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**Historical geographical development of Kosovo from the beginning until
the formation of the independent state**

PhD Theses

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Topic selection and goals

The major motivating factor for selecting our topic was the development of the situation of Kosovo and its effect on Hungary. When we decided to research Kosovo it was not yet clear what the duration and solution of the crises will be and what consequences it will have. Although by today the international legal status of Kosovo has been resolved but at the same time its consequences are just starting to evolve. These consequences affect both the future of Serbia, the possibilities of the Serb Hungarians (Voivodina), but the stability of the whole Western Balkan (and so the expansion of the European Union, the common foreign and security policy matters, its operational possibilities, minority protections systems, etc.) and indirectly the whole post cold war international legal system as well (UN, NATO, international autonomy vs. integrity of borders, creating precedence or not).

For Serbia, the fundamental dilemma of the resolution of Kosovo is whether it can join such international organizations which actively take part in the “mutilation” of the state. The question is which direction shall the Kosovo events lure the Serb State into; will Brussels or Moscow be point of orientation in the future? As a result of the prevailing Serbian internal political situation and the international power relations from time to time the probability of one or the other shall change. The shrinking of state territory and the size of population may be further sources of problems in Serbia, namely its relative weight and prestige will decrease in the region, due to social frustration the tolerance towards minorities (Hungarians, Bosnians, Albanian, Slovaks, etc.) left back in its territory will decrease. At the same time with Kosovo the number of Serbian refugees in the remaining state territory and over the borders had increased, of whom the state has to take care of.

For the Serbian Hungarians the big question is that what possibilities will the new situation bring for their intentions of autonomy. Will the independence of Kosovo make their possibilities better or worse? We believe that Hungary on the decision making level had still not realized that in our direct neighborhood, in Serbia and Kosovo such status problems, like Voivodina, Sandzhak, Prsevo, Mitrovica are to be solved, which determine the stability of the region and the Hungarian-Serbian relation, and may even dramatically affect the future of the Hungarians in Voivodina.

Most expect the solution to be found by the EU; at the same time the organization has not been able to prove its full capability to solve the problem. Furthermore, in many older member states of the European Union people do not understand, do not “sense” this region. What is even more important: unfortunately they are not acquainted with the matters of minority. For this, it would be important to get an initiative role to solve the status issues and other issues as well (which are not only applicable to Serbia and Kosovo, but the entire Western Balkan region), since perhaps our security is affected the most by the situation in this region.

The European Union does not have a minority protection system; the minority protection is not part of the *acquis communautaire*. There is no indication of “national minority” in any official, legally binding document. There are directives prohibiting discrimination, but this is not sufficient. The Union does not have a functioning minority protection system and it does not have standards and norms. Until admission, the Union has some controlling role which is manifested mainly in the annual reports.

We believe that in the present situation Hungary may play such an important mediating role in the relation of South Eastern Europe and the Balkans as did Austria with respect to Central Europe. Naturally we should get prepared for this role in every respect and we should communicate our readiness. Perhaps with our research we may add a little to this activity.

The problem of Kosovo in the beginning of the 21st Century has proven again the international law and diplomacy is the pawn of the world power interests. Beside independence, at least as many arguments looking objective can be brought for it against it. The occurrence of one or the other solutions, before all, was the result of the world power games. For a bystander, the solution of the Serbian-Albanian conflict may seem to be a real ethnic tension and an American-Russian-European competition at the same time. One thing that is sure is that no matter how hard we emphasize the opposite, Kosovo indeed creates precedence. It establishes the possibility of the declaration of a one-sided independence with world-power support. A presumable impressive geopolitical event of Europe after the Second World War is the declaration and recognition of the independent Kosovo but we do not realize its all-embracing consequences.

For us Hungarians, since we are neighboring the region and thus are indirectly affected by the conflict, it is necessary to know, reveal and manage the problems as well as possible. Merely for the good-neighbour relation it is necessary for Hungary to understand the problems of Serbia, but at the same time the situation of Kosovo becoming sovereign and the situation of Kosovo Serbs may even create a favorable situation for the trans-border Hungarians.

- The initial goal of our work is to analyze the genesis and evolution of the Kosovo issue with the intention to draw an objective picture of the nature, actors, and alternatives of the conflict and of the course of the geographical evolution of the region until the establishment of the sovereign Kosovo.
- The second goal is to – although it seems that the international community has decided to recognize the independence – review and analyze the not always trouble free array of events leading to attaining independence.
- Our third goal is to determine what potential challenges the new sovereign state will have to face in the near future.

Applied methods

In the course of the research reviewing the previous literature was apparent. This forms the basis of our research which is made complete by the primer source-processing of the reports and analysis of different international civilian and military organizations operating in Kosovo. Among the primer sources the archive-researches must be mentioned, in our case meaning that the examination of such original maps has contributed to the detailed cognition of the historical development of the region.

Since there has not been official census in the region since 1981 the data at our disposal is relatively deficient and questionable. In spite of this, we try to underline our arguments and conclusions beside the highest possible control also by analyzing statistical data. Principally, the census of 1981 as considered being the last Yugoslavian census with respect to Kosovo, and the census of 1991 as the last Yugoslavian census, which however, due to the boycott of Kosovo Albanians includes only estimates of the province; and the

estimates of the international organizations (first of all the OESC and UN) and the Kosovo Statistic Office represent the sources to be processed.

The historical and political geographical processes chosen for the subject of the analysis happen in front of us nowadays and substantially exceed the “stimulus-threshold” of international political journalism, thus – as a result – we often refer to the daily domestic and international reports as well.

Finally, the last group of our methods constitutes of the field research indispensable for geographical surveys, which contribute to a better understanding of the place and circumstances, to the verification of our statements made in our theory and to the control of the validity of the context.

Delimitation of the area

With respect to the Kosovo conflict naturally we first deal with Kosovo, Europe’s youngest state, the former autonom Yugoslavian province. The examination of the area surrounded by the present political borders could be evident, but at the same time the historical frames, the living territories of Albanians comprising the majority population of Kosovo and the decades spent in different political entities (Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia, Great-Albania, Serbia) make the choice and use of a wider research region necessary.

Kosovo and the Kosovo conflict forms an integral part of the sometimes more violent, sometimes milder Balkan conflicts having begun in the 19th Century, so the smallest area of our topic has to be the Balkan Peninsula. With respect to our topic the largest European peninsula expanding into the Mediterranean Sea has several unique features.

One of the greatest adventures of the region is the sea, the distance from the sea and the relation to the sea. This feature affects certain Balkan regions differently. The sea means and had always meant the easiest and simplest way of communication with the outside world, which in certain cases meant the accessibility of the European central region, the possibilities of modernization, innovation, in other words development. For the costal territories this

represented advantage in economical and social development, at the same time was attendant with cosmopolitanism and the coercion of external powers.

These opportunities for modernization were limited for those regions lying absolute or relatively far from the sea. Although there are several overland routes in the Peninsula, the volume and - by this - the effect of the flow of information and goods fall far behind the effects of that transmitted by the sea. Furthermore, due to the natural geographical aptitudes, these land communication channels are strongly determined in most periods of history.

The mountains represent the other important natural aptitude. The peninsula has the highest average altitude in Europe, at the same time it does not exceed 3000 meters anywhere. The multitudinous, stiff climbing humps which are rarely intermitted by river-dales and basins suitable for settlement and transport are the most characteristic aptitudes of the peninsula. The relief meant at the same time the limitation of communication and transport, the determination of settled living's spatial expansion and influencing spatial structures' formation which are characteristics for the Balkans. Besides limiting transport and settlement, the highlands provided security and protection against the occasionally appearing conquerors, thus the highlander semi-nomad pastoral-societies (which existed until the 19th Century) were able to preserve their identity, national, linguistic and cultural detachedness.

The fact that a unified empire, world power from the Balkan center could not evolve, can be accounted to the extremely intended relief. The extremely intended surface favoured the establishment of separate power centers, which was heightened by the fact that the peninsula's mountains are the most multitudinous and highest in the central regions, the rivers flow from here in radial direction outwards, which oriented the settled nations and the states founded by them from the centers to the peripheries. (T. Mendöl 1948).

This central territory is right near the Kosovo region, where - due to the mentioned natural geographical reasons - the interests of certain Balkan ethnic groups collide, and ethnic contact zones, regions of contentious affiliation, delayed in becoming a nation, ethnic groups of questioned status evolve. A form of manifestation for example of this is the Macedonian issue, or nowadays Albanian issue in which one of the problems is Kosovo.

A smaller slice within our Balkan Peninsula category is the newly evolving political geographical category, the West Balkan evolving in the 90's, in the territory of the disbanding Yugoslavia. The West Balkan, as a territory-category, is used by the EU bureaucrats and diplomats, so separating the remaining part of the peninsula getting the adjectives of a problematic, instable area on the remaining South Slavic Stage, posing security risk. The former Yugoslavia without Slovenia and Albania belong to this circle. Opposite is the East Balkan as a category. Its members (Romania and Bulgaria) face serious economical and social problems but do not represent security and military tension sources (N. Pap – P. Reményi 2007).

The West Balkan is primarily a political category and with the regional progression of the Euro-Atlantic integration we can gradually count with its loss of importance. At the same time, the political and military processes of the years of the 1990s and the 2000s are closely connected to this artificial political category.



1. Illustration: The countries of the West Balkan: G. Kovács

The former autonom Kosovo province, Europe's youngest state lays in the internal highland area of the Balkan Peninsula. Its territory is 10,887 square kilometers, and with what it belongs to the small-area states. In geological perspective it lays on a stirring area, on the

borders of the Dinarics and the Trak-Macedon masszif, the majority of its territory consists of the ofiolit belt and the Vardar-zone. That leads to the relatively large basins (Kosovo Polje, Metohija), which are separated by 500-1000 meter high central-chain mountain-like areas. Further consequence of the geological structure is its richness in minerals (metals, coal) which has been utilized by the population since ancient times.



2. Illustration: Koszovo

Source: Perry Castaneda <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/Kosovo.html>

Downloaded: 03.08.2009

Results

- A from time to time appearing and reproducing peculiarity of Kosovo in the empire transforming space of the Balkan is the frontier characteristic.

As a result of our research we could state that from the beginning until today the frontier character of the examined region is a regularly recurring feature in the history of Kosovo. This character is a multi-dimensional feature, since it is to be understood not only in an ethnic sense, but also as an empiric or state frontier character. Looking at the history of Kosovo from the age of antiquities until today, the frontier character can be seen as a regularly recurring element, of which an important dimension is its ethnic character. This feature can be observed from the beginning from ancient times, since the region fell in the illir and trak collision area, contact zone. The population of the region, the dardans forming a mixed population - who by the majority of the scientists are considered to be the ethnic basic component of Albanians - retreated back into the mountains in the 7th Century as less romanised Illir-Trak konglomerate fleeing from the Slavs arriving in large numbers. Historically measured, the Albanian infiltration into the Slavic-turning region began within a short time and speeded up from the end of the 17th Century. This resulted in the strengthening of the previously existing frontier character. The Slavic-Albanian relation is different from the former Illir and Trak relation. Beside the fact that – although on a smaller scale – one can observe the assimilation affecting each other, basically we can see the expansion of nations having different cultures and languages to the detriment of each other. As a certain waving motion, depending on the balance of power, the region's dominant element is either Slavic or Albanian. Presently, the Albanian immigration and the large number of natural reproduction, the expansion of Albanian habitation and the Serb transmigration is endangering the eroding and subsistence of the ethnic contact zone existing from the beginning of the 21st Century until today.

Another dimension of the frontier character is the periodically appearing empirical or state frontier feature. At the end of the 11th Century Kosovo had become a frontier territory of Byzantium with the expansion of Raška and by the beginning of the 13th Century it had integrated into the Serb state. At the same time, the frontier character existed until the first half of the 14th Century, but this time as part of Raška with relation to the Byzant Empire.

During the expansion of the Turks from the second half of the 14th Century Kosovo again had become a frontier territory. This status remained until the mid 15th Century, 1455, when for a longer period the Ottoman Empire fitted it into its own – several times changing – structure.

- **The situation of the Kosovo Serb minority and its solution has great impact on the relation of the Hungarians in Voivodina. First, the declension of the Kosovo Serbs' situation may inspire the Serbs migrated to Voivodina to take revenge on Hungarians and second, in case of a malevolent outcome the exodus of the Serbs shall not avoid Voivodina. Third, it is due to the precedence feature of the settlement, which could even be considered as a positive development,**

the number of incidents against nationalities living in Voivodina had increased since March 2004. Merely the Hungarian organizations of Voivodina have registered nearly 300 anti-Hungarian atrocities – and this number is increased by attacks against other nationalities – between March and September 2004 in the North Serbian province. The seriousness of the situation is well represented by the fact that previously so many anti-Hungarian atrocities have not been registered in even a decade in Voivodina.

As we know, in the 90s the fragile ethnic balance of Voivodina – created after the relocation of Germans in Tito's times - broke up. Following the South Slavic wars more that 300 thousand Serbs (S. Kicosev – K. Kocsis 1998) refugees arrived to the province, mainly from Croatia and Bosnia (according to certain estimates their number is at least 500 thousand), then in 1999 a part of the Serbs who had fled from Kosovo settled down in Voivodina.

The former peaceful coexistence of the people living in Voivodina was for the new Serb settlers unknown, as also the economical and cultural independence of the autonom province. Among the perpetrators the number of Serbs who had “immigrated” in the 90s was strikingly high. The Serb refugees took revenge on the minorities living in Voivodina for the indignity they had to suffer from the majority ethnic group in their homeland. For them Voivodina was no different from other territories of the Balkans, Bosnia or Kosovo. The Serb refugees who had arrived in the 90s are still citizens of the province living in the worst circumstance. The majority of them are unemployed, their living is totally insecure and the local authorities keep threatening to tear down their houses they had built without licenses.

The bitterness of the pursued Serbs and their anger spring into violence and the minorities living in the territory of Voivodina always provide a perfect target for these emotions. This had happened in March 2004 when - due to the outcry caused by the atrocities against and the massacres in Kosovo – the Voivodina Serb demonstrators had started to break and crash everything in the areas inhabited by Hungarians and other nationalities and had attacked institutions of minorities as well. Most experts did not pay attention to the fact that the number of violent events in Voivodina usually increased when atrocities happened against Serbs living there. In other words, when the atmosphere turns hot due to the events in Kosovo the ethnic violence increases in Voivodina.

Furthermore, a big issue is what kind of solution can be found for the protection of the Kosovo Serbs who are now in minority. As we have unfolded this in our thesis, the Serbs of the Mitrovica region are not willing to voluntarily subject themselves to Kosovo Albanian power. The homeland provides substantial support for this and the international organizations represented in the region are not able to abolish this situation. So some kind of compromise must be found since the modification of the frontiers is unacceptable for the majority (Albanians, international organizations, third countries).

Organizations (NATO, OSCE, EU, UN) and states having a significant role in achieving peace and independence of Kosovo at the same time consequently call for the protection of minority rights, thus – after a slow consolidation – some kind of a minority protection system will have to be established. If this contains broader and more insured rights than the present situation of Voivodina then this can be used as a reference base for improving the situation of the Hungarian minority as well.

- **The maximal support for the democratic Serbia in achieving its integration efforts is an eminent interest of the Hungarian diplomacy. This arises on the one hand from the neighbouring-policy, on the other hand from the responsibility for the Hungarian minority in Voivodina.**

The Serb side has been facing a series of frustration beginning from the early 90s. By this we mean that by losing the leading position of a state-alliance having a military extremely strong, politically relatively significant influence, nowadays “de facto” losing one of their autonom provinces as well, they have turned out to be the inhabitants of a much smaller

country of the Balkans. At the same time they had to experience that European leading powers (Great-Britain, France), who used to support the Serbian efforts, turned away from them. In addition, such new or “old-new” participants had appeared (USA, Germany) more dynamically in the political arena of South East Europe which had supported ideas, streams against the mentioned endeavors. As a result one could fear – and the danger still exists today – that Serbia, going against the European integration, might orient towards Russia, representing - as a result of the probable rejuvenation of Russia – a significant security policy concern as well.

The present Serb-Hungarian border is the South Eastern border of the military, economical and political block embracing Hungary. It is an elemental interest of the Hungarian side – putting aside and abstracting from the historical offenses – to have the present situation change and thus Serbia become a part of the same blocks, systems as Hungary. Belonging to the same block assumes that the major principles of Hungary and Serbia will be more or less similar (including the minority-policy as well) and in case of a Union membership, as neighbouring, smaller European countries, it will be our common interest to cooperate with each other and with other states in similar positions. This can strengthen the European position of each participant in Europe and, based on regular negotiations and personal contacts established via negotiations, may facilitate the solving of the already existing or just emerging problems between each other. The European integration of Serbia will entail the etherealizing of borders, our Southern Schengen border will cease to exist, which obviously will make contact with the homeland for minorities – although in Serbia in larger numbers – on both sides easier.

Overall, the shock caused by the loss of territory and power may somewhat ease with the integration of Serbia and with putting her on a prosperous path. Hungary may play an important role in this, because we know this region well and as a state we have accumulated a great capital of knowledge regarding integration issues. For Hungary, the dissolution of Serbia’s isolation and her reattachment to the European circulation would be important to improve the bilateral economical-political relations and the situation of the Hungarian minority, as well as for security policy dimensions.

One of the greatest challenges for Kosovo is to handle the demographic situation. Until the province was under Serb rulership, the so called demographic weapon served the

Albanian interests. The natural reproduction well exceeding the Serbian one was the token for the success of the Albanian issue on the long term. At the same time, this generates a rapidly growing population of a remarkably young age structure, for whom the economy and state sectors cannot provide enough employment-possibilities.

The demographic tension source consists of two larger elements. One is the rapidly growing population and the other is the ethnic tensions having caused an internal, hard to permeate boundary. Both problems are serious and difficult to handle. The latter threatens to split the state but at least projects the picture of a decentralized division similar to Bosnia-Herzegovina which, upon this example does not imply the formation of an effective state. The ethnic-based conflict will poison the relationship between Kosovo communities and will probably make international presence necessary for a long time.

We wish to point out also a very important aspect of the demographic processes. A big challenge for the European Union with a continuously ageing society in connection with maintaining and increasing the economical level is to supply for a population capable of playing an active role in production. A considerable part of this population originates from the continents of Africa and Asia. Consequently, a significant segment of the inflowing labor-force bears cultural and religious traditions different from the European one, resulting in a low level of assimilation and alignment to the written and unwritten rules of the majority of the society of migrants, and their descendants. We think that a good solution would be to make greater efforts to have this population from migration originating from European areas producing demographic surplus. Among others, the territory inhabited by Kosovo Albanians belongs to this area. We think that in spite the long Ottoman power and Asian influence, their culture is part of the universal European culture. And that is why facilitating their inflow is on the long term in the vital interest of the more developed part of Europe because the emergence and the escalation of tension between the autochthonous society and the Albanian migrant communities with partially archaic cultural signs has probably less chances on the long term as between arrivals from other continents and locals.

The realization of this mentioned process would contribute to the deduction of the demographic surplus and to the decreasment of local tension. Naturally, we believe that establishing a viable Kosovo meeting European criterias is necessary beside forcing back

Albanian organized crime encompassing Europe, which would obviously allow the elimination of the visa liability of Kosovo citizens.

The mentioned economical development is inevitable since if it does not keep up with the large population growth then the result of the process may be a gradually criminalizing society in which radical social and political formations could win more space. For the Kosovo Albanians independence was the most important within their individual and common aims, reaching it would be practically fulfilling their dreams. At the same time, the Kosovo elite has very little experience in governing a sovereign state and in solving everyday problems and tensions. Should they not be able to generate growth within the economy of Kosovo and thus increase employment in a short time (even with aid or credit), then radicalization will be inevitable. Together with similar Macedonian, Albanian and perhaps Serbian and Montenegrin processes this may “open new perspectives” in the history of the Balkan conflicts.

- **A characteristic of the regional political geographical situation of Kosovo is that it has a sensitive relation with all neighbours.**

Montenegro

The best word for characterizing the relationship between the two youngest states of Europe is pragmatic. Although differently, but still, both became independent from the remaining Yugoslavia among the last ones. Their newly won independence bear identical interests in many aspects so the conditions for their cooperation are principally given. This is deteriorated by the fact that the relation of Montenegro to Serbia and the Serbian people is considerably different than that of the Kosovo Albanians. If we consider the Serb-Albanian relation to be the most neuralgic within the second Yugoslav state then we can consider the Serb-Montenegrin to be the most balanced. Interestingly, the relation of the two young states is determined by their individual relation with a third state.

Their common state borders are composed of high-mountain chains, so it is a close, difficult- to-cross border. Only two roads cross it meeting in the city of Peć. A significant number of Albanians live on the Montenegrin side of the border yet this has not caused serious ethnic conflicts. Moreover, the Albanian population – naturally not against its own interests – was a consequent supporter of the Montenegrin independence. If Montenegro

would have not enjoyed their support, the initiative would probably have failed on the referendum.

Albania

The Kosovo-Albanian relation and the connection of the two states is determined by the fact that the majority population of both is Albanian. Either the two states remain to exist or not, it is sure that the Kosovo-Albanian relations will commence in an exceptional development. We must see that based on political geographical logic the development of the relationship with Albania and the necessary infrastructure is an essential interest of Kosovo. This results in a change of orientation in Kosovo, the former compulsory Northern (Yugoslav) alignment is taken over by a Western (Albanian).

A neuralgic point of Kosovo's and Albania's relationship is the issue of union. Disregarding now the international consequences (see later) let us examine what effects it would have on the two concerned states. First of all, where would the new center/capital of the new state be? Which elite would be the leading group of the new state? The answers are not clear since Albania has older state traditions but Kosovo – in spite of the destructions of the last decades – has a more developed economy and infrastructure. The qualification, experience and property situation of the Albanian and Kosovo population favors the latter again. The reason of this is in the possibility of an easier border-crossing since as a Yugoslavian citizen the Kosovo Albanians could work in the West, could study in the Yugoslavian education system while during this time their Albanian compatriots were the citizens of a closed Stalinist system.

Other sensitive questions will need to be answered if the union will not be formed even on the long term. Which state will represent the Albanians in the international arena and why that one? Serious arguments can be expected again among the elite of the political, economical, scientific fields governing the two states, that can easily force them into a dubious competition (who is more Albanian?) for winning the title of the defender of the Albanians living in a third country (Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro).


Macedonia

The most important and most critical indicator of the “barometer” of the Kosovo-Macedon relation is the Albanian nationality living in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia and their actual and expectable behavior and endeavors.

The first census of the independent Macedonia established in 1991 was held in the year of becoming independent but in 1994 the authorities had to repeat it since the Albanian population rejected to accept its results. According to the repeated census the population of the country in 1994 was overall 1,945 million, of which 1,295 million declared themselves to be Macedonian and 441 thousand to be Albanian nationals. By the last census in 2002 the population has increased to 2,02 million. From this the number of Macedonians – interesting us the most – remained at the same level, 1,297 million (66,6 percent) while the Albanian nationals show an intensive increase, raising to 509 thousand (25,17 percent).

The Albanian-Albanian relationship with Kosovo and Albania is facilitated by the fact that the majority counties of the Macedon-Albanians are in the North, North West part of the state adjacent to Kosovo and Albania. According to this the Albanians’ area of habitation can be considered to be the continuation of the Kosovo and Albanian area causing the internal Albanian-Macedonian dividedness and conflict – similar to the Kosovo Serb-Albanian dividedness, although different in its proportion – to be present beside the external Albanian relations.

Hence, the result of the early migration from Kosovo to Macedonia and that in the late 20th Century and early 21st Century manifests in family and partially interwoven, economical relations that practically cause the etherealizing of the borders within the Albanian collective conscience combined with some kind of a conscience of togetherness and ethnic perpetuity. It is no coincidence that beginning from 1999 the supreme Macedonian leadership supported Serbia for a long time and totally rejected the independence of Kosovo, fearing that this would serve as a precedence that would overthrow the peaceful internal Macedonian relations. They thought that with the Albanian aspirations – for the first time since the Second World War – the creation of Great-Albania may again come to an attainable proximity.



3. *Illustration The ratio of ethnic Albanians in the općina-s of Macedonia based on the census of 2002. Source: A. Végh (2006)*

The Macedonian-Albanian conflict of 2001, which many think was an operation directed from Kosovo, further oppressed the Macedonian-Kosovo relations. This conflict was settled through external pressure by the so called Obrid Agreement which forms the basis for coexistence even today. The source of the long term, so called strategic tension stems far deeper. The continuous demographic expansion of the Albanian population in a country with such a small population can be catastrophic on the short term as well. We have to look for the major irreconcilable conflict in the tension between the increasing Albanian and decreasing Macedonian population.

Beside the expectable short and mid-term strengthening of relations, taking the tendencies experienced so far into consideration, on the long term we have to count with an increasing number of ethnic Albanians and their stronger political activities in the region. It is a question, when this growth disturbs the sensitive Macedonian balance layed down in the Agreement, and what answers does the Macedonian population and leadership of Macedonia have for the expansion of the Albanian living sphere. Simplifying it, there can be two

answers. According to the first, the Macedonian population of Macedonia will not resist the Albanian territorial conquest and practically by having the Albanians reach majority, Macedonia will become a state with Albanian leadership and majority. The only other possibility is resistance individually or in an alliance, that has the danger of a civil war or the possibility of changing the borders.

- **On the short and mid-term the independence of Kosovo assumes the simultaneous existence of two Albanian states which holds the possibility of the creation of Great Albania**

During the negotiations, the creation of Great Albania on the short term had no and practically has no realistic chances. At the same time, it was no coincidence that this option came to the minds of the observers: Kosovo's accessing to Albania after achieving independence, thus establishing Great Albania and correcting the mistakes made when establishing the Albanian state in 1913. This possibility does not even have supporters among the Albanians today, and the international community and the Serbs are totally against it. At the same time, on the long term we cannot imagine anything else than the union of Albanian territories. The same nationality living in several states is mainly temporary, created and kept up by external powers (German Federal Republic, German Democratic Republic, North and South Korea) With the disappearance and weakening of the external powers the two states usually unite. We expect the same to happen on the long term in the case of the Albanians as well. All this, complemented with the dynamic increase of population might make them the largest Balkan nation within decades. Until then the economical, ethnographical, idiomatical, identity differences and the disparity of the political and economic elite leading the two communities of the Kosovo and Albanian Albanians are even more significant.

- **Kosovo's economy at present is maintained by international aids but the resources necessary for self-sufficient development are given. The condition for utilizing these resources depends on the elucidation of the international legal status, the reduction of security risks and the drastic augmentation of the operational effectiveness of the state.**

The situation of the economy is in second-third place of the Kosovo problem-group following the issues of statehood and ethnic matters. The state practically has favorable

natural resources to develop the economy (metal, coal, hydropower, soil) but the utilization currently is very unefficient.

Nowadays the economy shows both a post-socialist and post-war picture (E. Vadas 2007). Privatization, the reorganization of state companies have just begun, still the small and mid ventures have been operating for a relatively long time in Kosovo, the latest modest economical increase is their merit. In spite of this, the GDP per person merely reaches 1,100 Euro, unemployment is still near 47 percent, poverty is outstanding. Furthermore, the economy of the country largely depends on the international aids as well (mainly US and EU), which from year to year show a decreasing tendency. Opposite to this, the remittances of Kosovo citizens working abroad represent the same volume in the budget, but compared to the aids the amount of remittance is annually showing an increasing tendency. The big question is what effect the economical crises shattering the developed world will have on the aids and on the remittances of those working abroad. If, like the direct investments, these show dramatic decrease as well, then the Kosovo government will very soon have to cope with a really severe crises.

	2004	2005	2006	2007
GDP (EUR, Million)	2271	2207	2273	2378
GDP/person (EUR)	1156	1105	1118	1150
GDP increase (%)	2,0	-1,0	3,1	3,5
Remittances of employees abroad (EUR, Million)	219	273	352	398
Inflation (%)	-1,4	-1,4	1,5	2,0
Budget balance (in GDP percentage)	-6,1	-3,2	3,6	6,5
NET FDI (EUR, Million)	20	59	222	n.d
Export (EUR,, Million)	79	71	111	147
Import (EUR, Million)	1023	1093	1306	1576
Foreign aid (in GDP percentage)	14,8	16,6	14,6	14,2
Balance of payment (in GDP percentage)	-32,7	-34,8	-34,6	-38,2
Unemployment (%)	39,7	41,4	n.d.	n.d.

Table 1: Selected economic indexes of Kosovo Source: E. Vadas 2007.

The greatest assistant for reforming the economy and making it more effective could be the increasing foreign investments. Both privatization and greenfield investments could significantly improve the status of the economy. But for this there is no realistic chance until the legal system of the new state becomes solid, corruption infiltrating every field does not decrease and the legal and business environment does not improve considerably. Another problem curbing privatization is the dispute on splitting up property which is concomitant to the process of becoming independent.

Summary of the results

A from time to time appearing and reproducing peculiarity of Kosovo in the empire-transforming space of the Balkan is the frontier characteristic.

The independence of Kosovo assumes on the short and middle term the co-existence of the two Albanian states, which make the formation of a Great-Albania on the long term probable.

The situation of the Kosovo Serb minority and its settling has a great effect on the relations of the Voivodina Hungarians. First, because of the precedent-characteristic of the settling, second the depravation of the situation of the Kosovo Serbs could encourage the Serbs who have migrated to the Voivodina area to take revenge on the Hungarians. Third, in the case of an outcome not favourable for the Serbs the exodus of the Serbs will not avoid the Voivodina area.

It is the eminent interest of the Hungarian diplomacy to give maximal support to the democratic Serbia to reach their integration goals. This arises on the one hand from the neighbour-politics, on the other hand from the responsibility towards the Hungarians living in the Voivodina area.

The economy of Kosovo is sustained currently by international aids, the necessary sources for an independent development are given, but the conditions for its exploitation are the clarification of the international legal situation, reducing security risks, and the dinamic growth of the effectivity of the functioning of the state.

The possibilities of utilizing the results and further possible directions of research

We can determine several possible fields of the practical utilization of our results. One is the elaboration of political and security-policy decisions. The territorial political geographical researches represent an important starting point of the political and diplomatic resolutions.

Another field of utilization can be the elaboration of the economical decisions of companies wishing to invest and trade in the region. Similarly to the political and diplomatic decisions, the economical decisions do not lack the well grounded information as well as the possible reveal of the processes and characteristics of the concerned region.

A third field for utilization is more academic, namely the results of the research can serve as a basis for further researches and study-aid in higher education.

We may say that further directions of our studies are self-evident. We faced difficulties during our research, since we chose a topic which is not an “ended” one. Its course of proceedings is happening in front of our eyes, so on the one hand there is the danger that time and future developments might overwrite our conclusions, on the other hand pursuing the status of Kosovo, the changes of its social, economical, political and geopolitical state of affairs will provide ammunition for researchers dealing with this topic for a long time.

Publications

I. Publications associated with the topic of the thesis

1. **F. Kovácsics**: Security situation in the Balkan – especially in Kosovo. Tradecraft Review (under publication) p.10
2. **F. Kovácsics** 2007. Specific areas of security-policy, peace supporting operations. Tradecraft Review Special Issue, pp. 5-11.
3. **F. Kovácsics** 2006. Characterization of the operational situation of the Ministry of Defense and the Hungarian Army. Emphasis and priorities. MDO Tradecraft Review “Top Secret” Special Issue of 2006. pp. 10-14.
4. **F. Kovácsics** 2006. International peace building and peace maintaining operations – new challenges (terrorism, organized crime). In: Conference on peace supporting operations. CD edition, p.10
5. I. Kobolka – **F. Kovácsics** 2004. Security geographic issues. In. F. Kovács (edit.): 8th National Conference of Geographic Doctorates. Scientific University of Szeged, Natural Science Faculty, Natural and Geographic Department, Szeged, CD edition.
6. **F. Kovácsics** 2004. Old-new security political challenges in the light of the European Union accession. New Army Tradecraft, Budapest, pp. 2-8.
7. **F. Kovácsics** 2004: The new issues of security in the Hungarian-Yugoslavian relation. In. P. Reményi (edit.): The political geography of the integrating Europe. PTE TTK FI Center of East-Mediterranean and Balkan studies, Pécs, pp. 41-46.
8. **F. Kovácsics**:2004. The old-new security challenges resulting from the European Union accession. MDO professional Scientific Bulletin, pp. 7-13
9. J. Izsa – **F. Kovácsics** 2002: From the history of the Hungarian military security. In: I. Horváth – J. Kiss (edit.): Sword and Pen. Selections from the studies of war-studies doctorates. ZMNE, Budapest, 2nd edition, pp. 163-170.
10. **F. Kovácsics** 2002: The Hungarian-Yugoslavian relations from the late 20th Century until today. In: Szónokyné Ancsin G. (edit.): Borders and the European Union. SZTE TTK Economical and Social Studies Department, Szeged, pp. 385-395.

II. Presentations associated with the thesis

1. **F. Kovácsics**: Security geographic changes. GEO 2004. Szeged, Aug 28 – Sept 12.
2. **F. Kovácsics**: Briefing on the research activity of the Hungarian Military Security Office. Hungarian Rectors' Conference, May 27, 2002.

III. Other Publications

1. **F. Kovácsics** 1999. Ideas of the processing work. MDO Tradecraft Review, 1999/3 “S” pp. 5-7.
2. **F. Kovácsics** – F. Kuti 1998: National security. In: Ledács Kis J. (edit.): Manual of subunit commanders. Hungarian MDO, Budapest, pp. 203-220.
3. M. Bagdi – **F. Kovácsics** – M. Szabóné dr. Gál 2002: Criterias of the directing system of the Hungarian Military Security Office. Professional curriculum II. MDO, Budapest, 55 p.