaboration

Figure 4. The Relationship between Corruption and Sport
Source: Own elaboration

indicate that a large proportion of primary school students do not find anything wrong in committing a foul, especially, if it seems to contribute to their own personal advancement.

If we talk about corruption, I would like to mention one of Kigotho's (2001) papers in which he draws attention to one of the most controversial recent cases in the field of higher education. The case is a good example of the enormous competition and the difficult access to higher education, since in 2001, 90 students dropped out from Egerton University when it turned out that they had fake high school certificates (Kigotho, 2001).

When we look at the meaning of fair play, we are bounded by a conceptual definition. I take a previous study of mine as a basis; there I also dealt with the definitions of the term found in the literature.

The first fair play concept found is in the Declaration on Sport (1964) by ICSSPE (International Council of Sport Science and Physical Education), which was "institutionalized" in sports life by the Fair Play Charter adopted in 1974. In the preface of the manifesto, Philip Noel-Baker, the then Nobel Peace Prize winner President of the ICSSPE, said: "The principle of fair play is the essence of all sports competitions, and it is also of fundamental importance in both professional and amateur sports. It requires not only the strict respect of the rules but also the joyful and spontaneous reception of their inner and spirit. This concept includes respecting ourselves, and our opponents as well. Without the fair play principle, sporting events could become humiliating and degrading for the participants. If the perfidious practices that unfortunately continue to be present in international and world competitions today, would spread further, the sport as a teaching tool, a recreation, a group form of entertainment, and as a factor of agreement between nations would irrevocably lose its value." (Baker, 1964: 5-6)

The Code of Sports Ethics (2001: 19-20) issued by the Council of Europe defines the concept of fair play as follows: "Fair play is defined as much more than playing with the rules. It incorporates the concepts of friendship, respect for others and always playing within the right spirit. Fair play is defined as a way of thinking, not just a way of behaving."

Hogan (1973) combines the concept of fair play with the moral and social values that are of particular importance in the world of sport. He believes that the behavior and the moral conduct of athletes are determined by the norms and sports rules taught in sports. Hofmann (1990) goes on to assume that empathy is closely associated with most moral principles, thus affecting moral judgment and conclusion, so empathic skills developed with the help of physical education can be decisive in defining fair play behavior.

According to Zsolt (1983), someone who acts sportsmanlike also presents the written and unwritten moral rules, norms; does not mislead anyone and does not use unfair means against others.

According to Keating (1995: 147), "fair play is a kind of moral code that guides behavior in sport." So, under the concept of fair play, we mean a series of sociomorphic values that are passed on through sport.

According to the concept of Vallerand, Briere, Blanshard, and Provencher (1997), sportsmanship can be defined as the relative respect of rules, judges, social norms, and opponents, as well as the commitment to sport and the lack of negative attitudes regarding participation in sports. The term 'fair play' includes several social and moral values that can be applied to sports and physical education as well.

According to Butcher and Schneider (1998: 1), fair play is "the view that sports should use to teach positive social values." It "is a part of the general moral or social values that are taught through sports and physical activity."

Horváth and Prisztóka (2005) go back to the past, arguing that the concept of fair play is rooted in the human ideals of the ancient Greek society, which expressed and respected valor, courage, masculinity, honor, and virtue as a life principle. The violation of the rules of ancient Olympics led to serious sanctions. Nowadays, modern minds think that the accelerated world, the pursuit of higher performance, and the immeasurable desire for money overwhelm almost everything else, thus, fair play becomes idealistic with the values it represents as well.

Overall, it can be said that "the conceptual definition of fair play moves on a very wide scale, but there is a common point in the wordings. The notion comes from sport, but it is not just a concept that is closely related to morality, empathy, sportsmanship, respect for others, but it also represents a philosophy. Today, the concept and the spirit of fair play are present in all areas of life." (Hideg, 2016)

Finally, I conclude the analysis with examining the results of my last question. What do young people think about the concept of fair play, what kind of meaning do they attribute to it? (*Figure 5.*)

Both college students and primary schoolchildren linked the same three indicators to the notion. During the filling out of the questionnaire, I asked students

Figure 5. Examining the Meaning of Fair Play
Source: Own elaboration

to link three attributes to the concept. Primary schoolchildren think of friendship (29.3%), justice (22.1%), and fairness (16.3%) when hearing the term. In the case of college students, the same three attributes appear in other ratios, with 20.8% of justice, 23.6% of honesty, and 19% friendship. 50-50% of the choices are positive and negative. Based on the results, we can say that the percentage of negative content is low, only fraud (1.5 and 0.5%) and corruption (3.2 and 0.5%) appear in the responses, which may even result from an error of interpretation, bearing the previous questions in mind.

6. Conclusion

The hypotheses of my research were tested in two age groups through a questionnaire study based on the development and the challenges of the Kenyan education system, and the moral values and the norm system of the society.

I assumed that in the Kenyan society, due to the inequalities in the educational system, students and schoolchildren have negative concepts about fair play. My hypothesis was not proved. Figure 5 shows that both primary school students and students in higher education attach a positive meaning to the concept of fair play, and though in a different ratio, the same three attributes are the most important for them. Is it a local, social, and/or socio-cultural characteristic?

My second assumption is that, within the framework of a game, they understand the importance of victory and, in order to achieve this, they would also commit a foul, which was partially confirmed.

To prove this hypothesis, I examined sportsmanlike behavior through three questions. The primary school age group is more likely to cheat and let themselves convince to do so compared to the college age group. According to the results, 54.1% of the schoolchildren would consciously commit a foul to win, 21.8% of them would not pass the ball to their own teammate even if they were in the right position, and 64.7% of them would benefit from the opponent's injury. The result is somewhat contradictory to the fact that they are aware of the concept of sportsmanship on a theoretical level, but they cannot or will not act so in practice.

Possibly due to age difference, college students are not only theoretically aware of the meaning of fair play. My personal experiences support the results of the questionnaire survey, according to which primary school students are selfish to the utmost meaning of the word, coupled with incredible aggression.

My third and last hypothesis was also confirmed. Resulting from their social conditions, 73.7% of schoolchildren and 84.7% of students thought that corruption in sport existed.

Overall, it can be concluded from the results of the study of the two age groups that Kenyan young people, who grow up in the same social, economic, and socio-cultural environment, are aware of the meaning of fair play in the theoretical sense. However, there is a difference between the two age groups when applying sportsmanship in practice.

The development and implementation of a practical program where young people can learn how to practice good sportsmanship toward their team and in everyday life can be the subject of a further study. Consequently, the short- and long-term results of the program should be examined as well. ☀

Bibliography

- Alwy, A. and Schech, S. (2004). Ethnic inequalities in education in Kenya. *International Education Journal* **5 (2),** 266-274.
- Anderson, E. J. (1970). *The Struggle for the School*. Longman, London.
- Baker, P. N. (1964). *International Council of Sport and Physical Education (ICSPE) Declaration on Sport*. Berlin, ICSSPE.
- Banya, K. and Elu, J. (2001). The World Bank and financing higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Higher Education* **42**, 1-34.
- Brock-Utne, B. (1995). *The role of higher education in Africa*. Institute of Educational Research 37. http://www.africavenir.org/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/BrockUtne-HigherEducation.pdf [02.02.2019]
- Butcher, R. and Schneider, A. (1998). Fair play as respect for the game. *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport* **25**, 1-22.
- Council of Europe (2001). Európai Sport Charta és a Sport Etikai Kódex. [Code of Sports Ethics] Európa Tanács Információs és Dokumentációs Központ, Printorg Kiadó és Nyomda.
- Eshiwani, G. S. (1993). *Education in Kenya Since Independence*. East African Educational Publishers Ltd.
- Ghai, D. and Court, D. (1974). *Education, Society and Development: New Perspectives from*
- *Kenya*. Oxford University Press, Nairobi.
- Hideg, G. (2016). Fair play neked mit jelent? Kárpát-medencei fiatalok véleménye a fogalomról. [What Does Fair Play Mean to You? The Opinion of Young People in the Carpathian Basin on the concept.] In: Kovács, K. (Ed.). Értékteremtő *testnevelés. Tanulmányok a testnevelés és a sportolás szerepéről a Kárpát-medencei fiatalok* életében. [Value-creating Physical Education. Studies on the Role of Physical Education and Sport in the Life of Young People of the Carpathian Basin] Debreceni Egyetemi Kiadó.
- Hoffman, M. L. (1990). The contribution of empathy to justice and moral judgment. *Journal of US - China Public Administration* **6**, 79-84.
- Hogan, R. (1973). Moral conduct and moral character: A psychological perspective. *Psychological Bulletin* **79**, 217-232.
- Horváth, L. and Prisztóka, Gy. (2005). *A sportpedagógia* és *sportpszichológia alapkérdései*. [Fundamental Questions of Sports Pedagogy and Sports Psychology] Bessenyei György Könyvkiadó, Nyíregyháza.
- Keating, J. W. (1995). Sportsmanship as a moral category. *Ethics* **75 (1),** 25-35.
- Nkinyangi, J. A. (1982). Access to primary education in Kenya: the contradictions of public policy. *Comparative Education Review* **26 (2)**, 199-217.
- Oketch, M. and Somerset, A. (2010). *Free primary education and after in Kenya: enrolment impact, quality effects, and the transition to secondary school*. Transitions and Equity 37. Consortium for Research on Education Access, University of Sussex, Brighton.
- Papp, G. (1995). Etika tartalmú értékorientációk hatása iskolai tanulók sporttal kapcsolatos magatartására. [The Influence of Ethical Value Orientation on the Sports Behavior of Students] In: Soós, I. (Ed.). *Sportszociológia Szöveggyűjtemény II.* [Sports Psychology Textbook] Janus Pannonius Tudományegyetem, Pécs, 269-300.

- Somerset, A. (2007). *A preliminary note on Kenya primary school enrolment trends over four decades*. Transitions and Equity 9. Consortium for Research on Educational Access, University of Sussex, Brighton.
- Ssekamwa, J. C. and Lugamba, S.M.E. (2001). *A History of Education in East Africa*. Fountain Series in Education Studies, Fountain Publishers, Uganda.
- Teferra, D., and Altbach, P. (2004). African higher education: challenges for the 21st century. *Higher Education* **47**, 21-50.
- Teferra, D. and Altbach, P. G. (2003). Trends and perspectives in African higher education. In: Teferra, D. and Altbach P. G. (Eds.). *African higher education: An international reference handbook*. Bloomington, Indiana UP, 3-14.
- Vallerand, R., Briere, N., Blanchard, C. and Provencher, P. (1997). Development and validation of the Multidimensional Sportpersonship Orientation Scale. *Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology* **19 (2)**, 197-206.
- Vos, R., Bedi, A., Kimalu, P. K., Manda, D. K. and Nafula, N. N. (2004). Achieving universal primary education: can Kenya afford it? *Economics Working Papers* **200447**, http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpape rs/200447 [02.02.2019]
- Yakaboski, T. and Nolan, K. (2011). The Kenyan School Systems' Impact on Public Higher Education Access: Examination of Growth, Access and Challenges. *Journal of International Education and Leadership* **1 (1)**, 1-13. ISNN: 2161-7252
- Zsolt, R. (1983). *Sportolók, sporterkölcsök*. [Athletes, Sport Morals] Sport, Budapest.

Tarrósy István – Glied Viktor – Vörös Zoltán (szerk.)

Migráció a 21. században

SECURITIZATION AND MILITARIZATION OF THE BORDER: SECURITY DILEMMA IN POST-1998 ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA

MERESSA TSEHAYE GEBREWAHD

The post-1991 Ethiopia and Eritrea were hoped to become promising and exemplary states in Africa. But, after seven years of euphoria, national stability and security trapped both countries into a bloody conflict, and their relation is now in structural crisis: the 'no war, no peace' dilemma. Their security dilemmas are basically centered on the antagonistic foreign and national security as well as nation-building policies. The post-independence nation-building attempt to forge a militarized single national identity in Eritrea, under the motto of "one people, one heart" and the remaking of the age-old Ethiopian state based on ethnic federalism further deepen the nation-building dilemma. The post-1998 security dilemma between the two states is, therefore, the result of securing Eritrea's nation-building policies and the militarization of the Yika'alo-Warsay generation where Ethiopia has been made to be "a relevant enemy to its Singaporization vision" and Eritrea is subsequently viewed as a "relevant enemy to Ethiopia's renaissance vision and securitization of poverty". During the militarization of the borders, Badme still remains symbolically the hotbed of the 'no war, no peace' regime. This article, therefore, analyzes the post-2000 security dilemma between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the subsequent dynamics that have led to securing and/or militarizing their relations.

1. Conceptual framework: security, securitization and militarization

Security has been exclusively defined as a state's ability to survive and prosper in the self-help, anarchic international system (Wing, 2000). According to the traditional school of security, state's security threats were regarded external in their origin and militaristic in their nature. The instruments of defense were military capabilities and wars were considered to be fought outside the jurisdiction of the state (Rourke, 1993). In this regard, states were considered as the only referent object (i.e., unit of analysis) and provider of security. Non-state actors were neglected as marginal units (Buzan, 1991). Therefore, security was defined as a phenomenon of war: focusing on the threat, and the use and control of the military force (Walt, 1991).

The end of the Cold War, however, resulted in a major blow to the traditional (state-centric realists and territorialist) schools and led to the emergence of critical schools of security studies: *"widening and deepening"* (Hough, 2004: 4-6). The

Widening schools called for horizontal inclusions threats (both military and non-military) that could emerge both from outside and inside the state, and instigated by both state and non-state actors (Buzan, 1991). The Deepening schools called for the vertical actors' redefinition of referent objects for security to include non-state actors, mainly human beings, human security, migration, and minority self-determination rights, and so on, as units of analysis (Willians, 2004). According to the critical school (mainly the Deepening one), states are not only referents and the providers of security, but also could be a source of threats to their citizens.

The concept of securitization entered into the vocabulary of international relations after Ole Wæver outlined it in 1995. The Copenhagen school was also pioneering in mainstreaming the concept of securitization into the study of international relations. It conceptualized securitization as a process taking place beyond or outside "normal politics" (McDonald, 2008). It has been applied into the analyses of state foreign policy behaviors, transnational crime and war on terror, minority rights, and secessionist and irredentist armed struggles for independence. And indeed, since 2001, securitization includes human security, and immigrants and asylum seekers as threats to the sovereignty and identity of the nation-states in Europe (McDonald, 2008).

Moreover, securitization can be defined as the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as a "threat to survival", which in turn enables emergency measures and the suspension of normal politics while dealing with an existential threat. The main argument in securitization is that security is a speech act. It is about the labeling of a particular referent object, which is threatened in its existence, and thus, a securitizing actor claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object's survival. Securitization moves beyond the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics (Taureck, 2006: 3).

According to Barry Buzan, as cited in Taureck (2006: 3), 'everything' should not be the subject of securitization as it requires emergency responses beyond normal politics to prevent the securitizing actor from annihilation. He further argues that in order to prevent 'everything' from a security issue, securitization should consist of three issues and steps: "identification of existential threats; emergency action; and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules." (Taureck, 2006: 3) Securitization is, therefore, all about giving prior attention (emergency status) to the referent object so that to prevent itself from existential threats.

Militarism and militarization that had traditionally been interchangeably used, on the other hand, were associated with aggressive foreign policy and backed up by an unwarranted and threatening military buildup, given the capacity to exercise the use of force in resolving conflicts between states. The critical proponents of militarization were realist schools that argued for building military power under the

The concept of securitization entered into the vocabulary of international relations after Ole Wæver outlined it in 1995.

principle of "realpolitik." The principle of realpolitik further holds that countries should practice balance of power politics to ensure their national security through "either building up your own strength, allying yourself with others or dividing your opponents" (Rourke, 1993). Hence, militarization should aim at "increasing power, keeping power, or demonstrating power." (Rourke, 1993)

According to Michael Klare (1978), militarization was a tendency of a nation's military apparatus (which includes the armed force, intelligence, and the bureaucratic agencies) to assume ever-increasing control over the lives and behaviors of citizens, for military goals (preparation for war, acquisition of weaponry, and the development of military industries), and military values (centralization of authority, discipline and conformity, combativeness and xenophobia). Furthermore, militarization is a process of change in the state and in the relationship between state and society. It is also about the process of politico-military and economic development dynamics of building a modern nation-state. Richard Tanter (1984) identified five dimensions of militarization including expanded military force structure; military predominance in politics; a preference for a coercive solution to political problems; cultural support for organized state violence; and a degree of offensively-oriented external military alignment, alliance, or war-fighting capacity.

Methodologically, this article analyzed the securitization and militarization dynamics of the post-1998 Ethiopia and Eritrea qualitatively and the resultant 'no war, no peace' stalemate regime. Finally, the paper has the following specific objectives; i.e., to critically examine the history of militarization and securitization of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea; to analyze the post-war legal (the Algiers Agreement and the Hague border verdict) and diplomatic (UNSC sanctions against Eritrea) battles; the 'no war, no peace' regime, and indefinite regional security dilemma, which all "blurred" the prospect for normalization (even after the June 2018 rapprochement between president Isaias of Eritrea and prime minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia) and aggravate the proliferation of fragile states in the Horn of Africa as a result.

2. The pre-1998 trajectories of the security dilemma between Ethiopia and Eritrea

There is no common agreement, as to the causes of the hostile relation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, though their relationship following independence, it was hoped that they would contribute to the stabilization of the conflict-prone region of the Horn and the leaders of the two countries were viewed as a "new breed of African statesmen" (Gebru, 2009: 344). According to Gebru (2006: 53), the border issue was not the pivotal cause of the conflict, but the real causes have been related to the nation-building aspirations and the nature of the states. He added that the conflict was "contention between a new state too zealous to solidify its statehood and an older one too jealous to protect its sovereignty." For Berhane (2006: 31), the conflict with Ethiopia was part of "Eritrea's war for national unity" through conducting wars and severing the ethnic ties with all its neighbors with the ultimate goal of reengineering a new Eritrean national identity, because all ethnic groups of Eritrea have trans-border ties.

2.1. A securitized development: The economic viability of development in Eritrea and Ethiopia

According to Gebru Asrat (2006: 58), the former president of Tigray, the economic issues that had led to a confrontation between the two countries began to surface immediately after the end of the Eritrean liberation war. Following the referendum, the Eritrean leadership declared the development vision to make Eritrea "self-sufficient" and the "industrial powerhouse of the Horn", and ultimately to replicate Singapore in the region by the year of 2015 – 'Singaporization' (Solomon, 1998: 15). The actualization of this economic vision assumed "a large and untapped Ethiopian market, and cheap migrant labor from Ethiopian hinterland for Eritrean industrialization." (Gebru, 2006: 58) In 1991, the two countries agreed to use a "common currency until Eritrea issued its own currency, Assab and Massawa would be free ports for Ethiopia, and Ethiopia in return would run and maintain the Assab oil refinery." (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000: 35) And, in September 1993, both countries signed the "Asmara Pact" (Gebru, 2006: 58) that covered all fields of cooperation including a defense pact. In line with the stated agreement, Eritrea demanded that trade and investment should be open to resident and non-resident nationals of both countries without restriction and on equal treatment (Gebru, 2006: 58).

At the heart of the grand vision was that the Eritrean intellectuals and policymakers envisaged that Eritrea would remain the heartland of the Horn with its skilled human resources and the overvalued ports which were basically considered strong bargaining instruments against Ethiopia (Tekeste, 1997). The politics of Eritrean ports as part of the nation-building narratives remained part of the mainstream of the Ethiopia-Eritrea relations and became over-politicized mainly during the Dergue regime, for which "losing Eritrea would mean cutting Ethiopia's neck" (Tekeste, 1997: 174). This indeed remains as part of the post-independent Eritrean national narrative failing to take into account alternative ports that could be accessible to Ethiopia, mainly the Port of Djibouti (Tekeste, 1997).

The stated vision of Eritrea began to be frustrating when Ethiopia started to tighten its economic policies and to regulate the participation of resident and non-resident nationals from Eritrea, particularly in the sphere of banking, insurance, electricity, and power supply. Such new policies created resentment on the Eritrean part as it contradicted with their long-term strategy of making Eritrea an "African Singapore" (Gebru, 2006; Solomon, 1998). The Eritrean government began to show frustration as such policies were aimed at ousting Eritrea out of the Ethiopian economy and declared the new Ethiopian move a "protectionist policy" (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000: 44). Eritrea then called for the revision of the 1993 protocol to rectify the impasse and presented four demands: "free trade to ensure smooth transfer of Ethiopian products which could be re-exported, free movement of people, investment rights to Eritreans in Ethiopia on equal terms, and lastly make Nakfa a legal currency in Ethiopia on one-to one exchange with Birr." (Gebru and Awa'alom, 2005: 14-15) The deteriorated relation between the two states reached its climax when Eritrea launched Nakfa[1]-as the national currency of Eritrea in November 1997.

The introduction of Nakfa was believed to be the immediate cause of the war. Eritrea demanded the exchange rate between Nakfa and birr to be one-to-one and the two currencies would be freely serviceable in both countries (Gebru and Awa'alom, 2005). Ethiopia rejected Eritrea's claim for equal status between the birr and the Nakfa and it argued that "Nakfa did not have established a base within Eritrea and international trading system (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000: 35). Ethiopia also changed the old notes to the new currency in order to prevent the uncontrolled flow of old birr from Eritrea and also instituted cross-border trade control. Hence, all these changes created anxiety in Eritrea as they had brought an unexpected problem to their economy, and Eritrea criticized the Ethiopian policy as nothing but the "declaration of economic war" (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000: 37).

Bereket Haileslassie (2006) argued that the economic problem was a cover-up to the Ethiopian resentment of the "loss" of Eritrea. He further argued that the problem was basically related to the bureaucratic and technocratic monopolization of the Amhara; "the Amhara monopolized most of the key positions, including the sensitive posts in finance and banking, at the key sub-ministerial, technocratic level. Eritrean negotiators on the currency harmonization policy discussion complained that there was stiff resistance by these technocrats to the requests by the Eritreans to have a fair share in the currency" (Bereket, 2006: 26). Furthermore, Bereket contended that the problem with the currency was also related to the naming of the Eritrean currency after the Eritrean town, Nakfa that was a symbol of the armed resistance and triumph (Bereket, 2006: 27). Ethiopians, as the result, were determined to take revenge for their military defeat at Nakfa through economic warfare, and the Eritreans, too, considered Nakfa a symbol of achievement in economic development in particular and nation-building in general, which in turn resulted in "the Nakfa syndrome" (Gebru, 2009: 345).

2.2. Securitized and militarized nation-building projects

There is a common understanding that the basic sources of the conflict between the two states were related to "nation-building and governance structures" (Gebru, 2006: 58) adopted by the victorious nationalists in both countries, but inflamed by the evolving economic, currency, and border disagreements. According to Gebru (2006), the border dispute was a cover-up and the culmination of the deteriorated relationship between the two states. The border issue was only raised when agreements, mainly on economic issues, failed. As a result, the government of Eritrea pushed the issue of the border "to question the genuineness of Ethiopia's recognition of Eritrea an independent state as long as the border remained un-demarcated". Therefore, Gebru concluded that "the nature of the states and the historical process that created the Ethiopian and Eritrean states became important causes of the inter-state conflicts." (Gebru, 2006: 57-59)

Following the downfall of the Dergue regime, the victorious nationalists were preoccupied with state-making and nation-building in Eritrea and state restructuring in Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, the EPRDF introduced an ethno-linguistic federal structure

with the 1995 constitution that granted nations and nationalities the right to self-determination including the secession to address the historical question of nationality as stated in article 39. Eritrea, on the other hand, introduced a "unitary and central-ized political system where ethnic or sub-regional identities have no place in the political space." (The Constitution of Eritrea, 1997) It was committed to neutralizing ethnicity, like in the case of post-colonial African states, in line with the principle of "one people, one heart" focusing on civic identity (Meressa, 2013), though it is a state of nine ethnic groups with two major contending religions (Islam and Christianity). Eritrea, therefore, opposed the Ethiopian ethnic federal system as it feared the pos-sible spillover effects of ethnicity and the right to self – a determination that could ultimately negatively affect the Eritrean nation-building (Henze, 2001).

Nation-building in Eritrea was the continuation of war-induced mobilized nation-alism as Eritrea has been a "war born state" (Bundegaard, 2004). The post-war civic national identity formation was rooted in "the invincibility of the Eritrean fighters and the great achievements of the EPLF during the armed struggle." (Bundegaard, 2004) The young and small state of Eritrea thus hoped to construct a single national identity that stands on the war-induced "homogeneity, unity and determination" (Gebru, 2006: 58) that negated the existential differences of Eritreans. However, there are also contending arguments that the 1998-200 war with Ethiopia was the latest manifestation of the strained and unholy relationship between the EPLF and the TPLF during their armed struggle (Ghidey, 1999). The relationship between the two parties was not based on "mutually balanced and reciprocal basis" but rather on a "senior-junior partnership" dominated by the EPLF's "superior, paternal and arrogant" attitude towards the TPLF (Ghidey, 1999: 3).

The parties also had major differences on the issues of military strategies, the nature of the Soviet Union, the question of nationalities, and united fronts. With regard to the question of nationalities, the TPLF had an opposite stance to the EPLF in recognizing the rights of nations and nationalities to self-determination and seces-sion; however, the EPLF rejected them as disastrous sub-national entities. (Young, 1997) On the issues of military strategies, the TPLF also criticized the EPLF's pro-fessional, trench-based, and Sahel-confined strategy. Instead, the TPLF proposed a mobile peasant-based military strategy for both human and material sources (Gebru, 2005; Ghidey, 1999). The EPLF however opposed the TPLF military strategy on the ground that the latter actor was a junior part-ner in all issues including military doctrine and experience, and stated the TPLF stance as "an effort to present itself as experienced and knowledgeable, [...] in giving the EPLF a lecture as regards to military operation strategies" (Eritrean Ministry of Informa-tion , April 11, 2010).

Finally, given all the above differences between the two parties, the TPLF declared

> **Nation–building in Eritrea was the continuation of war–induced mobilized nationalism as Eritrea has been a "war born state".**

that "the relationship with EPLF could be 'tactical' – based on nothing more than a shared commitment to eliminate their common enemy: the Dergue." (Ghidey, 1999) But strategically, the TPLF concluded that the EPLF was "a strategic enemy - an enemy that would ultimately prove to be deadly but which one cooperate[s] for a time being" (Gebru, 2005: 14-15). Therefore, post-war securitization and militarization were strongly framed and conditioned by the past relations of the two parties.

2.3. A securitized and militarized border: Badme as a "casus belli"

On May 12, 1998, Eritrea invaded Badme; the "casus belli" of the war. Many agreed, including the leaders of the two states, on an issue that the border was not the real cause of the war rather the culmination of the deteriorated relations between the two states.

The war, however, was fought for the reason that Gebru (2009: 344) put as "the contention between a new state too zealous to solidify its statehood and an older one too jealous to protect its sovereignty." The war also signified that the climax of Eritrea's aspiration to fully claim its military invincibility in the Horn of Africa through "standstill" (President Isaias, quoted in Bundegaard, 2004: 49) Ethiopia's regional hegemonic stance and redefining the regional power structure. Clapham (2000: 16) further added that the war initially helped Eritrea to "revive the memories of the 'struggle' and consolidate a sense of Eritrean nationalism that was in danger of being lost amidst the problems of peacetime administration" though he questioned the sustainability of the war-induced solidarity in peacetime.

Ethiopia, on its part, engaged in the war to defend its traditional reputation of repelling external aggression and reinstalling its regional power structure and balancer role that had been weakened by the more than two-decade-long civil war and its final cession of Eritrea in 1991 (Gebru, 2009). The war was also inflamed by strong rhetorical axioms of both countries' leaders to project their invincibility and power capability against their adversaries that in turn nullified diplomatic and peaceful endeavors. President Isaias stated that "withdrawing from Badme means the sun would never rise in the east for the second time." (Gebru, 2009: 345) On the Ethiopian part, General Samora Yenus denounced Eritrean trenches and fortifications not to be defensive against the Ethiopian army by stating that "the Eritreans are good at digging trenches and we are good at converting trenches into graves. They, too, know this; we know each other very well." (Gebru, 2009: 345) After nine months of preparation, Ethiopia declared "Operation Sun Set"- named after President Isaias's speech, on May 12, 1999. The war marked the military defeat of Eritrea and the end of its invincibility. The war continued up to 2000 and Ethiopia not only retook its contested areas but also deeply penetrated into the Eritrean territory; finally, Eritrea accepted the OAU peace plan.

2.4. The Algiers Agreement and the EEBC[2] Border verdict: securitization and militarization of the border

On December 12, 2000, the Algiers ("December") Peace Agreement was signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea to resolve their border dispute by a neutral boundary

commission. The agreement was concluded by the two countries after their acceptance of the OAU Framework Agreement and the modalities for its implementation, as well as the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities.

According to the signed agreement, the EEBC was given the mandate "to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902, and 1908) and applicable international Law." (Art. 4.2: 3) As per the agreement, both parties agreed to "the delimitation and demarcation determinations of the commission to be final and binding" (Art. 4. 15: 6). Two years later, the EEBC announced its decision regarding border delimitation. Ethiopia, via Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfine, declared that it had won all its claimed territories including the contested territories such as Badme and its surroundings, and viewed the decision "just and fair" that makes Ethiopia victorious in both "military and legal battles" (Seyoum, 2002: 13).

Ethiopia anticipated that "after the reversal of the Eritrean aggression and maintenance of the status quo ante, the commission would easily ensure its legal sovereignty over the contested areas as it had administered them for decades." Indeed, "Ethiopia from the very beginning viewed both the Algiers Agreement and the EEBC, as essentially legal instruments to smooth over the results of the war and to bring lasting solution without challenging its right to hold territory that it had administered in modern times." (Clapham, quoted in Medhane, 2004: 81) The Ethiopian government could not have imagined that the commission would transfer the contested territories to Eritrea, if so, it would be nothing but rewarding an aggressor (Medhane, 2004).

However, after a year, the commission came up with the clarification of its ambiguities and said that Badme lied within the Eritrean claim line. The Ethiopian government expressed its regret and declared that it would not accept the ruling specifically over the awarding of Badme to Eritrea that it had historically been administered by Ethiopia. Ethiopia expressed its unhappiness over the ruling of the EEBC, especially over "the legality and fairness of the ruling, the integrity of judges and deviations from the spirit of the Algiers Agreement i.e. ensuring long-lasting peace" and it moved to outright rejection of the commission's allocation of key areas as "unfair, unbalanced, unworkable and impossible to implement." (Medhane, 2004: 82)

In a letter written to the UN Security Council in September 2003, Prime Minister Meles condemned the commission's decision as "unjust" and "illegal" that violated the main objectives of the Algiers Agreement, i.e. ensuring lasting peace and stability in the region. He expressed the difficulties that Ethiopia had to face to accept the decision, specifically in symbolic areas as:

It was unimaginable for the Ethiopian people to accept "a blatant miscarriage of justice" - specifically over the awarding of Badme to Eritrea. Badme was symbolically important and the casus belli for the two years' war. The decision is thus a recipe for continued instability, and even recurring wars… nothing worthwhile can, therefore, be expected from the commission to sal-

vage the peace process ...indeed, the commission seems to be determined to continue its disastrous stance whatever the consequence to peace in the region (Meles, 2003:10-11).

Ethiopia's request to the EEBC and the UNSC to rectify the problem through "correction and interpretation" (Medhane, 2004: 82) failed to be accepted. The decision of the commission, however, began to challenge the post-Algiers power balance. Ethiopia was militarily victorious but the new status quo did not support territorial change. Eritrea, on the other hand, was legally victorious but did not have the military power to implement the decision unilaterally and overturn the post-Algiers regime along the disputed areas, which made the decision unworkable (Medhane, 2004: 82). Ethiopia criticized the EEBC for apparently confirming Eritrean sovereignty over Badme, failing to blame Eritrea for the aggression and to develop a long-term solution, and for the incapacity of the commission to rectify the anomalies on the basis that its decision is final and binding. As a result, the 'no war, no peace' régime began to govern the relationship between the two states, and on May 12, 2018, both states remembered the "20 years of no war, no peace anniversary".

On November 25, 2004, Prime Minister Meles submitted a new five-point peace initiative entitled "Report on the New Ethiopia Eritrean Peace Initiative" to the House of Peoples' Representatives. In the peace initiative, he underlined that the decision was unjust and illegal (Medhane, 2004: 6-7).

The *first point* of the initiative was a call to peacefully resolve the problem through dialogue and negotiation based on the principle of give and take." (Meles, 2004: 11) It nullified force as a means of resolving disputes and ensuring durable and sustainable peace. Cognizant of the first point, the *second point* called for addressing "the root cause of the conflict with a view to normalize relations between the two countries and peoples." (Meles, 2004: 12). The *third point* "accepts the verdict, in principle" (Meles, 2004: 14), which was the major turnaround for the Ethiopian government which had once described the decision as "unacceptable" and which it still called "illegal and unjust". Accordingly, Ethiopia, in principle, made a step forward from the earlier blanket rejection of the decision to acceptance in broad terms without going into specific details that could be hoped to be the basis for dialogue and to help the commission continue its work including the work of demarcation while discussing implementation. The third point was expected to be a response to the Eritrean accusation of Ethiopia for its unwillingness to accept the decision as well as for the international community that viewed Ethiopia as an obstacle to the realization of the decision. Lastly, the initiative called for "dialogue on implementation of the EEBC's decision in a manner consistent with the promotion of sustainable peace and brotherly ties between the two peoples." In this point, however, the prime minister warned that "…an attempt to implement the decision of the Commission, *as is*, might lead to a serious escalation of tension between the two countries and thereby undermine the peace process." (Meles, 2004: 17)

Eritrea, once it was assured that Badme was within its claim line, called for the immediate implementation of the decision without any precondition. It strongly declared that "any notion of dialogue regarding the border issue with Ethiopia is closed and hermetically sealed." The commission made it "crystal clear that the case was put to rest once and for all…final means binding there is not dialogue to be carried out on the issue." (Ogbazgy, 2006: 2)

With regard to the five-point peace proposal, Eritrea's position has been the same, i.e., nothing but the full implementation of the decision. It clearly opposed the initiative that "if there will be any dialogue it should only [come] after the demarcation of the whole border is completed and Eritrea gains full sovereignty over its territories. Ethiopia's attempt to make an association and comparison with the border dispute of Nigeria and Cameroon is an obscured comparison." (Ogbazgy, 2006: 2) Therefore, it viewed the proposal as nothing but brinkmanship in order not to implement the rulings of the EEBC immediately.

> **At the core of the stalemate is that ceding the symbolic areas would have grave implications for the domestic security and regime legitimacy of both states as the war was fought in the name of those symbolic areas. After all, negotiating and ceding symbolic areas would be considered as a capitulation to their adversaries who both claimed victory.**

At the core of the stalemate is that ceding the symbolic areas would have grave implications for the domestic security and regime legitimacy of both states as the war was fought in the name of those symbolic areas. After all, negotiating and ceding symbolic areas would be considered as a capitulation to their adversaries who both claimed victory. Eritrea stated its withdrawal from the contested areas as a strategic retreat, locally known as 'Mizlak' (Healy, 2008). On the Ethiopian part, the war was fought to defend its territorial integrity from external aggression. After the war, Ethiopia has emerged as a militarily stronger actor compared with its neighbors who could deter military aggression, and as a result, it has reinstalled its traditional regional hegemonic leadership. Hence, it would be improbable, given Eritrea's internally emerging security problems and nation-building failures, its isolation from the international community (the UNSC sanctions of 2009 and 2012), and more importantly its inability to challenge Ethiopia's diplomatic and military muscle, to surrender the symbolic areas to the existing Isaias regime, in which both governments frequently stated that the root cause of the conflict was not the border itself.

2.5. The 'no war, no peace' regime: Refugee crisis and indefinite deadlock

Eritrea's stubbornness to firmly stick to the ruling, having the law on its side, and its failure to get the sympathy of the international community to pressure Ethiopia to comply with the EEBC decision (the handover of Badme), indicated its inability to challenge Ethiopia's diplomatic and military deterrence power. Its failure to challenge the diplomatic muscle of Ethiopia, in the eyes of the great powers, mainly America, also made Eritrea turn back to its traditional policy of isolationism ('the North Korea syndrome') under the principle of "self-reliance", viewing the American-led world as full of injustice.

Following the EEBC verdict and Ethiopia's failure to implement it, the Eritrean national security threat became clear and visible. As a result, the Eritrean government indefinitely declared a state of emergency for the fear of the existential threat, mainly of regime change and re-colonization, posed by Ethiopia. The Eritrean government continued to tighten its control to sustain the controlled nation-building by declaring a state of emergency to deter Ethiopia and its ally's potential threat to its sovereignty though it had never sent a notification to the United Nations Secretary-General (UN Human Rights Council, 2016: 19). Moreover, the war dashed the hopes of political inclusion, reconciliation, and the system of multiparty politics was also challenged when the government declared national security a paramount priority. Dan Connell (2005: 2) characterized the postwar trajectory of Eritrea as similar to the "crisis of the postcolonial African state and the corruption of the political process" defined by the concentration of power in the hands of President Isaias, the closure of the parliament, the establishment of a special court to undermine the judiciary to imprison the enemies of the regime or send journalists and vocal critics including G-15[3] to exile, and the closure of independent media accused of being "foreign-funded" and "engaging in defamation and rumor-mongering" (UN Human Rights Council, 2016: 35). According to the Freedom House Report of 2016, Eritrea still falls under the category of the 'Worst of the Worst' list of 11 countries as it scored 3 out of 100, while the next country, Syria has a rating of "-1" regarding the situation of the violations of political rights and civil liberties.

The Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea also declared that the Eritrean government had engaged in a "systematic and widespread" violation of rights. Furthermore, it stated that the abuses had been occurring "in the context of absences of rule of law", that is why the commission affirmed in the final analysis that "it is not the law that rules Eritreans but fear." (UN Human Rights Council, 2016: 46) Many of the critical young generation are in the military trenches indefinitely as part of the national service, which is the basic reason for thousands to leave the country with no possibility to return in the foreseeable future. As a result of such policy, only underage and over-age people remain in Eritrea, and for this reason, Yosief Gebrehiwot, the Eritrean well-known activist, defined the situation as "generational genocide" (2017: 12), though president Isaias Afeworki repeatedly stated that the continuing migration of Eritreans had been an externally induced political

conspiracy of the Western states to undermine Eritrea's human resource base and "self-reliance" based on nation-building.

Matina Stevis and Joe Parkinson summarized the refuge crisis in the Wall Street Journal (2016: 2) by calling Eritrea "one of the world's fast emptying nations […] plays an outsize role in the biggest global migration crisis since World War II." Furthermore, they added that "attention is focused on […] Syrians, […] yet by some measures, the exodus from the smaller Eritrea is more extreme. From the start of 2012 […], one in fifty Eritreans sought asylum in Europe, nearly twice the ratio of Syrians." (Stevis and Parkinson, 2016: 2) Eritrea is often referred to as the 'North Korea of Africa' as the military regime is isolated and totalitarian, and also mentioned as a "second Somalia" for the reason that the state and the regime functionally "failed" and the descent of the country into civil war in the hotbed region of the Horn of Africa is imminent.

On the Ethiopian side, the Ethiopian government redefined its pre-1998 good neighborhood policy towards Eritrea and re-institutionalized the policy of building a modern army to "deter, isolate and defeat" (Ethiopia's Foreign and National Security Policy, 2002) incoming national security threats not only from Eritrea but also from other neighboring states. The Ethiopian government, under a developmental democratic state ideology (DDS) and "renaissance vision[4]", defined poverty as an existential threat to Ethiopia's territorial integrity and security as it creates an enabling conductions for the resurrection of chauvinism, narrow-nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism (EPRDF, 2005).

By the containment policy, the Ethiopian government relegated the threats emerging from Eritrea to a secondary status which requires "passive deterrence" and counterinsurgency policy against Ethiopian insurgent forces hosted by the Eritrean government (Meles, 2010). The 'containment policy', therefore, imposed the 'no war, no peace' regime on Eritrea to deter and isolate with ultimate goal of regime change by the Eritrean forces of change (Yosief, 2017). It was basically focused on "proportional measures" for every provocation by the Eritrean government.

The 'containment policy' of the Ethiopian government against Eritrea was successful in deterring military aggression and isolated Eritrea diplomatically from the international and regional community. However, Eritrea is still a potential threat to Ethiopia's national security for the reason that the border has still remained undemarcated, no investment and development have been realized in the conflict areas, six refugee camps were established in the war zone due to the Eritrean refugee crisis, furthermore, Eritrea leases ports to competing Arab countries (like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE) scrambling for the Horn of Africa's coastal zone to let them use as a military base in their fight against Yemen. The Arab countries' struggle for the coastline and the militarization of the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb triangle have further isolated the landlocked state of Ethiopia and have militarized Eritrea with no prospect for normalization and reconciliation between the two states as the Arab countries have been hostile to Ethiopia's national security interests since the 1960s. The problem of the failed state of Eritrea has been becoming an existential

threat to northern Ethiopia given terrorism is becoming pervasive in the Middle East and around the Red Sea which all ultimately make Ethiopia surrounded by failed states.

3. A 'fragile rapprochement': post-July 2018 phenomenon

After 20 years of "no war, no peace" stalemate (1998-2018) between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in March 2018 the EPRDF (Ethiopia's ruling party since 1991) elected Abiy Ahmed as a new party chairman and consequently the prime minister of Ethiopia. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in his inaugural speech in April 2018 made a call for normalization and to end the "no war, no peace" stalemate.

Unlike the 20 years of stubborn and antagonistic policy towards the EPRDF government in Ethiopia, on June 20, 2018, *on the Eritrean Martyr's day held in Sawa[5],* president Isaias Afeworki accepted the call for rapprochement and declared that he would sent his delegation team to Addis Ababa "to gauge current developments directly and in depth as well as to chart out a plan for continuous future action" (Eritrean Ministry of Information, 20 June 2018) with Abiy Ahmed's EPRDF leadership. Moreover, President Isaias proclaimed that he accepted the call for normalization from Abiy Ahmed and his new EPRDF leadership (also known as "Oro-Mara EPRDF"[6]) as the era of TPLF dominated EPRDF has gone following the protracted protests since 2015. He further stated that the Ethiopian people said "enough is enough" and he famously described the change in EPRDF leadership as "Game Over" with the TPLF dominated EPRDF era (Jonathan and Meressa, 2018:195). He underlined that the 20years hostile relationships between Ethiopia and Eritrea was because of the misguided policies of the TPLF-EPRDF government supposedly supported by the pre-Trump American administration.

On the morning of July 8, 2018 Abiy Ahmed made a landmark visit to Asmara, the first seating prime minster to visit Eritrea after the 1998 war. The people of Asmara poured into the street to receive the Ethiopian delegate led by Prime Minister Abiy chanting slogans like "Selam at last" (Tigrigna for peace at last), "love wins", "yes peace, no war", and "game over"(Billion, 2018:13-14).

On July 9, 2018 the leaders signed a "joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship" (Addis Standard, 2018) that consists of seven articles. Article–one of the agreement stated that "the state of war between the two countries has ended and a new era of peace, friendship and comprehensive cooperation has started". The two states also agreed to "promote comprehensive cooperation in the political, security, defense, economic, trade, investment, cultural and social fields on the basis of complementarities and synergy" (Ibid). More fundamentally, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to "implement the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission decision" that has been remained as the structure problem for a war torn and "no war, no peace" deadlock (Ibid).

On July 9, 2018, the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres visited Addis Ababa following the signing of the joint declaration of peace and friendship in Asmara and he promised that the UN sanctions on Eritrea would be lifted. He further elaborated

that "the sanctions were motivated by a number of events that took place, (but) it is my belief that those events will no longer exist…If the reasons that led to the sanctions will no longer exist…they will naturally become obsolete"(Fikreyesus, 2018:22). Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State, also praised that deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea in such a way that "peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea will further the cause of stability, security, and development in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea" (July 10,2018). Finally, on December 14, 2018, the UN Security Council unanimously lifted the nine years old sanctions (army embargo, assets freeze and travel ban) on Eritrea which were imposed on claims that Eritrea supported al-Shebab militants in Somalia (BBC, December 14, 2018).

The hope for normalization was further strengthened when President Isaias Afeworki visited Addis Ababa on July 14, 2018 for the first time since 1998 and warmly received by the people of Addis Ababa. On his address to the Ethiopians from the national palace in Addis Ababa president Isaias stated that "from now onwards anyone who thinks that Ethiopia and Eritrea are two different countries is the one who fails to know the truth" (ERi-TV, July 14,2018). Such remarks of the president in Addis Ababa later resulted in a shock on the Eritrean side fearing that he will sell-out Eritrea sovereignty and independence to Ethiopia as in the case of 1952 federal arrangement. Finally on July 16, 2018 he reopened the Eritrean Embassy in Addis Ababa in order to officially started diplomatic relations. As a result of the Rapprochement President Isaias And prime Minister Abiy received the United Arab Emirate Crown Prince's highest medal award ("The Zeyed Award") in July 24, 2018 and Saudi Arabia's highest medal ("the Order of King Abdul-Aziz") in September16, 2018 (Tesfa News,2018).

Even though, the breakthrough rapprochement between the two leaders sparked a new hope for sustainable peace, the prospects for normalization and reconciliation still remain elusive. The details of the agreements are still remaining secret and known only to Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias and their sponsors like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and UAE though citizens of both countries have been asking the disclosure of details of the agreements and get approved by relevant institutions like national parliaments, regional organizations (AU and IGAD) and International Organizations (like the UN). Moreover the rapprochement fails to address the fundamental causes of the two decades conflict including border demarcation, disarmament and demobilization, currency and custom harmonization, port politics and issues of Eritrean refugee resettlement. And a result, refuge crisis is continuing as defining agenda of the future relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

> **Even though, the breakthrough rapprochement between the two leaders sparked a new hope for sustainable peace, the prospects for normalization and reconciliation still remain elusive.**

Furthermore, both leaders also failed to ensure peace, security and democratization in their respective states after the rapprochement. President Isaias failed to reform his totalitarian government, end the indefinite national conscription, release political prisoners and decriminalize political forces struggling for freedom and democracy as in the case of Abiy Ahmed reforms. The Eritrean become more worried about the prospects for normalization as there are no signs of reform under Isaias Afeworki and even they fear that President Isaias would compromise Eritrea's sovereignty and territorial integrity in favor of regional integration of the Horn or con-federal arrangement with Ethiopia. And hence, they continue their struggle, under the resistance theme of "Yiakel[7] to dictator and yes for rule of law" (ATV, April 14, 2019) against totalitarian leadership of president Issais and secret agreement with Prime Minister Abiy.

On the Ethiopian side, protracted ethnic and social conflicts have become pervasive, even after it normalized its relation with Eritrea, and Ethiopia is recently branded as " failed state" characterized by "lack of control over armed forces, militias, lack of free participation in politics, lack of control over territory within national borders, Massive displacements, failure to provide public services food, health, shelter etc, high level of corruption, high numbers of refugees seeking to leave ,and no or poorly functioning economy" (Dawit, 2019: 2-3). As a result, the hope for sustainable normalization and reconciliation increasingly become fragile and volatile. Surprisingly, the Eritrean government unilaterally closed the Zalaambesa (central part) border crossing on December 28, 2018. The western (Omhajer- Humera) and eastern (Bure-Assab) parties of the Ethiopia Eritrea border crossings were finally closed on April 18 and 23, 2019 respectively. As a result it shocked Eritrean and Ethiopian people and hence a threat of regional conflict is looming which in turn, if interstate conflict again erupts, transforms the region into new wave of re-militarization and protracted regional conflict.

4. Conclusion

The Ethiopia-Eritrea war ended Eritrea's military invincibility and weakened its leadership's vision of power projection instigating instability against its neighbors. Economically, the war also ended Eritrea's vision of 'Singaporization' to become the "industrial houses of the Horn of Africa". The port-based (Massawa and Assab) national economy has lost its comparative and competitive advantage to Djibouti for the decades to come, and the policy of "self-reliance" has proved to be a structural failure of a poor war-torn state in the era of globalization. The Eritrean ports have been leased as a military base to regionally competing Middle Eastern countries, previously to Shia Iran and Qatar, and after the Yemen crisis, since 2013, the management of some Eritrean ports have been transferred to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Due to the proxy wars and the regional hegemonic competition between Shia and Sunni Arab counties, Eritrean ports are getting militarized. Eritrea is also called the 'North Korea of Africa', a functionally "failed" state, and on the verge of 'Somalization'.

Following the protracted protests in Oromia and Amhara regional states since December 2015, in April 2018 a new 'Oro-Mara' leadership emerged within the EPRDF under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Abiy Ahmed is the first Oromo leader in modern history of Ethiopia. After he took office, he made a call for normalization of the 20 years "no war, no peace" stalemate and surprisingly he well received by president Isaias and the Eritrean people. The new rapprochement policy was equally praised by international institutions and superpowers. It was celebrated that it would transform the two decades stalemate, militarization, securitization and refugee crisis between Ethiopia and Eritrea and contributes to the peace and security of the conflict prone Horn of Africa. The prospects for normalization and reconciliation, however, remain fragile and un-institutionalized as the agreements continue to be 'secret, externally induced and failed to address the root causes of the stalemate'. After eight months of open border relationship between the states, the Ethiopia Eritrea borders again closed in April 2019. Militarization and securitization of relations thus become a structural dilemma with bigger repercussion to the security of Horn of Africa and Red Sea. ✵

Notes

1 Nakfa was the military and political base of the EPLF during the armed struggle. It is known in the history of Eritrean liberation struggle as symbol of resistance, heroism, and determination of the Eritrean guerrilla fighters in their struggle against the Dergue regime of Ethiopia. It was the stronghold of the EPLF where they defeated the Dergue's all-inclusive military campaign known as 'the red star campaign' in cooperation with the TPLF. Thus, the Eritrean national currency was named after the place Nakfa.

2 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission

3 EPLF/PFDJ Central Committee and Politburo members who were imprisoned by President Isaias allegedly for committing crime of "subnationalism" and "defeatism" in September 18, 2001.

4 The late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on September 1, 2000, declared to build a "new Ethiopianism" through a renaissance project for socioeconomic transformation, where the rights of nations and nationalities to self-rule are ensured, and consensus-based national unity (federalized Ethiopianism) is achieved. He claimed that "the third Ethiopian millennium would be as good as the first millennium and not as bad as the second millennium." The first millennium was marked by the Axumite civilization, when Ethiopia enjoyed the most prosperous period in its history, but the second millennium was remembered as an era of political-economic decline, protracted civil wars, famine (e.g., in 1985), crisis of national unity, etc.

5 Also known as "Warsay-Yikaalo School". Warsay refers to the post-independence Eritrean generation and Yikaalo is the liberation struggle generation. Warsay is Tigrigna for "heir" and Yikaalo is Tigrigna for "able"- a generation who able to realize the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia. Thus Warsay- Yikaalo school is the political and military training center to integrate the two generations and ultimately support the new nation building project of the new state of Eritrea under the theme of "one people, one hear" and "United we stand".

6 A new coalition of Oromo People Democratic Organization (OPDO) and Amhara Nation Democratic movement (ANDM) emerged within the EPRDF following the protests since December 2015 in Oromia and Amhara regions. It was to challenge the post1989 EPRDF establishment that was dominated by the TPLF. It is an alliance of the two largest ethnic (Oromo and Amhara) groups to counter the TPLF (Tigriyan) ethnic groups in Ethiopia. The

new Abiy Ahmed EPRDF Leadership is also popularly known as "Oromara-EPRDF" that replaced "TPLF-EPRDF" era in post-1991 Ethiopia.

7   Tigrigna for "Enough"

Bibliography

- Addis Standard. (2018). Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea available at http://addisstandard.com/full-text-of-the-ethio-eritrea-agreement-signed-in-jeddah/
- ATV. (April 14, 2019). "Enough-□□□□-Message to All Eritrean -We Stand With My People-part 3" available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ds-LkG4UoSk&t=4s
- Awa'alom, W. and Gebru, A. (2005). TPLF, EPLF and why peace eludes them. *The Reporter* 9 (449), 14-15.
- BBC. (December 14, 2018). "Eritrea Breakthrough as UN sanctions Lifted" available at www.bbc.com/news/amp/world-africa-46193273
- Bereket, H. (2006). Dreams that Turned to Nightmares: The Ethio-Eritrean War of 1998-2000, and Its Aftermath. In: Leta, L. (Ed.). *The Search for Peace: The Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea* (PP25-30). Proceedings of Scholarly Conference on the Conflict of Ethiopia and Eritrea, July 6-7, 2006, Oslo.
- Berhane, W. (2006). Eritrea: the War for National Unity. In: Leta, L. (Ed.). *The Search for Peace: The Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea* (PP31-40). Proceedings of Scholarly Conference on the Conflict of Ethiopia and Eritrea, July 6-7, 2006, Oslo.
- Billion, T. (2018). Selam at last! Eritrea and Ethiopia join in peace after two decades of Hostilities. *Eritrea Profile* 25 (38), 13-21.
- Bundegaard, C. (2004). *The Battalion State: Securitization and Nation-Building in Eritrea*. Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, Geneva.
- Buzan, B. (1991). *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York.
- Clapham, C. (2000). *War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea*. Paper presented at the colloquium: La Guerre entrerele local et le global, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, May29-30, Paris.
- Connell, D. (2005). *Conversation with Eritrean Political Prisoners*. The Red Sea Press Inc., Trenton.
- Dawit, W.(2019). "Ethiopia: A Country on the Brinks" available at https://borkena.com/2019/04/10/ethiopia-a-country-on-the-brinks-by-dawit-woldegiorgis/
- EPRDF. (2005). *Revolutionary Democracy and Ethiopian Renaissance, EPRDF ideology*. Mega Printing Press, Addis Ababa.
- Eritrean Ministry of Information (2018). Eritrea: 'President Isaias' speech on Martyrs' Day', 20 June 2018 available at http://www.shabait.com/news/local-news/26520-president-isaias-speech-on-martyrs-day
- Eritrean Ministry of Information. (2010). **"**Ethiopia: At a Decisive Stage between Its People and the TPLF (Part III)" available at http://www.shabait.com/categoryblog/1555-ethiopia-at-a-decisive-stage-between-its-people-and-the-tplf-part-iii
- ERi-TV. (July 14, 2018). "ERi-TV, Eritrea: Ethiopia Welcomes President Isaias Afwerki, July 14, 2018 - Part III" available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ExTYKWrVAn0
- Fikreyesus, A. (2018). Eritrea and Ethiopia: Recap and Brief Commentary on Recent Developments. *Eritrea Profile* 25 (39),
- Freedom House. (2016). Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies: Global Freedom under Pressure. Freedom House available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016

- Gebru, A. (2006). Towards a Sustainable Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In: Leta, L. (Ed.). *The Search for Peace: The Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea (PP53-62)*. Proceedings of Scholarly Conference on the Conflict of Ethiopia and Eritrea, July 6-7, 2006, Oslo.
- Gebru, T. (2009). *The Ethiopian Revolution: Wars in the Horn of Africa*. Ohio University Press, Athens OH.
- Ghidey, Z. (1999). *The Ideological and Political Causes of the Ethio-Eritrean War: An Insider's View*. Paper for the International Conference on the Ethio-Eritrean Crises, July 24, 1999, Amsterdam.
- Healy, S. (2008). Eritrea's Regional Role and Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future Perspectives. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Henze, P. (1985). *Rebels and Separatists in Ethiopia: Regional Resistance to a Marxist Regime*. Santa Monica: Rand.
- Hough, P. (2004*). Understanding Global Security*. Routledge, New York.
- Jonathan, F. and Meressa T. (2018). 'Game over'? Abiy Ahmed, Tigrean People's Liberation Front and Ethiopia's political crisis. *African Affair 118(470),* 194-206.
- Klare, M. (1978). Militarism: the issues today. *Bulletin of Peace Proposal* 9 (2)
- McDonald, M. (2008). Securitization and the construction of security. *European Journal of International Relations* 14 (4), 563-87.
- Medhane, T. (2004). *Turning Conflicts to Cooperation: An Energy-led Integration in the Horn of Africa*. Frederic Ebert Stiftung, Addis Ababa.
- Meles, Z. (2010). *Counterinsurgency: strategies, tactics and doctrines*. Addis Ababa.
- Meles, Z. (2004). *Report on the New Ethio-Eritrea Peace Initiative Submitted to the House of Peoples Representative*. House of Peoples Representative, Addis Ababa.
- Meles, Z. (2003). Correct Errors when shown to be errors. *The African Economist* 7 (19), 10-11.
- Meressa, T. (2013). Nation-building challenges in post-independent state of Eritrea and its regional domino effects. *Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict,* 21-36.
- Ogbazgy, A. (2003). *Demarcation Is the Only Option for Peace in the Border Dispute Between Ethiopia and Eritrea* available at http://dehai.org/demarcation-watch/articles/Ogbazgy_Abbay_Asmerom_demarcation_is_only_option_for_peace.html [02.02.2019]
- Pompeo, M. (2018). Eritrea and Ethiopia End War and Adopt Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship available at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/283930.htm
- Rourke, J. T. (1993). *International politics at the world stage (4ᵗʰ Ed.)*. The Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc., Connecticut.
- Seyoum, M. (2002). Ethiopia Victorious Again. *The African Economist* 2 (4), 13.
- Solomon,I. (1999).Key Determinants of Ethiopia-Eritrea Crises. In Walta Information Center (Ed.), *Dispatches from the Electronic Front (*PP6-20*)*. Addis Ababa: Berhanena Selam Printers.
- Stevis, M. and Parkinson, J. (2016). *African dictatorship fuels migrant crisis: Thousands flee isolated Eritrea to escape life of conscription and poverty*, The Wall Street Journal available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/eritreans-flee-conscription-and-poverty-adding-to-the-migrant-crisis-in-europe-1445391364 [02.02.2019]
- Tesfa News. (September 16, 2018). "Leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia received Saudi Arabia's Highest Honour" available at https://www.tesfanews.net/eritrea-ethiopia-leaders-received-saudi-arabia-highest-award/
- Tanter, R. (1984). Trends in Asia. *Alternatives* (Special Issue on Militarization) 10 (1).
- Taureck, R. (2006). Securitization theory and securitization studies. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9, 53-61.
- Tekeste, N. (1997). *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publisher.

- Tekeste, N. and Tronvoll, K. (2000). *Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War*. Ohio University Press, Athens OH.
- Tronvoll, K. (2009). *The Lasting Struggle for Freedom in Eritrean: Human Rights and Political Development*, *1991–2009*. Oslo: HBO AS.
- UN Human Rights Council. (2016). *Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea* available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIEritrea/A_HRC_32_CRP.1_read only.pdf [02.02.2019]
- Wæver, O. (2007). Securitization and desecuritization. In: Buzan, B. and Hansen, L. (Eds.). *International Security: Widening Security*. SAGE Publications, London.
- Walt, S. M. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies. *International Studies Quarterly* 35, 212-239.
- Willans, S. (2004). *Human Security and the Evolution of Security: Case Study – Northern Uganda Conflict*. PhD. Dissertation, Dalhousie University, Halifax.
- Wing, I. (2000). Refocusing Concepts of Security: The Convergence of Military and Non-Military Tasks. *Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Papers* 111.
- Yemane, G. (July 8, 2018). *Ethiopia's PM Abiy Ahmed in Eritrea for landmark visit* available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/ethiopia-pm-abiy-ahmed-eritrea-landmark-visit 180708083000438.html
- Yosief, G. (2017). Ethiopia and Eritrea: The Waiting Game. *Discourse* 1 (1), 4-15.
- Young, J. (1997). *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: Tigray Peoples Liberation Front, 1975-1991*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Documents

- Algiers Agreement of Ethiopia and Eritrea. (2000). December 12, 2000, Algiers
- Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. (2000). June 18, 2000, Algiers
- Elamanan, N. (1971). Our Struggle and Its Goals. Eritrean People's Liberation Front Manifesto.
- Ethiopia – Eritrea Boundary Commission/EEBC/Delimitation Decision. (2002). April 13, 2002
- Ethiopia's Foreign and National Security Policy. (2002)
- The Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic Constitution of 1995. (1995)
- The Constitution of Eritrea (not implemented). (1997).
- The Proclamation of National Service of the State of Eritrea, Proclamation No. 82/1995. (1995).

THE NEW WAVE OF CURRENCY DEVALUATIONS IN AFRICA – WILL THE DEVALUED BIRR HELP THE COFFEE EXPORTS?

SZABOLCS PASZTOR

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE

Despite the fact that currency devaluations are likely to have a negative effect on the economy in the long run, Ethiopia devalued its national currency, the birr (ETB), by 15 percent in 2017. They turned to this option in the hope of attracting more investments from abroad, decreasing import bills, improving the current account deficit and giving a boost to the exports of the coffee sector. A couple of months later, the impact seems to be promising because the export has been revived in some areas. However, it has to be stressed that the imported commodities may experience a price increase, there can be a widening balance of payments deficit and rising inflation. The paper aims to shed more light on the short- and long-term impacts of currency devaluations in the developing countries with a special emphasis on Ethiopia. Also, the recent Ethiopian measure is to be analyzed in greater detail highlighting the impacts on export earnings, import bills, the balance of payments, and on the overall competitiveness of the coffee sector.

1. Currency depreciations and devaluations in Africa

Recently, most of the African countries have suffered from significant currency instabilities. The reasons are quite obvious as the strength of the African currencies is closely related to raw material prices. These prices have faced huge volatility since mid-2014 and the global demand for commodity exports has weakened remarkably. We also have to mention China registering much flatter growth rates than before. In this context, African central banks face multiple challenges related to exchange rates. Among others, we can mention Mozambique's metical (MZN) which fell by well over 30% against the US dollar in 2016. The Angolan kwanza (AOA) lost almost 20% of its value. The Guinean and Congolese francs (GNF and CDF) weakened significantly, by 18% and 21%. The leone in Sierra Leone (SLL) depreciated by 27% in 2016. Nigeria is also an interesting case, as the naira (NGN) almost collapsed and weakened by a third just after the government removed its peg to the USD in June 2016. The Zambian kwacha (ZMK) depreciated by over 40% in 2015 becoming the third-worst performing currency in the world. The Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI) developed by Girton and Roper (1977) reflects increased tensions in the

foreign exchange market. The exchange rate risk is still relevant in Africa which is confirmed by the depreciation of the AOA by more than 30 percent since the partial liberalization of the exchange rate regime in January 2018 (Nizard, 2018).

African countries registering lower levels of exports of raw materials have seen their inflows of US dollars diminished. As a number of local currencies are highly dependent on the USD, the impact on the stability is far from promising. The macroeconomic stability of the sub-Saharan region has also seen better days as the oil exporters maintained a fiscal deficit of over 5 percent in 2017 (IMF, 2018). This and a couple of other factors dent the confidence of the investors in the economies and in the local currencies. The rising inflation rate is also a huge concern as it was hovering around 20 percent in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria in 2016. In some countries (e.g., Angola, Congo, Central African Republic), it reached almost 40 percent (IMF, 2018).

Weaker local currencies are mostly detrimental as they increase the local prices for consumer products and make the prices of machinery and capital goods more expensive for infrastructure developments. Under these pressures, central banks face very difficult challenges: in the hope of mitigating the impact of inflation, *(i)* they can turn to raising interest rates *(ii)* or they may choose to keep the inflation rate low and maintain the growth prospects. *(iii)* At this time, the positive impact of currency depreciation is not an option, as owing to the reduced demand in world markets, they cannot count on the boosting effect. *(iv)* Most of the central banks have run out of foreign currency reserves as they were partly financing the rising import costs and maintained the local exchange rates, not to mention servicing the increasing external debt obligations. In this context, more and more central banks are doing research on devaluation or they let the local currency depreciate. Some have already turned to devaluation (e.g., Sudan, Ethiopia) and their reasoning is clear: they want to attract more investors and they also want to give a boost to the export sector of the economy. An issue which has been debated for decades.

2. Theoretical framework

Apart from the fact that both devaluation and depreciation indicate altered values in terms of other currencies, they are not the same. So, first of all, we have to give an appropriate definition for the terms of devaluation and depreciation in order to fully understand their impacts on the economy.

Devaluation is a deliberate reduction of the value of a country's currency relative to another currency or currencies. The opposite of devaluation is revaluation. Devaluation is a monetary policy tool of those countries and central banks which have a fixed or semi-fixed exchange rate system. Contrary to devaluation, depreciation is caused by market forces making the local currency less and less valuable. While devaluation is a one-time measure taken by the central bank, depreciation is a gradual change. However, in international economics, it always takes time for the changed exchange rate to have a clear effect on the patterns of international trade (Meade, 1988; Backus et al., 1994). It is already confirmed that after large devalua-

tions there is sluggishness in exports, partly because the most powerful response happens with a lag of three or four years. This lag comes mainly from the costs that producers face to adjust the markets or customers that they want to serve. It is also true that the export response can be hampered as financing export expansion is worsened by the devaluation (Manova, 2013).

When studying the theoretical framework of devaluation, it becomes clear that there are three different approaches. According to the first, *the monetarist approach* (Dornbusch, 1973; Miles, 1979), devaluation changes the relative price of traded and non-traded products which leads to the improvement of the trade balance and the balance of payments. They claim that the real supply of money decreases, an excess demand for money is reached and actually the ensuing hoarding effect improves the trade balance.

African countries registering lower levels of exports of raw materials have seen their inflows of US dollars diminished. As a number of local currencies are highly dependent on the USD, the impact on the stability is far from promising.

According to the *absorption approach*, if a country has a balance of payments deficit, consumers are 'absorbing' more than what they produce. Devaluation changes the terms of trade, increases production and shifts spending from import to local goods. Trade balance is improved as the domestic absorption relative to production is reduced (Johnson, 1967).

According to the *elasticity approach,* transactions might dominate a short-term change in the trade balance which results in deterioration (Krueger, 1983). Later, in the long run, exports and imports adjust causing an elasticity increase of exports, imports, and their quantities. The price of the devaluing country's exports is lowered and, at the same time, both the price of the imported goods and their demand are increased. It is clear that the real effect of devaluation depends on the elasticity of exports and imports. Higher import prices may give a boost to domestic production and later lead to price increases of the non-traded goods. The obvious effect is inflation and the potential benefit of devaluation is diminished (Williamson, 1983). The Marshal–Lerner (ML) condition gives a further solid analytical ground for the elasticity approach and it is built on the following assumptions: *(i)* partial equilibrium, *(ii)* the price elasticity of supply in the home country and abroad is infinite, *(iii)* the monetary effects of exchange rate variations are ignored, and *(iv)* an initial balance of trade is assumed. If the Marshall–Lerner conditions are satisfied, devaluation can improve the trade balance and the GDP in the long run.

Based on the three approaches, it is quite clear that devaluation has ambiguous results in growth. The positive aspects include the followings. The Keynesian approach emphasizes the expansionary effects of devaluation to output and growth. Namely, devaluation stimulates the demand and output and the expansionary effect

is reached by expenditure switching and reduction in domestic consumption. As it has been already mentioned, when the Marshall–Lerner condition is met, devaluations can be positive. At firm level, when a currency is devalued, profit made by local companies producing in foreign markets increases after converting it to the national currency. Paul (2006) and Gala (2007) highlights that this increased profit can be used for research and development and innovations. However, it is also true that when there is less competition, devaluation can make firms unmotivated and the consequence would be no significant effect on the economy in the long run (Erixon, 2007). Acar (2000) points to the issue of wage indexation. In case of a price increase resulting from devaluation, the real wage falls and the producers will be pressurized to increase the wage rate to retain the workers or offer them a decent standard of living. This will directly lead to the decreasing profit of producers.

Apart from these positive or mixed aspects, Krugman and Taylor (1978) point to the definitely negative effects of currency devaluations on economic growth. They argue that devaluation would increase the profit share of GDP with the negative effect of aggregate demand if the saving propensity of firms and capital owners is higher than that of wage owners. Countries being highly dependent on the non-tradable sector[1] will experience a negative impact as the distribution of the exposed and the non-exposed sectors is not the same and the non-exposed sector and the total output growth would be negatively affected (Goldberg, 1990). Owing to the increasing inflation, interest rates may be raised also, leading to decreasing aggregate demand finally. Local companies borrowing from commercial banks to finance their operations will be also negatively affected, not to mention servicing the government debt. It has to be highlighted also that anticipated and unanticipated devaluations may have different effects on the long-term growth of the economy.

When analyzing exact countries and their devaluations, the answers are still mixed (An et al., 2014) but there are some unquestionable facts. Imoisi (2012), for example, focused on interest rates, the balance of payments, and the relationship between exchange rates and pointed to a significant relationship between the three variables. Reinhart (1995) took into consideration the relative price and its trade effect and made the following conclusions: *(i)* relative prices are important determinants of the demand for imports and exports, *(ii)* price elasticities are usually low and they are below unity, and *(iii)* relative prices and a sufficient level of income are both necessary for steady trade flows.

As far as exact countries or group of countries are concerned, Acharya (2010), for example, when studying the Nepalese case, argued that devaluation increases the price of import and, as a consequence, leads to a higher production of export products in the agricultural and industrial sectors. He also pointed to the fact that the industrial sector expands and the service and agricultural sectors shrink. The final outcome is an overall GDP growth, owing to the increasing production of the industrial sector. Acar (2000) studied 18 LDCs with very different export performances. In the first year, he found a negative relationship between devaluation and output. In the next year, a positive effect was confirmed, while in the long run, no

effect was measured. Akinlo (1996) focused on Nigeria and concluded that negative relationship existed between the profit levels of manufacturing industries and exchange rate movements: the higher the exchange rate depreciation is, the lower the rates of profit are. Another African country, Cameroon was also studied by Tybout et al. (1997). Firms already involved in international trade increased their exports, while non-exporting firms started staying away from international markets because of increasing costs. Ratha (2010) confirms the Keynesian positive aspect of devaluations and the multiplier effect on export and GDP growth. The results were not promising in the short run, but in the long run, the expansionary effects were clear. A study on Fiji confirmed the positive impact of devaluation when it pointed to a 2.3 percent and 3.3 percent increase in the output in the short and long run as well. Related to Ethiopia, Taye (1999) argues that devaluation would help improve the current account balance but would be stagflationary. The improvement in the current account balance is, therefore, more likely due to a decrease in imports (expenditure reducing, not expenditure switching) and not due to an expansion in output and hence exports. In the case of a small, open economy, Musila and Newark (2003), based on evidence from Malawi, claimed that the devaluation might help improve export performance and mitigate the growth of imports in the long run. However, in the case of Africa and the Middle East, where export is highly reliant on primary commodities, the impact of devaluation is negligible. Al-Abdelrazag (1997), for example, examined the Jordanian economy and argued that the devaluation did not improve the trade balance as the sum of demand elasticities for imports and exports were less than one. Zaidan (1999) argues that developed country elasticities are much higher than in the case of developing countries. Other studies are also far from being optimistic. Agénor (1991) took into consideration 23 countries and he pointed to the fact that the expected devaluation had contradictory effects. Edwards (1986) studied 12 developing countries and confirmed that the devaluation of the exchange rate in the same year had a negative effect. One year later the effect proved to be positive and, in the long run, the conflicting effects resulted in a zero-sum game. Mehare and Edriss (2013) argues that devaluation may play a certain role in eliminating market distortions and correcting price misalignment in the short term. However, in the long run, in the case of Ethiopia, devaluation has a negative impact on the export of agricultural products. Their argumentation is clear as they make a differentiation between the short-term and long-term impacts. In the short term, exporters benefit and increase their export volumes, but given the fact that agricultural products have an inelastic nature of demand, the price increase in the world markets will finally disappear and the local market prices will be higher than the international ones so the companies will be less and less incentivized to export. In this way, devaluation would have an opposite effect compared to that in the short run. According to the theory of deteriorating terms of trade; for an agrarian economy, export revenues from primary commodities are likely to remain the same or drop after a certain period of time. Imports continue to rise and the two effects together widen the balance of payment deficit.

Apart from these mixed results, many developing countries still use currency devaluation as a tool to achieve short- and long-term growth objectives and they do not always bear in mind that the effect of devaluation depends on the followings. *(i)* The elasticity of demand for exports and imports. If the demand is price-inelastic, a fall in the price of exports will not lead to a large rise in quantity leading to a fall in the value of exports. If the price elasticity of exports and imports is more than one, devaluation may improve the trade balance. It is also true that the effect of devaluation comes with a time-lag, as in the short run, demand might be inelastic but, in the long run, it might become elastic with a bigger effect. *(ii)* The overall state of the world economy is also important. In case of global recessions, devaluation can be insufficient to stimulate export demand. In case of a boom, there is greater demand but it can also exacerbate inflation in the devaluing economy. *(iii)* Inflation is a crucial factor as it may have different effects. In case of recessions in the local economy, when there is spare capacity, devaluation is unlikely to lead to inflation. Companies may reduce their profit margins and, for a shorter period of time, do not pass the increased import costs to the consumers. Apart from import prices, there can be very different other factors influencing inflation like wage increases. *(iv)* We also have to understand the reason for devaluation. If it is about attracting more investors and increasing competitiveness and economic growth, it can be an option. If they are just trying to find an appropriate exchange rate, the scenario is quite different and not leading to promising results.

When we summarize the possible effects, we can make the following conclusions. *(i)* Import prices increase, which leads to reduced real wages and consumption demand in the short run. Firms may postpone or completely halt investments as they are expecting further devaluations. *(ii)* The unexposed sector may register a loss in their profits and a higher level profit-to-GDP reduces private consumption. In those sectors which are exposed to devaluation structural changes can be delayed as the already strong companies may become even stronger. The higher profit level may also increase investments and R&D. *(iii)* The interest rate increase in the short and in the long run as well leads to decreasing domestic demand, investment, and consumption.

3. The Ethiopian economy with a special emphasis on the coffee sector

Ethiopia, officially the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, is located in the Horn of Africa and has a strategic location. It is close to the Middle East and borders Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, and Djibouti. Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa and the most populous landlocked country in the world with a population of 102 million in 2016 (World Bank, 2018). The country occupies a total area of 1,100,000 square kilometers and its largest city is the capital, Addis Ababa.

Recently, Ethiopia experienced a massive economic growth and has become the fastest growing economy in the region. However, it is still one of the poorest with a per capita income of 783 USD (World Bank, 2018). Economic growth remained resil-

ient in 2016/17[2] despite the fact that the global prices for commodities are still weak and some pastoral regions are hit by droughts. Output has grown 9 percent partly because of the recovery in the agricultural sector and the 16 percent growth of the industrial sector. In the country, we can see a significant investment in infrastructure and manufacturing. The external current account deficit in 2016/17 narrowed due to lower imports but exports remained stagnant. The recent current account deficit is 8.2 percent of the GDP. Unfortunately, export revenues rose only 2.9 percent but coffee export volumes increased after supply-enhancing market reforms. Foreign direct investment (FDI) increased remarkably by almost 28 percent mainly because of the elevated investors' interest in industrial parks and privatization proceeds. However, international reserves dropped to 3.2 billion USD, which represents 1.8 months of prospective imports of goods and services (World Bank, 2018). The Ethiopian economy is a mixed and transition economy with a large public sector as the government slowly and steadily privatizes the state-owned businesses and moves closer to a market economy. The agricultural sector is still important in the economy (36.5%), but recently, the share of the service sector has increased remarkably (42.2%). The industrial sector represents 22.2 percent of the Ethiopian GDP (IMF, 2018).

In the year of 2016, Ethiopia exported 3.13 billion USD and this made the country the 117th largest exporter in the world. During five years between 2011 and 2016, the exports of Ethiopia increased at an annualized rate of 1.7 percent from 2.88 billion USD in 2011 to 3.13 billion USD in 2016. Ethiopia exports coffee (24%), other oily seeds (15%), dried legumes (7.9%), cut flowers (5.5%), gold (13%), gas (5.3%), sheep, and goat meat (3.1%). As for the imports, Ethiopia imported 17.9 billion USD which made the country the 75th largest importer in the world. In the same period, the imports of Ethiopia increased at an annualized rate of 14.7 percent, from 8.38 billion USD in 2011 to 17.9 billion USD in 2016. Ethiopia imports refined petroleum (10.1%), planes, helicopters and spacecrafts (3.6%), packaged medicaments (3.6%), delivery trucks (3.3%), mixed mineral and chemical fertilizers (2.8%), and gas turbines (2.3%). (UN COMTRADE, 2018) Ethiopia exports mainly to China (14%), Switzerland (11%), the Netherlands (10%), Saudi Arabia (9.2%), the United States (7.4%), and Germany (6.1%). Ethiopia imports mostly from China (30%), the United States (8.6%), India (7.3%), Kuwait (5.6%), Italy (3.9%), and Turkey (3.2%). When it comes to trade openness, Ethiopia's value (value of export and import per GDP) was 28.55 percent in 2016 (UN COMTRADE, 2018). Agricultural commodities gave almost 80 percent of the export earnings in 2016/17 and the share of capital goods, fertilizer, and petroleum products was 66 percent in the same year. With these numbers, it is clear that Ethiopia

Recently, Ethiopia experienced a massive economic growth and has become the fastest growing economy in the region. However, it is still one of the poorest with a per capita income of 783 USD.

mainly exports agricultural commodities with high price elasticity of demand and imports products (capital goods, petroleum products, and fertilizers) with low price elasticity of demand.

Based on the export structure, it has become also clear that coffee production has an important place in the Ethiopian economy. Coffee is Ethiopia's most important export crop and the country is the biggest exporter in Africa accounting for 3 percent of the global coffee trade (ICO, 2014; Minten et al., 2017). Adugna et al. (2008) argue that the Ethiopian coffee is valuable in the global markets because it is of the Arabica type and because of its unique taste. However, we have to point to the fact that the Ethiopian coffee sector is underperforming as the coffee yields are low. The yields are higher in Uganda and only a bit lower in Rwanda and Kenya (Technoserve, 2014). When we compare these numbers with the major Latin American producers, the Ethiopian yields are only one-half and one-third of the level achieved in these countries. Technoserve (2014) argues that Ethiopian farmers obtain a smaller share of export prices compared to most other countries' farmers, and Ethiopian farmers earn the lowest share of the export price, at 60 percent of the export value. Shares in other countries range from 70 percent in Kenya to 90 percent in Brazil. Minten et al. (2017) highlight that coffee exports from Ethiopia have performed well over the last decade but when we compare 2010/11 (879 million USD) and 2016/17 (897 million USD), the numbers are not convincing (ICO, 2018). Most of the increase is related to the significant rise in the international prices of coffee (ICO, 2014). Minten et al. (2017) highlight the fact that while quantities exported from Ethiopia increased over the last decade, they were only 18 percent higher in 2013/14 compared to ten years earlier. It happened because in 2010 and 2013 we saw a decline in the price of coffee in the international market which challenged coffee exporters. The Ethiopian government incentivized the exporters to increase the volume of exports because earnings had stagnated for many years. There has been a large increase in national coffee production but this has been mostly the result of the increasing expansion of the coffee area, rather than through yield increasing. As it was released by a National Planning Commission report (NPC, 2016), the volume of exported coffee hit a record of 200,000 tons for the first time since 2014/15 but the export earnings did not meet the one-third of the set target. In the period of the first Growth and Transformation Plan[3], the government wanted to generate an annual average of 783.3 million USD revenue from coffee export. Unfortunately, they reached only 61.4 percent of the target. It is also interesting that about half of the production is consumed within Ethiopia (Minten et al., 2017) but coffee accounts for up to 30 percent of the total export revenue (CSA, 2018a). So mainly this sector is targeted with the currency devaluation of 2017 and it would be interesting to see how this monetary policy tool succeeds.

4. The history of devaluations in Ethiopia and their impacts on the coffee sector
The Ethiopian Birr (ETB) was introduced in 1945 and during the imperial regime, they used a fixed exchange rate policy with the official exchange rate of 2.5 ETB

per USD. Then in the 1970s, two devaluation rounds came. During the Derg and before the EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) regimes Ethiopia still used the fixed exchange rate system with an official exchange rate of 2.07 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) per USD. Later it was the EPRDF which turned to devaluing the currency. Kidane (1994), for example, argued that owing to some exchange rate policy management problems in the 1970s and 1980s, the ETB was overvalued, causing trade and public budget deficits. Others like Taye (1992) and Ghura and Grennes (1993) indicated that in light of the unofficial market rate and other relevant measures of misalignment, the official value of the ETB since the 1970s was only about half or less of the unofficial market rates. At that time Ethiopia proved to be a textbook case as exports and domestic production were discouraged by the low price of the imported products. The shortage of hard currencies (mainly USD) was also rampant and only few people had the possibility to enter the foreign exchange market.

As it was observed in other countries as well (Milas – Otero, 2003), the unofficial or parallel exchange rate started to appear in the whole country. The result was obvious: by the mid-1980s, the unofficial rate reached 6 or 7 ETB per USD. (The official exchange remained unchanged at 2.07 ETB.) In the year of 1992, Ethiopia decided to devaluate the national currency to 5 ETB per USD. (This was a remarkable devaluation with the magnitude of 141.5 percent.) As Taye (1999) argued, the devaluation of the exchange rate was expected to increase output by giving a boost to the export sector and increase domestic production. 1992 was a milestone for the country as they abandoned the fixed exchange rate system and turned to the flexible one with the aim of controlling overvaluation. They wanted to gradually depreciate the ETB every single year by a given percentage. The first results were promising as the gap between the unofficial and official rate decreased in comparison with the period when the exchange rate had been fixed. However, in the fiscal years of 2007/08, 2009/10, and 2010/11, the rate of depreciation reached –so far– never-seen heights. In 2010, Ethiopia devalued the birr by 23.7 percent, and following the 2010 devaluation, the monetary authorities also allowed the unsterilized accumulation of foreign exchange reserves arising from the ensuing rise in exports and this contributed to additional inflation (inducing a growth penalty of 0.3 percentage points in the late 2000s) (Moller–Wacker, 2017). As the IMF (2010) and the NBE (2009) argued, these huge devaluations were expected to decrease overvaluation and increase competitiveness. After 2010, the Ethiopian currency was depreciating gradually and in 2016 it reached the exchange rate of 21.26 ETB per USD.

On October 9, 2017, Ethiopia's President, Mulatu Teshome claimed that earning foreign exchange became the issue of life and death for Ethiopia. One day later, on October 10, 2017, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) devalued the ETB by 15 percent with immediate effect. The new exchange rate was 26.91 ETB per USD and since then the government has been counting on improved export numbers, decreased imports, and a narrower trade deficit. Also, in the hope of easing the inflationary pressures, the authorities have raised the key interest rate by 2 percent

to 7 percent. In the followings, we are going to point to the argumentation of Bonsa (2017) when understanding the possible effects of devaluation.

As we could see in the theoretical part, the postdevaluation inflation pressures start to build up through two separate channels. *(i)* As the domestic currency is cheaper in the foreign exchange market, foreigners could purchase the locally made goods at a lower price, which leads to improved competitiveness. If Ethiopia has a larger stock of exportable goods than the quantity of exports, it will consequently increase its presence in the world market. New orders will give a boost to production and the relevant activities and after a time more investments and expenditure would be needed. At this point, it is quite obvious that inflationary pressures appear. *(ii)* The second effect is the price increase owing to imports. It is obvious that devaluation makes imported products more expensive in the local markets.

As it is clear from Figure 1, the inflation rate jumped from 8.14 percent (2010) to 33.22 percent (2011) and it remained quite high in 2012 as well with 22.78 percent.[4] So the immediate effect of the 2010 devaluation was a remarkable rise in the inflation rate. As Bonsa (2017) argues, the data stemming from the World Bank are quite conservative and the effects of the 2010 devaluation resulted in about a 40 percent increase in inflation.

The current Ethiopian government is well aware of this fact and in 2017 they turned to increasing the key interest rate in order to dispel the current inflation fears. (It is quite an unusual move in the international literature.) However, Bonsa (2017) highlights the fact that a slight increase (like 2 percent) in the interest rate is too

Figure 1. Inflation Rates (Consumer Prices) in Ethiopia (1990–2016)
Source: World Bank (2018)

small to stop the inflationary pressures. It indeed might be a small step but finally the government admits that devaluations lead to inflation and they show certain signs of treating or solving this problem.

We have to point to a second, much more serious issue as well. First of all, as interest rates increase, the willingness to invest more simply evaporates. Secondly, those imported products (e.g., semi-prepared goods and services) which would be vital for boosting export production also become much more expensive. So, taking these two measures into consideration, we can easily detect contradictions.

In the theoretical part, we could have a more nuanced picture on the effects of devaluation on export performance and now we are still going to focus on the Ethiopian case and the impacts of the devaluation of 2010. However, we should bear in mind the argument of Bonsa (2017), according to which behind every devaluation is the ultimate policy target of improving trade deficit.

When we take into consideration the date of Figure 2, it is quite clear that the trade deficit in Ethiopia has increased quite remarkably since 1997. For us, the year of the last devaluation (2010) is crucial, so we compare the pre- and postdevaluation tendencies. Export revenues have increased from 2 billion USD in 2010 to 6 billion USD in 2014. Total merchandise export in 2010/11 increased by 37 percent to 2.75 billion USD in comparison with the previous year. The rise of 841.8 million USD was largely due to the 59.3 percent growth in coffee export earnings. This explains the rise from 26.4 percent (2009/10) to 30.6 percent (2010/11) in the share of coffee in total exports (NBE, 2018). The NBE annual reports (NBE, 2011; 2012) point to

Figure 2. Ethiopia's Trade Performance (1997–2016)
Source: World Bank (2018)

the fact that there was an increase of export earnings of gold (64.1%), live animals (63%), leather and leather products (84.1%), and meat and meat products (86.2%) as well, and as a consequence, the share of export of goods in GDP improved to 10 percent from 6.7 percent in 2009/10. Later, there were protests in Ethiopia (triggering protests in Amhara regional state) and export numbers sharply declined by 2016 and reached again 2.91 billion USD (representing a 5.8 percent increase compared to 2010/11). Bonsa (2017) calls our attention to the fact that the figures are given in nominal terms and the effect of inflation is not taken into account. As the cumulative change in the general price level from 2010 to 2016 was 2.24, the country experienced a more than two-fold increase in prices of goods and services in just six years. In real terms, Ethiopia's export revenues in 2016 were less than 50% of the amount earned in 2010. It is also very telling that the coffee sector experienced the lowest increase of export earnings, a fact to be discussed later (NBE, 2012; 2018).

As far as imports are concerned, the bills decreased by 0.2 percent in 2010/11 in comparison with the previous year and reached 8.25 billion USD. This was largely because of the reduction of raw materials (13.5 percent) and capital goods (8.8 percent) imports. The share of imports in the GDP rose insignificantly to 29.6 percent from 27.8 percent. Owing to the fact that the total exports grew significantly and the total imports were reduced to a much lesser extent, the current account deficit in 2010/11 narrowed by 12.1 percent compared with the preceding fiscal year. Apart from the annual changes, it is also visible that expenditure on imports remarkably increased from 9 billion USD in 2010 to 26 billion USD in 2015 which is a three-fold increase. Based on the export and import tendencies, we can claim that Ethiopia's current trade surplus deteriorated and rose from about 6 billion USD in 2010 to 17 billion USD in 2016, which is also a three-fold increase. The share of the agricultural commodities of export earnings was 75 percent in 2010/11 and 80 percent in 2016/17. In the case of capital goods, fertilizers, and petroleum products, we have seen a decline from 68.4 percent in 2010/11 to 66 percent in 2016/17 (NBE, 2012; 2018).

Taking into consideration the whole period until 2017, the devaluation of 2010 was very far from being successful as export earnings increased by 5.8 percent only and the total merchandise import almost doubled and reached 15.8 billion USD in 2016/17. The current account deficit has increased by 134.5 percent since 2010 and reached 12.9 billion in 2016/17 (NBE, 2018).

When trying to answer these tendencies, we have to point to the fact that the current Ethiopian export policies actively discriminate against the country's main export product, coffee (Bonsa 2017). The author also highlights that the current export policy encourages brand new sectors which contribute to the overall export growth to a much lesser extent. Also, we have to confirm again that Ethiopia's imports are mostly essential products (e.g. petrol, semi-prepared goods, fertilizers, intermediate inputs, etc.). When the government promotes large public infrastructural projects, the import bill increases significantly, as capital goods are imported. As a result, the imported items become (unnecessarily) more and more expensive instead of being replaced by locally made products. Also, the discrepancies between trade value and

quantity would have far-reaching implications as the exported goods are made cheap and more is needed to earn about the same export revenue. In addition, consumers pay more for the same quantity of consumer or capital goods imported. In the light of the 2010 devaluation and learning from the experience, our focus should be shifted to the 2017 one, but given the narrow time frame, only preliminary results are available.

■ **When trying to answer these tendencies, we have to point to the fact that the current Ethiopian export policies actively discriminate against the country's main export product, coffee.**

The first numbers are promising as the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (2018) announced that it traded coffee worth 9 billion ETB in the first half of the current fiscal year. This figure is 62 percent higher than that of the same period in the last fiscal year. The first results are indeed eye-catching as the export proceeds from coffee hit a record high, reaching 435 million USD (25 percent increase) in the first half of the current Ethiopian fiscal year (102,000 tons of coffee) (ERCA, 2018). It is the highest increase since 2012 and surpasses, by 22 percent, the quantity sold overseas in the same period in the last fiscal year (Hailu, 2018). It is interesting that the highest export revenue the country earned from coffee was recorded in the first half of 2015/16 with 329 million USD. This year's (2018) target is 1.14 billion USD and there are ambitious plans for 2019/20 with a target of 2.2 billion USD. More companies are getting involved in the sector as there used to be 214 companies and 21 are added. However, it is quite likely that a rise in the global commodity price is behind as a supply shortage started two years ago. The price of the coffee rose in the past two years (17.5 percent annual increase) (NBE, 2018).

However, coffee exporters argue that the improvement in revenues is driven by the rise in global commodity prices. According to the ICO (2018), the supply limitations which started two years ago, continued in 2017 as well. The price of coffee has seen a steady rise in the past two years and showed an average of 17.5 percent annual growth.

When it comes to inflation, not so many were surprised when it started to rise after the devaluation of October 2017. According to the CSA (2018b), the annual inflation rate grew by 12.2 percent in comparison with the same period last year and the monthly inflation rose by 0.2 percent between September and October 2017. The EBR conducted an informal market evaluation which confirmed the price surge of imported commodities and locally produced goods (EBR, 2018). The inflation rate rose to 14.7 percent in June 2018 from 13.7 percent in May (CSA, 2018b). Clothes, footwear, construction, and furniture items showed a significant rise in price last month. Cereals, dairy products, and vegetable items pushed the food inflation rate up. While food inflation reached 17.9 percent, the non-food component of inflation increased to 11.1 percent. The rate, which is almost 6.7 percentage points higher than

the target set by the government, is the highest since February 2018. It is well-known that the inflation rate has been in double-digit numbers since August 2017 but the indicator started to show a quick pace since the effectiveness of the devaluation of ETB in October 2017 (CSA, 2018b). There is one more remarkable thing related to the recent monetary tendencies in Ethiopia as the gap between the official and the parallel exchange markets dwindled to 20 cents, which is the lowest in two decades. According to an assessment by the EBR (2018), the USD is exchanged for 27.3 ETB at the official market, the parallel market buys a dollar for 27.50 ETB.

Apart from these immediate effects, taking into consideration the main features and bottleneck of the Ethiopian export and coffee sector is more important when drawing final conclusions. Eshetu (2017), for example, argues that the first alternative policy for devaluation is boosting export performance through the rise in export productivity and diversification. The government may stimulate export diversification in the area of agriculture, agro-investment and agro-allied industries, and mining industries, which will improve the country's trade balance and foreign exchange earnings. According to Eshetu (2017), the second alternative policy to devaluation is to give due attention to the import-competing industries (e.g., chemical industries, cement factories, steel factory, and textile factories). This would help the Ethiopian trade balance improvement by decreasing dependence on imported goods.

Based on the theoretical part and the experiences of the previous devaluations, it seems that devaluation gives with one hand (exports) and takes with the other hand (imports) so the real effect on trade balance depends on the net effect. When a country is export-dependent, devaluation improves the trade balance and leads to output growth. However, in cases like Ethiopia, when the country is import-dependent, devaluation might aggravate the situation. Eshetu (2017) claims that devaluation has a positive impact once the country establishes export-oriented firms and international markets. Ethiopia first needs to import capital goods and when the production gets its way, devaluation makes sense. Among officials, it is widely accepted that coffee production, its value, and marketing chains need to improve on a massive scale. Realizing this, the parliament amended a proclamation in 2017 which is clustered around the production, the marketing, and the quality of coffee. (Proclamation No. 1051-2017 Coffee Marketing and Quality Control, 2017) The focus is partly on addressing the issues of the extended value chain and the widespread illegal trade in the sector. The proclamation also aims to incentivize coffee growers and exporters. Mehare and Edriss (2013) argue that instead of focusing on the volume of exports, the focus should be on real benefits for the country. They recommend value addition and as a consequence price increase before exporting. In this way, they point to rewarding the factors of production reasonably.

5. Conclusions

As the theoretical part concluded, the issue of currency devaluations is far from settled as the short- and long-term impacts are different on various economies. Still, Ethiopia has been trying to boost the export (coffee) sector with the help of this mea-

sure. Before 2017, the previous devaluation rounds did not bring success and taking those effects and the current conditions into consideration, it is very unlikely that the export sector (and the coffee sector within) will be transformed and made competitive. Increasing import bills are quite likely and a further widening trade balance also. The current coffee sector in Ethiopia is burdened with a number of problems and solving them would be the first step to boost competitiveness. Increasing the value-added component, having a technological transformation, and reaching higher yields are definitely needed before devaluations. A less competitive sector coupled with regular devaluations gives only partial success and does not solve the major problems in the industry. It seems that decision-makers have to find the appropriate steps according to which devaluations are only secondary. ✸

Notes

1 Like in most of the developing countries, there are two economies in present-day Ethiopia. There is the enclave economy with strongly interconnected domestic and foreign firms which are highly sophisticated. They jointly control the commanding heights of the Ethiopian economy. The rest of the economy is a traditional one where ordinary Ethiopians struggle to survive and make ends meet (Bonsa, 2017).
2 In Ethiopia, the fiscal year ends on July 7 of the calendar year.
3 The Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) was a five-year plan made by the Ethiopian government in the hope of improving the economy and reaching an annual increase of 11–15 percent of the GDP. The plan sets numbers to be reached by most of the sectors of the economy (MOFED, 2018).
4 In August 2011, the inflation rate was 41 percent (NBE, 2018).

Bibliography

• Acar, M. (2000). Devaluation in Developing Countries: Expansionary or Contractionary? *Journal of Economic and Social Research* **2 (1)**, 59-83.
• Acharya, S. (2010). Potential Impacts of Devaluation of Nepalese Currency: A general equilibrium approach. *Economic Systems* **34 (4)**, 413-436.
• Adugna, G., Bellachew, B., Shimber, T., Taye, E. and Kufa, T. (2008). *Coffee Diversity and Knowledge*. Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
• Agénor, P. R. (1991). Output, devaluation and the real exchange rate in developing countries. *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* **127 (1)**, 18-41.
• Akinlo, E. A. (1996). Improving the Performance of the Nigerian Manufacturing sub-sector after Adjustment. *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies* **3 (9)**, 91-111.
• Al-Abdelrazag, B. (1997). Does Devaluation Improve Jordan's Trade Balance (1969–1994). *Abath Al-varmouk* **3 (1)**, 65-72.
• Alessandria, G., Pratap, S. and Yue, V. (2013). *Export Dynamics in Large Devaluations*. International Finance Discussion Papers 1087, Board of Governors of the Federal System (US) https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2013/1087/ifdp1087 [07.16.2018]
• An, L., Kim, G. and Ren, X. (2014). Is devaluation expansionary or contractionary? Evidence based on vector autoregression with sign restrictions. *Journal of Asian Economics* **34 (10)**, 27-41.
• Backus, D., Patrick K. and Kydlad, F. (1994). Dynamics of the Trade Balance and the Terms of Trade: The J-Curve? *American Economics Review* **84**, 84-103.

- Bonsa, J. (2017). *Devaluing the Birr: Doing the Same Thing over and over again and expecting a different outcome*. Addis Standard. http://addisstandard.com/economic-analysis-devaluing-birr-thing-expecting-different-outcome/ [06.10.2018]
- Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA). (2018a). *Ethiopia Country Stat – Metadata*. http://193.43.36.162/home.aspx?c=ETH&p=me [07.30.2018]
- Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA). (2018b). Consumer price index in Ethiopia. http://www.csa.gov.et/ehioinfo-internal?start=5 [07.30.2018]
- Dornbusch, R. (1973). *Exchange Rate Economies*. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity.
- Edwards, S. (1986). Are Devaluations Contradictory? *The Review of Economics and Statistics* **68 (3)**, 501-508.
- Erixon, L. (2007). Even the bad times are good: a behavioral theory of transformation pressure. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, **31 (3)**, 327-348.
- Eshetu, F. (2017). Birr devaluation and its effect on trade balance of Ethiopia: An empirical analysis. *Journal of Economics and International Finance* **9 (11)**, 103–119.
- Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX). (2018). *ECX Coffee Contract*. http://www.ecx.com.et/downloads/Contracts/Coffee/CoffeeContracts.pdf [08.01.2018]
- Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority (ERCA). (2018). *Latest News* on exports. http://www.erca.gov.et/ [08.01.2018]
- Gala, P. (2007). Real exchange rate levels and economic development: theoretical analysis and econometric evidence. *Cambridge Journal of Economics* **32 (2)**, 273-288.
- Ghura, D. and Grennes, T. (1993). The Real Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Economic Development and Cultural Change* **42**, 155-174.
- Girton, L. and Roper, D. (1977). A Monetary Model of Exchange Market Pressure Applied to the Canadian Postwar Experience. *American Economic Review* **67 (4)**, 537-548.
- Goldberg, L. S. (1990). *Nominal Exchange Rate Patterns: Correlations with entry, exit and investment in US industry*. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3249, January 1990.
- Hailu, S. (2018). October's Devaluation. *Ethiopian Business Review* 15 March **6 (58)**, 13-18.
- ICO (Internatioal Coffee Organization). (2018). *Trade Statistics Tables*. http://www.ico.org/trade_statistics.asp?section=Statistics [07.20.2018]
- ICO (International Coffee Organization). (2014). *Strenghtening the Global Coffee Sector through International Cooperation*. http://dev.ico.org/documents/cy2014-15/annual-review-2013-14-electronic-e.pdf [08.01.2018]
- IMF. (2010). *The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: A Second Review of the Arrangement under Exogenous Shocks Facility*. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/31/The-Federal-Democratic-Republic-of-Ethiopia-Second-Review-of-the-Arrangement-under-the-24375 [06.12.2018]
- IMF. (2017). *Regional Economic Outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa: Fiscal Adjustment and Economic Diversification*. October 2017. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2017/10/19/sreo1017 [05.10.2018]
- IMF. (2018). *World Economic Outlook. Cyclical Upswings, Structural Change*. April 2018. http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2018/03/20/world-economic-outlook-april-2018 [05.21.2018]
- Imoisi, A. I. (2012). Trends in Nigeria's Balance of Payments: An empirical analysis from 1970–2010. *European Journal of Business and Management IISTE, USA* **4 (21)**, 210-217.
- Johnson, H. G. (1967). *Towards a General Theory of the Balance Payments. International Trade and Economic Growth: Studies in Pure Theory*. Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press.
- Kidane, A. (1994). *Indices of Effective Exchange Rates: A Comparative Study of Ethiopia, Kenya and the Sudan*. African Economic Research Consortium. November 1994.

- Krueger, A. O. (1983). *Exchange rate determination*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Krugman, P. and Taylor, L. (1978). Contradictory effects of Devaluation. *Journal of International Economics* **8**, 445-456.
- Manova, K. (2013). Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms, and International Trade. *Review of Economic Studies* **80**, 711-744.
- Meade, E. (1988). Exchange Rates, Adjustment, and the J-Curve. *Federal Reserve Bulletin* **74**, 633-644.
- Mehare, A. and Edriss. A. K. (2013). Evaluation of the Effect of Exchange Rate Variability on the Export of Ethiopia's Agricultural Product: A Case of Coffee. *Margin – The Journal of Applied Economic Research* **7 (2)**, 171-183.
- Milas, C. and Otero, J. (2003). Modelling official and paralell exchange rates in Colombia under alternative regimes: a non-linear approach. *Economic Modelling*, **20 (1)**, 165-179.
- Miles, A. (1979). The Effects of Devaluation on the Trade Balance and the Balance of Payments: Some New Results. *Journal of Political Economy* **87 (3)**, 600-620.
- Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MOFED). (2018). *GTP Main Document*. http://www.mofed.gov.et/web/guest/-/gtp-policy-matrix-vol-2?inheritRedirect=true [07.25.2018]
- Minten, B., Dereje, M., Engida, E. and Kuma, T. (2017). Coffee value chains on the move: Evidence in Ethiopia. *Food Policy*, (forthcoming)
- Moller, L. C. and Wacker, K. M. (2017). Explaining Ethiopia's Growth Acceleration – The Role of Infrastructure and Macroeconomic Policy. *World Development* August 2017 **96**, 198-215.
- Musila, J. W. and Newark, J. (2003): Does Currency Devaluation Improve the Trade Balance in the Long Run? Evidence from Malawi. *African Development Review* **15 (2–3)**, 339–352.
- National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). (2009): *Annual Report 2009/10*.
- http://www.nbebank.com/pdf/annualbulletin/Annual%20Report%202009_2010/Annual%20Report%202009_2010.pdf [05.20.2018]
- National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). (2011). *Annual Report 2010/11*. https://www.nbe.gov.et/publications/annualreport.html [05.20.2018]
- National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). (2012). *Annual Report 2011/12*. https://www.nbe.gov.et/publications/annualreport.html [05.20.2018]
- National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). (2018). *Statistics – Monthly Macroeconomic* https://www.nbe.gov.et/statistics/monthlyindicators.html [05.20.2018]
- Nizard, R. (2018). *Currency Risk in Africa: easing in 2018 but reserves have melted*. Coface Economic Publications, April 2018. Paris, France.
- NPC (National Planning Commission). (2016). *Second Growth and Transformation Plan*, http://www.npc.gov.et/documents/101123/979b7e51-ea5d-4bad-b148-662eset06a612 [08.01.2018]
- Paul, S. (2006). Devaluation, Innovation and Prices. *The International Trade Journal* **20 (1)**, 75-83.
- Proclamation No. 1051-2017 Coffee Marketing and Quality Control. (2017). https://chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/proclamation-no-1051-2017-coffee-marketing-and-quality-control.pdf [05.20.2018]
- Ratha, A. (2010). Does Devaluation work for India. *Economics Bulletin* **30 (1)**, 247-264.
- Reinhart, C. M. (1995). Devaluation, Relative Prices, and International Trade: Evidence from Developing Countries. *IMF Staff Papers* **42**, June 1995, 290-312.
- Taye, H. K. (1992). *Is the Ethiopian Currency (birr) Overvalued?* Paper presented for the Second Annual Conference on the Ethiopian Economy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Taye, H. K. (1999). The Impact of Devaluation on Macroeconomic Performance: The Case of Ethiopia. *Journal of Policy Modeling* **21 (4)**, 481-496.

- Technoserve. (2014). *Ethiopia: A Business Case for Sustainable Coffee Production*. Mimeo.
- Tybout, J., Gauthier, B., Navaretti, G. B. and De Melo, J. (1997). Firm-Level Response to the CFA Devaluation in Cameroon. *Journal of African Economies* **6 (1)**, 3-34.
- UN COMTRADE. (2018). *International Trade Statistic Yearbook Vol. I–II*. https://comtrade.un.org/pb/downloads/2016/VolI2016.pdf [08.01.2018]
- Williamson, J. (1983). *The Open Economy and the World Economy*. Basic Books, New York.
- World Bank (2018). *The World Bank in Ethiopia – Overview*. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview [07.01.2018]
- Zaidan, T. M. (1999). *Does Devaluation Improve the Trade Balance of Iraq*. OPEC Publications, 127-137.

Tarrósy István
AFRO-ÁZSIAI DINAMIKÁK

THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICAN YOUTH IN POLITICS

MANDISA GILA – IMAN LATIEF

UNIVERSITY OF PÉCS

Introduction

The Republic of South Africa is 25 years into its democracy and the youth of the country find themselves inextricably linked with the country's politics. With a fast-growing population, rapid urbanisation, gross overpopulation, inequalities as well as other issues faced by most developing countries, the youth of South Africa find themselves in the position of being the product of their history as well as the catalysts for their future.

Historical background

The history of the country is crucial in understanding the current issues faced by its people as well as the role of the youth in the country's politics. Translated from the Afrikaans word meaning 'apartness', apartheid was the ideology supported by the National Party (NP) government (SA History, 2018) and was introduced in South Africa in 1948 even though racism was practiced and enforced as far back as colonial times.

"Apartheid called for the separate development of the different racial groups in South Africa" (SA History, 2018). This oppressive system was abolished after many discussions and negotiations and the first democratic elections took place in 1994. Through the peaceful transition into a democratic state and the move for the acceptance of all South Africans in their diversity, the country became known as the 'rainbow nation'.

Youth during apartheid

The youth of South Africa played a significant role in the struggle against apartheid. Different acts of rebellion from the youth were seen as far back as the colonial rule. This rebellion really set in within schools, although protests were sparse and not interconnected, as the youth had no set leader or organiser. Originally, it was believed that these protests were for short-term gains, however, this was later proved to not be the case.

In 1945, the African National Congress Youth League was established. The establishment of this youth-driven sector of the party led to the coordination of the protests across the country and for a more uniform voice of the youth to emerge. The

Bantu Education Bill of 1953 was an act that was established to ensure that the black population was given an inferior education system to that of the white population and this later led to the enforcement of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction (SA History, 2017). This only increased the boycotts and protests planned and executed by students and student bodies but the government fought back against these actions, which were seen as radical at the time.

The climax and most notable moment in the history of South African youth would be the protest of 16 June 1976, known as the Soweto Uprising. This saw scores of South African youth take to the streets to protest the apartheid government and its laws on education. The youth movement was confrontational and daring and seen as radical by the oppressive government. This watershed moment marked the day that the youth of South Africa really showed the power they possess. This day is commemorated yearly in South Africa as 'Youth Day' and is viewed as an opportunity to observe what the youth has done, take note of their current issues and reflect on what can be done to aid them in the future.

Present-day challenges

According to Statistics South Africa (2018), the population in South Africa is fast growing, reaching 57.7 million people in 2018, with 80.2% being black African, 8.4% being white, 8.8% being coloured and 2.5% being of Indian/Asian descent. This fast-growing population is largely youthful with about 42% of the population being between the ages of 25 and 54.

According to Youth Policy (2014), South Africa's National Youth Policy, as well as its National Youth Commission Act and its Integrated Youth Development Strategy, youth is defined as people between the ages of 14 and 35 years. This guideline is adopted and used countrywide to define youth.

South Africa, as a developing nation, is faced with many issues, with the youth of the country suffering the most. The issues in the country range from education to HIV/AIDS, inequality and other social issues that impede the progress of the youth and thus, in turn, hinder the potential of the youth, limiting South Africa's ability to tap into the potential human capital that the youth of the country represents.

Despite the significant progress made since democracy in 1994, most young South Africans remain cynical of a better life with opportunities for social and economic progress. Inequalities remain very evident in the country and due to the past they still exist along racial lines and the class divide continues to grow.

Education

In terms of education, South African youth now are much more highly educated than in previous generations. Although significant strides have been made in providing access to education since 1994, the content, curriculum, and quality of education remain of huge concern. Today South Africa has more than 7 million youth in no-fee schools receiving free education and since its start; the National Student Financial Aid Scheme has provided R41.5 billion in student financial aid to more than 2 million students from

an underprivileged background (Ycl.org.za, 2018). Despite this, few improvements have been made in decreasing the number of young people with little or no education.

Only 11% of black South African youth and 7% of coloured youth are enrolled in a higher education institution, compared to 60% of white South African youth (Chetty, 2014). Poor quality primary and secondary schooling are key reasons for these differences. South African youth in poverty often look to higher education as a means to a better life. However, access to higher education is hugely limited for those who are impoverished and from rural areas (Ycl.org.za, 2018).

Although significant strides have been made in providing access to education since 1994, the content, curriculum, and quality of education remain of huge concern.

Language-related challenges are also significant, with South Africa having 11 official languages. Most learners whose home language is not English or Afrikaans begin schooling in their mother tongue and then experience a switch to English. This is supposed to happen at the fourth-grade level, although it is not always successfully executed (Ycl.org.za, 2018). Teachers and classroom practices are other factors driving low-quality education. The quality of teacher training and the need for more teacher training institutions is crucial to improving the quality of education in schools. (Ycl.org.za, 2018).

Unemployment

Unemployment remains one of the top challenges for young South Africans. About 70% of all South African unemployed persons in 2013 were youth (Mhlongo, 2016). The 2011 South African census found that people in the youngest age groups (15–19 years and 20–24 years) face the most difficult challenges in the country's labour market (Mhlongo, 2016). Young South Africans who do obtain employment also often do so with the assistance of personal contacts or networks, which black youth are less likely to benefit from (Lorenzo and Cramm, 2012). The challenge of youth unemployment is a global one, however, and not unique to South Africa. The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that there are over 75 million unemployed young people across the globe (Ycl.org.za, 2018).

Health

In terms of health, "despite the efforts and resources invested in South Africa's healthcare system, the indicators of a healthy nation remain unacceptable. South Africa has the highest number of people living with HIV/AIDS, the prevalence of this disease is highest amongst young people" (Ycl.org.za, 2018). Globally, South Africa has the "highest rate of inequity of access to health services. The public health system serves the vast majority of youth but is chronically underfunded and understaffed" (Ycl.org.za, 2018).

HIV/AIDS is the single most serious health challenge facing the country, with a 2016 United Nations report finding that the country has the 4th highest adult HIV prevalence rate in the world. This issue is most prevalent in the black communities and the most affected groups include sex workers, transgender women, men who have sex with men, people who inject drugs, children and orphans and women and adolescent girls (United Nations, 2016). Despite the fact that HIV/AIDS can be seen as the most prominent threat to the health of South African youth, "the massive rollout of antiretrovirals (ARVs) through comprehensive government programmes has increased life expectancy and productivity, especially for the youth" (Ycl.org.za, 2018).

A concept introduced by the United Nation's programme on HIV/AIDS in 2013, 90-90-90 is a set of goals. The idea is that by 2020, 90% of people who are HIV infected will be diagnosed, 90% of people who are diagnosed will be on antiretroviral treatment and 90% of those who receive antiretrovirals will be virally suppressed (UNAIDS, 2017). South Africa has made great strides in this regard, with 86% of people being aware of their HIV status, 65% being on treatment and 81% of those people being virally suppressed.

Youth and race

In a country where the past was so negatively centered on race, the racial inequalities created during apartheid continue to have lasting effects on society today. The issues of race show themselves in different areas of society and between the many different racial groups of the country. Inequality ranges from wealth to land ownership, which has been thrust into the spotlight in the country as the expropriation of land that was forcibly taken from the black majority becomes the main focus of the country and its policies.

The main societal, and racial, inequality in the country is that of wealth. According to Africa Check (2018), 27.9% of black Africans are unemployed - compared to only 7% of white South Africans. Africa Check (2018) also states that the average income of black African households in the country is R69,632 as opposed to the average income of white households, which is R387,011. In terms of top management positions in various types of employment, white South Africans hold 70% of positions while black Africans hold only 13.6%.

Present-day potential

The 'Global Youth Bulge' refers to a demographic trend where the age group of people between 15 and 24 is "comparatively greater than other age groups in the state's population" (Mhlongo, 2016). It was put forward by Fuller, whose 1990 study "identified that the high presence of youth between the age of 15-24 in South Korea threatened the political

In a country where the past was so negatively centered on race, the racial inequalities created during apartheid continue to have lasting effects on society today.

stability of the state" (Mhlongo, 2016). This trend has meant that the participation of young people becomes extremely important in politics as they form a significant portion of society and alienating them poses a "major risk to the legitimacy of the state" (Mhlongo, 2016).

In South Africa, the Youth Bulge has been similar to most developing countries, with a large segment of citizens being under the age of 35. This has meant that the government has faced demands to design policies encouraging youth participation and development (Mhlongo, 2016).

Despite these worthy goals, the Human Science Research Council conducted a voter turnout research in 2012 and found that the majority of young South Africans do not engage in the formal structures of politics. Research has found that the "successful inclusion of youth in accessible community decision making structures, accompanied by genuine opportunities to engage in political decision making, can create a sense of inclusion and responsibility among young people that can significantly curb their participation in criminal activities plaguing society" (Mhlongo, 2016).

Including "youth in political decision making is vital in creating a sense of belonging in the state" and in South Africa in particular, "where youth voter turnout has been declining and where the youth are often involved in violent protest" (Mhlongo, 2016), engaging young South Africans should be a top priority for government and civil society alike.

Policies and initiatives
South Africa does put a great amount of emphasis on the youth, which can be seen by the country's many youth-focused policies and initiatives as well as those of the NGOs that focus on youth and their development.

National Youth Policy
The National Youth Policy (NYP) 2020 (National Youth Development Agency, 2015b) seeks to create an environment that enables the young people of South Africa to reach their potential, mindful of the global economic challenges that affect the country.

National Youth Development Agency
The National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) was established to address youth development issues at the national, provincial and local government level (National Youth Development Agency, 2015a). The NYDA plays a leading role in ensuring that all major stakeholders, i.e. the government, the private sector and civil society, "prioritise youth development and contribute towards identifying and implementing lasting solutions which address youth development challenges" (National Youth Development Agency, 2015b).

YES

Unemployment has plagued South Africa for many years with the rate increasing steadily. The most affected are the youth. These numbers are worsened when considering that 39% of all unemployed South Africans have never worked before. The unemployment issue has been in discussion in South Africa for many years and several plans have been put in place but none have been effective.

This issue has been stated as being at the top of the new government administration's priority list and President Ramaphosa launched the Youth Employment Service (YES). Over the next three years, YES will "incentivise businesses to employ young people, giving them a chance at a life-changing first work experience" (Yes4Youth, 2018). "With a unique collaboration between government, labour, civil society and the youth, this represents a benchmark in fresh, bold responses to our country's unemployment crisis."

Non-governmental organisations

According to NGO.org (2016), non-governmental organisations are usually non-profit and sometimes international organisations that are independent of governments and international governmental organisations (though often funded by governments) and are active in humanitarian response, education, health care, public policy, social issues, human rights, environment and other areas to effect changes according to their objectives.

South Africa has many such organisations that vary in their missions but a good amount of them are focused on combating issues that affect the youth as well as working with the youth to better their standing in society. This paper will look at two NGOs that have made such an impact and are working towards the empowerment of the youth in various ways.

Partners for Possibility

Ranked amongst the 100 best NGOs in the world, Partners for Possibility is a creative solution to South Africa's education crisis - it is a "co-action, co-learning partnership between School Principals and Business Leaders, enabling social cohesion through partnerships, and empowering Principals to become change leaders in their schools and communities" (Partners for Possibility, 2016).

Inkamva Youth

Ikamva Youth equips learners from disadvantaged communities with the knowledge, skills, networks and resources to access ter-

> **South Africa has many such organisations that vary in their missions but a good amount of them are focused on combating issues that affect the youth as well as working with the youth to better their standing in society.**

tiary education and/or employment opportunities once they matriculate (Inkamva Youth, 2018).

These NGOs are just two of many that bring the government, the private sector as well as the respective communities together to make the challenges of the youth known and to aid the youth in their quest to overcome these barriers.

Present-day youth in politics

Despite a large amount of youth-oriented legislation and many institutions established since the start of democracy in 1994, post-apartheid youth have not been active in politics in a similar way that the youth of the 1970s and 1980s were" (Mhlongo, 2016). This does not, however, mean that young South Africans are not finding a way to make their voices heard (Campbell, 2017). In 2015, students from different universities around the country embarked on protests against the increase in fees for the year 2016 and the continuing inability of underprivileged students being able to access higher education opportunities.

The 'Fees Must Fall' movement was seen as a critical time for the young people of South Africa, with many viewing the protest action as one of the first times since 1994 that "young people across racial boundaries mobilised to put pressure on government and universities" (Mhlongo, 2016) and attracted international support and attention. Furthermore, the protests were widely viewed as a success after the South African government agreed to pledge more funds to higher education, although tensions at higher education institutions remain high more than 3 years after the initial protests.

Fees have since gone up and despite public promises from the government, it remains to be seen how and when these goals would be achieved.

When looking at political parties and their relationship with youth-based priorities, the Economic Freedom Fighters, a party that was created from an ANC split, emerge as a "party which taps into youthful frustration at the slow pace of change" in South Africa's democracy (Webb, 2018). They have enjoyed growing popularity and their supporters are younger than those of their political rivals, with 49% being under the age of 24 (Harris, 2014).

The party's manifesto includes many of the contentious proposals that its leader, Julius Malema had promoted while he was the head of the ANC's Youth League, "including the nationalization of mines and banks and the expropriation of land for redistribution, all towards the goal of economic emancipation" (McKenna, 2014). The manifesto also calls for a number of initiatives to increase access to quality education and improve health and welfare systems, which quickly gave it support among young adults, the poor and the unemployed (McKenna, 2014).

Another growing aspect of the relations between politics and youth in South Africa is the growing number of young members of parliament. With the candidacy age being 18, a few examples of youthful members of parliament include the Economic Freedom Fighters' Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, 33, Inkatha Freedom Party's Mkhuleko Hlengwa, 31, the African National Congress' Mduduzi Manana, 34 as well as the

Democratic Alliance's Hlomela Bucwa, who is the youngest candidate at 24 years of age according to Times Live (2018).

The rise in the representation of youth in parliament is in direct relation to the growth of the youth as the majority of the population and has allowed for youth issues to be discussed at the highest level of the South African political discourse.

The rise in the representation of youth in parliament is in direct relation to the growth of the youth as the majority of the population and has allowed for youth issues to be discussed at the highest level of the South African political discourse.

Conclusion

The protests about access to higher education in South Africa became representative of a larger societal anger at the prevailing inequalities of South Africa's current state. Youth public action such as these student protests indicates that young people are very concerned about public issues. Although these protest actions are testimony that "youth do engage with politics and public issues that affect them, they also highlight a lack of formal engagements with the state by the youth, including participation in politics" (Davids et al., 2016).

Many people looked at student demonstrations and the growing voice of parties like the EFF and the values they espouse as the dawn of a "new generation of youth activists, comparable to those who struggled against apartheid" (Webb, 2018). But while the protests certainly highlight a profound frustration among young people, they have not "fundamentally challenged the inequality of South African society", nor do they "signal a turning of the political tides". They do capture a "deep frustration at the pace of socio-economic change, specifically among young people" (Webb, 2018) and their willingness to demand more. ✺

Bibliography

- Booysen, S. (2015). *Strengthening Participation of Young People in South Africa's Electoral and Democratic Processes*. Freedom House, Johannesburg. https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/strengthening-participation-young-people-south-africas-electoral-and [30.04.2018]
- Campbell, J. (2017). *South African Youth Fed Up With Formal Politics*. (Blog) Africa in Transition. https://www.cfr.org/blog/south-african-youth-fed-formal-politics [30.04.2018]
- Chetty, R. (2014). Class dismissed? Youth resistance and the politics of race and class in South African education. *Critical Arts* **28 (1),** 88-102.
- Davids, Y., Masiya, T., Struwig, J., Gordon, S. and Roberts, B. (2016). *HSRC*, Hsrc.ac.za. http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/media-briefs/democracy-goverance-and-service-delivery/youth-understanding-sa-politics [30.04.2018]
- Harris, M. (2014). *The Supporter Profiles of SA`S Three Largest Parties*. Politics Web. http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/the-supporter-profiles-of-sas-three-largest-partie [30.04.2018]

- IkamvaYouth. (2018). *About Us*. InkamvaYouth. www.inkamvayouth.org/about-us [01.05.2018]
- Lorenzo, T. and Cramm, J. (2012). Access to livelihood assets among youth with and without disabilities in South Africa: Implications for health professional education. *South African Medical Journal* **102 (6),** 578.
- McKenna, A. (2014). *Economic Freedom Fighters*. Encyclopedia Britannica. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Economic-Freedom-Fighters [01.04.2018]
- Mhlongo, N. (2016). *Opportunities and Challenges of Youth Engagement: The South African Context*. Master. The University of KwaZulu-Natal.
- Mokoena, S. (2017). *'Major Challenge Facing Young People Today Is That Their Voices Must Be Heard' - Parliament of South Africa*. Parliament.gov.za. https://www.parliament.gov.za/ news/major-challenge-facing-young-people-today-their-voices-must-be-heard [30.04.2018]
- NGO.org. (2016). *Definition of NGO. NGO.org.* www.ngo.org/ngoinfo/define.html [30.04.2018]
- National Youth Development Agency. (2015a). *National Youth Policy*. NYDA. www.nyda.gov. za/publications/NYP%20Policy%202020%20Report.pdf [29.04.2018]
- National Youth Development Agency. (2015b). *What is NYDA*. NYDA. www.nyda.gov.za/ About-Us/nyda/Pages/default.aspx [29.04.2018]
- Partners for Possibility (2016). *About Us*. PFP500. www.pfp4sa.org/about-us [01.05.2018]
- SA History. (2018). *A History of Apartheid in South Africa*. What Was Apartheid. www.sahis- tory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa [01.05.2018]
- SA History. (2017). *Youth and the National Liberation Struggle*. Youth Politics in South Africa. www.sahistory.org.za/topic/youth-and-national-liberation-struggle-1894-1994 [01.05.2018]
- Statssa.gov.za. (2018). *Education, Statistics South Africa*. http://www.statssa.gov.za/?cat=16 [30.04.2018]
- Statistics South Africa. (2018). *Migrants Flock to Gauteng*. StatsSA. www.statssa.gov. za/?p=11331 [22.07.2018]
- TimesLive. (2018). *South Africa's Youngest MP's Are…* Politics by TimesLive. www.timeslive. co.za/amp/politics/2018-06-15-south-africa-7-youngets-mps-are---/ [25.06.2018]
- UNAIDS. (2017). *90–90–90 – An Ambitious Treatment Target to Help End the AIDS Epi- demic*. www.unaids.org/en/resources/documents/2017/90-90-90 [08.07.2018]
- UNAIDS. (2016). *South Africa. Country Fact Sheets*. www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/ countries/southafrica [08.07.2018]
- UNESCO. (2016). *Literacy Rates of South Africa. Data for Sustainable Development Goals*. uis.unesco.org [22.07.2018]
- Webb, C. (2018). *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Generation Has Come of Age, and They're Not Happy*. New Internationalist. https://newint.org/features/2018/01/01/south-africa-young- radicals [30.04.2018]
- Wilkinson, K (2018). *Race, Poverty, and Inequality: Black First Land First Claims Fact-Checked*. Africa Check. africacheck.org/reports/race-poverty-and-inequality-black- first-land- first-claims-fact-checked/ [12.07.2018]
- Ycl.org.za. (2018). *The Development and Underdevelopment of Youth in South Africa: Discus- sion Document 2016*. http://www.ycl.org.za/docs/discussion/2016/The%20Development%20 and%20Underdevelopment%20of%20Youth%20in%20SA.pdf [30.04.2018]
- YES. (2018). *What YES Does*. YES4Youth. www.yes4youth.co.za [01.05.2018]
- Youth Policy. (2014). *Definition of Youth*. South Africa. www.youthpolicy.org/factsheets/ country/south-africa/ [29.04.2018]

SHARING SOVEREIGNTY

STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SUPPORTING FRANCE'S PERCEPTION AS A GREAT POWER

TAMÁS BALÁZS

Introduction and hypotheses

This paper argues that conventional sovereignty can no longer account for France's perception as a great power, therefore, suggests Stephen Krasner's approach in analyzing French Africa policy. The basic assumption is that France can maintain its relative power by intervening in weak and failing states in sub-Saharan Africa. Interventions in its former colonies have long played a vital role in enhancing France's perception as a great power in the international system and in the protection of its vital national interests worldwide. Since the decolonization, there have been around fifty interventions on the continent. (Roesch, 2015) French Africa policy can be easily regarded as France's belief in a civilizing mission since French officials have always stressed the importance of encouraging regional stability and development, and the support of democratic governments.

At this point, French Africa policy and Krasner's shared sovereignty intersect. He claims that the two principal policy tools for addressing the problems of failing and collapsed states are inadequate. In order to improve governance in failing and collapsed states, Krasner calls for the creation of two new institutions: de facto trusteeships and shared sovereignty arrangements with regional and international organizations or, in some cases, more powerful and better-governed states. Such a powerful state would easily and willingly be France. I argue that state and non-state actors both play an important role in maintaining France's perception of being a great power through the possibility of creating shared sovereignty. Moreover, shared sovereignty or partnerships would be the best tool for France for maintaining its influence in sub-Saharan Africa, since such arrangements would be legitimated by the target state even if violating the core principle of Westphalian sovereignty (i.e., autonomy). (Krasner, 2004) Krasner himself claims that state actions are guided by concerns for power and interest rather than normative concerns for fulfilling a sovereignty norm.

Arguments and counterarguments – debates in the literature

If one is about to look at the theoretical background of sovereignty, security issues always come first. Especially in the 21st century when one of the biggest challenges is how to deal with failed and badly governed states – bearing in mind the fact that Westphalian sovereignty encompasses the idea of non-interference in domestic affairs by external actors. Concerning this issue, several perspectives exist in current IR on state development.

Firstly, the conventional modernization-perspective which argues that having economic development results in democratization. According to Lipset, by providing foreign assistance to economically underdeveloped countries, economic development would probably occur (i.e., the more aid leads to more growth). So far, this assumption has proved to be incorrect. (Lipset, 1959)

Huntington emphasizes the role of institutionalization in state development from the public administration perspective. He claims that political mobilization without political institutionalization leads to political decay – and the case of Iraq completely justifies this argument. Although Huntington considers the construction of political institutions vital, he does not explain where these institutions come from. (Huntington, 1979: 1-8)

Rational-choice institutionalism attributes development to people if they can strike a successful deal. In this case, institutions increase the probability of people making such deals. Robert H. Bates argues that if rulers want to stay in power, they can do it by conventional modes of taxation or by exploitation. His argument is that in Africa in the seventies, there was a sharp decline in growth rates as a result of the rising energy prices which led to declining tax revenues. Rulers, as a response, switched from conventional taxation to rent-seeking exploitation, because only rent-seeking exploitation could provide them with enough resources to pay off their supporters. (Bates and Bates, 2015: 129-135)

A fourth perspective emphasizes the importance of path dependence. Acemoglu and others suggest that random developments determine a polity on a certain path and that path is difficult to change, even if it is not optimal regarding economic growth or political development. (Acemoglu et al., 2008)

All four perspectives above fail to propose an adequate solution for weak and badly governed states to how state development can be achieved. They just describe what should be done but lack the "how" and do not consider direct intervention as a viable option. Krasner, on the other hand, breaks down sovereignty into different components and proposes active intervention – or better said: cooperation – in the context of shared sovereignty.

He distinguishes between domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty. Domestic sovereignty refers to the ability of the state to control its domestic affairs while interdependence sovereignty refers to the state's ability to control cross-border issues. International legal sovereignty shows whether a state is recognized and gets to be a member of international organizations with the right to diplomatically represent itself.

Westphalian sovereignty is a state's negative right and encompasses the idea of non-interference in domestic affairs by external actors. (Krasner, 1999)

Many examples could be listed to show that all state entities may exercise some of these characteristics, but they do not necessarily exhibit them all. Taiwan, for example, has Westphalian sovereignty and effective domestic sovereignty but does not have international legal sovereignty as it is internationally recognized only by a few states. Moreover, each member of the European Union has international legal sovereignty and effective domestic sovereignty, but all of them lack Westphalian sovereignty by having accepted both supranational institutions and qualified majority voting. (Krasner, 1999: 33-41)

In his 1999 book, Krasner analyses the durability and performance of norms of sovereignty in the international system. It has been frequently argued that globalization is eroding long-standing respect for sovereignty by challenging the ability of states to exercise control over their territory, governance, and international affairs. Nevertheless, Krasner points out that challenges to state sovereignty are nothing new in world politics. He argues that international actors have always interfered in each other's affairs and his key point is that even if the international community claims to be upholding sovereign rights, boundaries, and responsibilities, it often violates them in the name of upholding those conditions. The perceptions have changed, of course; it would be impossible to consider the conquest of one state by another legitimate in the 21st century. Yet, subtle violations of sovereignty occur on a regular basis. These can range from the enforcement of human rights norms to the implementation of economic restructuring (e.g., the allocation system of foreign aid).

According to Krasner, "*poor governance is a widespread problem.*" (Krasner, 2004: 118) Indeed, historical facts suggest that failed, weak, incompetent, or abusive national authority structures can result in endemic violence (e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo), exploitative political leaders, falling life expectancy, declining per capita income (e.g., Zimbabwe), and even state-sponsored genocide (e.g., Rwanda). Besides, history has shown that the consequences can easily spill across international borders. For all that, powerful states cannot ignore governance failures because they threaten their economic and security interests. Failed and weak states can easily become safe havens for terrorists where they can operate freely. On the other hand, "*gross violations of human rights present unpleasant political choices for democratic leaders in powerful states.*" (Krasner, 2004: 94) After the unhappy events in Rwanda, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect, which "*defends the principle of humanitarian intervention when governments abuse or fail to protect their own citizens.*" (Krasner, 2004: 95)

Krasner points out that conventional norms of sovereignty offer two options: governance assistance and transitional administration. However, their effectiveness often proves to be limited and consequently inadequate, even if a foreign power has militarily intervened in a given country – a very good example of this is Iraq. Although "*the scope of transitional administration or peacekeeping and peace-building operations has ranged from the full assertion of executive authority by*

the UN for some period of time to more modest efforts involving monitoring the implementation of peace agreements", transitional administration has only worked in reality for the easiest cases, when key actors could reach a mutually acceptable agreement. (Krasner, 2004: 99)

Krasner offers two options for dealing with failing states: de facto trusteeship and shared sovereignty. In a trusteeship, "*international actors would assume control over local functions for an indefinite period of time*"; while shared sovereignty – which would be best to refer to as "partnerships" – would involve "*the engagement of external actors in some of the domestic authority structures of the target state for an indefinite period of time.*" (Krasner, 2004: 114) This way, France could call herself a 'responsible sovereign' – which, in my view, would automatically encompass the perception of being a great power – and help its former weak African colonies to govern effectively domestically and play by the rules internationally.

Krasner also gives answers to such questions as why political leaders of a failing state might accept shared sovereignty. He brings several cases to support his argument: firstly, to secure external resources by either payment for raw materials' exploitation or foreign assistance; secondly, to encourage the departure of occupying forces; or thirdly, to attract voters. (Krasner, 2004: 119)

Mali as an empirical case

I chose Mali for an empirical case, because it clearly illustrates how sharing sovereignty can be a legitimate source for France to keep the influence over its former colonial country. Furthermore, the case of Mali also indicates what kind of roles state and non-state actors play and how their actions intersect with the French 'great power' perception. Finally, Mali is also a good example of proving that only sharing sovereignty could help the region's problems in the long term.

Instability and rebellion have always been constant features of Malian political life and thus the political scene has always been overshadowed by struggles for power. The social (i.e., Mali's remarkably ethnically diverse population) and economic disparity of Mali can be described by drawing a line dividing the north from the south. Northerners (especially the Tuareg population) have felt that development programs have favored the south at their expense. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2013) Unfortunately, Mali failed both to balance the economic development across all of its regions and to create an inclusive national identity that would encompass its citizens regardless of ethnic and tribal identities.

As I have already pointed out, one of the biggest challenges of failed and badly governed states is that the consequences can easily spill across international borders. Another recent feature of today's conflicts is that they involve heavily armed actors. Mali's case perfectly illustrates the assumptions written above: Mali-based Tuareg movements forged an alliance with Islamist extremists from a number of neighboring countries (Niger, Mauritania, and Algeria). In addition, Tuareg fighters formed part of the Qaddafi regime and, after the fall of that regime, they returned home with making use of those weapons they had acquired. All of the above accumulated in

the 2012 rebellion in Mali, which took place at a time when the government of Mali was at its weakest.

France has always considered West Africa to be its sphere of geopolitical influence and has been one of the most deeply involved international players in Mali. Thus, French military intervention did not come as a surprise. The justifications might have changed concerning the interventions involving fights against terrorist groups, yet I argue that France's economic interests have always been the unchanging motive for French intervention in Africa. Though France has limited direct economic interests in Mali, it still remains important in West Africa as part of a region where France is very active economically. Any threats to Mali's stability thus perceived as a threat to

Instability and rebellion have always been constant features of Malian political life and thus the political scene has always been overshadowed by struggles for power. The social and economic disparity of Mali can be described by drawing a line dividing the north from the south.

French economic interests in neighboring countries (i.e., Niger or Ivory Coast – out of which Niger is of utmost importance for France because of the uranium sources).

Although direct French military intervention came after the declaration of a state of emergency by the government in Bamako and an official request for military aid, it perfectly intersected with the policy of a "hegemonic France" in Africa. The official request allowed France to justify her action as being an effort to help a friendly state without disregarding conventional Malian sovereignty. Furthermore, France fought against armed non-state actors (i.e., Islamist extremist groups), thus the intervention could be claimed as being actions of the 'War on Terror'. (Kurtulus, 2005: 57-84) Probably this is the reason for the absence of any international or regional opposition to the direct French military intervention. It is interesting to note that it was a non-state actor that – indirectly – triggered the French intervention. In other words, an armed non-state actor secured the persistent French influence in the country.

The intervention may have solved an immediate problem and achieved two of its stated aims: it expelled Islamist extremist groups and liberated the cities in the north. So, in military terms, France's efforts have been remarkable (Kurtulus, 2005: 57-84) and confirmed France's stance as a 'great power' in the international scene.

On December 20, 2012, the UN Security Council authorized the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) to assist the Malian authorities in regaining control over their northern territory. This regional military force should have been led by the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), but AFISMA proved to be unable to deliver its task. (Avezov and Smit, 2014) In January 2013, the Malian transitional government requested additional assistance from France, which became known as Operation Serval. On April 25,

2013, the Security Council replaced AFISMA with the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). MINUSMA was given a robust mandate "*with the right to use 'all necessary means' to perform its tasks, including protecting civilian centers and taking proactive steps to 'prevent the return of armed elements to those areas*.'" (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, n.d.) Operation Serval was given formal status as a parallel force to MINUSMA, with the mandate to conduct counterinsurgency operations that fell outside MINUSMA's scope. As of now, Operation Barkhane (the successor of Operation Serval, the French military mission in Mali) is conducting joint operations and providing medical services with the help of non-state actors. MINUSMA is still active, while now it focuses on duties such as "*ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in that country*." (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, n.d.)

It is very interesting to see that non-state actors, such as the NGOs providing medical care (e.g., MFM – Medicine For Mali) or those tasked with monitoring human rights (e.g., Amnesty International), also contribute to maintaining French interests: namely to secure the environment for economic activities.

As I already mentioned, Mali is also a good example of proving that only sharing sovereignty could help the regions' problems in the long term. The intervention has probably solved an immediate problem; however, two basic requirements should be fulfilled if French and allied African forces want to succeed in the long term. The first one is the fate of the Tuareg rebel groups. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (a Tuareg group) offered its services to French forces and their African allies. It promised to give help to pursue the members of Islamist extremist groups. The second issue is more comprehensive and would require the establishment of an overall policy that would be backed by both regional and international bodies. An unbiased and complete solution should be found to meet Tuareg demands. It is unsolved so far, none of the Malian government's previous attempts could build a new relationship with the Tuareg. It will be necessarily a long process, because the mutual trust has been long missing. Education might be helpful in bridging the relationship between the Tuaregs and the government, and education is typically a field where non-state actors could take lion's share. (Weiss et al., 2013)

Conclusion

This paper argued that Stephen Krasner's shared sovereignty could bring new perspectives in analyzing French Africa policy because state actions have always been guided by concerns for power and interest rather than normative concerns for fulfilling a sovereignty norm. Based on the assumption that France can maintain its relative power by intervening in weak and failing states in sub-Saharan Africa, Krasner's shared sovereignty, in a way, legitimizes these interventions. The paper attempted to give an overview on the existing literature on state development in recent IR,

bearing in mind that, in the 21st century one, of the biggest challenges is how to deal with failed and badly governed states. For this, Krasner's approach to distinguishing between the types of sovereignty was adopted and the paper concluded with the fact that international actors have always interfered in each other's affairs in the name of upholding sovereign rights.

By looking at the case of Mali, it turned out that conventional norms of sovereignty are inadequate in the long term. By introducing shared sovereignty, the problem of Sahel countries might become solvable. Moreover, France could call herself a 'responsible sovereign' – the perception of still being a great power – and help its former weak African colonies to govern effectively domestically and play by the rules internationally. It was claimed that state and non-state actors play a very important role in maintaining France's perception of being a great power – "funnily" either by triggering a conflict themselves or taking part in helping solve it. To sum up, shared sovereignty or partnerships would be the best tool for France for maintaining its influence in sub-Saharan Africa, since such arrangements would be legitimated by the target state even if violating the core principle of Westphalian sovereignty. ☀

Bibliography

- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., and Yared, P. (2008). Income and Democracy. *American Economic Review* 98 (3), 808-842. http://economics.mit.edu/files/5677 [04.10.2017]
- Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. (2013). *France's Recent Military Intervention in Mali*. http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/ef245dc9-6cb8-4592-9cbd-209503564fd7 [04.10.2017]
- Avezov, X., and Smit, T. (2014). The consensus on Mali and international conflict management in a multipolar world. *SIPRI Policy Brief*. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/SIPRIPB1403.pdf [04.10.2017]
- Bates, R. H. and Bates, R. H. (2015). *When things fell apart: state failure in late-century Africa*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Huntington, S. P. (1979). *Political order in changing societies*. Univ. Press, New Haven.
- Krasner, S. D. (2004). Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States. *International Security* 29 (2), 85-120.
- Krasner, S. D. (1999). *Sovereignty organized hypocrisy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Kurtulus, E. N. (2005). *State Sovereignty*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *American Political Science Review* 53 (01), 69-105.
- Roesch, R. (2015). Françafrique and the Prohibition of the Use of Force. *Amsterdam Law Forum* 7 (1), 25-35.
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/ [04.10.2017]
- Weiss, T., Seyle, D. C. and Coolidge, K. (2013). The Rise of Non-State Actors in Global Governance: Opportunities and Limitations. *One Earth Future Foundation Discussion Paper*, 1-31. https://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/gg-weiss.pdf [04.10.2017]

TRADE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKEY AND SOUTH AFRICA
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LAST 20 YEARS

AHMET MURAT YETKIN

UNIVERSITY OF PÉCS

In the 2000s, a single political party became able to manage Turkey alone for the first time in the country's history. By ensuring internal stability, Turkey started to build and improve its relationships with foreign countries. In this manner, Turkey decided to look for ways to strengthen its relations with the African continent and especially with South Africa.

After the 2000s, South Africa-Turkey relations have improved in every way. Trade volume[2], which was less than $250 million in 2000, exceeded $2 billion at the end of 2017. It decreased to $1.9 billion at the end of 2018 due to low import of Turkey from South Africa only because of dramatic decrease of Turkish Lira against dollar. The years 2007 and 2008 were when mutual trade was at its highest level. Unfortunately, these peak values have not been maintained for many years due to the effect of the global economic crisis, but it is undoubtedly a huge success that the total trade volume between the two countries in the last 15 years has increased by nearly ten times. The biggest factor in this success is that the results have been remarkable despite Turkey's lack of an Africa policy before the 2000s.

Figure 1: Trade Volume between Turkey and South Africa

The number of Turkish embassies in Africa increased from 12 to 41 over the last 15 years (the target is 50). Turkish Airlines has direct flights to 28 African countries and 40 African cities.[2] Additionally, Turkish Airlines increases its market share for cargo carriage to Africa every day. Thanks to Turkish Airlines, the trade volume between Turkey and Africa has increased continuously. These flight networks have also encouraged Turkish authorities to put transit trade on their agenda.

South Africa is a very important and strategic country for Turkey, a partner that is able to open up the African continent. Both in terms of geographical location and the economic development of the last 15 years, South Africa is a key country, especially due to its high economic development.

The Republic of South Africa has been designated as a priority country to provide an entry to sub-Saharan African countries under the strategy for the improvement of economic relations with African countries put into practice by the Ministry of Economy in 2003. The Turkish government sees South Africa as the gateway to sub-Saharan African countries, while the Turkish private sector considers South Africa the main entrance to all of Africa.

There are more than 20 Turkish companies with investments in South Africa. The amount of investment made by these companies is estimated to exceed $500 million. These companies employ about 4,500 people locally.

The biggest investment made in South Africa by a Turkish company until now is the purchase of Defy by Arçelik. Arçelik is the first white goods producer in Turkey, and Defy is the leader of the white goods market in South Africa. The purchase price was $327 million, which makes it the biggest investment of a Turkish company in South Africa. Conversely, South Africa's investments in Turkey is limited. In 2013, Metair bought Mutlu Battery, the biggest battery manufacturer in Turkey, for $280 million. This investment is the largest South African investment in Turkey.

South Africa is seen as Turkey's door to the African market and is extremely important. For example, Arçelik, a Turkish company, has increased its presence in Africa from 19 countries to 39 countries within three years after the acquisition of Defy. In 2017, 17% of Arçelik's total sales were made in Africa. Undoubtedly, the main reason for this success is the right investment at the right time in South Africa. Arçelik invests not only in South Africa but potentially in the entire African continent. Surely, in comparison with other African countries, South Africa has received the most benefits from this purchase, which has strengthened the relations between Turkey and South Africa.

Turkey expects a free trade agreement from South Africa. However, South Africa does not give a warm welcome to this free trade agreement. South Africa thinks that such an agreement will have a negative impact on the industry of the country.

The former South African ambassador to Turkey suggested that Turkey and South Africa should cooperate in the key fields such as car manufacturing and construction in order to sell these products or services in a third country.[3] Currently, South Africa is following a conservative import policy to protect its production. Especially anti-dumping applications are aiming to reduce the price-based advantage of goods that

enter the country. In this context, South Africa, which is among the first countries to open an anti-dumping investigation, is also implementing high customs duties. Additionally, excessive congestion at ports, customs value determined higher than invoice prices, theft of goods, import permits, copyright violations, and insufficient bureaucracy are major complaints.

The increasing relations with Africa over the last 15 years have begun to bear fruits in many fields and have created unprecedented opportunities. In recent years, Japanese companies have opted to partner with Turkish companies to minimise their risks when investing in Africa.

Conclusion

Trade relations between Turkey and South Africa have grown almost ten times in the last 15 years. However, relations are not yet at the desired level. South Africa's conservative trade policies have been offensive to some Turkish investors. However, South Africa is a very important country for Turkey. Turkey is aware of the importance of strengthening its relations with South Africa to open up the continent of Africa. Turkey has not experienced any problems with South Africa so far, but diplomatic and trade relations were both in fairly poor condition before the 2000s.

After the 2000s, trade relations with South Africa were particularly emphasized. Considerable efforts are being made both by Turkey and South Africa to improve trade between the two countries. As in the case of Arçelik, Turkish investors have made South Africa a strategic base and are taking advantage of the strategic (economic and geographical) conditions of South Africa to gain access to other countries of Africa. ☀

Notes

1   Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Trade, Country Reports
2   Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs
3   South African Ambassador Pule I. Malefane (interview)

Bibliography
- Adams, S. (2009). Can foreign Direct Investment help to promote growth in Africa? *African Journal of Business Management* 3 (3), 178-183.
- Parlak, F. (2016). Guest of Ankara Talks: South African Ambassador Pule I. Malefane (interview). *Dunya Newspaper*, 25 .04. 2016.
- Gelb, S. and Black, A. (2004). Foreign Direct Investment in South Africa. In: Estrin, S. and Meyer, K. E. (Eds.). *Investment Strategies in Emerging Markets*. Edward Elgar Publishing, 177-212.
- Gibson, G. G. (2016). *Factors Effecting the Foreign Direct Investment (An Application on South Africa)*. Master's Thesis, Dokuz Eylulu University.
- Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-iliskileri.tr.mfa [01.05.2019]
- Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Trade, Country Reports. (n.d.) https://www.ticaret.gov.tr/portal/content/conn/UCM/uuid/dDocName:EK-174415 [01.05.2019]
- Saatcioglu, C. (2002). *Foreign Direct Investment and Turkey*, Istanbul University.
- South Africa Country Report. (2010). Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), September 2010.
- World Bank DataBank. (n. d.) http://databank.worldbank.org [20.07.2018]

POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE LEBANESE DIASPORA IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE BEFORE THE 2020 ELECTIONS

ALEXANDER SHIPILOV

RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

The recent political developments that took place in West Africa, encompassing several bloody civil wars and the following reconstruction, were marked by the involvement of a number of regional and completely external stakeholders. It has been, furthermore, broadly acknowledged by the recent scope of globalization, international, and transnational studies that diasporas constitute a significant portion of the internal groups of interest in local political processes. This tendency is true to West Africa and, most particularly, Côte d'Ivoire, the country that has experienced the latest large-scale civil conflict among the states in this part of Africa (Akyeampong, 2000: 200). Further signifying the special role of diasporas in this conflict-ridden state is the fact that foreigners constitute 24.2% of the population according to the 2014 census (with the issue of stateless persons common for West Africa now largely addressed) (Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat, 2014). Most of these foreigners are citizens of the neighboring Sahel states earning to gain access to the Ivorian economic opportunities that are simply not present in the countries of their origin.

These have a history of being victimized both during the French colonial rule and the new post-independence national government, as the Togolese and the Dahomeans were terrorized and expelled from Ivory Coast in 1958 and migrants from other neighboring states got consistently disenfranchised and discriminated against in the wake of the 1980's national recession and the following civil war (Cooper, 2014: 353). Nevertheless, low-paid regional workforce has largely contributed to the Ivorian export-based economic growth of the 1960s and 1970s. Their electoral support became crucial in maintaining the regime of the nation's first President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, in power until his death in 1993 (Marshall-Fratani, 2006: 19).

Expats from France have also played a notable role in the country's post-independence development despite never making up a substantial portion of the country's population and mostly confined to maintaining the economic viability of

the established export-oriented model. This diaspora also became a target for attacks by violent pro-government protestors in 2004 in the course of the Ivorian civil war when France annihilated the country's entire air force (Piccolino, 2012: 2).

Meanwhile, another diaspora has established itself both in the country and the greater region as a powerful economic actor and internal political player with a broader presence than that of the French. The Lebanese have actively settled in the country since at least the 1920s, encouraged by lucrative opportunities in local trade and colonial administration, and are still revered or feared for having great influence on regional politics and economics (Bierwirth, 1999: 80). The given article aims to determine the role played by the Lebanese diaspora in the current political situation in Côte d'Ivoire, especially considering the upcoming 2020 presidential elections and their uncertain outcome.

A set of controversies regarding the named diaspora is to be addressed, which is crucial to determine its actual impact on the Ivorian society. These include the actual size of the diaspora considering the wide array of conflicting statistics as well as its control over local economy and ties to powerful foreign players, namely Shia radical Islamist organizations in Lebanon and their backers in Iran.

Controversies arise starting from various estimates of the actual size of the Lebanese diaspora. These estimates rank from as low as 25,000 to 300,000 people, depending on the political agenda of those providing the data and the peculiarities of data collection in the existing Ivorian realities. The census of 1975, the last one to take place before economic turmoil and civil war erupted in the country, sets the number of Lebanese residing in the country at 5,233 while the next census, taking place in 2014, three years after the end of violent hostilities and the last one to be held to date, marks an increase of their presence to 30,000 out of the overall 22,700,000 Ivorian population (Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat, 2014). Nevertheless, both of these figures are considered to be improbably low, especially the one describing the 1970s, when the state saw the largest influx of the Lebanese immigrants due to both rapid economic growth in this West African state as the cocoa beans, the country's largest export commodity, experienced record-high demand on the global market and the outbreak of civil war back in Lebanon (Losch and Banegas, 2002: 150). Since then it was expected for the number of Lebanese residing in the country to remain unchanged. The main reason for that was the economic recession of the 1980s caused by the downturn in global cocoa prices. Besides, the Ta'if accords of 1989 concluded the Lebanese civil war and enhanced reconstruction under the premiership of Rafik Hariri. Soon after that came a long-term Ivorian political turmoil and a civil war in the following two decades (Peleikis, 2003: 81).

Moreover, in the given period, many Lebanese residing in the country went on to obtain Ivorian or French citizenship, which took them out of statistics. One reason for the statistical underestimation of the diaspora's size is the gradual naturalization of its representatives. Another reason is the fact that the Lebanese were afraid of hostility from the local population due to their financially privileged status and a history of foreign minorities' purges and expulsions from Ivory Coast (Marshall-Fratani, 2006: 19).

Therefore, the diaspora's members tried to downplay its size and avoid representation in Ivorian censuses, hence their officially small number. These tendencies deem the official Ivorian statistics to be dubious.

An alternative official source of information on the size of the Lebanese diaspora in Côte d'Ivoire is the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. According to their official statement of February 2018, they registered roughly 40,000 compatriots residing in the West African country (National News Agency, 2018). This number still seems to exclude those ethic Lebanese who represent second- or third-generation immigrants and lack citizenship of the country of their ancestors. Moreover, the Lebanese embassy is also interested in downplaying their citizens' presence in the host country in order to avoid hostile treatment and allegations of taking over the local economy by the diaspora (Bierwirth, 1999: 80). Considering this, the overall number of Lebanese residing in the country should be somewhat higher than the figure presented by the embassy.

On the other hand, Ivorian press outlets considered to be in alliance with the country's ethno-nationalist movements claim the size of the Lebanese diaspora in Ivory Coast to be 100,000 or even 300,000 people (Bigo, 1992: 515-516). While these figures and estimations lack reliable statistical backing, disseminating such information serves the purpose of rallying nationalist sentiment against wealthy minorities and using them as political scapegoats for the social and economic setbacks for which, otherwise, they used to blame the ruling government. Therefore, it is safe to consider these figures to be deliberately inflated. The given span of estimates has led most of the researchers to consider the size of the diaspora to realistically amount to 50,000-60,000 people due to the lack of more accurate figures (Peleikis, 2003: 82).

As it can be seen, such a wide array of estimates is maintained. On the one hand, by the diaspora's desire to keep a low profile to avoid hostile local attention to their wealth and, on the other hand, by the nationalist media seeking to exploit the "economic threat" allegedly posed by the Lebanese in order to divert attention from social and economic issues faced by local communities as well as possible resentment of political authorities.

> **While these figures and estimations lack reliable statistical backing, disseminating such information serves the purpose of rallying nationalist sentiment against wealthy minorities and using them as political scapegoats for the social and economic setbacks for which, otherwise, they used to blame the ruling government. Therefore, it is safe to consider these figures to be deliberately inflated.**

Once we have established the approximate size of the Lebanese diaspora in Côte d'Ivoire, it is important to understand its internal divisions, historical origins, and social niches occupied by its various representatives. It is relevant due to the ethnic and religious complexity of the society of origin as well as different waves of migration and its reasons.

Initial migration from Lebanon to West Africa started at the turn of the 20th century with the first settlers arriving in significant numbers from the 1870s (Peleikis, 2003: 79). This wave mostly consisted of Maronites fleeing persecution of the Ottoman government (which, at the end of the 19th century, reversed on its Tanzimat reform policies and denied sufficient protection to the Christian communities of the Middle East) to safe havens under the French or British control (Neil, 1979: 86). As these European colonial powers were reluctant to permit Lebanese settlement in significant numbers in the metropolitan territory, they encouraged the Middle Eastern migrant inflow to the recently colonized West Africa as the newcomers were capable of acting as intermediaries between the scarce European community along with colonial administration on the one hand and local population on the other. Furthermore, new-coming migrants established themselves in the local trade, buying up local produce at higher prices than those offered by the French or British and soon took over this niche, thus making West Africa and, namely, Ivory Coast a lucrative destination for other Lebanese migrants.

The period discussed has seen the emergence of the *durables* – established trading families that maintained this role over the course of the 20th century even as the colonial powers that had harbored them left West Africa, leaving the diaspora with the largely poor and therefore sometimes hostile local population (Bierwirth, 1999: 83). Having preserved their initially somewhat privileged role, they have entered new lucrative regional markets, establishing themselves in fuel, rice, rubber, and diamond trade and getting involved with other notable West African commodities (nevertheless, leaving cocoa production in Ivory Coast largely to French firms and their local contractors). The share of Lebanese representing the descendants of those who had arrived with this initial Maronite wave in the overall diaspora that emerged in Côte d'Ivoire is relatively low but the *durables* form its core and exert maximal influence on local economy and politics.

The next significant influx of the Lebanese into West Africa and specifically Ivory Coast came in the wake of WWI and the silk-worm economic crisis that hit South Lebanon and its most viable export commodity. With South Lebanon being mostly populated by Shia Muslims that were the fastest growing demographic group in the country, they naturally composed the majority of those leaving for Ivory Coast (Bierwirth, 1999: 88). They also joined in the local trade as intermediaries and established some trading families that later also became a part of the *durables*. With their arrival, Lebanese presence in Côte d'Ivoire became noticeable and coincided with the foundation of the first nativist organizations informally aligned with local colonial elites. One of such organizations, the League of Inhabitants of Côte d'Ivoire, was responsible for a number of pogroms mainly against settlers from other French

West African territories; specifically the Senegalese, the Dahomeans, and Togolese, but occasionally targeted Lebanese settlers as well. So early on, under the French colonial rule, a dual role of the Lebanese diaspora in Côte d'Ivoire was established both as a wealthy commercial intermediary bringing local resources to the global markets and as an occasional target of nativist sentiment, which grew stronger as the French colonial system got gradually dismantled.

Yet another, so far the largest, wave of Lebanese labor migration was observed in the 1960s right after Ivory Coast obtained independence, lured by the economic prospects of the rapidly growing cocoa industry and the national economy in general (Losch and Banegas, 2002: 150). The arrival of Lebanese immigrants to the country got especially significant in the 1970s as a civil war erupted in Lebanon, urging many to seek security overseas. In this particular case, the newcomers mostly found employment at the firms and businesses established by the *durables* and took a much more humble economic niche than their predecessors.

Today these are considered to be the largest fraction of the diaspora but possess much fewer instruments to wield their political influence. It was also at that time that the local Lebanese diaspora, mostly Shia, got divided along the lines of the domestic civil war. The main split came in accordance with allegiances displayed towards the two rival Shia Lebanese movements, more moderate Amal and Iran-allied Hezbollah (ISS West Africa Report, 2015: 2). Therefore, up until now, the internal relations inside the diaspora are largely determined by the complex state of affairs in Lebanese politics. This, along with religious differences between Lebanese Christians and Muslims and their various denominations, as well as the social split between the *durables* and later-day labor migrants, constitutes major internal divisions inside the diaspora, just as complex as the local society of the host country.

As it has been mentioned, it is the economic role played by the Lebanese diaspora in the Ivorian society that has contributed both to their power to influence the local state of affairs and their potential victimization by the nationalists considering them to be draining out the country's national wealth. Members of the diaspora indeed control a large share of the local economy. According to the data provided by the Ivorian section of the Lebanese Global Cultural Union, 3,000 Lebanese companies currently control 40% of the internal market and pay 15% of all the taxes while 250 Lebanese manufacturing firms employ 2,000-3,000 Lebanese workers. It was also assessed by scholars that an 18,000-19,000-strong Lebanese-Ivorian legal workforce exists in the country, as could be derived from transparent local business operating "outside of the shade" (Bierwirth, 1999: 84). As most of the Ivorian small businesses, including Lebanese, are avoiding fiscal enforcement, it is considered that the overall number of Ivorian workers and the self-employed is substantially higher.

Much attention was drawn to this economic presence in both local and regional press. Nevertheless, Lebanese business in Côte d'Ivoire is now hard-pressed by the recently emerged Chinese (3,000 people) and Indian (1,500 people) diasporas bypassing competition by more established firms to dominate local small and medium-sized businesses (Jain 2017: 20). Yet, these emerging diasporas, so far, do

not seek to establish a significant political presence in the country thus converting their newly-acquired commercial influence, which still leaves the Lebanese by far more powerful than any other non-European expats.

The most significant criticism often faced by the Lebanese trading families residing and operating in West Africa (with Côte d'Ivoire not being an exception) appears due to the alleged involvement of diaspora members in regional civil conflicts that took place in 1989-2011 in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire, and to lesser extent in other countries of the region. Their interest in the intermediary trade of diamonds, metal, wood, crops, retail goods, and petroleum made them necessary for the various warring factions to establish mechanisms of financing their cause (Melber and Southall, 2006: 312). This was frequently conducted by some of the *durables* through the facilitation of smuggling and illicit loans.

The most controversial example of such cooperation can be found in the relations established between the local Lebanese diaspora and Charles Taylor of Liberia, condemned for war crimes by the Special Court for Sierra Leone and Liberia. Among instances of illicit trade between these two parties, one could name the 1997 rice deal of Taylor's government with Basma family as well as the 1998 petroleum deal with George Haddad, both cases mired in corruption and substantial humanitarian abuses (Melber and Southall, 2006: 312). These families also had a role in financing the atrocious RUF operating in neighboring Sierra Leone (Gberie, 2002:10-11). It was done not only for the sake of greater profits but also because of a need for political protection in the ongoing violent clashes.

Turning to the particularities of the Ivorian case, the local Lebanese diaspora was historically supportive of any ruling authorities in order to obtain protection against local nationalist sentiments, but its most firm ties were established with the regime of Laurent Gbagbo, a former dissident who came to power driven by a largely nationalist agenda of the oppressed population of the southwestern part of the country. His outspoken nationalist stance and especially that of his backers organized in street movements in large Ivorian cities in the wake of the 2000 presidential elections, largely viewed as unfair, alienated the mostly Muslim northern half of the country. Enactment of the respective policies led to a northern-backed

The most significant criticism often faced by the Lebanese trading families residing and operating in West Africa (with Côte d'Ivoire not being an exception) appears due to the alleged involvement of diaspora members in regional civil conflicts that took place in 1989–2011 in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire, and to lesser extent in other countries of the region.

abortive coup d'état in September 2002, followed by an outbreak of civil war that saw a quick transition of the northern part of the country to the rebels and the arrival of French and other international peacekeepers (Dulin, 2007: 19).

In these conditions, the Lebanese diaspora became indispensable to the ruling regime, helping establish war-time finance. The admission of Roland Dagher and Fouad Omaïs (representatives of Maronite and Shia *durables*) to the President's economic council took place in 2000, as the internal political crisis was escalating while also lending legitimacy to the new government on behalf of the local Lebanese (Serhan, 2015: 64). Later, the Lebanese Commerce and Industry Chamber in Côte d'Ivoire was established to promote the interests of both domestic Lebanese businesses and those of the metropolitan community (Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie Libanaise de Côte d'Ivoire, 2018). Members of the diaspora assisted Gbagbo in maintaining friendly relations with the state of Lebanon, which proved their strength after the contested October 2010 presidential elections, whereas most of the international observers declined to recognize Gbagbo's victory, leading to the large-scale regional crisis settled by direct French military intervention deposing Gbagbo in April 2011. Along with Angola and Gambia, Lebanon was among the few to grant Gbagbo an initial recognition of his victory (Colombant, 2010). Close relations between Gbagbo and Ivorian Lebanese diaspora have developed despite Israeli pressure on the president due to alleged ties between the Shia part of the diaspora and the radical Hezbollah movement (Israel supplied Gbagbo with drones to be used against the rebels at an early stage of the Ivorian civil war and could wield a significant amount of pressure on Abidjan) (McGovern, 2012: 248-249). Thus, solutions to economic difficulties during the civil war offered by local Lebanese were crucial enough for the Gbagbo regime to maintain such relations.

Due to Gbagbo's imminent loss of the civil war, the current position of the diaspora is jeopardized by having supported the lost cause – a leading source of mistrust between the community and the regime of victorious Alassane Ouattara. Moreover, allegations of ties between the diaspora and Hezbollah have come to light, boosting concern on behalf of Moroccan, Israeli, and Vatican diplomats stationed in Côte d'Ivoire (ISS West Africa Report, 2015: 2). Both of these problems could have long-term negative consequences for the political prospects of the Ivorian Lebanese diaspora, making their positions in the country's markets potentially more vulnerable. Nevertheless, their political weight has the opportunity to become a decisive force in the upcoming 2020 presidential elections as Alassane Ouattara has served his permitted two terms in the president's office and it is absolutely not clear who will inherit his position.

The diaspora's representatives possess the Inter newspaper, which could become a crucial tool to sway public opinion, for now closely divided between the four major contesting parties. These include the incumbent Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly, Defense Minister Hamed Bakayoko, former leader of the rebels and the Speaker of the Ivorian Parliament, Guillaume Soro, and Pascal Affi N'Guessan, the political heir to Laurent Gbagbo. The first two are considered to be Ouattara's

favorites, while Ouattara promised support to Soro in becoming president in a power-sharing deal executed prior to his arrival to power in 2011. A similar deal was struck at approximately the same time between Ouattara and Henri Conan Bedie, the political successor to Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Côte d'Ivoire's first president. As Bedie himself is old, it is believed by his partisans that Ouattara's support is owed to whoever inherits Bedie's political legacy. Simultaneously, Gbagbo's supporters seek to regain power, which they claim was unconstitutionally taken away from them due to interference by a foreign power.

It is thus obvious that the current ruling Ivorian regime has burdened itself with more political commitments than it can possibly fulfill in the process of securing power transition from Laurent Gbagbo. Having all the prominent political forces compete in upcoming elections without a set mechanism of peaceful political transition poses a threat to the country's stability and a threat of descending into another civil war. Therefore, the financial and media resources available to the Ivorian Lebanese community might become crucial in controlling this potentially dangerous situation, contributing to the emergence of yet-unestablished pre-election alliances.

Having reviewed the evidence regarding the Lebanese diaspora in Côte d'Ivoire, one could state that it maintains a continuous ambivalent role in local politics, simultaneously acting as a lucrative political ally in control of financial resources and the media as well as a scapegoat that attracts criticism of the nationalist and nativist political movements and is in need of protection by the local political allies. It is useful in the facilitation of war-time finance, as was shown during the civil wars that ravaged West Africa in the 1990s and 2000s. The political ties of the Lebanese diaspora might prove helpful in finding allies in the Middle East, although there is a risk of simultaneously finding adversaries in the same region and in the West due to possible contacts with Hezbollah. The diaspora also remains deeply internally divided, just as is the entire Ivorian political spectrum in the run-up to the 2020 presidential elections. These divisions stem from the migrants' background and political ties in Lebanon as well as their social strata. This might curb the diaspora's ability to cohesively act in the upcoming crisis as a single unit to best serve its interests and avoid serious setbacks. ✳

Bibliography

- Akyeampong, E. (2000). Africans in the diaspora: the diaspora and Africa. *African Affairs* **99 (395)**, 183-215.
- Akyeampong, E. K. (2006). Race, Identity and Citizenship in Black Africa: The Case of the Lebanese in Ghana Africa. *Journal of the International African Institute* **76**, 297- 323.
- Bierwirth, C. (1999). The Lebanese Communities of Côte d'Ivoire. *African Affairs* **98**, 79-99.
- Bigo, D. (1992). The Lebanese community in the Ivory Coast: A non-native network at the heart of power? In: Hourani, A. and Shehadi, N. (Eds.). *The Lebanese in the World: A century of emigration*. Centre for Lebanese Studies and I.B. Tauris, London.
- Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie Libanaise de Côte d'Ivoire. (n. d.). http://www.ccilci. org/ [18.07.2018]

- Colombant, N. (2010). *Voice of America. Despite Growing Pressure, Ivory Coast Incumbent Gbagbo Still Has Outside Allies.* http://www.voanews.com/content/despite-growing-pressure-ivory-coast-incumbent-gbagbo-still-has-outside-allies-112528679/132832.html [27.07.2018]
- Cooper, F. (2014). *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
- Côte d'Ivoire Constitution and Citizenship Laws Handbook – Strategic Information and Basic Laws. (2014). International Business Publications, Washington D.C.
- Dulin, A. (2004-2005). *La Gestion par la France de la Crise en* Côte d'Ivoire. Séminaire de relations internationales de septembre 2002 a avril 2005. Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Lyon.
- Gberie, L. (2002). *War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection.* Occasional Paper #6, Partnership Africa Canada. International Peace Information Service.
- Ibrahima, B.A. (2014). Directeur Général INS, Directeur Exécutif du RGPH. *Rapport d'Execution et Presentation des principaux resultats*. Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat 2014. http://www.ins.ci/n/documents/RGPH2014_expo_dg.pdf [07.07.2018]
- Jain, A.K., Tripathi, U.N. and An, V. K. (2017). Overview on Indian Diaspora in Africa. *Educational Quest: An Int. J. of Education and Applied Social Science* **8**, 17-21.
- Lebanese in West Africa. (2011). Far from home. *Economist*. May 20th. https://www.economist.com/baobab/2011/05/20/far-from-home [17.07.2018]
- Losch, B. and Banegas, R. (2002). La Côte d'Ivoire au bord de l'implosion. *Politique africaine* **87,** 139-162.
- Marshall-Fratani, R. (2006). The War of "Who is Who" – Autochthony, Nationalism, and Citizenship in the Ivoirian Crisis. *African Studies Review* **49,** 9-43.
- McGovern, M. (2012). Turning the Clock Back or Breaking with the Past? Charismatic Temporality and Elite Politics in Côte d'Ivoire and the United States. *Cultural Anthropology* **27**, 239-260.
- National News Agency. (2018.) *Bassil addresses Abidjan conference participants: forgiveness can only be solicited from god*. http://nna-leb.gov.lb/en/show-news/87886/Bassil-addresses-Abidjan-conference-participants-Forgiveness-can-only-be-solicited-from-God [19.05.2018]
- Neil, O. L. (1979). The political economy of a stranger population: the Lebanese of Sierra Leone. In: Shack, W. A. and Skinner, E. P. (Eds.). *Strangers in African Societies* University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
- Peleikis, A. (2003). *Lebanese in Motion: Gender and the Making of a Translocal Village*. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (US) and London (UK)
- Piccolino, G. (2012). David against Goliath in Côte d'Ivoire? Laurent Gbagbo's war against global governance. *African Affairs* **111**, 1-23.
- Serhan, N. (2015). Les libanais en Côte d'Ivoire: Qui sont-ils? Combien sont-ils? Que font-ils? Et où sont-ils? *Revue de Géographie Tropicale et d'Environnement* **1**, 58-66.
- Southall, R. and Henning, M. (2006). *Legacies of Power: Leadership change and former presidents in African politics*. HSRC Press, Cape Town, South Africa.
- West Africa Report. (2015). *Institute for Security Studies* **13**, 1-12.

THE CONDITIONS OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTI-GENOCIDE MOVEMENT IN THE USA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE IN AFRICA

JAKUB KOŚCIÓŁEK

JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY

The United States of America ratified the *Anti-genocide Convention* only thirty-six years after its initial signature. It was passed to the Senate for the first time by President Harry Truman in 1949. It evoked great controversy as it was perceived as something that might be favorable to communist regimes and possibly be an attack on the basic rights of US citizens. Successive attempts to pass it began much later in 1970 due to the support from Richard Nixon who backed the ratification initiative. The main reason for the reluctance to pass the convention was its record on international jurisdiction on persons responsible for genocide (LeBlanc, 1991).

Other controversies were related to the issue of the intent to commit genocide, which as a descriptive category was perceived as not sufficiently clear or even not precisely characterized. Senators also had doubts on another description which referred to group extermination as a whole or part. They deliberated to what extent partial extermination can be recognized as genocidal (Hirsch, 2002: 4-9).

Nevertheless, despite existing controversies, the United States finally adopted and ratified this act of international law and became the world leader in genocide prevention. Herbert Hirsch claims that each and every prevention policy must commence in the United States, regardless of its ability to prevent or stop genocide alone. Due to its clear and obvious role as a world leader in the post-Cold War order, the United States must participate in any and every effort that aims to counter genocide. In order to initiate this, however, there must be an internal and indigenous movement in the country that fosters such actions (Hirsch, 2002: 10-11). Such a movement should be equally aimed at opposing genocide, as well as fighting for its prevention. This is feasible thanks to concentrating on putting political pressure on political institutions and its leaders and convincing them that the introduction of a policy that prevents genocide is moral, and at the same time politically beneficial (Hirsch, 2002: 17). The ultimate goal of building such a political structure is the development of a political consciousness of how important the problem of genocide has become, as

well as the empowerment of individuals to see their active role in this problem and their options to participate in the humanitarian movement to put an end to this crime. In this sense, the movement to put an end to genocide is an intermediary structure between an individual and the contemporary nation-state (Hirsch, 2002: 33). Greg Stanton sees this movement as the engine driving a cultural shift, which, if strong enough, can effectively impact the authorities. However, he also highlights the fact that, in his opinion, hitherto social movements have not managed to change the Congress's or the government's approach to foreign policy in this matter (Stanton, 2014)[1]. Such a movement needs to have an impact on political decision-making processes, or more broadly, on law-making at the national level, as well as the international level. Scott Calnan calls such a process the mobilization of law, the process in which the legal system acquires its cases or the substance that it can subsequently deal with. The law is mobilized whenever desires or wants are translated into demands as an assertion of rights (Calnan, 2008: 20). The law can be mobilized by individuals, groups or institutions, although the law itself, in this view, is not understood as a body of rules that have a determinate social realm, but as a process of struggle in order to interpret certain facts by means of predetermined rules. Usually, the activities of human rights organizations are seen as being directed at challenging prevailing meanings and replacing them with their own, with minority meanings that have not yet made their way into the official canon of meaning. When such attempts are successful, it can be said that societal change emerges and universalizes itself to social presence, or the arena of social relations has aligned with actual cases and at the same time may have impacted power redistribution in society at large (Calnan, 2008: 21).

Each victory in legal disputes contributes to the general goals of the social movement, expanding the negotiation space between authority and this movement, enabling the enforcement of the state to support the achievement of the movement's goals. Furthermore, it independently affects society at large through normative change, regulating a particular area of social life. Facilitating expectations for a forthcoming change, such a victory beyond doubt contributes to an increase in the morale of the members of the social movement, and could equally lead to the expansion of its core by means of deeper

> **Each victory in legal disputes contributes to the general goals of the social movement, expanding the negotiation space between authority and this movement, enabling the enforcement of the state to support the achievement of the movement's goals. Furthermore, it independently affects society at large through normative change, regulating a particular area of social life.**

engagement of those who latterly doubted the effectiveness of the movement's actions. The power of the law has an effect on defining the goals of such a movement, its external perception, which is particularly true for human rights protection movements which are naturally focused on actions around the advocacy of normative change. It is worth paying attention to reservations made by Henkin who made a distinction between movements focused on the rights of Americans, citizen's rights, and movements connected to the international system of protecting human rights. Both discourses have their own individual history, separate ideologies and roots, and different social backgrounds (Henkin, 1999: 33). The level of human rights observance depends to a large extent on the ways that domestic and international rights discourses create a dialogue with one another, and are reconciled (Calnan, 2008: 23).

It is also worth bearing in mind that the specifics of international law as a system that to a lesser extent relies on a centralized enforcement of power, and is usually interpreted as not being connected to judiciary rulings, gives social movements better opportunities to act in terms of mobilizing the law in the name of virtues important to such a movement's vital interests. The interpretation of law adopted by the movement can be set as a framework of advocacy towards public opinion or decision makers. The main reason for mobilizing the law at an international level is to gain the support of the international community, the engagement of as many countries as possible for particular action – this usually referring to the enforcement of the interpretation of particular norms in another country in relation to the status of individuals or groups in this state. These enforcement activities might take the form of effective sanctions, including armed intervention, but can be strictly symbolic when enforced by diplomatic approaches when the state sees that complying with a particular interpretation of international norms at stake is in its best interest in maintaining present diplomatic relations.

We need to assume the importance of the opinion of Burnstein that for mobilizing the law for a certain case, the degree of mobilizing the movement and its recourse becomes more important than the extent of human rights infringements and the needs of people affected and suffering (Burnstein, 1991: 1209). This shows that humanitarian crises, human rights violations, and other breaches of international humanitarian law rarely prompt any response just because of the evil they cause. Empathy or compassion fosters a reaction only after the case is perceived and gains social interest, therefore, somebody spreading information on the event and using their professional experience, talents or resources intends to introduce a reaction (Epp, 1998: 8). According to Tarrow, contemporary mass mobilization possibilities are seen as moderately optimistic due to the fact that the existing model of the organization of social movements seems to be a combination of narrow professional leadership, large but passive forms of people's support, and relationships resembling personal structure networks. In such a system, members of the organization communicate with its leaders by means of mail, fax, and e-mail, or take part in large but rare massive demonstrations, or take responsibility for small but unexpected

demonstration outbreaks or activities, performed by trained teams of civic militia (Tarrow, 1994: 133).

A model example of this type of social movement is *Greenpeace* or *Amnesty International*. This model shows something that will be presented below, describing the activity of non-governmental organizations, i.e., there is a visible change in the forms of engagement within the societal movement, from personal volunteering to financial support primarily. As previously mentioned, interest in this problem and knowledge on its nature are indispensable factors of subsequent engagement. This relationship makes the emergence of the anti-genocide movement slower than expected by organizations engaged in its creation. Furthermore, as highlighted by Holly Dranginis from the *Enough Project*, the media are causing a great problem as they find interest in or begin dealing with certain problems only if violence occurs on a massive scale, which is often far too late to do anything to resolve the situation (Dranginis, 2014). The reduced visibility of genocide issues among US citizens is also caused by the fact that genocide appears to be something distant and irrelevant to their everyday life. The causalities of genocide cannot affect politics or US public opinion as they do not have representatives in the US. This, in turn, signifies lesser interest in the problems of certain groups or a world region in the US. This also signifies lesser motivation to take action. If the region is far away and media coverage is low, there is a high probability that the US will not respond (Hirsch, 2002: 33-34). To change this, organizations fighting genocide aim to educate and enlighten people on the nature of the genocide and how it affects humanity, and not only the victims of this crime. It is important to emphasize how crucial it is to stop genocide and prevent future outbreaks (Hirsch, 2002: 35). One of the many strategies proposed by NGOs is a reform of the effectiveness of their actions directed at a change in foreign policy as led by states, particularly the US (Calnan, 2008: 37-41). To disseminate such knowledge within the society in an efficient manner, movements, as well as having a certain level of organizational structure, must also acquire sufficient resources. This will be further discussed under the classification proposed by Calnan (Calnan, 2008: 173-176). The primary resource is obviously financial, however, cultural capital seems equally significant; this consists of the ability to gain knowledge, write, and appeal to, most often, intellectuals or academics. It is interesting to note, as Calnan observes, that in many countries individuals who are enriched by such cultural capital are expected to speak out in political matters and demonstrate moral sensitivity (Calnan, 2008: 173). This is expected as an ethical obligation from these people, prompting them to be natural leaders of prospective social movements. However, in order to implement an efficient strategy of political pressure and achieve results, the social movement must have access to professionals and experts. US NGOs are characterized by gaining recognition and focusing their activities on lobbying by hiring professional personnel. Another indispensable resource is mapping the legal frames in order to justify their actions. In the space that is derived from a legal foundation, it is extremely difficult to find effective tools to resolve key problems of emerging social movements. These legal frameworks

are connected to the organization, its internal rules, its ability to engage in public affairs and maintain relations with authorities, be responsible for politics, as well as the existence of human rights protection jurisprudence. The emerging anti-genocide movement will obviously appeal to the norms of international law, as it firstly sanctions the protection of human rights which is severely infringed by genocide, and secondly, it seeks such international law mechanisms that will realize such protection. Due to this complicity, many organization coalitions with networks within the movement focus on the promotion of the mechanism of *Responsibility to Protect – R2P*. This is perceived as a hope to revive the effective protection of human rights in the post-Cold War era, not governed by opposing, binary political blocks, but by the principle of sovereignty. This principle is declared as the most frequent excuse for armed humanitarian intervention and it seems that UN reluctance to take decisive action to support such solutions is related to the burden of Cold War relations. An identified goal of the anti-genocide movement is to break the impasse caused by the inactivity of Western countries in global foreign policy. This can only be achieved by evolution in international law or the necessity of customizing it.

Another important resource that aids the efficiency of social movements are volunteers; at a low cost, they can bring meaningful benefits to such a movement and support the need for pro-social engagement. The importance of volunteering is significant in many aspects. It helps with the simple things but can also contribute to the very highest professional level or level of expertise, although most frequently it simply increases the scale of the movement. What is particularly interesting is the reciprocal relationship between serial participants of a movement and its leaders. Tarrow indicates likewise that participation in a social movement not only increases political awareness but also empowers the participants both in their psychological readiness to take risks, but also politically, i.e., gaining new social skills and expanding perspectives (Tarrow, 1994: 166).

The next resource available is the information that is gathered and accumulated by the movement. Knowledge about the authorities' actions and the capacity to utilize this in adequate time constitutes the basic component of an effective strategy of an organized social movement trying to solve social problems. Together with the information revolution, we have seen the rise of the importance of this resource, firstly due to the freedom that the internet has brought, with information previously deliberately hidden or not readily available, such as information about the government, but now free of predictable control, and secondly due to the possibility of disseminating information quickly and efficiently through social channel technologies at a scale previously unheard of, often with the exclusion of traditional media, which historically had a monopoly on deciding whether particular information reaches the public or not.

Paradoxically, the internet and social media have grown in significance becoming one of the primary sources of information about the world. This has also changed the strategy of traditional broadcasters and social movements. Once, in order to receive credible information about genocide in a certain part of the world, it was necessary

to send war reporters, broadcast reports, acquire recordings, acquire photos, develop them, analyze them and, then finally, possibly publish them. Nowadays, the same information, through smartphones, the cloud, and online apps, reaches the media in real time directly from the participants of the event, both the victims and perpetrators. There is no time for a prior analysis of the incoming information or pictures, which has consequences for social movements, which are focused on the protection of human rights, making previous action strategies obsolete. Open and quick access to information has more often than not become a nightmare rather than an asset for the human rights protection movement as traditional media prefer negative and drastic messages. This makes it difficult to prove the legitimacy of the anti-genocide movement, as Richard Downie told the author; former strategies relied on a simplified description of the situation and presented a black and white dichotomy in order to achieve their expected results (Downie, 2014). Such strategies would have been justifiable with the ethical acceptance of the possible outcomes of such a choice, namely stopping the occurrence of genocide. However, the image of genocide is not as clear as it was often presented to the public. This was expressly emphasized by Alan Kuperman in his comments to the ideas of Madeleine K. Albright and William S. Cohen (Albright and Cohen, 2008) in their report on the prevention of genocide. He noted that according to the report each case of mass killing or ethnic cleansing is seen as similar to the Holocaust, in which pleasant, loving people who live peacefully are stigmatized and then all killed by a mad man who gains power (Kuperman, 2014). Kuperman is convinced that the Holocaust was the only genocide of its kind, and other genocide events that have happened contemporarily do not resemble it at all, but they have been fought between numerous groups, none of which were pleasant or unarmed. On the contrary, all have been aggressive, repulsive, and criminal, which prompts the important question of how to prevent genocide in such circumstances. Hitherto, people chose the party they stood for and had control of the flow of information. This process was fairly well presented in *The Bang Bang Club* movie by Steven Silver, based on actual events, describing the work of war reporters. There is a scene in the film in which one of the protagonists delivers some gory pictures from an inter-ethnic clash, brutal killings, and the editors of various international magazines decide which images can be published and seen by the public. Nowadays, this particular privilege of the traditional media and the enforced comfort of its audience have come to an end, as uncensored, unprocessed information reaches the audience almost immediately after the event takes place, practically stripped of all commentary. Regardless of its explicitness and thanks to the World Wide Web, we can watch everything from different angles and perspectives, often in HD quality.

This graphic reality is a significant problem and challenge for human rights movements, who are currently facing a negative form of narration, when information and broadcasts related to the so-called "migration crisis" is used to criticize human rights defenders and victims of mass human rights violations, strengthening social integralism.

Access to information on genocide through traditional media channels is therefore indispensable as a lack of information among the audience, be it readers or listeners, about genocidal atrocities from those channels, makes this issue irrelevant to the public and does not prompt any response or gain public interest, and as a result does not evoke any pressure to prevent the crime itself. However, it is worth highlighting the fact that whenever human rights infringements take place in distant regions, ordinary citizens are not willing to engage unless trendsetting celebrities or people who take political responsibility take a leading role in raising awareness that the prevention of genocide is socially important (Hirsch, 2002: 42).

We can confirm the inclusion of certain issues in the political agenda once the public expresses an interest; politicians are then eager to act for such a cause. It is important though to show genocide in a way that will attract public opinion. It is clear that images of crimes, innocent genocide victims and images of suffering have a significant impact on evoking compassion in the audience. A positive narration about these victims increases the probability of gaining greater support. The balanced portrayal of causalities, giving the stories of individuals, immersed in a social or family context, gains public interest and puts greater pressure on political decision makers. Hirsch notes, however, that despite efforts, some information is ignored or depreciated if issuing a warning results in confronting a difficult or unpopular political decision (Hirsch, 2002: 133). It seems though that the main role of social movements on the prevention of mass atrocities and human rights violations focuses on the gathering, disclosing, and promoting of positive broadcasts, and the rectification and correction of negative information, fake news or news that is derived from a historical or social context, especially if such negative information is attached to the victims of mass human rights violations.

The following resource, essential to the effective achievement of the goals assumed by a social movement and indicated by Calnan, provides an access to decision makers, subjects of authority, and other institutions that have the power to make final decisions. Such access is vital primarily for the exchange of information, accessing official data from the government and establishing a base for direct

> **Access to information on genocide through traditional media channels is therefore indispensable as a lack of information among the audience, be it readers or listeners, about genocidal atrocities from those channels, makes this issue irrelevant to the public and does not prompt any response or gain public interest, and as a result does not evoke any pressure to prevent the crime itself.**

or indirect contact for transmitting statements and maintaining legitimacy. For this reason, Hirsch believes that the anti-genocide movement needs to be directed at the President of the United States and the US Congress. This movement, due to a lack of adequate financial resources, will also mobilize great numbers of supporters and activists in order to put pressure on decision makers.

In the case of the United States, prevalent attempts to influence the attitude of politicians on the prevention of genocide should take place during primary election campaigns and election campaigns, especially the presidential one. Candidates need to address the nation on their position on the protection of human rights around the world. They should reveal how important the issue of the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities is for their foreign policy. Such decisions need to be never seen as controversial, difficult or unpopular. Pressure from campaign donors is particularly important here (Hirsch, 2002: 65). Usually, this sponsorship comes from international corporations who on the one hand are concerned for business-related social responsibility, but on the other hand have vital interests in supporting the stability and democratization of developing countries, as such a change can secure a stable environment for investment. It is worth mentioning that the effective campaign conducted by the *Save Darfur Now* coalition around the divestment act for Sudan caused a massive outflow of capital and the withdrawal of major global corporations from Sudan. Such actions are particularly important as previous experiences proved that when US foreign policy-making institutional leaders were confronted by genocide situations they were not capable or willing to actually stop or implement deterrents on those perpetrating such heinous crimes (Hirsch, 2002: 70). In an interview the author undertook with Hirsh, the interviewee declared pessimism with respect to the development and strength of the anti-genocide movement. Hirsh stated that it has been hitherto limited to students and activists, groups having no influence on the establishment. Of course, while they are capable of expanding the movement by mobilizing and even including celebrities or singular congressmen and congresswomen for the cause of saving lives, in the final analysis, this has not led to any real change in government policy (Hirsch, 2014). This is no doubt related to the ideas of another interviewee, Jonas Claes, who said: "the visibility or influence of the campaign cannot be simply associated with its effectiveness." (Claes, 2014)

There are two major factors affecting US foreign policy according to Hirsch: (i) national interest resting on power and sovereignty and (ii) election or partisan interest resting on public opinion polls and the prediction of the impact of the decision-making process on the victory of the next election. Furthermore, the author sees US politics as resting on the ethics of apologizing, not the ethics of action. Instead of taking action to stop and deter genocide, the United States often apologizes for its years of inaction well after the crime has been committed. In the case of Africa, this is caused by the perception of the region both by the US and other world powers as being simply peripheral (Hirsch, 2002: 89). Presently China is more interested in the African continent, however, for obvious reasons, this concern is not related to any support for democratic transformation, not to mention the protection of human

rights. Similarly, the Chinese government, like the US government, cannot be a partner in the dialogue for the prevention of genocide. Although Hirsch claims no country is able to wear the mantle of a global police force, the United States, together with its international partners, could, if they were willing to do so, have taken initiatives to strengthen prevention and deterrence mechanisms available within the UN (Hirsch, 2002: 108).

In this sense, another important asset of social movements mentioned by Canlan which could make a valuable contribution is the legitimacy to take actions for a particular cause. This refers to the movement's representativeness which is important for decision makers, especially if it covers their constituency. This defines also the perceived moral authority of the movement, which, if widespread enough and speaking to common democratic values, might influence the decision-making process. This is strictly dependent, however, on the movement's credibility, the information that it publicly disseminates and the support it receives from victims of human rights violations, whose lives it is speaking for. It is equally important for the anti-genocide movement to not only call for military options as a universal remedy for the perpetration of genocide. Princeton Lyman claims that the further development of the movement is dependent on a broader perception of prevention frameworks and that average US citizens must not think that support for the prevention of genocide movement means sending US soldiers to the front (Lyman, 2014). A particular balance in relations between the representation of the movement and the government must also be maintained because, as Calnan claims, the more this movement relies on the current determinants of government policy, the less it is perceived by the government as legitimate in introducing change (Calnan, 2008: 175).

The next important resource of the movement is a feature related to its representativeness and the necessity of building up the movement through social organization networking. Such cooperation is always empowering, as assets, staff, and experience are exchanged between cooperating stakeholders. Bringing together efforts helps organizations engage in the protection of human rights; previously dispersed, they can now act as a singularly strong and influential body. One of the best examples of such a coalition is *Save Darfur Now* or ICPR (*International Coalition for Responsibility to Protect*). Movements with a wide social representation can gain further assets necessary to enhance the effectiveness of the actions taken. This includes support from the government or public institutions for the demands of the movement. The assessment of government cooperation, while maintaining independence, is one of the most valued opportunities in implementing a change in society and aiding the success of social movements.

Nevertheless, it seems that the currently developing anti-genocide movement in the US, the government of which was particularly active during the Darfur crisis, has not yet reached such capabilities, while, as mentioned previously, US government institutions are passive in resolving humanitarian crises. This is the chief reason why Peter Lewis does not believe that such a movement will ever emerge in the US. To back up his opinion, he notes that the term 'genocide' is extremely abstract, which

does not motivate Americans to mobilize fast enough to "catch up" with sudden outbreaks of the phenomenon (Lewis, 2014). As is commonly known, the genocide in Rwanda took place over 100 days. For Hirsch, the passiveness of the United States government in this crisis was completely incomprehensible. He indicates that the failure of US policy to stop the Rwandan or Bosnian genocide was not only immoral but also… impractical. In his opinion, contemporary foreign policy must be rooted in the *practicality of morality*. Deterring or stopping genocide is practical in order to maintain stability and the international exchange of products and services. As he highlights, "(…) moral imperatives were supposed to be, in the new post-Cold War environment, the most practical way to pursue our common national interests, giving foundations to creation of life-saving ethics." (Hirsch, 2002: 123) Social movements can be helpful in convincing governments to face this simple truth. To publicly present their demands, social movements need to reach a certain level of organization. The most popular form of organizing individuals for resolving social problems is the establishment of a non-governmental organization. The formalization of activities within this framework enables it to set the goals and operations of the movement, access and gather information, testimonies, interviews, develop expertise, and create long-term strategies.

The final asset essential for the effective advocacy of a cause for each social movement is its public recognition. It enables, due to the character of US social activity, the expansion of the ability to raise vast funds, but also – by means of a trademark – it allows for maintaining a dialogue with the authorities or other organizations. It additionally prompts the interest of ordinary citizens in gaining their support and involvement. Dranginis believes that charismatic personalities who are the faces of the movement are essential for its success (Dranginis, 2014). This is the reason why coalitions like *Save Darfur Now* attempt to utilize the popularity of celebrities in order to involve them in action to solve problems connected to the prevention of genocide. Gaining social recognition might be particularly important for the educational efforts of the movement. The main component of such educational work must include breaking the supremacy of other national interests. Hirsch advocates for the specific rehabilitation of the political process through a change in the perception of international affairs. This signifies shifting the accent from a nationalistic approach to internationalism and raising the question of human rights as a superior ethical imperative. The mechanism that ought to lead to this rests on amendments in socialization patterns and adopting a universal ideology of a system for protecting human rights (Hirsch, 2002: 165).

The universalism of human rights is not unanimously accepted, however, it is hard to imagine any other principle that justifies order in international relations. Political education rarely describes identity or rights in terms of such universalism. Schoolboys, schoolgirls, and students are still taught to cherish their national identities, which narrows down the perspectives of world development and the shaping of human relations. The change of such a social approach, in the long run, would, to a larger extent, benefit the anti-genocide movement compared to invoking the

conscience of political agents. This would shift the perception of the world and the conditions in which genocide or other forms of violence are born (Hirsch, 2002: 179).

A change in the educational policy in democratic societies is certainly possible, but only if there is a consensus to make such an effort. The question of the effectiveness of social movements and their political impact must be posited in this social context. Tarrow claims that finding dependence between the actions of social movements and certain political decisions is still controversial as there is not enough information that might allow the description of such a connection. This, however, does not change the fact that internationalizing forms of action may create the belief in the inevitability of such a change and also affect those changes in the real political process (Tarrow, 1994: 161-162).

It is worth noting, as has already been mentioned above, that the efficiency of the social movement is more dependent on its assets, resources, and capabilities than external factors, even social ones in which the movement takes action. This is the result of organizational processes among citizens who create different entities, usually in the form of non-governmental organizations. Their impact on foreign policy on the prevention of genocide is still very much underestimated albeit priceless. Further research is clearly necessary in this field. ❉

Note
1 This and the following interviews were undertaken as part of the author's scholarship in Washington, D.C. between August 2013 and March 2014. The author was a scholar of the Polish-American Fulbright Foundation at George Washington University.

Bibliography

• Albright, M. K. and Cohen, W. S. (2008). *Preventing Genocide. A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers*. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington DC
• Burnstein, P. (1991). Legal Mobilization of Social Movements Tactic: The Struggle for Equal Opportunity. *American Journal of Sociology* **96 (5)**.
• Calnan, S. (2008). *The Effectiveness of Domestic Human Rights NGOs. A Comparative Study*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden-Boston.
• Epp, Ch. R. (1998). *The Rights Revolution. Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Court in Comparative Perspective*. Chicago University Press, Chicago.
• Henkin, L. (1999). International Human Rights in the United States. In: Meron, T. (Ed.). *Human Rights in International Law. Legal and Policy Issues*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
• Hirsch, H. (2002). *Anti-Genocide: Building an American Movement to Prevent Genocide*. Praeger Publishers, Westport.
• LeBlanc, L. J. (1991). *The United States and the Genocide Convention*. Duke University Press, Durham-London.
• Tarrow, S. (1994). *Power in Movement*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Interviews
Claes, Jonas, February 5th, 2014, Washington DC
Downie, Richard, February 4th, 2014, Washington DC
Dranganis, Holly, February 3rd, 2014, Washington DC
Hirsch, Herbert, February, 17th 2014, Richmond VA.

Kuperman, Alan, January 24th, 2014, Washington DC
Lewis, Peter, February 11th, 2014, Washington DC
Lyman, Princeton, February 11th, 2014, Washington DC
Stanton, Greg, February 6th, 2014, Washington D. C.

Bios of respondents

Jonas Claes – is a senior program officer at the US Institute of Peace, where he conducts research and analysis on the prevention of electoral violence and mass atrocities, and efforts to counter violent extremism. In this capacity, Claes coordinates USIP prevention projects and consults senior US and UN officials in fine-tuning prevention practices. He has made numerous public presentations and published peer-reviewed articles, book chapters, and policy briefs on the prevention of violent conflict. Claes has written extensively on the responsibility to protect, including an article on "Protecting Civilians from Mass Atrocities: Meeting the Challenges of R2P Opposition" published in Global Responsibility to Protect in February 2012 and a chapter on "Responsibility to Protect and Peacemaking" in the Praeger volume Peacemaking: From Practice to Theory, co-authored with Dr. Abiodun Williams.

Richard Downie – is deputy director and fellow with the CSIS Africa Program, based in Washington, DC In this role, he analyzes emerging political, economic, social, and security trends in sub-Saharan Africa with the aim of informing US policymakers, the US military, and members of Congress. Downie recently co-directed a major project commissioned by the US Africa Command that "stress-tested" African states, identifying possible sources of instability in 10 countries during the next decade. He authored the Sudan Country Report in this series. Before, he conducted research and completed writing projects on Africa for the Council on Foreign Relations and the US Institute of Peace. He is a contributor to the Africa section of Freedom House's annual report, Freedom in the World.

Holly Dranginis – is a Senior Policy Analyst for the Enough Project where she focuses on the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lord's Resistance Army, and the Central African Republic. Holly is an attorney specializing in international criminal justice, sexual and gender-based violence, and natural resource trafficking. In 2008, she was a consultant to then-ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, and later led a program in Northern Uganda introducing human rights curriculum into conflict-affected schools.

Herbert Hirsch – is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond, Virginia. He is the author of several books and numerous articles and book reviews, including Genocide and the Politics of Memory (1995) and Anti-Genocide: Building an American Movement to Prevent Genocide (2002). He serves on a number of advisory boards and teaches a course every summer at the University of Toronto on Genocide and Human Rights. He gave a seminar for the policy planning staff at the US Department of State in 1992. Professor Hirsch is one of the co-editors of the journal Genocide Studies International published by the University of Toronto Press.

Alan J. Kuperman – is an Associate Professor of Public Affairs in Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. His research focuses on ethnic conflict, nuclear nonproliferation, and US military intervention. Dr. Kuperman is the author of The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda (Brookings, 2001). Prior to his academic career, Kuperman worked as legislative director for the US Rep. Charles Schumer, legislative assistant for US House Speaker Thomas Foley, chief of staff for US Rep. James Scheuer, and fellow at the US Agency for International Development.

Peter Lewis – is an Associate Professor and the Director of African Studies Program at John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He has written extensively on questions of economic adjustment, democratization, and civil society in Africa; democratic reform and political economy in Nigeria; public attitudes toward reform and democracy in West Africa; and the comparative politics of economic change in Africa and Southeast Asia. His most recent book, Coping with Crisis in African States, examines sources of resilience and fragility across African countries and presents a series of critical cases. He is a member of Council on Foreign Relations and the Research Council of the International Forum for Democratic Studies, and a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Princeton Lyman – Ambassador Princeton N. Lyman served as United States special envoy for Sudan and South Sudan from March 2011 to March 2013. As a special envoy, he led US policy in helping in the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Ambassador Lyman previously held the position of Ralph Bunche Fellow for African Affairs at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He was also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and at Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies. From 1999 to 2003, he was executive director of the Global Interdependence Initiative at the Aspen Institute. Ambassador Lyman's previous career in government included assignments as deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs (1981-1986), US ambassador to Nigeria (1986-1989), director of refugee programs (1989-1992), US ambassador to South Africa (1992-1995), and assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs (1996-1998). From 2008-2010, he was a member of the African Advisory Committee to the United States Trade Representative. He began his government career with the US Agency for International Development and served as USAID director in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 1976 to 1978.

Greg Stanton – Gregory H. Stanton is the President of Genocide Watch. He is the Research Professor in Genocide Studies and Prevention at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution of George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia, USA. From 2007 to 2009, he was the President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars. Dr. Stanton served in the State Department (1992-1999), where he drafted the United Nations Security Council resolutions that created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Burundi Commission of Inquiry, and the Central African Arms Flow Commission. He also drafted the UN Peacekeeping Operations resolutions that helped bring about an end to the Mozambique civil war.

SOCIAL MEDIA DYNAMICS
AS A NEW FACTOR IN AFRICAN POLITICS

JĘDRZEJ CZEREP

POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

In the last years, the African political landscape has become increasingly influenced by the effects of the introduction of social media as a major channel for political debate. Apart from democratising the discourse, it has contributed massively to the spread of rumour, hate speech and disinformation, which had significant real-life effects on the ground. Re-starting the war in South Sudan in 2016 is thought to be the most spectacular of them. In the social media era, the distortion of the flow of information is a global phenomenon, which has caught the attention of analysts and the academia itself in the context of the US and European political developments. The article aims to draw a picture of its impact on African politics.

The framework for discussing the role of social media in shaping public debate and political reality in the world in the last decade can be defined by three fundamental trends:

1. New prospects for 'civic mobilization'. Social media offers potential for accelerating freedom aspirations, politicising masses, getting around censorship and administrative blockades, and finally, creating a momentum which forces authoritarian governments to back down. All of which were envisaged after the developments of the Arab Spring of 2010-2011.
2. 'Mobilisation of fear', where social media becomes a catalyser for inciting xenophobic feelings, dehumanising "the other", mobilising around hate speech and fear. This effect was seen particularly clearly during the 2015 migrant crisis in Europe.
3. 'Crisis of trust', which distorts the conduct of public debate. Its quality is affected by a number of social media-related factors:
   • The very format of the social media 'walls' which promotes the extreme shortness of texts and puts emphasis on images;
   • The emergence of a type of discourse where truthfulness or the falsehood of statements does not matter ('post-truth') (Oxford Living Dictionaries, n.d.);
   • The adoption of war-like strategies in debates where "defeating" adversaries is more valued than mutual learning and where openness to being convinced is rare;
   • The dominance of political emotions over merits;

- 'Death of expertise', where established knowledge is being perceived with suspicion, and the voices of experts are no longer considered more valuable than those of the laypeople (Nichols, 2017);
- The emergence of self-made experts and commentators exercising "power of public publishers" (acting like journalists) without skills in selecting and verifying sources, lacking standards and professional integrity (Werner, 2016);
- The fragmentation of the online public opinion into closed 'filter bubbles' (only accepting statements which confirm the established worldview of the readers) mixed with the illusion of contact with the full spectrum of the debate (Morozov, 2012);
- The gradual atomisation of the political discourse and the replacement of coherent, universal political stories with self-contradicting messages tuned up for specific sections of an electorate.

The most illustrious example of these trends was made visible during the US presidential campaign in 2016.

Each of those mechanisms, despite being highlighted in specific socio-political and cultural contexts, tends to be far more universal than many would have thought. They are indeed manifestations of wider communication problems that hamper the progress of present-day societies. The rapid expansion of social media and its quiet takeover of the role of the main channel for acquiring and spreading information on political processes and for conducting public debate have proceeded faster than the development of its users' awareness of mechanisms that shape its frames. Africa is not, therefore, repeating the experiences of others but is facing challenges in mass communication with profound political effects that are similar throughout the world. Thus, while details of specific cases in Africa will often be deeply rooted in local contexts, they will also be closely linked and parallel with processes observed elsewhere.

Conditions for conducting public debate vary from one African state to another depending on its history, political system or type of current problems (armed conflicts, political crises, social tensions, etc.). Different environments create different characteristics of trends in political discussions on Twitter or types of politics-related fake news. It is still fair to say that the politicized social media of Africa mostly relates to crises and conflicts where emotions fly high, hunger for information is problematic and the lack of the availability of objective, verified facts is evident. In the case of electoral campaigns, the goal of discrediting rivals is what mostly drives social media to exert leverage over real-life politics.

African Fake News

The African information environment, heavily impacted by the rise of social media, is undergoing a test of credibility, as its active participants (journalists, commentators), and end-users (readers) are not always aware that they share distorted pieces of information. Educational and pre-emptive activities, such as establishment in 2012 of the first verification service for stories from the African media – Africa Check

– seem to be not enough when confronting with the ubiquitousness of the phenomenon. Other counteractions, despite their systemic ambitions, are clearly of a short-term, hasty nature: the compilation of instructions on how to identify fake news, published on the website of the South African Eyewitness News, accompanied by a list of fake media outlets (Bath, 2017) was motivated by the anticipation of a disinformation campaign by the special online team (War Room) of the ruling ANC before local elections (Olewe, 2017).

Popular fake news is produced mostly for clickability and monetized through commercials. By carrying political relevance they generate huge online traffic. Such were "news" on lifting visa requirements for Nigerians by the United Kingdom or alleged remarks by Zimbabwean president that "stealing is in every Kenyan's blood"

The African information environment, heavily impacted by the rise of social media, is undergoing a test of credibility, as its active participants (journalists, commentators), and end–users (readers) are not always aware that they share distorted pieces of information.

(Olewe, 2017). The existence and the popularity of such stories become problematic when they are given credibility by mainstream media or influential participants in the public debate. Respected Kenyan sport newspaper Game Yetu repeated "news" created by a fake news site based in South Africa that Zimbabwean female footballers were being sent to Brazil to be impregnated by local football legends. Thanks to algorithms, fake stories even popped up in the section 'you may like' placed below the very anti-fake news guidebook published by the Huffington Post South Africa (Olewe, 2017). In South Sudan, after 2013, extreme emotions accompanied discussions about the role of the informal tribal lobby group of section of the Dinka people, the Jieng Council of Elders, which exercised influence on the president. An evidently false "document" told to be authored by the group, which sketched a "plan for the Dinka rule for 200 years" (South Sudan Nation, 2016), was uncritically accepted and analysed by Peter Adwok Nyaba, one of the most experienced local public intellectuals (Nyaba, 2016). Thus, this "program" became a real subject of debate and a point of reference. When one marginal website's author added new details to the social-media-driven false story on Nigeria's President Buhari's alleged death and conspiracy to replace him with a double (Dare 2018), it was not expected to make any impact. But after an influential Christian preacher, Bishop David Oyedepo, picked it up in his televised speech (Nyesen, 2018), the president himself felt obliged to publicly assure Nigerians he was real (Mbachu, 2018). Similarly, pre-electoral fake news in Zimbabwe got a boost when integrated into the official discourse of the main newspapers (Moyo, 2018).

Well-established titles are still generally more trusted in Africa than new online sources. For this reason, often impression is deliberately given that fake news originates in reliable sources. This gives them impetus to a spontaneous spread in social media. It became notorious during a pre-election period in Kenya in 2017. A "front page" imitating the respected Kenyan Daily Nation, reporting sensational political transfer, attempted to influence the pace of pre-electoral nominations (Portland Communications, 2017). A doctored page imitating a Focus on Africa section on the BBC website, including a message predicting a certain victory of Uhuru Kenyatta was massively shared by WhatsApp users, which prompted an official *dementi* by the BBC (Akwei, 2017). A similar reaction was forced upon CNN after a high-quality video imitating its programme was released (Daldorph, 2017). When the killing of a high electoral official in Kenya before the 2017 elections elevated rumours to a higher level, the operators of Facebook announced that the platform would provide Kenyans with a special anti-fake news tool in its app (Miriri, 2017). During the Zimbabwean campaign in 2018, supporters of Nelson Chamisa used symbols similar to those of the South African Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) to present images of crowded EFF rallies as their own in the social media (Moyo, 2018). The teams of both main candidates hired "online warriors": Varakashi (Destroyers) worked for the ruling ZANU-PF and Nerrorists (after Nero, the nickname of MDC's Nelson Chamisa) for the opposition. Both focused on sharing doctored documents while the opposition also clearly aimed at discrediting the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission to depict it as a biased, non-neutral body, unable to guarantee the fairness of the elections. Thus, it contributed to creating an atmosphere of uncertainty, pushing each side to reject any unfavourable result, and raised the risk of violence.

In Kenya, automatic Twitter accounts – bots – had approximately 25% share among the politically active ones, which is symptomatic for the significance of efforts to influence the perception of political developments. A fair portion of influential Twitter commentators in 2018 was based abroad: in cases of the elections of Liberia and Equatorial Guinea, as much as 54% of influencers resided outside of Africa (Mbah, 2018). While the overlap between Twitter and real-life politics is growing, it would be far from the truth to perceive discussions on this medium as representative.

Another aspect of distorting the debate comes from the involvement of companies specialised in the analysis of metadata for political marketing and influencing sentiments. Symbolically, Kenyan authorities hired the infamous Cambridge Analytica to work for their public image and help in conducting electoral struggle, where a wide assortment of techniques used during the 2016 US elections was employed. The representatives of the company boosted rebranding the government Jubilee Party as its biggest success story (Nyabola, 2018).

The spread of fake news prompts administrative reactions in many African states. During the 2017 campaign, the Communications Authority of Kenya and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission announced a requirement for administrators to remove each reported false material in 24 hours. The obligation was, however, never properly implemented (Sambuli, 2017). Another sign of radical

approach towards the issue came from Ivory Coast. In January 2018, the court sentenced Michel Gbagbo, the son of a former president for 6 months prison and a fine for "complicity in disclosing fake news", after he spoke of 250 political prisoners still being kept in the country in 2016. Also, Koaci.com was punished for spreading those remarks (BBC, 2018a). Obviously, these measures cannot be treated simply as targeting the danger of misinformation, but rather as part of the political agenda. Similarly, when Ugandan authorities announced in June 2018 the introduction of tax for users of Facebook, WhatsApp, Viber and Twitter to reduce the spread of "gossip", it did not sound very convincing in the context of earlier efforts to control the critical coverage online. Tanzania started to require that bloggers obtain licences and disclose their sources of financing (BBC, 2018b). Leaders more and more often treat the very existence of its citizens' problems with navigating in the information environment as an excuse for their own failures. A drastic example came from the South Sudanese President Salva Kiir, who, in 2017 told in a Deutsche Welle interview that a million of refugees who had escaped the war in his country to Uganda did so without a proper reason, after taking social media rumours too seriously (Kriesch, 2017).

An African Spring?
The events of the Arab Spring had a direct influencing effect on a wave of popular pro-freedom demands in Sub-Saharan Africa. Examples from Northern Africa helped to mobilise protest movements in Djibouti, Swaziland and other countries. If in North Africa in 2010-2011 social media was decisive, at the same time in Sub-Saharan Africa, it was not that widespread to play a key role (Fortier, 2011). The biggest success of the African extension of the Arab Spring materialised in putting a blockade to an authoritarian turn of Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade in 2011. Under pressure from the streets, animated in traditional ways by the new youth movement Y'en a Marre, he was forced to backtrack on his plans to change electoral laws to allow a candidate winning 25% in the first round and to be declared winner. The son of Wade, Karim, whom he hoped to be his successor, was to benefit from the projected legislation. Similarly, 3 years later in Burkina Faso, an awareness-raising street movement, Le Balai Citoyen, mobilised hundreds of thousands of protesters in the capital Ouagadougou through agitation at meetings and concerts. Even if social media played not more than a subsidiary role in engaging people in politics in those cases due to limited Internet access, it was enough for Burkinabe diaspora supporting protesters in 2014 to call them a "Revolution 2.0". The most popular hashtags of the day included #AfricanSpring and #Lwili (a patriotic reference to popular Burkinabe fabrics) (Becker, 2018). But the role of Twitter took on a new importance in the following years. In 2016, 8.67% of the most popular African Twitter hashtags bared political connotations (a higher percentage than in the US, France, or the UK) while politicians and journalists still contributed to less than 10% of the discussions significant for shaping political opinions (Rwanda, where this rate was 31% by 2017, is exceptional) (Portland Communications, 2018). During the Nigerian 2015 elections, a hashtag #NigeriaDecides had far more references to the

winning Muhammadu Buhari than his competitor, incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, despite the fact that the latter was far more active on Twitter (he had poor following though). #StopNkurunziza played a significant role in mobilising protests against the leader of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza in 2015, which pushed the authorities to cut off mobile social media (including Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp) in April of that year (News24, 2015), which looked like a rather odd and desperate step. In the following year, 2016, this practice became the norm: there were as many as 11 cases where state authorities cut off the Internet. Those included Cameroon where marginalised Anglophone citizens were mobilising to express their grievances, Togo where protesters demanded President Faure Gnassingbé that he depart, Ethiopia during the rising of the ethnic Oromo protest movement and Uganda during the general polls where authorities feared social unrest. In 2017 and 2018 the trend continued, with Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo among states attempting to limit popular discontent by cutting off social media access. In each of those cases, authorities calculated that the risk of leaving the domestic social media environment free was more dangerous than the negative consequences of blackouts for their economies, such as the reduced trust of investors (Dahir, 2017). It clearly indicates that social media is believed to limit the sense of impunity of African authorities.

Hate Speech Online, Real-Life Violence
Throughout the history of rumours, half-truths and lies channelling the destructive energy of people against certain communities were spread by word of the mouth or the mass media. In Rwanda, programs based on hateful anti-Tutsi stereotypes aired by Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines prepared ground for the 1994 genocide (Kellow, Steeves, 1998). Xenophobic gossip repeated from mouth to mouth resulted in ethnic violence at Tana River in Kenya, where Orma and Pokoma ethnic groups fought in 2012 (Boyd et al., 2015). Thus, the development of social media has not brought any novelty in terms of content. However, the way pieces of information are seen and exchanged (like memes where striking images and "interpretative" lines of text are merged) offers a sense of comprehensiveness in explaining reality, thus their reliability is boosted. Hate speech "under the guise of open sharing of information" (LeRiche, 2016) makes its proponents believe to be contributing to freedom of speech, often restricted in their home countries. The use of mobile phones massively accelerates the speed of fake stories' spread and offers a sense of belonging to the rebelling "community of the informed", which multiplies the mobilising effect of the rumours. It not only allows sensational "news" to reach its audiences but also often revives the long-forgotten stories, which are given second or third lives and rise to a dangerous scale. A scene of the aftermath of the explosion of the fuel cistern in the Democratic Republic of Congo, verified back in 2011 by the debunking site Loonwatch, was repeatedly recycled to depict a poorly defined "Nigerian genocide" or post-electoral conflict in Ivory Coast (France24, 2016). In 2015, in South African KwaZulu province, bloody anti-foreigner riots took the lives of 7 people and displaced 7 thousand. Violence was a consequence of sharing a statement on social media attributed to the king Goodwill

Zwelithini during a rally in Pongola: it was believed that he said that foreigners were changing the structure of South African society and should pack their bags and leave (Patel, 2016). While the very ruler denied saying these words, they have spread, in the specific context of ethnic tensions and economic rivalry. They triggered an avalanche which was impossible to be stopped. A government-commissioned report stated that "the spreading of misinformation on social media platforms contributed to widespread panic at the height of the attacks in April 2015" (Patel, 2016). Similar background stood behind the violent riots in the capital of Zambia, Lusaka, in 2016, where mobs targeted Rwandan shopkeepers, the representatives of a small and well-integrated minority of 6 thousand people who had settled after fleeing the 1994 genocide. After a series of mysterious, ritual-like killings, the expectations of the public to be given explanations fuelled online speculations. According to a rumour, body parts were used by Rwandan merchants as amulets to help them succeed in business. Alarming statements placed spontaneously on social media pointing to Rwandans to be responsible for the tragedies prompted the mobilisation of militants. In April 2016, at least 62 shops were attacked, and police arrested 250 perpetrators. While ethnic tensions or competition between locals and newcomers are nothing new in South African politics, they were previously unknown to Zambians (BBC, 2016). They were nurtured inside an online "filter bubble", unnoticed by the general public, but still led some to engage in physical violence.

When Good Intentions Are Not Enough
The problem with political consequences of providing a false depiction of the situation does not only lead to attacks but also to subsequent reactions, during which new stories are built. Users exchanging messages to condemn specific acts of violence often use images taken at a different time and place and in a different context. In February 2017, attacks against DR Congolese and Nigerian immigrants in Gauteng, South Africa were reported. People sympathizing with victims of violence, including the immigrants themselves, shared drastic videos depicting scenes of killings from Brazil as these would have happened in South Africa (where there were actually no victims that time). Such a user contacted by Africa Check admitted that his intention was to raise awareness about the problem which, in his view, excused him for using means of doubtful credibility. He spread the film to express disagreement on the alleged silence of Nigerian and Congolese governments in the wake of the attacks against their citizens (France24, 2017). Notably, the very assumption of the passivity of the governments was false: actually, Nigerian Minister of State and Foreign Affairs repeatedly requested South African authorities to guarantee safety for his compatriots and widely reported this to

Users exchanging messages to condemn specific acts of violence often use images taken at a different time and place and in a different context.

the public (Channels Television, 2017). In this case, a justified need to speak about the actually alarming situation could not only affect the international reception of the events but also influence the conduct of intergovernmental relations. Kenyan social media users passionately shared false information about election-related "mayhem in Nairobi's Mathare slum" where police was believed to have massacred residents. Emotions were so high that a disclaimer by the head of Kenyan Red Cross saying nothing similar was happening, channelled the anger of people against him. He was quickly accused of complicity in hiding the truth (Sambuli, 2017). Again, honest intentions to react to the perceived deadly crisis unfolding initiated new dynamics and gave life to new tensions on the ground.

An armed conflict brings a particularly delicate context for the information environment as its features can translate into rising ethnic tensions, fighting and other

An armed conflict brings a particularly delicate context for the information environment as its features can translate into rising ethnic tensions, fighting and other acts of violence. South Sudan, which exploded into a civil war in 2013, proved to be a ground where lines between social media discussions and real–life politics (and war) are blurred.

acts of violence. South Sudan, which exploded into a civil war in 2013, proved to be a ground where lines between social media discussions and real-life politics (and war) are blurred. The atmosphere of "fear and paranoia" built after the experience of the massacre of thousands of ethnic Nuers in Juba on 15-17 December 2013, left people in "survival mode" (LeRiche, 2016). This state of spirit, combined with harsh restrictions on media (hence very limited access to proven information), made the online crowd eager to pick up any piece of information that it found relevant. On 8 July 2016, James Gatdet Dak, official spokesman of the recently appeased fighting force led by Vice President Riek Machar, posted an unverified and very false statement that his boss had just been arrested in the presidential palace. As soldiers of the forces of Machar, which stationed outside the building, were killing time by scrolling Facebook walls on their mobiles, the post caused panic among troops. Chaotic shooting set the ball rolling: messages building on the shooting story, told about targeted attacks on Nuers (LeRiche, 2016), which quickly became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The toll of the fatal day was 272 dead, and it brought the collapse of the fragile peace and the renewal of an open conflict. The South Sudanese ambassador to Kenya pointed directly to the misleading Facebook post as being an impulse for the new war (Kaberia, 2016). The second phase of the South Sudanese civil war was probably the first modern armed conflict triggered by social media fake news.

Conclusions

African social media dynamics filters into real-life politics with spectacular speed, quickly catching up with global trends in solidifying interdependency between the online and the offline. Governments increasingly consider the control of social media debates as a prerequisite for avoiding political unrest. Influencing social media debates has become one of the key features of the electoral campaigns in Africa. On the other side, grassroots hunger for relevant information, especially in crisis situations, makes it extremely difficult to prevent both intentional and spontaneous flaws of the public debate. While organised counteractions are clearly needed to limit the destructive impact of hate speech, spreading fear, social distrust and false information, these require parallel efforts and the goodwill of authorities, administrators, authors and (social) media users. Shutting down access to the Internet, which is increasingly popular among African leaders, is not a solution. Reports that in 2018 Russia brought disinformation experts to the Central African Republic, in an attempt to incite anti-French sentiments (Beau, 2018), which would give their country an advantage over the former colonial metropolis, and in 2019 to Sudan in order to undermine unity of the street protest movement against its ally President Omar al-Bashir (Elbagir, Lister, Shukla, 2019), signals the opening of a new chapter in the story: one where social media has become instrumental in a renewed competition of international powers for influences in Africa. ☀

Bibliography

- Africa Check. (n.d.). https://africacheck.org/ [15.05.2019]
- Akwei, I. (2017). *Fake news reports hit Kenya's election build up.* Africa News, 29.07.2017, http://www.africanews.com/2017/07/29/fake-news-imitating-foreign-media-reports-hit-kenya-elections/ [15.05.2019]
- Al Jazeera. (2018). *How social media shaped calls for political change in Ethiopia*, Al Jazeera, 11.08.2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2018/08/social-media-shaped-calls-political-change-ethiopia-180811084501289.html [15.05.2019]
- Bath, C. (2017). *How to spot a fake news story.* Eyewitness News, 21.01.2017, http://ewn.co.za/2017/01/27/important-notice-how-to-spot-a-fake-news-story [15.05.2019]
- BBC. (2018a). *Son of former Ivorian president jailed for 'fake news'.* BBC Online, 26.01.2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-africa-42461438?ns_mchannel=social&ns_source=twitter&ns_campaign=bbc_live&ns_linkname=5a6b5aa8ce7984064b4491f4%26No%20political%20uncertainty%20in%20Congo%20-%20Kabila%26ns_fee=0#post_5a6b5aa8ce7984064b4491f4 [15.05.2019]
- BBC. (2018b). *Uganda imposes WhatsApp and Facebook tax 'to stop gossip'.* BBC Online, 02.06.2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44315675 [15.05.2019]
- BBC. (2016). *Zambia arrests over xenophobic attacks in Lusaka.* BBC Online, 19.04.2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36084858 [15.05.2019]
- Beau, N. (2018). *Centrafrique, la France muette face à Poutine.* Mondafrique. 09.05.2018, https://mondafrique.com/centrafrique-la-france-muette-face-a-lactivisme-de-poutine/ [15.05.2019]
- Becker, H. (2017). *Revolution 2.0: Thomas Sankara and the Social Media Generation in Burkina Faso.* Writer @ Ethnography, 10.07.2017, http://writer-at-ethnography.com/revolution20-burkina.html [15.05.2019]

- Boyd, D., Green, J., Mutisya, C., Tuckwood, C. (2015). *Una Hakika? Mapping and countering the flow of misinformation in Kenya's Tana Delta*. Final Report, December 2015, iHub Research / The Sentinel Project / IDRC-CRDI, https://thesentinelproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/UHPublicReport_Final.pdf [15.05.2019]
- Channels Television. (2017). *Xenophobia: Nigeria Asks South Africa To Protect Foreigners*. Channels Television Online, 23.02.2017, https://www.channelstv.com/2017/02/23/xenophobia-nigeria-asks-south-africa-to-protect-foreigners/ [15.05.2019]
- Dahir, A. L. (2017). *Internet shutdowns are costing African governments more than we thought*, Quartz Africa, 28.09.2017, https://qz.com/africa/1089749/internet-shutdowns-are-increasingly-taking-a-toll-on-africas-economies/ [15.05.2019]
- Dare A. (2018). *Matters miscellaneous,* The Nation, 27. 11.2018, http://thenationonlineng.net/matters-miscellaneous-13/ [15.05.2019]
- Daldorph, D. (2017). *Kenyans worry 'fake news' might spark more election violence*, PRI, 07.08.2017, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-08-07/kenyans-worry-fake-news-might-spark-more-election-violence [15.05.2019]
- Elbagir N., Lister T., Shukla S. (2019). *Fake news and public executions: Documents show a Russian company's plan for quelling protests in Sudan,* CNN, 25.04.2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/25/africa/russia-sudan-minvest-plan-to-quell-protests-intl/index.html [15.05.2019]
- Kriesch, A. (2017). South Sudan President Salva Kiir downplays refugee crisis, Deutsche Welle, 24.08.2017, https://www.dw.com/en/south-sudan-president-salva-kiir-downplays-refugee-crisis/a-40209980 [15.05.2019]
- Fortier, A. (2011). *Why Senegalese youth want change, not revolution*. PRI, 20.07.2011, https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-07-20/why-senegalese-young-want-change-not-revolution [15.05.2019]
- France24. (2016). *The top 8 fake images shared on African social media*. France24, 04.12.2016, http://observers.france24.com/en/20160412-top-fake-images-african-social-media [15.05.2019]
- France24. (2017). *These gory, violent videos don't show xenophobic attacks in South Africa*. France 24, 03,03.2017, http://observers.france24.com/en/20170303-these-gory-violent-videos-don-show-xenophobic-attacks-south-africa [15.05.2019]
- Kaberia, J. (2016). *False Facebook post blamed for 272 deaths in S. Sudan*. Capital News, 12.07.2016, https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2016/07/false-facebook-post-blamed-for-272-deaths-in-s-sudan/ [15.05.2019]
- Kellow, C., Steeves H., *The Role of Radio in the Rwandan Genocide*, Journal of Communication, Summer 1998, pp. 107-128
- LeRiche, M. (2016). *Facebook and Social Media Fanning the Flames of War in South Sudan*. Centre For Security Governance, 12.07.2016, http://secgovcentre.org/2016/07/facebook-and-social-media-fanning-the-flames-of-war-in- south-sudan/ [15.05.2019]
- Mbachu D. (2018). *Nigerian President Says He's Very Much Alive and Not a Clone*, Bloomberg, 3.12.2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-03/nigerian-president-says-he-s-very-much-alive-and-not-cloned [15.05.2019]
- Mbah, F. (2018). *How diaspora influenced 2017's elections in Africa: report*. AlJazeera, 18.07.2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/diaspora-influenced-2017-elections-africa-report-180717185153249.html [15.05.2019]
- Miriri, D. (2017). *Facebook offers tool to combat fake news in Kenya ahead of polls*, Reuters, 04.08.2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-facebook/facebook-offers-tool-to-combat-fake-news-in-kenya-ahead-of-polls-idUSKBN1AK1IU [15.05.2019]
- Morozov, E. (2012). *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*. PublicAffairs.

- Moyo, D. (2018). *Africa: A Vicious Online Propaganda War That Includes Fake News Is Being Waged in Zimbabwe*. The Conversation, 24.07.2018, https://theconversation.com/a-vicious-online-propaganda-war-that-includes-fake-news-is-being-waged-in-zimbabwe-99402 [15.05.2019]
- News24. (2015). *Protest-hit Burundi cuts mobile social network access*. News24, 29.04.2015, https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Protest-hit-Burundi-cuts-mobile-social-network-access-20150429 [15.05.2019]
- Nichols, T. (2017). *The Death of Expertise: The Campaign against Established Knowledge and Why it Matters*. Oxford.
- Nyaba, P. (2016.) *Linkage between ARCISS' Abrogation and 'Dinka Development Plan for 200 Years: A Response to the Jieng Council of Elders'* South Sudan Nation, 30.09.2016, http://www.southsudannation.com/linkage-between-arciss-abrogation-and-dinka-development-plan-for-200-years-a-response-to-the-jieng-council-of-elders/ [15.05.2019]
- Nyabola, N. (2018). *Politics in the digital age: Cambridge Analytica in Kenya*. Al Jazeera, 22.03.2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/politics-digital-age-cambridge-ana-lytica-kenya- 180322123648852.html [15.05.2019]
- Nyabola, N. (2018). *Digital Democracy, Analogue Politics. How the Internet Era is Transforming Politics in Kenya*, London.
- Nseyen N. (2018). *Bishop Oyedepo speaks on 'dead Buhari'*, Daily Post, 3.12.2018, https://dailypost.ng/2018/12/03/bishop-oyedepo-speaks-dead-buhari-video/ [15.05.2019]
- Olewe, D. (2017). *Fake news: How can African media deal with the problem?* BBC, 15.05.2019, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38883347 [15.05.2019]
- Oxford Living Dictionaries. (n.d.). *Post-truth*. Oxford Living Dictionaries. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/post-truth [15.05.2019]
- Patel, K. (2016). *What caused the xenophobic attacks in South Africa*? Al Jazeera, 06.04.2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/report-blames-media-xenophobic-panic-africa-160406102827284.html [15.05.2019]
- Portland Communications. (2018). *How Africa Tweets 2018*. https://portland-communications.com/pdf/How-Africa-Tweets-2018.pdf [15.05.2019]
- Portland Communications. (2017). *The Reality of Fake News in Kenya*. https://portland-communications.com/pdf/The-Reality-of-Fake-News-in-Kenya.pdf [15.05.2019]
- Sambuli, N. (2017). *How Kenya became the latest victim of 'fake news'*. Al Jazeera, 17.08.2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/kenya-latest-victim-fake-news-170816121455181.html [15.05.2019]
- South Sudan Nation. (2016). *2015 Master Plan: Dinka Development Plan for 200 years!* South Sudan Nation, 14.09.2016, http://www.southsudannation.com/the-jieng-council-of-elders-jce-2015-master-plan-dinka-development-plan-for-200-years/ [16.02.2016]
- Sudan Tribune. (2017). *South Sudan president downplays refugee crisis, blames social media*. Sudan Tribune Online, 28.08.2017, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article63355 [15.05.2019]
- Werner, J. (2016). *Debunking viral rumors – A story of modern folklore*. TEDxStockholm.

JANUS-FACED PARADIGMS

ERIKA GÚTI – ATTILA T. HORVÁTH

1. Introduction

In our paper, we examine the parallel existence of the global paradigm 'linguistic imperialism' and the linguistic/cultural paradigm in the African language system, which in their own right can have positive or negative effects, too. The other question that we look at is the role of the great African lingua francas (e.g., Swahili) in this system.

2. Linguistic paradigms/language policy paradigms

There are two known language policy alternatives, paradigms: (a) 'linguistic imperialism' or the diffusion of English as an international language; and (b) the 'ecology of language'/cultural paradigm (see Table 1). Linguistic imperialism can be characterized by theoretical orientations like capitalism, science and technology, and modernity. Its goal is to reach monolingualism, ideological globalization (assimilation), the homogenization of world culture, and linguistic, cultural and media imperialism (Phillipson, 1992; Tsuda, 1994; Tsuda, 2013). It often leads to linguicism and in Africa it is often accompanied by ethnicism and racism. The language-based discrimination cannot only be found among the speakers of different languages but also among those who speak varieties of the same language (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1995; Skutnabb-Kangas, 1997: 20).

The global paradigm (linguistic imperialism) = The diffusion of English paradigm	The ecology of language/ cultural paradigm
Capitalism	Human rights perspective
Science and technology modernization	Equality in communication
Monolingualism	Multilingualism
Ideological globalization	Language and cultural maintenance
Homogenization	Protection of national sovereignty
Linguistic, cultural and media imperialism	Promotion of foreign language education

Table 1. The Global Paradigm (Linguistic Imperialism) – The Ecology of Language/Cultural Paradigm Source: Tsuda (1994: 58-59)

It creates an asymmetry between the speakers of standard languages and the users of nonstandard varieties, to the advantage of the former and to the disadvantage of the latter. The languages and their varieties (dominant – dominated) mirror social relations, structures, and hierarchy, they depict the social inequalities of the system in which they were established and where they function. In other words, language is not neutral; its function is to transfer power or the lack of power in a pragmatic and symbolic sense as well. Pragmatic means the functional use of language; while symbolic refers to the political and economic power of a community in a given social context (de Kadt, 1996).

But "the colonialism's most important area of domination was the mental universe of the colonized, the control, through culture, of how people perceived themselves and their relationship to the world [...]. Colonialism involved two aspects of the same process: (a) the destruction or the deliberate undervaluing of a people's culture, history, geography or education [...], and (b) the conscious elevation of the language of the colonizer." (Nguni, 1981: 160 underline by Tsuda, 2013)

Laws regulate the status, the privileges, and the use of languages, which means the economic protection of a dominant group, but at the same time, it also facilitates the participation in an international economic network.

Beyond this, the symbolic power of a language influences decisively the preservation of identity[1] (de Kadt, 1996; Eyassu, 2009). From an ideological point of view, languages can often become the weapon of nationalistic tendencies and can often be politicized. The "task" of language policy is to clarify and analyze these relations in a given historical, political, and legal context.

The goal of the 'ecology of language paradigm' is to overcome inequalities based on human rights (human language rights). It promotes equality in communication, multilingualism, the maintenance of languages and cultures, the protection of national sovereignty, and foreign language education (Tsuda, 1994; Tsuda, 2013).

The vernacular principle is in the center of the 'ecology of language' paradigm. The arguments of its followers against linguistic imperialism are the following: (a) human rights documents (e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) prescribe how to handle languages in a just and fair way; (b) the use of mother tongue is a basic human right; (c) mother tongue plays a crucial role in education thus in the cognitive development of children; (d) monolingualism has a negative effect on the economy and the development of a nation in a multicultural, multilingual state; (e) using small languages might be useful in international trade and tourism; and (f) the extension of the English paradigm assimilates world culture. Linguistic and cultural pluralism is a counterstrategy from this point of view because diversity is the most important index of a democratic society (Tsuda, 2013; Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1995; Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1996).

Until the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, there were not even lawmaking efforts to dissolve inequality. Most of the constitutions legitimized social and linguistic prejudices. Legal documents, which were designed to react on linguistic imperialism on the continent, contained the paradigm of the 'ecology of language'

for the first time in the 1980s. The 'ecology of language' supports the idea of greater equality. In order to achieve this goal, the legal status of local languages has to be clarified.

3. Legal context at continental level

There is a need to support the 'ecology of language' paradigm in Africa. In 1976 the OAU (the Organisation of Africa Unity) adopted the Cultural Charter for Africa but has not executed it on a continental level till now. Article 6 (2b) of the Treaty states that the member states should promote "the introduction and intensification of the teaching in national languages in order to accelerate the economic, social, political and cultural development of Africa", and Article 18 encourages the implementation of the reforms necessary for the introduction of African languages into education (Cultural Charter for Africa, 1976: 7; 10).

After a year, in 1997, at the Intergovernmental Conference of Ministers on Language Policies in Africa, in Harare, Zimbabwe, from 17 to 19 of March (organized by the UNESCO), the participants agreed that each country should produce a precise and consistent language policy document within which every language spoken in the country can find its place. They defined tasks at 3 levels: (a) pan-Africa level; (b) regional; and (c) governmental.

The pan-Africa level emphasize (without the need for limitation) the "re-activation [of] the Language Plan for Africa and the implementation [of] the decision taken in 1986 to make Swahili one of the working languages of the OAU," i.e., to add Swahili to English, French, Portuguese, and Arabic also underline the "adaptation of the Pan-African Project for Training and Educational Materials Production in African Languages (PATPAL)." At the regional level, the participants called for "co-operation on matters of policy and resources for cross-border languages", drew attention to the development of regional and sub-regional languages, and called for the revitalization of the African language research institutions, such as the Pan-Africa Association of Linguists. At the government level, the participants called attention to the need for institutionalization, such as establishing a language bank at national and also at a regional level, a central language service or institute, etc. (Intergovernmental Conference of Ministers on Language Policies in Africa, 1997: 76).

The participants encouraged institutions – also institutionalization – and researchers/research departments "to intensify their activities in order to play a catalytic role in the effort to achieve the development of Africa," and also financial organizations to give their support to the efforts (Intergovernmental Conference of Ministers on Language Policies in Africa, 1997: 77)

In this sense, language policy development and the implementation of language policy have become part of the change process/democratization process. But till now only a few of African states have consistent and comprehensive language policy, and if one has a language policy, in the majority of the cases, these policies can be only implicitly seen from the requirements in such sectors as education (or justice, training, etc.)

The authors of the Asmara Declaration had the same intention: to support the African language ecology. From January 11 to 17, 2000, in Asmara, Eritrea, was the first conference titled: *Against All Odds: African Languages and Literatures into the 21th Century*, where the participants from Africa and from the diaspora, and writers and scholars from around the world declared: at the start of the new century/ millennium Africa must return to its languages and heritage, and has to overcome the shadows of the colonialism, because "colonial obstacles still haunt independent Africa, and block the mind of African people." The participants declared that "African languages are essential for the decolonization of African minds and essential for the African renaissance. All African children have the unalienable rights to attend school and learn in their mother tongues, but it requires the development and use of African languages at all levels of education." The participants called for universal cooperation to preserve human dignity and values. They stressed that "the vitality and equality of African languages must be recognized as a basis for the future of African peoples. The diversity of African languages reflects the rich cultural heritage of Africa it must be used as an instrument of African unity." The dialogue between African languages is vital: "African languages must use the instrument of translation to advance communication among all people including disabled. Democracy is essential for the equal development of African languages and vice versa African languages are vital for the development of democracy based on equality and social justice." (The Asmara Declaration, 2000)[2]

Figure 1. The Seven African Aspirations
Source: Agenda 2063 (2014: 53)

The preservation of the national culture and cultural identity, values, and ethic as one of the seven African aspirations also appeared in the Agenda 2063 adopted by the AU in Addis Ababa, in January 2015 (see below). The Agenda uses a bottom-up approach, is of a result-oriented nature, and for the first time, it was politically coherent as all continental and regional initiatives have been brought under one umbrella. Although it provides an overarching framework, its implementation requires nation- and/or country-specific activities as countries are at different stages and levels of development. The Agenda 2063 is comprised of 18 goals based on the Seven Aspirations:

ASPIRATION	GOAL
Political Unity and an Integrated Continent	• Politically united Africa • Economic integration • Free movement of people, goods, and services
A Peaceful and Secure Africa	• Security and stability • A capable nation at peace with herself and its neighbors
Strong Cultural Identity, Values and Ethic	• National culture is recognised and respected • Pan-Africanism
A Strong and Influential Global Player and Partner	• Speaks with one voice in global affairs • A major partner in global affairs and the promotion of global economic prosperity
Development Is People-driven	• Equal opportunities and encouraging the participation of women and the youth • Local governance for sustainable development • The civil society's contribution to development
Good Governance, Democracy, Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law	• Universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law observed • Capable development state
A Prosperous Africa	• Environmental sustainability and climate resilience • Inclusive economic growth • High standard of living (income, jobs, health, education) • Transformed economies and jobs

Table 2. Aspirations and Goals
Source: Agenda 2063 (2014: 52-66)

Some of the aspirations are based on regional and sub-regional integration that is the key for African revival. Politically it goes back to the concepts of pan-Africanism: (a) the Casablanca school, which wanted to transfer power from national governments to a pan-African authority, and (b) the other is the Monrovia school, which believes that each nation should take its own decisions: this latter is protected by the AU.

Good governance, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are the aspirations that are crucial for the continent. In a multilingual context, the appearance and recognition of human language rights is important. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and its recommendations have been ratified since 1986 by the majority of African states under the patronage of the UN. A number of articles – e.g., No. 20 and 29 – mention the importance of preserving indigenous cultural values. The same is true for Agenda 2063: but they do not refer to the preservation of the African linguistic heritage. It means that these documents, from a linguistic perspective, are rather more assimilation-oriented than tolerant (Buergenthal, 2001: 190-204; Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1995: 345).

Preserving African cultures and languages has become an integral part of development processes and policies, which brought (a) the development of education embedded into the paradigm of modernization called "for the development of education", a prerequisite for economic growth; and (b) it is closely connected to nation-building policies. (c) The dimension of identity is that the construction of the African identity can be realized primarily through the appreciation of their own language and culture and through education. One of the conditions to achieve this goal is native language literacy and education, the other: these languages should – if possible – receive national or official status.

However, despite all noble intention, implementation is limited not only in structural and ideological but also in a legal and linguistic sense.

(a) On the one hand, the majority of African languages are not able to mediate the curriculum at a higher level of the education system, because the standardization of some languages is not desired. Although many initiatives are known, such as the Zulu or Xhosa Language Board, the Zulu or Xhosa Languages Advisory Board, the Setswana Language Council, or such initiatives as ALLEX, i.e., the African Languages Lexical Project in Zimbabwe, these aspirations are not typical for all communities.

(b) The paradigm of 'linguistic imperialism' continues to be very strongly opposed to the linguistic 'ecological paradigm' in Africa, which implies that the dominant languages of the former colonists continue to be a decisive means of communica-

tion both in politics and economics and outwardly towards international markets. At the same time, 'linguistic imperialism' has also led to the fact that the vast majority of indigenous/Bantu languages have still not gone through the process of development that many languages do like in the European region. Which means that nation-building should be realized through the development of education. Although the internal cohesion of "imported" European languages is weak (Búr, 2002: 303), it is unlikely that the majority of African states will change their language policy since the colonial languages have greater vitality than the indigenous languages (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1995: 336).

(c) It raises the problem of the legal status of languages. The development of languages is best served if the local languages are (legally) equal (have official status) with the language of the former colonizers. Although in some countries like South Africa, e.g., this condition is set, monolingualism is supported in the banking and economic sectors. On the one hand, the lack of corpus planning, on the other hand, the lack of institutionalization limit the implementation of multilingualism – that is to say, the local, indigenous languages cannot appear in the sphere of politics, economy, and international communication.

4. Swahili

In order to create national unity, finding a common language used in broad circles seems to be necessary. This either leads to the consensus of learning the official colonizing language – thus, local languages remain in the background – or it is a neutral language such as Swahili, which often becomes a symbol of national unity, self-reliance, independence, and solidarity, as in Tanzania, where, after the declaration of independence, Swahili became the official language in addition to English. Swahili was not bound to any ethnic group, it was ethnically neutral, and according to anti-(linguistic)imperialism, free of nationalism; therefore, Swahili was considered to be suitable for unifying the local ethnic language groups (Blommaert, 2001: 138). Swahili, as a unifying national language, has become the lingua franca in Tanzania, where there are more than 100 languages in use, and it took the wind out of the nationalistic movement's sails since there were no ethnic associations attached to it. Today, 95% of the population speak Swahili. It was only 10% when Tanzania became independent (de Swaan, 2004: 130).

In the Tanzanian three-language constellation (local language, Swahili, English), Swahili has to face its rivals: (a) English at higher levels of education and (b) local or regional languages at a lower level. In a multilingual environment, the existence of a trilingual model is more a rule than an exception, like in Tanzania. The three-language formula can be modeled as follows:

- nation → further tongue
- community, region → other tongue, lingua franca
- immediate community, local → mother tongue, vernacular language (Brann, 1981: 6)

This configuration can be used to maintain multilingualism at a satisfactory level.[3]

The number of Swahili speakers is variable, between 60 and 130 million people use it as lingua franca, with approximately 4 million people speaking it as a first language (Fodor, 2007: 137). It is the lingua franca of a huge area of East Africa. In many respects, Swahili is a special African language: for example, there are lots of sources written in Swahili – which are very useful for historians – from different geographical areas. Not only the number of users is high, but it is also a highly appreciated language. Its written and audio sources – accessible on the internet – can be easily studied. In many countries in East Africa, researchers learning Swahili can communicate with a wide range of local people without language barriers. Swahili today – maybe it is not an exaggeration – has become the best-known language of sub-Saharan Africa in the world. Many universities in the world teach this language as the "black African" foreign language. In 1966 Swahili was taught at 13 universities in the United States (Stevick, 1967: 19). Nowadays, as Swahili tops the charts of the popular African languages in the US, it is featured in more than 100 institutions, both government and private (Maganda and Moshi, 2014: 202).

As a symbol of the spiritual creativity of African spirituality, Swahili emanates from the use of the modern African-American syncretic Kwanzaa celebration. This is an interesting example of the language's prestige because the majority of the former slave workers in North American plantations came from West Africa, so at that time probably nobody could speak this language.

Particularly rich literature deals with Swahili from a political perspective (e g., Whiteley, 1969; Fabian, 1986; Mazrui and Mazrui, 1995). The history of the language policy of Swahili stretches over a long time, so it is well-studied in the historical context, conveniently relying on the pillars of the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods, into which one can divide its history. In the last few years, the post-colonial period has greatly contributed to the period of accelerated globalization.

The pre-colonial period was characterized by the spontaneous spread of Swahili from the East African coast to the continental areas. The Swahili language and Muslim culture formed and developed in the coastal city-states spread to the continent in ever-increasing areas in the mid-to-late 19th century. Merchants from the coast were of great interest in this

The pre-colonial period was characterized by the spontaneous spread of Swahili from the East African coast to the continental areas. The Swahili language and Muslim culture formed and developed in the coastal city-states spread to the continent in ever-increasing areas in the mid-to-late 19th century.

process. At that time language helped the horizontal communication between different groups – tribes.

In colonial times colonial states already had needs for language planning and its associated apparatus: Germans and then the British colonizers made efforts to develop the legal and institutional basis for its education and implementation and urged the codification process. Swahili was destined to be the language of the lower-level public administration in East Africa. Language development was supported by long-lived institutions such as the Inter-Territorial Language Committee (later East African Swahili Committee) between 1930 and 1964.

Christian missions took a major part of the spread of the language: the users of Swahili were the practitioners of monotheistic Islam, and the language was suitable for transmitting the theological content of Christianity.

During the post-colonial period – and partly also in colonial times – Swahili was used to promote vertical communication, thus helping build the modern (Western) state.

By gaining independence in the sixties, the language planning policy in African countries became an important issue for newly emerging states. The most characteristic language policy was adopted by Tanzania. President Nyerere was a devout believer in the Swahili language being an important tool of nation-building. The Arusha Declaration in 1967, which is also a Swahili text, built the foundations for it. Swahili was an important means of spreading the specific African socialist ideology developed by the president. This political philosophy was not accidentally named in Swahili: *Ujamaa* (brotherhood or familyhood). But other Swahili expressions related to ideology became known throughout the world at that time.

There were remarkable institutions of language policy and research: the Institute of Kiswahili Research (*Taasisi ya Uchunguzi wa Kiswahili – TUKI*), was founded in 1964 in succession of the East African Inter-Territorial Language Committee and was integrated into the University of Dar es Salaam in 1970. The TUKI's advice would be submitted for approval and implementation to the National Swahili Council (*Baraza la Kiswahili la Taifa – BAKITA*), a political bureau in charge of official language policy (Blommaert, 2013: 47).

The history of post-independence attitudes towards Swahilization and other language planning measures can be divided into five periods (Blommaert, 2001: 52-54):

1. 1961-1967: The pre-Arusha period: English and Swahili coexist. Swahili is ideologically constructed as the language of African nationalism and pride.
2. 1967-1975: The heyday of Swahilization. English and Swahili has become more and more symbolized as antagonistic value complexes. This is the period of "the struggle for Swahili" against English.
3. 1975-1982: The period of confusion. Politics and linguistics set different goals. Nyerere – unlike the goals outlined earlier – did not want Swahili to be an exclusive language. The prestige of English language increased, mainly due to the renewed relationship with donor countries. Swahili was the national language and the medium of instruction in primary education, while English remained

the language of post-primary education. Political decisions effectively prevented further Swahilization; in the meantime, linguistic purism reached its peak with the publication of the *Kamusi ya Kiswahili Sanifu (Standard Swahili Dictionary).*

4. 1982-1986: The period of decline. The government's decision to maintain English as the medium of higher education brings the prospect of Swahilization to an end. Efforts in that direction are stopped.

5. After 1986: The period of relaxation. The introduction of economic liberalization and the abolishment of the one-party state render the old oppositional schemes of English versus Swahili irrelevant, and new sociolinguistic patterns emerge.

Another important East African country is Kenya, where Swahili plays a significant role. Here there are some bigger other local-language communities – e.g., Kikuyu or Luo – who have their own language aspirations. Though after independence Kenya did not pursue a coherent language policy as Tanzania, the spread of Swahili nevertheless took on new impetus once independence was gained. The status of Swahili in Uganda was lower than in the two countries mentioned above, but many people speak it there too (Pawlíková-Vilhanová, 1996).

The collapse of the bipolar system – in addition to many other dimensions – had an impact on the development of Swahili too. Globalization has created a whole new situation. On the one hand, the language of the former colonizers, English – for various practical reasons, such as employment and migration for study purposes – has been revalued.

Summarizing the Swahili language policy, we can say the following:

(a) The language policy aspirations were clearly monolingual: they wanted to build a nation that used one language. So, the question was reduced to an either/or formula: either Swahili would become the language of the country, or English would. This was a monist, monolingual concept in which linguistic and cultural pluralism had little or no place. (Blommaert, 2013: 48)

(b) In debates on the English versus Swahili issue, language varieties were not taken into account. Swahili have had many dialects, but officially the standardized Swahili was the norm, the "true" dialect.

(c) Language planners ascribe the struggle between Swahili and English to the assumption of Swahili being an underdeveloped language (Blommaert, 2013: 55).

(d) Swahili is considered to be a language created by the Arabs, mainly in the context of slave trade, and not regarded as a "pure" Bantu language but rather a foreign, almost colonial language like English.

But these language planners also believed that the users of Swahili would simultaneously become a representative of the socialist ideology, the values and principles of Ujamaa. Swahilization is thus a means of desirable linguistic-national-ideological homogenization. But they could not count on the fact that the coming of globalization would lead to completely new linguistic dynamics. The most spectacular phenomenon was the emergence of two metropolitan language variations: the Sheng

(Swahili-English), which is a mixed language used in the big cities in Kenya, especially in Nairobi; while in Dar es Salaam, in Tanzania, the "*lugha ya mitaani*" or "*the language of the suburbs, of the slums*" are in use. Both language variations are used by people of very similar socio-economic backgrounds: young people of the globalizing world, and consumers, who often use these variations as a kind of "counterculture".

Swahili language planning is paradoxical. Politicians and planners wanted Tanzania to be entirely dominated by Swahili. They also believed that Swahili would at once turn every speaker into a citizen with Ujamaa socialist values. However, in this respect, they have failed, because in the 21st century Swahili has become not only the vehicle for but also the emblem of enthusiastic consumerism and a self-confident expression of the globalized world view. (Blommaert, 2013: 13)

Politicians and linguists also have a number of plans for this new system. Many (e.g., Ojwang, 2008; Kishe, 2003) would like to see the Swahili as a regional and international language of communication. In the long run, the East African Community (EAC) wants to develop the Swahili, which is used by all citizens of the member states. As the Committee on the subject says: "the Commission is charged with the responsibility of ensuring the development of Kiswahili as a lingua franca for regional and international interaction for political, economic, social, cultural, educational, scientific and technical development." (kiswacom.org)

But these language planners also believed that the users of Swahili would simultaneously become a representative of the socialist ideology, the values and principles of Ujamaa. Swahilization is thus a means of desirable linguistic–national–ideological homogenization. But they could not count on the fact that the coming of globalization would lead to completely new linguistic dynamics.

The legislation of the Community has taken several steps in recent years to promote the status planning of the language. In 2016 August, the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) passed a resolution to make Kiswahili an official language of the East African Community alongside English. The East African Kiswahili Commission (EACK), the Community's special board, at the 1st International Conference launched the Commission's Strategic Plan 2017–2022, which was developed in line with the aspirations of the EAC's Vision 2050 and the African Union Agenda 2063 (EAC, 2017).

Thus, the political will for the spread of the language and to follow the codification process has not disappeared. The main question is what its impact is on its material-intellectual resources and on the global world in the dynamics of languages, what Swahili will bring about?

5. Pro and contra

All the languages in Africa have connotative meaning as well: the languages of the former colonizers have high prestige; meanwhile, local languages have low value in the economy. African languages are in an asymmetric relationship: the former colonizers' languages are at the one end of the axis and the local indigenous languages are at the other.

Functionally, the languages of the former colonizers are the most effective in a state. They are mainly used not only in formal contexts but also at workplaces, simultaneously with local languages. The use of these local languages are functionally restricted and are used only in informal contexts (e.g., in family communication, religious practice). Though by the number of their speakers, local languages are "big languages", in a linguistic-political sense, they are minor ones. These languages are spoken by black Africans, who are effectively multilingual, but their multilingualism is based on the inadequate knowledge of these languages.

In the last century, official policy realized the 'divide and rule' approach: black languages were devaluated, and most of the states treated multilingualism as a problem. Today we are witnessing the beginning of a completely different politics.

Current continental aspirations seek to increase democracy and try to improve the situation of Africans. These goals promote mutual tolerance between different cultural, religious, social, and political groups and increase linguistic tolerance, preserve ethnolinguistic diversity, and respect human rights, i.e., human language rights. There are trends which understand that the language of the local inhabitants proves to be a useful investment from the point of view of national interest. Also, the negative attitude towards local languages has been changing which means the promotion of the status and prestige of the local languages in some countries, their standardization, and their norm codification by developing literacy and reading skills in local languages, as well as increasing the number of non-blacks who are learning local, indigenous languages as second languages or would like to learn indigenous languages. But one thing is sure, in order to get into the economic and political life of Africa, Africans are supposed to master the languages of the former "colonizers", too, on a high level.

Language policy can generate effective and successful changes if it is embedded into a national strategy or the larger decision-making process of social policy. Thus, language planning is nothing else but a device for human resource management. It is subordinated to that kind of policies which aim at achieving the national ideals of the state (Webb, 2002). A firm structure and internal-external interests can prevent the change of a previous status or situation. The recognition of linguistic human rights is very important in a multilingual context. The educational, social, and economic dimensions of language policy can reinforce language and cultural competence, which can lead to a higher degree of social justice. Language policy decisions should be based only on the results of sociolinguistic research. ☀

Notes

1 This was the situation in the South African Republic as well, where the symbolic power of the Afrikaans language was polarized after the events of Soweto in 1976: this led to (a) a stronger identification with the language (in the case of the Afrikaner nationalists, for instance); or resulted in (b) the negation of the language – since Afrikaans was closely connected to the Afrikaner regime, which did not mean questioning its important role in the future, but restricting its special status.

2 These are the elements that were formulated by the UNESCO in the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001) as well, and were ratified by the member states of the EU and the UN. The preservation of African cultures and languages also appeared in the EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development (2005) as part of the community's development strategy (see also Fodor, 2006).

3 This language configuration spread across sub-Saharan Africa, North Nigeria (local language, Hausa, English), and Kenya (local language, Swahili, English). This model is also known in other sub-continents like India (vernacular language, Hindi for non-Hindi native speakers, and a major Indian language for native speakers of Hindi, English) (Brann, 1981: 5-8).

Bibliography

- Agenda 2063. (2014). *The Africa we want. Draft Document*. The African Union Commission. www.iri.edu.ar/publicaciones_iri/anuario/anuario_2015/Africa/30-NEPAD.pdf [07.10.2017]
- African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. (1979). Adopted in Nairobi, 1981. https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights [07.10.2017]
- The Asmara Declaration on African Languages and Literatures. (2000). https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/asmara-declaration-african-languages-and-literatures [07.30.2017]
- Blommaert, J. (2001). The Asmara Declaration as a sociolinguistic problem: Reflections on scholarship and linguistic rights. *Journal of Sociolinguistics* **5 (1)**, 131-155.
- Blommaert, J. (2013). State Ideology and Language in Tanzania. *Tilburg Papers in Culture Studies* **80**.
- Brann, C. M. B. (1981). *Trilingualism in language planning for education in Sub-Saharan Africa. Division of structures, content, methods and techniques of education*. UNESCO, Paris.
- Buergenthal, T. (2001). *Nemzetközi emberi jogok*. [International Human Rights] Helikon Kiadó, Budapest.
- Búr, G. (2002). Nemzeti eszmék és folyamatok Afrikában. [National Ideas and Processes in Africa] In: Balogh, A., Rostoványi, Zs., Búr, G. and Anderle, Á. *Nemzet és nacionalizmus*. Korona Kiadó, Budapest, 287-405.
- Cultural Charter for Africa. (1976). https://au.int/en/treaties/cultural-charter-africa [07.09.2018]
- East African Kiswahili Commission. (2018). www.kiswacom.org [07.01.2018]
- East African Community Secretariat. (2017). *EAC Partner States urged to embrace Kiswahili as the Lingua Franca for the region*. https://www.eac.int/press-releases/138-education,-science-technology-news/832-eac-partner-states-urged-to-embrace-kiswahili-as-the-lingua-franca-for-the-region [07.20.2018]
- European Union Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro–African Pact to accelerate Africa's Development. (2005). Brussels. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ro/TXT/?uri=
- CELEX:52005DC0489 [05.02.2017]

- Eyassu, T. (2009). Politikai hatalom és nemzeti identitás Afrika Szarván. [Political Power and National Identity on the Horn of Africa] In: Csizmadia, S. and Tarrósy, I. (Eds). *Afrika ma. Tradíció,* átalakulás*, fejlődés*. [Africa Today. Tradition, Transformation, Development] Publikon Kiadó, Pécs, 139-154.
- Fabian, J. (1991). *Language and Colonial Power: The Appropriation of Swahili in the Former Belgian Congo 1880−1938*. University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Fodor, E. (2006). Kultúra és fejlesztés – az Európai Unió fejlesztéspolitikájában és az új Afrika Stratégiában. [Culture and Development – in the Development Policy of the European Union and in the New Africa Strategy] In: Sebestyén, É., Szombathy, Z. and Tarrósy, I. (Eds). *Harambee*. Publikon Kiadó, Pécs, 134-141.
- Fodor, I. (2007). *A bantu nyelvek*. [The Bantu Languages] L'Harmattan, Budapest.
- Harare Declaration. Intergovernmental Conference of Ministers on Language Policies in Africa. (1997). www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001457/145746e.pdf [05.02.2017]
- de Kadt, E. (1996). Language and Apartheid: The Power and Minorities. *Alternation* **3 (2)**, 184-194.
- Maganda, D. M. and Moshi, L. M. (2014). *The Swahili People and Their Language: A Teaching Handbook*. Adonis & Abbey Publishers, London.
- Mazrui, A. A. and Mazrui, A. M. (2011). *Swahili, State and Society: The Political Economy of an African Language*. James Currey, London.
- Nguni wa, T. (1981). *Decolonizing the Mind: The politics of language in African Literature*. James Currey, London.
- Pawliková-Vilhanová, V. (1996). Swahili and the Dilemma of Ugandan Language Policy. *Asian and African Studies* **5**, 158-170.
- Phillipson, R. (1992). *Linguistic Imperialism*. Oxford University Press, London.
- Skutnabb-Kangas, T. and Phillipson, R. (Eds) (1995). *Linguistic Human Rights, Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination*. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin–New York.
- Skutnabb-Kangas, T. and Phillipson, R. (1996). English only worldwide or language ecology? *TESOL Quarterly* **30**, 429-452.
- Skutnabb-Kangas, T. and Phillipson, R. (1997). Nyelvi jogok és jogsértések. [Language Rights and Violations] *Valóság* **1**, 12-30.
- Stevick, E. V. (1967). The Teaching of African Languages in the United States since 1961. *African Studies Bulletin* **10**, 16-21.
- De Swaan, A. (2004). *A nyelvek társadalma. A globális nyelvrendszer*. [The Society of Languages. The Global Language System] Typotex Kiadó, Budapest.
- Tsuda, Y. (1994). The diffusion of English: Its impact on culture and communication. *Keio Communication Review* **16**, 48-64.
- Tsuda, Y. (2013). The Hegemony of English and Strategies for Linguistic Pluralism: Proposing the Ecology of Language Paradigm. In: Molefi, K. A., Yoshitake, M. and Jing, Y. (Eds): *The Global Intercultural Communication Reader*. Routledge, New York, 445-456.
- Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. (2001). http://portal unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php [02.06.2017]
- Webb, V. (2002). *Language policy development in South Africa*. World Congress on Language Policies. Linguapax Institute, Barcelona.
- Whiteley, W. H. (1969). *Swahili: The Rise of a National Language*. Methuen, London.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Goran Hyden – Ph.D., Distingusihed Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, University of Florida
ghyden@ufl.edu

Dániel Solymári – M.A., Director for International Innovation and Migration, The Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta
solymari.daniel@maltai.hu

Lawalley Cole – Ph.D., Executive Director, Coalition on Media and Education for Development Africa Forum (CAFOR), African Union Commission (AUC)
ColeL@africa-union.org

Judit Bagi – Ph.D. Aspirant, Secretary, Africa Research Centre, University of Pécs
bagiju@gmail.com

Gabriella Hideg – Ph.D., Assitant Professor, Eszterházy Károly University
hideg.gabesz@gmail.com

Meressa Tsehaye Gebrewahd – M.A., Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Strategic Studies, Mekelle University
meressa21t@gmail.com

Szabolcs Pásztor – Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Institute of Economics and International Economics, National University of Public Service
pasztor.szabolcs@uni-nke.hu

Iman Latief – M.A. Student, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Pécs
imanlatief1@gmail.com

Mandisa Gila – M.A. Student, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Pécs
mandisagila@gmail.com

Tamás Balázs – Ph.D. Student, Corvinus University of Budapest
dealan.thomas@gmail.com

Ahmet Murat Yetkin – Ph.D. Student, Doctoral School of Business Administration, University of Pécs
yetkin.murat@pte.hu

Alexander Shipilov – Postgraduate Student, Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences
alexmo1994@gmail.com

Jakub Kościółek – Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Institute of Intercultural Studies, Jagiellonian University
jakub.kosciolek@uj.edu.pl

Jędrzej Czerep – Ph.D., Analyst, Middle East and Africa Programme, Polish Institute of International Affairs
czerep@pism.pl

Erika Gúti – Ph.D., Habil. Associate Professor, Department of Applied Linguistics, University of Pécs
guti.erika@pte.hu

Attila, T. Horváth – Ph.D., Central Library, Budapest University of Technology and Economics
athorvath@omikk.bme.hu

István Tarrósy – Ph.D., Habil. Associate Professor, Director, Africa Research Centre, University of Pécs
tarrosy.istvan@pte.hu

AFRICA RESEARCH CENTRE
UNIVERSITY OF PÉCS

PÉCSI TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM
UNIVERSITY OF PÉCS

AFRICA'S
CHANGING
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND REALITIES

5th Pécs African Studies Conference **MAY 24–26, 2018** PÉCS (HUNGARY), UNESCO GLOBAL LEARNING CITY

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Africa Research Centre of the Department of Political Studies, University of Pécs (HU), in co-operation with Metropolitan State University Denver (USA), also co-sponsored by the Polish African Studies Centre at the University of Wroclaw (PL), the Jagellonian Research Centre for African Studies in Cracow (PL), the Centre of African Studies at the University of West Bohemia (CZ) the Center for West African Studies of UESTC, Chengdu (PRC) will host an international interdisciplinary conference on Africa's changing international relations and realities. The working language will be English.

The conference focuses on discussing Africa's potential place and role in international politics and the inter-connected global economy of the 21st century, as much as how the enhanced dynamics of external actor engagements affect daily realities across the continent. It will offer the ground to present both macro and micro perspectives and to analyze the various interactions among different entities and stakeholders. One of the key questions will be how a confident 'African agency' can determine the most desirable path of development for Africans and what types of partnership African peoples want for their own future.

A special event will close the conference: part of the official program of the rotating presidency of the Visegrad Four held by Hungary in 2017-18, a V4 Political-Scientific Symposium on Africa Policies and African Studies will be organized in collaboration with the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

PROPOSED PANELS

I.   **History** (colonialism, imperialism revisited, decolonization, military conflicts and their aftermath, new imperialism, second scramble for Africa)
II.   **Politics** (civil wars, nation-building and ethnic cleansing, fragile states, African ownership, African Union, decentralization, regionalization, role of INOs, GOs, NGOs, security issues, political culture, Africa in world politics, women in politics)
III. **Economics** (development plans and failures, old and new venture forms, strategic resources, raw materials and value-added production, old and new investors, FDI, ITC, from zero sum to win-win, impact of the global crises, emerging economies in Africa)
IV.   **Sociology** (interethnic co-operation, impact of education, illiteracy, new elites–old poverty, reconciliation, demobilization, child soldiers)
V.   **Humanitarian aid and voluntary action** (role of INOs, GOs, NGOs, assessment)
VI.   **Anthropology** (social- and cultural anthropology, new and old folklore, tradition and tourism)
VII. **Medicine** (evolution of tropical medicine, AIDS prevention, virology, epidemiology, threats, prevention, health migration issues)
VIII. **Diaspora** (global African migrations, refugees, diasporas and development, diaspora involvement and foreign policy, diasporas and peacemaking)

International Spring

2019

North America Days
1-5 April

Africa Days
15-18 April

Ibero American Days
6-10 May

International Evening
9 March

Asia Days
11-14 March

Europe Days
18-22 March

Pécsi Tudományegyetem
UNIVERSITY OF PÉCS