Contributions to the Philosophy

of Linguistic Minorities in Hungary and Canada

from the middle of the 19th to the end of the 20th century

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Abstract

This paper is an examination of the philosophies relating to linguistic minorities, most specifically in Canada and Hungary from the mid 19th to the end of the 20th century. I review some relevant philosophers and their work as it might relate to linguistic minorities, and follow with a more detailed examination of Canadian and Hungarian thinkers. I also reviewed recent research and discoveries by neuroscientists about the operation and responses of the human brain, especially as they relate to fear, reason and the electronic media, and the effect this has on relationships between minorities and majorities. New evidence from environmental and space science points to all life being totally interdependent and this will also lead to a change regarding our view of minorities. My method is a review of relevant literature as well as personal observations based on a lifetime of experience. My purpose is not just to understand, but to suggest how we might change our philosophy about linguistic minorities. In this study there are some important questions we want ask and try to answer. What are the characteristics of linguistic minorities? How multi-layered, how multi-dimensional is the concept of linguistic minority? What is the difference between linguistic and cultural identity? What is the value for the linguistic majority of the presence of the linguistic minority and why should the minority be protected? If we lose language, do we also lose irreplaceable cultural treasures. With globalization and increased mobility, the probability of becoming a member of a linguistic minority increases. I conclude that increasingly linguistic and cultural identities and loyalties can be chosen, can be multiple and can change throughout a lifetime. Just treatment of linguistic minorities is not only beneficial for both the majority and the minority, but essential because it contributes to peace. This is attainable because the main force of evolution and progress is not competition but cooperation.

Contents

Hungarian Table of Content. Tartalomjegyzék.

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I

Introduction

Why is the study of the rights of linguistic minorities important?

There is much excellent scholarly work that has been written about the rights of linguistic minorities, much of it by thinkers whose expertise is in the philosophy of law and in the philosophy of rights.[1] I am not one of these experts. So what can I contribute to this important topic that is new, useful and interesting?

I choose as the foundation of my work a combination of my knowledge of philosophy, history, the social sciences and literature, and my life experience having lived and worked three quarters of my life as a member of a linguistic minority, primarily in Canada, but for shorter periods in Western Europe, in the Balkans, in the United States and in a number of Third World countries. At times, the results of this approach might look more like a series of vignettes or short essays only loosely connected to the topic of the rights of linguistic minorities. However I am convinced that the reader, whether a philosopher or a member of the general public, will come away with a number of philosophical conclusions that are essential to a better understanding of the rights of linguistic minorities as a result of this approach.

[1] Some Hungarian examples are the articles in *Studia Europea*, Volumes 7, 8 and 9, Pécs, 1999, 2000 and 2001. Especially articles by Andrássy György ,Bruhács János,Duza László, Herccegh Géza,Horváth Kristina and Kovács Péter,Vol. 7, 93-115, Vol. 8, 17-33, Vol. 9, 189-203 and 219-231. Here such topics as "Offical Languages, Minority Languages, Language Rights" are dealt from the viewpoint of legal philosophy. The articles in Volume 8 also appear in English, and German translation. Volumes 7 and 9 are all in Hungarian. Similarly scholarly articles in Jogtudományi Közlöny(*Magazine of Law Studies*), Vol.LVI, No 7 and 8, 265-279, VII *Politológus vándorgyűlés, Európai nyelvpolitika (The politics of languages*) by Andrássy, 162-172, Pécs, 2001, or *Law and Language, Editura Cugetarea*, Iasi, 2003, Explicit and implicit language rights, 119-124 and many others deal with the rights of linguistic minorities from the viewpoint of the philosophy of law. Examples of excellent, mainly North American studies are even more numerous, as the literature review will demonstrate it later. For the scope of serious scientific work, just one example from the many, is Chatterjee, Deen K. (ed.) (2004). *The Ethics of Assistance, Morality and the Distant Needy*, Cambridge University Press; where in less than 300 pages topics range from "Our obligations to those beyond our border"; "National responsibility and international justice"; to "Human rights and the law of peoples" to "Human rights and cultural diversity".

Based on my study and observations, I come to a number of conclusions. The first is that, unlike what social Darwinism advocates, it is more natural for humans and other forms of life to cooperate rather than to compete in order to survive.

Despite differences in history, population, geography and size, the history of the philosophy of linguistic minorities in Canada and in Hungary shows more similarities than differences. This would probably hold true in comparison to many other countries. When considering the rights of linguistic minorities, most truly important philosophers generally transcended the narrow limits of their own nationalism. To show this general trend, I had to include some biographical and historical materials on some of these thinkers that would support the conclusion of cooperation rather than competition.

Another conclusion is that in a truly civic society people are connected to each other through a myriad of intricate interwoven human and social relationships, of which language and nationality are just single elements of the many important characteristics that can unite or divide people. Conflict is an essential part of freedom, and this conflict can be resolved through dialogue, negotiation and compromise. Consequently, I devote some space to conflict and especially to the importance of compromise.

Compromise is related to the "Golden Mean" of the classical writers, especially Horace (Horatius 65-8 BC), who advocated moderation. Baruch Spinoza (1632-77) lists wise compromise as one of the virtues of a truly free man. "The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat; or, free man shows equal courage or presence of mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat."[2]

Roger Scruton has summarised that successful human communities are "composed of persons, who have rights, responsibilities and duties, and who endeavour

[2] Spinoza, Baruch (1988). 121.

to live by agreement with their fellows."[3] Such rights and agreements are generally based on compromises and are vitally important for linguistic minorities.

We generally study philosophy as a branch of social sciences and humanities by analyzing the works of important or great philosophers and those of different philosophical schools and trends for the purpose of developing knowledge. But there is an equally important and more ancient reason for studying philosophy. This other reason is to learn how to live more ethically and wisely and therefore with more tolerance, both as individuals and as groups. If we study the philosophy of linguistic minorities with this second reason in mind, then the study of history, the lives of great thinkers, literature and even vignettes from our personal or family histories can become an essential part of the process. For very practical reasons I place the emphasis on this second purpose. Linguistic and other minorities face so much discrimination and injustice that much emphasis has to be on majority and minority learning to live together more tolerantly and wisely in a democratic civic society. In such a study we must ask questions about whether we humans are fundamentally cooperative or competitive. We must ask if this world is basically in a state of chaos or are there natural laws or at least high probabilities that guide human behaviour and hence can provide guidance to humans, both minorities and majorities, for how to live in relative harmony. Such questions are not just loosely connected essays or digressions but essential parts of our work.

Language is an absolutely essential part of our humanity. Language allows us to reason, construct abstract arguments, have dialogue, dream and speculate about the past and the future. Aristotle uses the word *logos* both for speech and reason. For Aristotle animals are both without speech and without reason; hence they are *alogon.* Both Hegel in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and Wittgenstein in *The Philosophical Investigations*

[3] Scruton, Roger (1999). 68.

argue that language and self-consciousness developed and emerged together. Schopenhauer contends that all animals are without proper language, and therefore remembrance is restricted to the recognition of familiar things[4].

Nelson Mandela writes, "There is no passion to be found playing small, in settling for a life that is less than the one you are capable of living."[5] Linguistic and other minorities are constantly forced to settle for a life that is less.

The philosophy of the rights of linguistic minorities is complex and multi-faceted. Attitudes change from region to region and they change with time. Attitudes are also influenced by variables such as income, education, sex, and age. In this study on the thinking of past and present philosophers and other thinkers who had something important to say about the rights of linguistic minorities, I have tried to avoid historical and political arguments. I am aware that I do not always succeed in this. From time to time, it is necessary to describe the historical and social context in which these philosophers lived and worked because, without knowing the context, it would be very difficult to understand how they arrived at what they thought and wrote in regard to linguistic minorities.[6]

Linguistic minorities are important for a number of reasons. Linguistic minorities have existed for many thousands of years and they are often composed of bi or multicultural and/or bi or multilingual individuals. In many ways these individuals represent bridges or at least windows from one culture and language into another. They often have a special understanding where the difficulties lie and how different cultures

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[4] Scruton, Roger. (1999). 58-72.

[5] Crwyrs-Williams, Jennifer. (ed.) (1999). For similar writings and quotes from Mandela. Unnumbered pages.

[6] As an example, see Gregory Baum's thinking later in this work on what the words "*Germany, Germany, above everything else in the world*" *(Deutchland Deutchland über alles, über alles aus dem Welt*) meant in 1848, 1900 or 1938. The words had entirely different meanings in each of these different periods. „An interview with Gregory Baum:Faith, Community&Liberation", interview conducted by Adam S. Miller, in Journal of Philosophy and Scripture, Editorial Adviser, James Wetzel. www.philosophyandscripture.org/Issue2-2Baum/Baum.html, p.7

relate to one another. In the last hundred years the number of persons belonging to linguistic minorities has actually been increasing. Voluntary and involuntary migration, arbitrary border changes, the development of ever larger and often multinational entities such as the European Union are some factors contributing to why there are now more people than ever before who are members of linguistic minorities.[7] We can learn a great deal from the past experiences of linguistic minorities which will be important for our future. These lessons may be both positive and negative. In our lifetime, most of us try to answer such questions as "Who am I? How do I fit in? What makes my life worth living?" A linguistic and cultural identity is very much an element of the answers we arrive at to such questions.

Discriminating – damage and danger

The first reason for not discriminating against linguistic minorities is that discrimination results in the members of the minority not being able to achieve their full potential as human beings, and therefore they cannot contribute fully to society at large. Mihály Csikszentmihályi in his studies as professor of psychology and education at the University of Chicago searched for an answer to the question of what makes a really authentic and fulfilling life. In his book *Finding Flow: The Psychology of Engagement with Everyday Life*[8] he writes that we have to challenge ourselves with tasks that require a high level of skill and commitment and learn the joy of complete engagement. For example, he suggests playing the piano instead of watching television. Minorities generally find it much more difficult to acquire the high levels of skill and opportunities for complete engagement in their state, than members of the majority. This is a

[7] I supply numbers and statistics to support this statement later in this work.

[8] Mihály Csikszentmihályi, 1997, *Finding Flow: The Psychology of Engagement with Everyday Llife. New York, N.Y. Perseus, p. 30-31*

tremendeous waste of talent and human life and happiness, not only for members of minorities but for the whole of society. This of course has happened not only to linguistic minorities, but to others such as people of colour and women.

If we ever hope to allow minorities the same opportunities to achieve all that they are capable of, to allow them complete engagement in life where they can utilise high levels of skills and commitment, we first have to acknowledge that this restriction of opportunity exists, then look objectively at why it is allowed to happen, and what are the philosophical and ideological underpinnings of such discrimination.

The second important reason why we should not discriminate against minorities, and specifically against linguistic minorities, is that such discrimination can be a major cause of war. In the world there are more than two thousand "nation people" (e.g. Basques and Kurds) but fewer than two hundred nation states.[9] There are linguistic minorities in nearly every state. Several states are composed of linguistic minorities where numerically there is not a linguistic majority. This is the case with some very large states such as India, which has a population of over one billion people, yet no single language group is in the majority.

In many areas of the world, including several parts of Africa, the Balkans and in East Central Europe, national borders do not correspond to linguistic boundaries. One of the main reasons for wars during the last hundred years has been the constant attempts by different states and peoples to redraw these borders for their benefit.

Wars have always been horrible and destructive of human and economic resources, but with the present capabilities of atomic weapons that are able to annihilate all of humanity and because wars are one of the major reasons for the degradation and destruction of the world's environment, humanity can no longer tolerate or afford wars or

[9] Gwyn, Richard (1995). 15.

the serious risk of war. There have to be and there are better ways to deal with the injustices that are inflicted on lingistic minorities by majorities than the redrawing of borders based on past history through wars.

It is interesting to note that in some sense most of humanity has become a linguistic minority. For example 80% of all the data stored on the world's computers is in English[10] yet less than 6% of the world's population speaks English as their mother tongue.

A civic society where people feel part of the community and have a sense of belonging and a sense of responsibility for others is an indispensible ingredient of any participatory democracy. In many countries political parties often become more remote from and less responsive to the electorate. This comes about because members of parliament, once elected, generally feel more loyalty and responsibility to their party than to their constituents. This is especially the case for parties in power, where the party leader is also prime minister and holds a great deal of power.[11] This is one of the reasons why so many feel alienated from the democratic political process and it is even more the case for linguistic minorities. Minority language clubs, cultural associations and even minority political parties can provide a smaller and more intimate forum in which people can participate in the democratic political process and are beneficial in reducing this alienation from the general democratic political process. This is a side benefit of granting rights to linguistic minorities.

We have to learn to dialogue[12] with, to respect, to understand and not to demonize our opponents. Institutions of learning have a special responsibility to provide a setting that is conducive to thoughtful and respectful dialogues, reflections and debates. My

[10] Gwyn, Richard (1995). 15.
[11] For a more detailed discussion, please see Macpherson, C. B. (1977), especially 45-115.
[12] In the section on the contributions of Gregory Baum to philosophy in Canada we deal in more detail with the importance of dialogue.

hypothesis is that free human beings will disagree on many things, therefore freedom and conflict are closely related. The humane and civilized way of resolving such conflicts in a democratic and civil socity is through compromise. This understanding is especially crucial in regard to the rights of linguistic minorities in East Central and Eastern Europe. Perhaps we can use as an example an examination of the relative peace and goodwill of the European Union and the relative peace and tolerance of multicultural Canada to conduct such dialogues and a philosophical search for answers.

Personal experience

As children, there are seeds planted in our lives that influence our thinking as we grow up and find expression in how we think as adults. In our Hungarian family, there had always been a story of a little twelve year old Rumanian girl, a child minder (*pesztonka*), and it is a story told with tenderness. None of us remember her name. We only remember this. In 1849 in the Transylvanian mining town of Verespatak (Rosia Mantano), several men were killed by an armed mob. One man's wife and four children, accompanied by the Rumanian girl, fled to the forest. For safety, the mother sent the girl and three children in one direction while she, with baby daughter, took another path. The four were hiding in the forest when they heard the sound of the mother and baby being killed. The young Rumanian girl had nothing to fear from the mob as they were also Rumanian, but she stayed hidden with the little children all night, and the following day she walked with them to a safe Hungarian town. They would not have survived without her. One of the young children that escaped was my great grandfather. He, an orphan, studied as a beggar student (koldusdiák), became a physician and director of the hospital in Kaposvár, where a small college (Szigeti-Gyula Jánod egészséügyi szakiskola) is named after him. We never knew the little Rumanian girl's name, but the story carried

such a significance that it was passed down generation after generation. Why? The story, in our family, asks us to resist falling into the trap of stereotyping certain groups as the enemy, and to search for the people of goodwill who exist in all societies. From a simple story comes a philosophy for my own life.

But we also have to honestly acknowledge our limitations and prejudices. We are creatures of our ancestry, upbringing, education and social milieu . For example I was born in 1937 into a somewhat nationalistic, well off, middle class family. The decade of the 1930's was a time when anti-semitism and a wish to return to Hungary's historical borders were very much in the air. I am grateful that my family consciously and actively tried to resist anti-semitism, however it has taken me half a lifetime to accept that a complete return to the historical borders of Hungary would neither be realistic nor just. This does not mean that I believe the borders of Trianon are just or are necessarily unchangeable, only that a change would have to be by peaceful means and based primarily on present day realities. Even so, I cannot claim that I am fully aware of all my prejudices. Neither can I ever claim to truly understand the culture, history and aspirations of Romanians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Serbs or Croats who are our neighbours. I am sorry that I do not speak their languages as this would give me a greater understanding of them. As I speak German and lived in Austria briefly and have visited three many times, I think I do understand our Austrian neighbours and their culture better than some of the other Hungarian neighbours, however, despite the limitations of my understanding and my hidden prejudices, I ask for tolerance as I attempt to search, with goodwill, a way to understand.

In my lifetime I have experienced poverty, war, dictatorships, and terror. As a "class alien" I was denied educational opportunities, was briefly arrested, spent months in a refugee camp, and have worked in some of the world's poorest countries. Yet no

matter how difficult the situation, I always had hope that change for the better was possible. I arrived to a peaceful and tolerant Canada at age 19. Although was I able to attend and return to university a number of times, and was quite successful in my profession as a social worker, becoming eventually an executive director, at many points in my life journey, progress could have stopped and hope could have died. Although I cannot claim to fully understand what it is like to live a lifetime without respect, with discrimination, and with little hope for anything better than hunger, no permanent place to live and no future for one's children, I have had glimpses along the way of what a life without hope for change can be like. This is the lot of many minorities. I still don't fully know what it is like to be a woman or an aboriginal person, but we all have our limitations, and our limitations are no excuse for avoiding difficult topics. The following work is my attempt to grapple with the philosophical underpinnings for either denying or allowing rights for linguistic minorities.

Although I might not have always succeeded, I have tried to write in such a way that non philosophers could understand what I am saying.

The structure of the dissertation

In political science and in social action, one well tested method for achieving legislative change and obtaining certain rights is a strategy consisting of the following four steps:

1. Creating awareness of the challenge or problem
2. Education
3. Community mobilisation and finding partners and supporters
4. Creating new legislation and policies.

This work attempts to create awareness by examining the philosophical foundations of some of our thinking, feelings, preconceived notions and ideas about linguistic minorities, particularly the discrimination, hardships and unequal treatment that linguistic minorities face. What we are aiming for is active, positive engagement on behalf of the linguistic majority to help eliminate most of the discrimination and hardship linguistic minorities' face. As Sir Nicholas Winton, who by organizing the Kindertransport saved nearly 700 Czech children between March and August 19, 1939 wrote to one of the children "there is a difference between passive goodness and active goodness, which is, in my opinion, the giving of one's time and energy in the alleviation of pain and suffering. It entails going out, finding and helping those who are suffering and in danger, and not merely in leading an exemplary life in a purely passive way by doing no wrong."[13] Our philosophy has to be going out, finding and combating discrimination.

I hope to examine in some detail the hypothesis that 19th century nationalism is still strongly influencing our thinking and feelings. Our whole philosophy about linguistic minorities and many of our views about the subject are influenced, not by facts or objective reasoning, but by myths about who we are and who our neighbours are.

It is essential that we thoroughly examine and then state what we think and believe about human nature and therefore society at large. I spend a considerable time in this work examining philosophical, anthropological, historical and religious writings, as well as works in the social sciences. I come to the conclusion that humans are fundamentally cooperative beings and it is cooperation and not ruthless competition that drives progress. The arguments and some of the literature for this conclusion are presented later in this work. This is not what most 19th and many 20th century

[13] Diment, Judith (2008). 44-47. *Guardian Angel,* In The Rotarian, December 2008, Evanston, Illinois.

philosophers believed. As former Harvard philosophy professor, Henry Aiken wrote in his book "*The Age of Ideology*" Darwin's evolutionary theory is a point of view that profoundly affected the course of philosophical reflection in the nineteenth century.[14] Without this perspective, it would be hard to accept my conclusion about the future of linguistic minorities and their rights, which are on the whole guardedly optimistic.

By examining some of the Western philosophical literature as it relates to linguistic minorities, and by studying selected Hungarian and Canadian philosophers, writers, historians and other thinkers who had something new or interesting to say on this subject, we can contribute to creating awareness and providing some education about the rights, or lack of rights of linguistic minorities.

After studying the philosophy of linguistic minorities for years, both in Canada and in Hungary, I come to the conclusion that despite universal trends, history (and to a lesser extent geography) has helped to shape and colour the relevant philosophies of these two nations differently.

In Canada, there seem to be three major influencing factors. First, Canada has no real ethnic majority, having evolved from the coming together of at least five defeated peoples. Second, Canadians live in an immense land that is often harsh and sometimes dangerous. Thirdly, Canada's only continental neighbour, the United States, is ten times its size in population and wealth. These three factors and the declining but still present influence of Britain have resulted in a social philosophy that is less individualistic and more socialist in the broad sense of the word, than that of the United States. Canadians see their identity as an evolving process, with perhaps a certain amount of curiosity about the direction towards which the country will develop.

[14] Aiken, Henry (1956). 161.

For Hungarians, their history of frequent domination by more powerful neighbours such as the German and later the Austrian Empire, the Mongols, the Turks and the Soviet Union and the subsequent fear of national extinction has been a fact of life for centuries. The unjust and undemocratic Treaty of Trianon after World War I resulted in millions of Hungarians becoming linguistic minorities. The geography of the Carpathians, whether seen on a topographical map or in fact, is an ever present and indelible reminder of what used to be Hungary for more than a thousand years. Hungarians see their identity as well established and less open to change. However this Hungarian identity has a long history of ethnic and linguistic diversity and a certain sense of acceptance and tolerance which has been more or less pronounced in certain historical periods.[15] Hungary's first King, St. Stephen (1000-1038) reportedly said "One language and one set of customs for the Kingdom is stupid and makes it weak" (*Unius linguae uniusque moris regnum imbecile et fragile est).*[16]

The conclusion from these studies is that despite very real differences of history, culture and geography, there is more that is similar in the philosophy of these two nations, Canada and Hungary, regarding the rights and treatment of linguistic minorities than what is different. Both of these nations have progressive laws protecting linguistic minorities.

I raise questions and suggest and summarize possible solutions to some of the many questions and challenges that are connected with the subject of the rights of

[15] For a detailed collection of the linguistic laws of Hungary, see *Corpus Juris Hungarici* CD II József nyelvrendelete,1784, laws from 1790/91, and Transylvania 1791,later Hungary 1792, 1805, 1807, 1808,1830, 1840,1844,1847,1849, 1868, that is a progressive and tolerant law (*Laws for the equality of nationalities/ törvénycikk a nemzeti egyenjoguság tárgyában*), 1879, 1883 (18 pages on secondary schools and the training of their teachers), 1893, 1897,1907(state schools, ten pages), 1907 municipal and confessional schools, 1907, 15 pages). This brief review demonstrates the relative importance which first the Austrian, and after 1867 the Hungarian lawmakers gave to the question of languages. It is also an interesting documentary of how the treatment of linguistic minorities was more or less tolerant at certain times during the 137 years of these laws. This coincided with the rise of nationalism in Europe. Professor Andrássy György supplied me with copies of these laws.

[16] Dossier 49, No 10. *Hungary or the inherent diversity*. Reviewed by Andrássy György. http://www.meh.hu/nekh/Angol/6.htp

linguistic minorities. Some of these solutions and suggestions may be seen as naïve or unrealistic, however simply raising the questions helps to highlight the causes and may create sympathy and desire by the majority to find solutions and accept changes. I hope that some of the work of Hungarian philosophers and the Hungarian experience will be new and interesting to Canadian readers. Similarly, some of the work of Canadian thinkers and the Canadian experience with linguistic minorities, both with its mistakes and positive achievements, may be useful for Hungarian readers. There are a number of philosophical ideas and suggestions in this work that will help people think more positively about the rights of linguistic minorities. I hope that we as Canadians and Hungarians can learn from each others' thinking and experiences.

Because I am writing this paper in English, whenever possible when I am writing about Hungarian philosophers, thinkers and history, I use books and materials that are available in English. This greatly reduces the number of my sources, and the sources are not necessarily the very best or the most recent ones, but they are open to the English reader. When using Hungarian sources translated into English, I often try to quote the original Hungarian in parenthesis if it is a word or in the footnotes if it is longer, so my Hungarian readers can read the original and compare my translation to theirs.

My approach to the topic of legitimate limits of the rights of linguistic minorities is a multi-disciplinary one. Research and studies in the area of law with respect to linguistic minorities are much more advanced than they are in the field of philosophy. My perspective is not that of the philosophy of law. Others have written excellent pieces on this topic and the philosophy of law is not my speciality. However, there are many philosophical works, although not written specifically to deal with linguistic minorities, which do have parts that are relevant to our topic. I have studied these philosophical works and tried to forge their fragments and relevant ideas into coherent conclusions and

new ways of thinking about linguistic minorities. This is especially true in regard to new research in the philosophy of sciences, such as biology, neuroscience and anthropology, that suggest the main force of evolution and progress is not competition but cooperation. A multidisciplinary approach is also evidence in other areas of my work, such as the summaries of contributions of well known Hungarian and Canadian philosophers, writers and politicians.

A multidisciplinary approach is increasingly the way that new discoveries are made and how new knowledge is acquired. This is very evident in the natural sciences, but it is also increasingly accepted in the humanities. My approach is both philosophical and multidisciplinary.

An example of how closely language, culture, history, literature, science and identity are interrelated is contained in a letter from Sütő András, the foremost playwright of Transylvania, written to the prominent Hungarian actor, Sinkovits Imre in September 1988, and aired on Hungarian radio and television by Sinkovits. At that time Sütő wrote that his "new book has not seen publication in ten years and neither have the old ones" [17], and that the bulk of his works were banned, some retroactively, by the repressive Ceausescu regime. Hungarian his mother tongue was "largely banished from the schools"[18], and under such circumstances Sütő wrote about the Transylvanian Hungarian heritage "although it's true I'm no longer allowed to write down the Hungarian names of our historic cities, Kolozsvár, Nagyvárad, Segesvár, Marosvásárhely, nor the names of Zágon, Farkaslaka, these names are recorded by, instead of my broken pen, an army of creative spirits, valued contributors to European civilization. The name of Nagyvárad is penned by Endre Ady ... the name of Segesvár is legitimized for us by Sándor Petőfi with his blood shed on the plains of Fehéregyháza, and the chorus is joined by another great

[17] Harkó Gyöngyvér, Paul Sohár (trans.) (1997). 16
[18] Harkó, 17

spirit, János Bólyai, intoning the names of Marosvásárhely, Székelyudvarhely, as does Kelemen Mikes of Zágon and Áron Tamási of Frakaslaka in such beautiful tones of timeless validation that these villages, now firmly rooted in our hearts, no power can destroy, and no power can expropriate their historic names born in the mist of time."[19]

We all have an ethical responsibility to the welfare of our fellow beings. The weaker and the more vulnerable such a being is, the greater is this responsibility. Linguistic minorities fit this category of being weaker and more vulnerable, especially when we consider how they have generally been treated, particularly since the early 19th century. Lack of recognition, ignoring rights to autonomy, forced assimilation and discrimination is still often the lot of linguistic minorities.

[19] Harkó, 18 („Mert igaz ugyan: ma már nem irhatom le nemzeti nyelvünkön: Kolozsvár, Nagyvárad, Segesvár, Marosvásárhely, és azt sem, hogy Tágon, Farkaslaka, ám az én eltörött tollam helyett leirja mindezeket európai érvénnyel Erdély magyar remekiróinak múltbeli serege.
Várad nevét leirja helyettem is Ady Endre...Segesvár magyar nevét a fehéregyházi sikon kiontott vérével törvényesiti számunkra Petőfi Sándor, és vele kánonban mond Marosvásárhelyt, Székelyudvarhelyt egy másik lángelme: Bólyai János, Zágonról Mikes Kelemen , Farkaslakáról Tamási Áron szól oly szépen és örökérvényűen, hogy a szivünkbe költözött falvakat semmilyen erő le nem rombolhatja, az idők homályában született nevüket cenzor el nem oozhatja. Harkó,12)

II

Recognition of national minorities and language rights in international law and political philosophy

Several of the thinkers that are discussed here will be studied in more detail in later parts of this work.

During the 19th and early 20th centuries nationalism was one of the most important, if not the most important of the intellectual currents, first in Europe and then worldwide. Language and language rights, especially as they related to national independence and the use of mother tongue by the majority in the state, in literature, science, law and politics, became important topics in political and legal philosophy.
In Western Europe national languages replaced Latin before nationalism became a force. It happened during the Renaissance in Italy and France and during the 17th century in England. By no means were these countries unilingual. For example in France when French replaced Latin as the official language, less than half of the population spoke French as their native tongue, and even at the beginning of the French Revolution of 1789, the majority of the population of such areas as Bretagne, did not speak French. In Hungary and in Poland, Latin remained the official language until almost the middle of the 19th century. By that time, the aspirations of national minorities in Hungary such as the Croats, Serbs or Rumanians, to use their own languages instead of Latin, was a strong force.

When the Emperor Joseph II (1780-1790) attempted to replace Latin with German as the official language of the Kingdom of Hungary, this attempt prompted some Hungarian deputies to suggest the use Hungarian as the official language of the common higher institutions of the Hungarian state, but of course not the language of the Croatian internal administration. This led to the first crack in the unity of Croatian and Hungarian nobles. The Croatian nobles wanted to retain Latin and were not ready to advocate for the

use of Croatian.[20] Interestingly, the philosophical foundation on which the Croatian counter-argument rested was the idea of a social contract in Rousseau's sense of the word "contract". They interpreted the arrangements between the Hungarian King Coloman, "the book lover" (1095-1116), who conquered Croatia and the Croatian nobility as a social contract that could not be changed unilaterally by one party.

During the Middle Ages and up until the late 18th century the use of Latin unified the nobility of Hungary, regardless of their ethnic or linguistic origin. In the 19th century, replacing Latin by Hungarian, a language that was not the mother tongue of almost half of Hungary's population, became an issue of minority language rights. In an age of strong national sentiments, the lateness of this attempt made it very difficult and contentious. The use of mother tongue or native language in the affairs of the state was less of an issue in the Middle Ages and up to the18th century.

A good example of this is the relationship of Croatians and Hungarians. Croatia, originally an independent state, was part of Hungary for over nine hundred years, from 1102-05 to 1918. For over seven hundred years a fairly satisfactory coexistence developed between Croatians and Hungarians, and Croatian autonomy even worked during most of the 19th century. It was a working example of what might be possible for other ethnic minorities in Hungary.

The aristocracy of Croatia was largely bilingual, and they had estates both in Croatia and in the rest of Hungary. Families such as the Zrinyi's form an integral part of both Croatian and Hungarian history. For example, Zrinyi Miklós (1620-1664), who was born in Croatia, spoke Croatian as his first language, was Bán[21] of Croatia, and was also the greatest Hungarian poet of the 17th century.

[20] Kosáry Domokos (1987). 59.
[21] The name *bagan* is of Avar origin.The Bán was more than a Duke, as he was both head of the Croatian regional parliament, the Szábor, and was also Croatia's chief judge. Ács Zoltán (1984). 112.

It is less known even in Hungary, that other well known Hungarian aristocratic families, with very Hungarian sounding names, such as the Batthyányis, Erdődys or the Nádasdys were also of Croatian origin.[22] A multilingual, multiethnic Hungarian state worked well during most of it's over thousand year's history. For centuries, other linguistic and ethnic minorities, such as the Saxons of Transylvania and the Kumans and Jazyges of the Great Hungarian Plain (Alföld) enjoyed lesser autonomy than the Croatian, but still quite significant autonomy to manage their own affairs.

During the 17th and 18th centuries the minorities that were protected were sometimes religious minorities. The Catholic inhabitants of Livland (northern part of present day Latvia and the southern parts of present day Estonia), when they passed from Polish to Swedish rule (1660) would be examples of this protection. Similar guarantees were given to religious minorities at the peace treaties of Nimegue (1678) and Rysuick (1697) between France and Holland, and, among others, in the Peace Treaty at Paris, wherein France agreed that much of present day eastern Canada, then known as New France, would pass to British rule.[23]

From the early 19th century on, often in connection with the protection of religious minorities, ethnic and linguistic minority protection is also inscribed in some treaties. The Treaty of Vienna, 1815 which provided some protection and rights to Poles who lived under Russian, Prussian and Austrian rule is an example of this protection, as is the Treaty of Berlin (1878), and the treaties after the Balkan Wars (1913, 1914).[24] The first law to protect linguistic and religious minorities was passed on July 28th, 1849 by the revolutionary Hungarian Parliament in Szeged, in the final weeks of the year and a half long Revolution. We will return to this law later.

[22] Ács Zoltán (1984). 114.
[23] Andrássy, György (1998), 50-51. Also *Atlas zur Weltgeschichte* (1966). 270-71.
[24] Andrássy, György (1998). 52-53.

Ethnicity and language, particularly the use of mother tongue, not only remained important for most people throughout the 19th century but became even more vital as the century progressed. Karl Marx (1818-1883) appears to be incorrect when he predicted that non-class based differences such as gender, race or ethnicity would become less significant as compared to the division of bourgeoisie and the proletariat.[25]

The protection of minority language rights did receive some attention before the First World War. After the First World War, the League of Nations did guarantee language rights that were already defined and accepted.[26] This became increasingly necessary because the new borders often did not follow the Wilsonian principle of self-determination and left millions of people as linguistic minorities within the new borders. Language, culture and ethnicity are closely associated, so discrimination based on language most often also involves cultural and ethnic discrimination. The minorities resulting from these new borders included three million Hungarians, four million Germans, several million Ukranians as well as other nationalities.[27]

After the First Word War, the map of Europe, especially that of Eastern and Southeastern Europe changed drastically.[28] The principle of the new order was self determination, but in practice this often was not fully followed. After the war, the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ceased to exist and in its place two new states, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, came into existance. Austria and Hungary became separate states, and large German minorities were incorporated into the Czechoslovak state. Over three million Hungarians ended up as minorities in the enlarged state of Romania and in the new states of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

[25] Satzewich, Vic (1990). 231-32.
[26] Andrássy György (1998). 5.
[27] Andrássy György, (1998). 54-74.
[28] The next two paragraphs are based on Andrássy's work in Nyelvi Jogok, 54-78

The treaties for the protection of minorities did not include the states of the victorious Allied Powers or other states outside Europe, with the exception of Iraq. As we mentioned, this was one of the weaknesses of this system of minority protection. The other weakness was that the means for enforcing minority protection were inadequate, partly because of the purely advisory role of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Between the two wars, of the two rights, namely the right of all citizens to their own language, culture and religion, and the state's right to have an official language, the right of the state seems to be regarded as the more important right. However, after the First World War these treaties represented real progress in the protection of minorities.

One of the first and most complete of these these language minority rights guarantees was included in the Treaty, signed by Poland in Paris on June 30th, 1919. It was on this treaty that many other similar minority language guarantees were based, often following the wording of the treaty with Poland verbatim. The Polish Treaty states "Poland undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland, without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion."(Chapter 1, #2).[29]

Article 8 states: *Polish nationals who belong to racial religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the Polish nationals*. In Article 9, the Treaty further states*: In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Polish nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in enjoyment and application of the sums that may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious or charitable purposes.* Article 9

[29] *New York Times*, July 2, 1919, Copy supplied by Prof. Andrássy György

also states: *Poland will provide, in the public educational systems in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Polish nationals of other than Polish speech are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools instruction shall be given to the children of such Polish national through the medium of their own language*.[30]

The Polish Peace Treaty also contained some procedures to guarantee that the treaty would be respected. Article12 states: *Poland agrees that any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action ...as it may deem proper. The Polish Government thereupon consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereof demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice.The decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the covenant*.[31]

Here we have guarantees of collective minority language rights and the authority of the Permanent Court of International Justice to enforce them. We have to note however that the International Court of Justice did not have general or full jurisdiction regarding language rights. These 1919 language rights and the methods for enforcing them are stronger than anything the United Nations has accepted up to today.

Here we have guarantees of many individual rights and occasional guarantees of collective minority rights with the authority of the League of Nations to safeguard them. The opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice were generally used only in an advisory capacity. Hungary worked to give the Permanent Court a greater role, but this was strongly opposed by the British Government, among others. We have to note

[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.

however that the International Court of Justice did not have general or full jurisdiction regarding language rights. These 1919 language rights and the methods for enforcing them are stronger than anything the United Nations has accepted up to today.

The *Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary*, signed at Trianon June 4th, 1920, uses the same language. Article 58 declares *all Hungarian nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civic and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religio*n.[32] The Treaty later states, also in article 58 *Hungarian nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Hungarian nationals* and continues almost verbatim in article 59 to follow the Polish Peace Treaty of 1919, guaranteeing adequate facilities for children belonging to linguistic minorities and language instruction in their own language. The Hungarian Peace Treaty further guarantees the same equitable share in the application of public funds from state, municipal or other budgets for minorities as is mentioned in the Polish Peace Treaty.

Other peace treaties which included protection of minorities were those between the victorious Allied Powers and Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary, where these minority guarantees were elements of the peace treaties with the states, while with Czechoslovakia and Romania, the Allied Powers signed so called minority treaties. The Baltic States joined this system of protection of minority rights by unilateral declarations. Most of these treaties were signed in 1919 and offered protection for minorities similar to the Polish Treaty. Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Iraq made declarations of minority protection to facilitate their admission to the League of Nations.[33] The treaty with Turkey was concluded in 1923. Other treaties such as ones addressing specific

[32] *Treaty of Peace Between The Allied and Associated Powers and* Hungary.Articles 58 and 59 (page 11,12). Copy supplied by Prof. Andrássy György.
[33] *Minority Treaties*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minority -Treaties 1

geographical areas, for example Danzig(Gdansk), the Aland Island or the Memel area, all contain similar clauses for the protection of minorities. [34]

Between the First and Second World Wars most international jurists and philosophers supported a system of minority protection. It was almost fashionable to do so. These treaties offering minority protection were progressive and well intentioned but had two major flaws. The first flaw is that the treaties were only supposed to be acknowledged and applied to members of the defeated Central Powers and smaller, generally Central and East European countries, and not to the major victorious Allied Powers who saw minority safeguards as unnecessary for their own minorities. Therefore minority rights were not seen as universal rights. The second weakness was with enforcement. Enforcement was not strong, but even so, was much better than anything that the United Nations was and is able to do to enforce the rights and autonomy of minorities, even today. Today we speak less of collective rights and more of a right of minorities to their autonomy. This is based on an acknowledgement of individual human rights by individual members of minorities and on the principle of the right of self-determination by members of a minority.

After the Second World War, the United Nations concentrated on universal rather than on particular human rights. It did not recognize language rights or the concept of linguistic genocide.[35] For linguistic minorities, this strong emphasis on individual human rights with an almost complete negation of collective and group rights was a major,

[34] Andrássy, *Nyelvi Jogok*, 58-59

[35] 7. The United States was strongly against such recognition. One of the reasons for this reluctance could be that many of the native American (Indian) languages were in the process of extinction during the first half of the 20th century, and the use of native Indian languages was often discouraged or forbidden by school, municipal or state authorities.

negative, change. The United Nations General Assembly in its 1948 resolution on the fate of minorities, side-stepped the issue of a uniform solution.[36]

During the 1956 Hungarian Revolution there were no chauvinistic claims at the expense of neighboring nations. After the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, national conflicts surfaced again, sometimes violently, as in the former Yugoslavia.

Originally, not only did the United Nations not recognize minority language rights, it did not recognize any language rights at all. Starting from the late 1950's this position began to change. In the *Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect to Employment* (1958), in the *Convention against Discrimination in Education* (1960), in a *Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination* (1965), and in both the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966) and *the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (1966), some minority rights begin to became part of these covenants. [37]

At the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries, the rights of linguistic minorities, although still neglected, started to receive more attention. A few examples of this increased interest in minority language rights are the following. In 2003 UNESCO accepted the *Convention for Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritages* (ICH). Intangible cultural heritages are defined as the practices, representations, knowledge and skills….that communities, groups and in some cases, individuals

[36] "The General Assembly, Considering that the United Nations cannot remain indifferent to the fate of minorities, Considering that it is difficult to adopt a uniform solution of this complex and delicate question, which has special aspects in each State in which it arises, Considering the universal character of the Declaration of Human Rights, Decides not to deal in a specific provision with the question of minorities in the text of this declaration." U.N. General Assembly Resolution 217 C (III), Fate of minorities. Copy from Prof. György Andrássy.

[37] Andrássy, György (1998). 89-118, United Nations , International Conventions and Declarations, http://www.ancivento.org/intercultura/convenzioni.asp 1-3

recognize as part of their cultural heritage."[38] Language, I think, fits the definition of an intangible cultural heritage. One of the branches of The Hungarian Academy of Sciences is the Research Institute of Ethnic and National Minorities. The 11th International Conference on Minority Languages was held at the University of Pécs in Hungary and its Theme was *Multilingualism, Citizenship and the Future of Minority Languages*. The prospect for achieving a peaceful resolution and international consensus on protecting minority language rights is slightly better today than what it was a generation ago.

In Canadian political philosophy the Queen's University professor, Will Kymlicka is a good example of this new emphasis on multiculturalism and minority rights. We will discuss Kymlicka's work in more detail later. Here I want to follow the intellectual trail of the development of his philosophy. He lists John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and Gerald Cohen as the thinkers who most influenced his work.[39] Although we will examine John Stuart Mill's and John Rawls' relevant work later in more detail, it is worthwhile to look here at Ronald Dworkin's and Gerald Cohen's influence on Kymlicka's ideas and on minority rights in general.

The Massachusetts-born Dworkin (1931-), a philosopher and lawyer, was Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford when Kymlicka studied there under the direction of G. A. Cohen (1941-) from 1984 to 1987. Dworkin's theory that the law is "whatever follows from the constructive interpretation of the institutional history of legal system"[40] fits well with Kymlicka's generous and liberal interpretation of aboriginal and Québec minority rights. So also does Dworkin's theory on equality whose core principle is that every person is entitled to equal concern and respect in the design of the structure of society.[41] Dworkin's view is that liberty must be understood to entail certain considerations of

[38] Wikipedia, 2008 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intangible_Cultural_Heritage.
[39] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Will-Kymlicka, 1
[40] Ibid. Dworkin, Ronald (1985). 1.
[41] Ibid. 3

equality since it is not possible to exercise one's freedom without the use of a considerable amount of resources (e.g. participating in the democratic process by voting is not possible without having the food, health, time or knowledge to do so).[42] These ideas also influenced Kymlicka's broad interpretation of freedoms for minorities.

Cohen's view on egalitarianism is also broader than in general practice. As his book's title *If You are an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich* suggests, Cohen's theory is that rules and structures of egalitarianism should not only apply to laws and the society, but also to individual personal behaviour. For example, the "talented" should be willing to exercise their talents without extra and unequal rewards. [43]

Kymlicka is not a modern Marxist as Cohen is, but his views that certain people, such as aboriginal Canadians, would be entitled to indefinite state support and indefinite affirmative action in order to safeguard their culture, language and identity could have been influenced by Cohen's views. But Kymlicka's own views also are part of the wider development of international interest in minority rights.

As Will Kymlicka summarised this development and the main reasons for it in his book*, Politics in the Vernacular,* "for much of this century, issues of ethnicity have been seen as marginal by political philosophers. (Much the same can be said about many other academic disciplines, from sociology to geography to history). Today however, after decades of relative neglect, the question of minority rights has moved to the forefront of political theory."[44]

Kymlicka lists the collapse of Communism and the following dramatic re-emergence of ethnic nationalism and the *nativist* backlash against foreigners, especially immigrants in long established democracies, the political mobilisation of indigenous

[42] Ibid. 3
[43] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerald_Cohen
[44] Kymlicka, Will (2001). 17-18.

peoples and the treaties of secession in Canada (Québec), Spain (Catalonia, Basque counties) or Belgium(Flanders), as reasons for minority rights becoming so important. Kymlicka distinguishes three phases of the philosophical debate regarding minority rights. He states that the first phase occurred as minority rights were seen as part of the centuries old debate whether individual freedom and rights should or should not have priority over a communal way of life. This question is closely connected with the question whether humans have a really free choice to decide who they are and who they want to be, or are they creatures of their society, social roles, families and communities. The second stage of debate concentrates on the question: "what is the possible scope for minority rights within liberal theory?"[45] The third stage examines minority rights as a response to nation-building. As Charles Taylor writes, the process of nation building inescapably privileges members of the majority culture.[46]

This majority culture does not readily accept minority nationalism. Kymlicka discusses at length David Hollinger's 1995 book *Post-ethnic America*, a work he calls "the most sophisticated defence of the consensus view."[47] This consensus view in Canada has resulted in a significant increase of interethnic friendships and intermarriages and to shifting, multiple and hybrid identities. Kymlicka argues that this consensus view is a positive influence when we deal with recent immigrants, whether in North America or in Europe, but it should not be applied to non-immigrant groups, especially those who were colonised or conquered. Here Kymlicka mentions the French speaking people of Québec, the Québécois and the indigenous peoples of Canada.[48] I think that the Basques, Catalans, Székely or the Hungarians of Southern Slovakia belong to the same category of people. In this case, if the consensus view were applied, this would ultimately result in

[45] Ibid. 21.
[46] Taylor, Charles. "Nationalism and Modernity", in McMahan and McKim (1997: 31-55), 34 as quoted by Kymlicka (2001). 22.
[47] Kymlicka, Will (2001). 266.
[48] Ibid. 267-68.

assimilation of these minorities and would also mean the loss of irreplaceable cultural and linguistic treasures. However difficult it might be to accommodate minority nationalism of people who were conquered or colonized and to define how they still could be included in the larger Canadian, American, Slovak etc. nation, the alternative, forced assimilation would be unacceptable.

Kymlicka, along with most other contemporary political philosophers, agrees that the vast majority of minority rights are individual rights. He also agrees that the objections of a generation ago, that minority rights are collective group rights and as such, they often curtail individual rights and therefore should not be protected are out of date. I also agree with this viewpoint as the human rights of freedom from hunger and fear and discrimination, and the right to education, health care, employment, shelter and other basic human rights are inalienable rights of any individual, whether s/he is a member of a majority or a minority.

In this work, we are examining the philosophy of some possible compromises and accommodation of minority nationalism that could result in a win-win situation. As stated in the conclusions of the Québec 2008 Bouchard-Taylor *Commission on Reasonable Accommodation (Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles*), a civic society imposes a mutual obligation of reasonable accommodation both on the minority and on the majority.[49]

When we speak of linguistic minorities we have to distinguish between national and ethnic linguistic minorities. Will Kymlicka defines *national minorities* as cultural diversity arising from "the incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into a larger state."[50] National minorities want some form of

[49] www.macleans.ca/andrewcoyne. We will refer again later to this commission in connection with the work of the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor.
[50] Kymlicka, Will, (2001). 10.

autonomy or self government to ensure their survival. Basques and Catalans in Spain and Hungarians in Transylvania, in Rumania or in Southern Slovakia are examples of such national minorities. It is important for an ethnic group to be recognized as a national minority. *Ethnic minorities* on the other hand arrive from immigration and their aim is not a separate, self governing autonomous region but some acceptance and accommodation of their cultural differences.[51]

With increasing immigration, more and more states are becoming poly-ethnic. Other states, such as Switzerland, Belgium, Finland, Canada or India have been multinational for decades or even for centuries. Historically, the Kingdoms of Hungary or Poland, the Russian Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire or the Soviet Union were also multinational states.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries when nationalism was one of the predominant ideologies, much of the political and legal philosophy supported the idea of one nation, one language, and one state. Michael Walzer, a contemporary philosopher, writes that France was and, in a sense, still is the classical example of this kind of national state.[52] The political, legal and philosophical acceptance of this kind of nation state as the norm to strive for, also often explicitly or implicitly regarded the assimilation of linguistic minorities as the normal and preferable way of progress. At the far extreme of nationalistic solutions there is forced assimilation, which may include cultural or even physical genocide.

Jürgen Habermas defines the nationalism of peoples as those who see themselves as ethnically and linguistically homogeneous groups against the background of a common historical fate and who want to protect their identity not only as an ethnic

[51] Ibid. 11.
[52] Walzer, Michael (2001). "Nation States and Immigrant Societies", 151. in Kymlicka, Will and Opalski , Magda (eds.) 2001.

community but as a people forming a nation with the capacity for political action. Nationalist movements have almost always modelled themselves on the republican nation-state that emerged from the French Revolution."[53]

Writers, poets and even composers are more likely to advocate this kind of nationalism. Gabriele D'Annuncio (1863-1938) in Italy, Maurice Barrés (1862-1923) in France or Richard Wagner (1913-1983)[54] in Germany are good examples of this trend in nationalism. Apart from perhaps Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814)[55] there were no major philosophers who could be regarded as first and foremost nationalists. Later interpretations, particularly the National Socialist one of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) and F. Nietzsche (1844-1900), portrayed both of these major philosophers in a highly nationalistic light. However, nationalistic ideas alone are not their major or most important contribution to philosophy. Both thinkers are far more complicated and complex to be labelled in any one, simplistic way.

The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy defines the **Philosophy of Law** as the study of "a group of problems (that) concern the relations between law as one particular social institution in a society and the wider political and moral life of that society (and) the nature of legal obligations."[56] There are many branches of legal philosophy, such as the study of natural law, legal realism and legal positivism. Legal realism, especially in its contemporary politicized form, sees the claimed role of the law in legitimizing certain

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[53] Habermas, J., "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State" 118, in Gutmann, Amy, (ed.) (1994), 118.

[54] Szerb Antal (1992). 774-76, 704-706. and 596-97 Richard Wagner is remembered primarily as a composer of operas, but he also wrote parts of the librettos for his operas, short stories such as *The Death of a German Musician in Paris*, studies such as *Die Kunst und die Revolution* (1849), Szerb, 596-97. Hans Kohn, in his book, *Nationalism* (1955), publishes extracts from Wagner's article, *Danger in Judaism in Music* (1850). This article contains some fairly ugly antisemitic writing. One can argue about the value of Wagners music, whether he is a genius or a second rate composer, but his prosa writing is certainly not first rate.

[55] Euchen, R. (1890) 445-48, Hamlyn, D. W. (1990). 243-45 and Breuilly, J. (1985), 66, 340.

[56] Audi, Robert (ed.) (1999). Cambridge Dictonary of Philosophy. (2005). 676-677, (article written by Roger A. Shiner)

gender, race, or class interests as the prime salient property of law for theoretical analysis.[57] Legitimizing language interests and rights also belongs to this category.

Political philosophy is defined, perhaps rather narrowly, as "the study of the nature and justification of coercive institutions from the family to the United Nations."[58] I do not claim to have special expertise in either political philosophy or in the philosophy of law.

Multiculturalism and **Civil Society** are expressions that we use daily, and I use them often in this work, but the concepts behind them are quite complex. Will Kymlicka, together with Simone Chambers, edits a whole book on the different concepts of Civil Society.[59] They write that "assumptions about individual autonomy or deliberative democracy are said to reflect a distinctly Western, and perhaps even distinctly liberal, conception of how society should be organized, and one that is not part of other traditions."[60] Later they write that "to think about ethical pluralism as within a civil society framework is to presuppose that we are working within the broad framework of a liberal state."[61]

Can there be such a thing as a non-liberal, or even a non-pluralistic society, these philosophers ask? In trying to answer such questions, Chambers and Kymlicka assembled contributors not only from the western, classical liberal traditions, Christianity, Jewish and feminist thinking, but also from the Islamic and Confucian traditions. The authors address the same questions, and placing the responses of different traditions beside each other highlights both their similarities and their differences.[62] This

[57] Ibid. 676-677.
[58] Ibid. 718.
[59] Chambers, Simone and Kymlicka, Will (ed.) (2002).
[60] Ibid 5.
[61] Ibid 5.
[62] Ibid 4.

approach encourages different traditions into a dialogue with each other.[63] This comparative, dialogic approach could be used in other areas where there are divergent opinions. An example would be the very different interpretations of the same event by different scholars in South Eastern Central Europe. For example, it would be interesting to have such a dialogue among Croatian, Slovenian, Rumanian, Hungarian and Slovak thinkers about the coming of the Hungarians into the Carpathian Basin in 895-96.

There is often no commonly agreed upon concept, even within fairly open philosophical systems such as the Western, liberal traditions, about the definition of civil society. Left leaning liberals, such as Michael Waltzer[64] ("*Equality and Civil Society*") want an egalitarian society with more state intervention, while right leaning liberals, such as Loren E. Lomasky ("*Classical Liberalism and Civil Society*")[65] want a libertarian state that intervenes as little as possible. Horkheimer and Adorno believed that liberal democratic institutions did more to reinforce domination than to weaken it. Habermas believes that the institutions of liberal democracy can help emancipate marginalized groups. [66]

There is also the question, whether individuality and sociability might not be able to be reconciled.[67] The rise of individualism, secularism and materialism are generally associated with the liberal tradition. Judaism, Islamic and Confucian traditions do not contain a theory of civil society in the modern, liberal sense.[68] However, there is a willingness in all three authors to explore what is common and what is universal. As the Jewish philosopher and law professor Suzanne Last Stone asks: "can the idea that man is

[63] Ibid 5.
[64] Walzer, Michael (2001). "Equality and Civil Society", 34-50 in Kymlicka, Will and Opalski , Magda (eds.) 2001.
[65] Lomasky, Loren, E. (2001). "Classical Liberalism and Civil Society", 50-71in Kymlicka, Will and Opalski , Magda (eds.) 2001.
[66] Chambers, Simone and Kymlicka, Will (eds.) (2002), 96.
[67] Seligman, Adam B. "Civil Society as Idea and Ideal", 13-34, in Chambers, Simone and Kymlicka, Will (eds.) (2002).
[68] Ibid, 151-230

created in the image of God provide a new universal category of membership in the Jewish polity and a new universal category for the creation of social bonds with all members of the society, by the virtue of their humanity alone?"[69] Such a shift would make, for example, the life of the two million Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel entirely different.

In assuring minority rights, philosophy and ideas have a crucial role to play. As Ann Phillips writes: "Programs for radical change have to capture peoples' hearts and minds and cannot depend just on directives from the state."[70] Equal, collective rights for linguistic minorities is such a radical change that it needs very strong support from respected thinkers in order to capture the hearts and minds of both the minority and the majority. Civil society attempts to synthesize individualism with community and to develop a society strong enough to resist state hegemony and the concentration of power in the state.[71] For both of these reasons, civil society in the modern world is essential for the survival and peaceful development of linguistic minorities.

As many philosophical works as have been written about civil and civic society, so to have many philosophical works been written about Multiculturalism. A good example is Multiculturalism, edited by Amy Gutman. This work has contributions from Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer and many others.[72] Another book on the topic is Will Kymlicka's *Multicultural Citizenship*.[73]

Kymlicka distinguishes three different uses for the word *multicultural.* It can refer to multinational, poly-ethnic, or especially in the United States, the reversal of historical discrimination of such groups as the disabled, homosexuals, and women.[74] When I use

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[69] Chambers, Simone and Kymlicka, Will (eds.) (2002), 167.
[70] Ibid. 8.
[71] Ibid.154.
[72] Gutmann, Amy, (ed.) (1994).
[73] Kymlicka, Will (1995). *Multicultural Citizenship*.
[74] Kymlicka, Will (1995). 17.

multiculturalism in connection with long established immigrant groups, I will generally use multicultural in the multinational sense, with a few exceptions. I will never use the term to refer to atheists, gays, or lesbians, etc. These discussions are developed further in a later collection by Kymlicka, entitled *Language Rights and Political Theory*.[75] This collection is a compilation of presentations made at a workshop at Queen's University in 2001. In this volume, Michael Blake from Harvard offers a refinement or adaptation to practical life of Kymlicka's criteria for protected linguistic status. Kymlicka's primary criteria rest on historical facts, namely that "the national group in question has, or recently has had a societal culture of the relevant form, and had possession of a determinate area of territory and so forth."[76] Blake adds "and must show that some form of discrimination is at the root of the need for its need for protected linguistic status".[77] Blake further asks if "the simple fact of unequal opportunity stemming from linguistic status counts as a form of injustice?"[78] Blake seems to answer this in the affirmative.

The Canadian philosopher and novelist John Ralston Saul (1947-) presents his philosophical ideas in his non-fiction trilogy *Voltaire's Bastards, The Doubter's Companion* and *The Unconscious Civilization*. In his next, non-fiction book, *On Equilibrium,* [79] he continues to explore how the ideas presented in the trilogy can be practiced in everyday life. He looks at the interaction between Memory, Reason, Ethics, Normal Behavior, Common Sense, and Imagination and comes to the conclusion that if these qualities are valued and practiced individually and in isolation they become weaknesses, possibly even forces for destruction or self-destruction. They become

[75] Kymlicka, Will and Patten, Alan (eds.). (2003)
[76] Ibid. 228.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid. 225.
[79] Saul, John Ralston (2001).

ideologies. Ralston-Saul writes "qualities are most effective in a society when they are recognized as of equal, universal value and so are integrated into our normal life".[80]

I think that the situation is similar with languages and cultures in a society, in a state. If one language, one culture, or one people of a certain origin are valued to the exclusion of all others, then it is a weakness, it is a dangerous ideology.

After World War II, in Central-East and Eastern Europe ideology and not scientific research dominated philosophy. It was the official (though not valid) view that international Communism had solved the minority language problem. Therefore in Hungary between 1948 and the late 1980's, it was very difficult to talk and write about the oppression and great difficulties and discrimination that the more than two million Hungarians who lived in the neighboring states faced daily. Today there is much more openness in most of the former Communist states to the study and search for solutions for linguistic minorities

Achieving a truly democratic society and the treatment of national minorities are closely linked. Kymlicka argues that there is a strong negative correlation between democratization and minority nationalism. Among the former Communist countries, those without significant linguistic and ethnic minorities, and therefore without significant minority nationalism, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland or Slovenia have democratized successfully. Countries with large linguistic minorities where there is understandably strong minority nationalism, such as Macedonia, Serbia, Slovakia, Romania and the Ukraine are finding democratization much more difficult.[81]

In Canada, where there was never one people who constituted an absolute national majority, the idea of a multi-national state was more acceptable in Canada than in most other countries. Later we will examine the profound implications for Canadians

[80] Saul, John Ralston (2001). unnumbered page of the introduction.
[81] Kymlicka, Will (2001), 273.

of Canada being formed by five defeated peoples as compared to the victorious revolution that formed the United States. As former Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre E. Trudeau (1919-2001) wrote in 1967 "By historical accident Canada has found itself approximately 75 years ahead of the rest of the world in the formation of a multi-national state and I happen to believe that the hope of mankind lies in multiculturalism."[82]

As even this very brief and far from complete summary demonstrates, there is an increasingly rich and sophisticated body of scientific work in political and legal philosophy pertaining tot linguistic minorities and their rights. In the future, I am convinced this area of philosophy, being the rights, especially group rights of minorities, will continue to grow in importance. However, I choose a somewhat different, a multidisciplinary and personal approach, in order to make an original contribution to the philosophy of linguistic minorities. I do this for several reasons. For more than three quarters of my life I have lived as a member of a linguistic minority in Canada, in Germany and for shorter periods in other countries, for example six months in the former Yugoslavia. My family on my father's side is from the Carpathian-Ukraine, on my mother's side, from Transylvania, so in a way I daily live and breathe what it is to be a linguistic minority. I bring a unique philosophical and personal perspective on the challenges that linguistic minorities face.

I am also convinced that we increasingly need to use multidisciplinary approaches when we want to approach age old challenge from a new angle. In this way I believe my graduate degrees in History (Munich, Germany, in Social Work, to a large extent sociology and psychology (Toronto, Canada) and management (United States) will help me to approach the philosophy of linguistic minorities from a new and different perspective. In recent times, philosophy has become a scientific discipline which is at

[82] Trudeau, P. E. (1968). 214.

times abstract. My approach is to go back to the ancient, original purpose of philosophy, which was to help people to find a way to understand each other, to live in relative peace, and to try to live a meaningful life.

Much of the following work is an exploration of the intellectual foundations of achieving a full and meaningful life, both for the minorities and for the majority. I come to the conclusion that a majority that discriminates against its minorities cannot achieve the best possible life for itself.

Summary of some of the most important ideas, questions and developments

The first idea is the close relationship between the concept of official language or languages and the language rights of national minorities. The official language of the state is almost always the language of the majority, and this linguistic majority, because its language is the official language of the state, enjoys wide ranging, implicit collective language rights. This is so much taken for granted, taken as the natural state of affairs, that the majority is generally not even aware that they have extensive collective language rights. The majority is generally not aware that these rights are generally denied to or at least restricted when it comes to linguistic minorities. [83] This is one of the reasons why history, philosophy and other areas of the humanities have neglected for so long the study of collective language rights. This lack of awareness is also one of the reasons why the United Nations ignored language rights during the first twenty years of its existence.

As we will discuss it in detail later, the first step in correcting injustices is to acknowledge that they exist. Implicit language rights existed for centuries for linguistic majorities. One of the future tasks for legal philosophy is to help to highlight the

[83] Andrássy, György (1998). 31-38.

existence of implicit collective language rights and to supply some of the philosophical arguments necessary to help translate these implicit rights into acknowledged, explicit rights, for both the majority and for the minority.

The second idea is that individual human rights, in order to be meaningful, have to be very broad, and have to include collective rights. Freedom is a condition under which one is free to realize one's full human potential. This includes freedom from hunger, poverty, discrimination and the right to education, health care and shelter and employment. Without collective linguistic rights, linguistic minorities face explicit or implicit discrimination in culture, education, and often in health care and employment. Therefore we cannot achieve full human rights for a very large proportion of the words population, without dealing with linguistic rights.

The third idea is that because language is intimately connected to culture, heritage and identity, the loss of a language also means the loss of irreplaceable cultural treasures that were accumulated over thousands of years.

The fourth important idea is that according to recent research and discoveries in biology, medicine and anthropology, the motivating force of progress is not ruthless competition but cooperation, and the protection of the weaker members of our society. It is part of our genetic make up, our genetic heritage. Because of this fourth principle, more freedom, more rights and more protection for linguistic minorities is a realistic and achievable goal. I will deal in more detail with these four, but especially with the last two ideas, in the body of my work.

The philosophy of linguistic rights has been in the past neglected for a long time, but for a number of reasons, reasons on which I will elaborate later, the study of these rights is becoming more important and in a modest sense more popular. The philosophy of linguistic rights is a relatively new and very important field of philosophy that,

because of globalization and increased mobility, will become even more important in the future, especially if we are able to study it from the viewpoint of inherent human cooperation.

Many previous generations regarded their time as a time of crisis. For example, in the 1930's it was the depression and the rise of Communism and fascism, in the 1940's the horrors of the Second Word War, the tens of millions killed and the Holocaust, in the 50's the Cold War and the real possibility of an atomic war. Today our crisis is global warming, the destruction of our natural environment and the ever widening economic gap between the older, comparatively well off populations of European, North American countries and Japan and the younger, much poorer populations of emerging countries.

The Chinese symbol for crisis is a combination of the symbol for danger and the one for opportunity. The English word crisis comes from the Greek word "krino" to decide.[84]In all crises we have danger and opportunity and we have to decide what we are going to do. Throughout my work, the reoccurring conclusion is that compromise and cooperation by both the majority and the minority is essential for our own survival and the survival of our environment. In the fallowing chapters we are looking at the philosophical foundations of how these compromises can be honorable and how we can cooperate in a way that benefits both the majority and the minority.

[84] Hall, Douglas (1980). 18.

III

History, Viewpoint, Definitions

Some thoughts about the history of the philosophy of the rights of linguistic minorities.

Although not originally written for this purpose, there appears to be some general agreement among very different philosophical schools about how we should consider the rights of linguistic minorities. Greek and Roman philosophy has as one of its pillars that all humans seek happiness and self fulfilment and that this is a legitimate search. One of the main tasks of philosophy is to help to determine what denotes a "good life".

Hebrew scriptures and Jewish writings have as one of their main themes the responsibility of all Jews to their fellow Jews and to a lesser extent to all humans. The burning issue for many of the prophets is the attainment of social justice. Moslems have a similar responsibility to their fellow Moslems regardless of their language or race. For Christians it is fundamental that we are our brothers' (and sisters') keepers and until the appearance of nationalism and the nation state, all Christians were supposed to be equal in Gods eyes, regardless of language and ethnicity.

Some religious people feel that the injustices of this world will be corrected in an afterlife. However, ethical agnostic and atheistic people, because they do not believe in an afterlife where justice is balanced, feel an even greater responsibility to achieve justice, peace and the welfare of all while they are still in this terrestrial world. In their thinking, there is no second chance to rectify injustices and suffering in an afterlife. Some religious people who do not believe in an afterlife also feel the same urgency as non religious people to do the right thing in the short time we have on earth.

In the 19th and early 20th century, because most people followed some sort of religious belief, people whether living in Canada or Hungary, felt it as their duty to make life more just and bearable for everyone. Today, even if it is just a significant minority who are religious, the following argument remains.

A basic belief is that you have a relationship with God which may manifest itself through your relationships with your fellow humans. For Canadian settlers living in isolated and very harsh conditions, there were many opportunities to provide essential help to one another. Daily they lived the commandment to "do unto others as you would have them do unto you"[85] by helping their neighbours. This practice was almost as important, and for some even more important, than expecting help from God. The Methodist and Social Gospel traditions, originating out of these religious beliefs, will be discussed in detail when we examine Canadian philosophy, especially that of John Watson. These beliefs were the main roots of Canada's Socialist parties.

This tradition of helping one's neighbours and the weak runs very deep in early pioneer European-Canadian and in native traditions. Without such philosophy and obligations, people would simply not have survived in Canada. The common and practical expression for these religious / philosophical beliefs finds expression in such sayings that God works through our hands. In the more radical traditions, God has *only* our hands to work with. This puts a clear onus on all of us to care for the weaker and more vulnerable members of our society.

There is another philosophical tradition for this view that is independent of the early Canadian experience. I have to take a detour to illustrate what I mean. One of the most difficult and controversial questions of philosophy and religion is the question of evil. Why would an all powerful, omnipotent and truly good God permit all the horrors that are part of life? Harold S. Kushner, in his book *When Bad Things Happen to Good People*[86] summarises this problem and in my opinion provides a satisfactory answer to

[85] This is not only a commandment of the Old and New Testaments, but for many other religions. Zoroaster taught this 3000 years ago in Persia, as did Confucius, Lao-Tse and Buddha.
[86] Kushner, Harold (1983).

this question. [87] Kushner, a New England rabbi, faced this question with some members of his congregation. As well, Kushner had a son who was diagnosed with an incurable disease at age two, and died of it at age fourteen, so there was a personal as well as vocational need to deal with this question. To illustrate his thinking, Kushner works his way though the Book of Job. He comes to the conclusion that we have three propositions, but can only accept two of them at any one time. Job, being human and representing all of us, can be good or bad. God can be good and just or not. God is omniscient and omnipotent or he is not.

If we accept that Job was a good man and that God is just and good, then why was Job (or any one of us) punished so severely? The traditional answer is that Job probably did something wrong. Or that Job will be rewarded in heaven for his suffering. Or that God has a good plan for us, but Job does not understand what the plan is. This thinking does not provide a satisfactory answer for many of us who try to understand the reason for the ongoing injustices, wars, horrors and cruelties of this world.

The view that Kushner and others express is that when we have free will and are not simply God's puppets, we have choice. We can choose to be good or bad. The choices we make are our own and not God's, except that he has given us free will. Kushner goes a step further. When God created the world, or the world came to being, it was created with certain natural laws in place. Such natural laws might be gravity, viruses, old age, whatever. For example, if a loose brick falls from the fifth floor, it is following the natural law of gravity. The brick may fall on the head of a person who is

[87] Of course, the question of evil is one of philosophys and theologies earliest and most persistent questions, and I am not claiming that Kushner suddenly solved it. Among the countless books on the question of evil, just one example is Brody, Baruch A. (ed.) (1974). Here five twentieth century philosophers struggle with this question, in connection with David Hume's „The Argument from Evil"(against God's existance), and some of these philosophers, like Voltaire after the Lisbon earthquake, come to the opposite conclusion from Kushner that „We must conclude from the existance of evil that there can not be an omnipotent, benevolent God." Baruch (1974) 186.
I just find Kushner's arguments logical, common sense and for me, acceptable.

standing in the path of the falling brick. It does not matter to the falling brick that the person is good or bad.[88] It is simply a matter of chance. However, if God were to stand there catching loose bricks which were about to fall on good people and allowing them to fall without intervention on bad people, the world would then be an unpredictable and chaotic place because we would not know with certainty when certain actions would happen. By creating natural laws on which we can rely and by granting free will, God has, so to speak, given away some of his powers. In this sense God is not all powerful or omnipotent, and the expectation, even for those who are religious, is that we cannot passively sit back and rely on God to do everything for us. Humans are required to exercise judgement and to act, and since they have free will, they may sometimes act in ways that are not good for one another or good for themselves. If religious people accept that this is a reasonable explanation for why bad things happen, then they have an obligation and responsibility to watch out for their fellow beings. For those who do not believe in God or in an afterlife, they have a unique obligation and responsibility to look after one another. Thus, we all have an ethical responsibility to help and care for those who are weaker and more vulnerable than we are.

Minorities who are generally weaker and more vulnerable than the majority should have the right to live in freedom and to have opportunities to achieve their full potential. We all have an obligation to care and be involved in achieving this equality.

The reason why we look at the rights of linguistic minorities from the viewpoint of philosophy

Despite our many differences, we in the Western world, for the most part, share common philosophical roots which establish a known basis for dialogue and the

[88] At the moment and in this study, we are not defining what is good and what is bad.

exploration of ideas. One of the advantages of what we call Western philosophy is that much more unites than divides us, regardless whether one's mother tongue is French, English, Croatian, Polish, Hungarian or Slovak. It is the great tradition from pre-Socratic Greek thinkers, through Plato and Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Descartes, Spinoza to Kant, Hegel and others, to Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Existentialists, it is this common intellectual heritage that unites all of us.

Unlike history or linguistics where national schools of thought often predominate, it would be difficult to speak of a Canadian, Slovak or Hungarian school of philosophy. Even such descriptions as the ideas of the French Enlightenment or German Idealism which originated in a certain linguistic and social milieus, later crossing linguistic and political borders, identify schools of thought had a common philosophical foundation. Of course, it would be naïve to think that philosophers are not often under enormous pressure to conform to the ruler's or the state's ideology. We will discuss this in more detail in connection with Stalinism in Hungary, but more generally philosophers have been persecuted world over for their views. Even in relatively tolerant societies such as 17th century Holland, Baruch Spinoza at age 23 was excommunicated by the Jewish community of Amsterdam for his philosophical views[89]. Two of the greatest Arab philosophers also faced persecution. Avicenna (Ibn Sina 980-1037)[90] wrote his great works while fleeing from court to avoid being captured, and Averoes[91] (Ibn Rushd 1126-1198) was persecuted when the sultan needed Islamic Orthodox support in his war with

[89] Kaufmann, Walter, (ed.) (1961). 125.

[90] Audi, Robert (ed.) (1999). 63.

[91] Ibid. 63.

Christian Spain. All this took place in tolerant Andalusia.[92] However, in my view philosophy tends to be more international than, for example, history or national literature.

Andrea Dworkin took Jean-Paul Sartre's concept that anti-Semitism is not an idea but first of all a passion. She extended this idea of passion rather than logic to the "long standing, intense, blood-drenched nationalistic hatreds"[93] that exist in many parts of the world. There is a large part of nationalism that is not logical, not a free dialogue of ideas, but a belief, a passion, a creed. In philosophy we seem to be passionate about things like a search for truth, ethics, ideas and the like, but generally not passionate about the ideas of race, semi-mythical ethnic origins or ancient historical rights. Philosophy tries to be *dis*passionate.

It seems that if we use philosophy to search for reasons why linguistic minorities should have rights, it is more likely that we find some universally accepted principles, rather than if we would use politics or history as the main focus of finding answers. Philosophy seems to be more universal, less tied to a nation. While I have used data and ideas from history, literature and from the social sciences extensively, I have attempted to do so in a philosophical framework.

Of course there is plenty of room and reason to look at the rights of linguistic minorities from historical, sociological, literary or other viewpoints. What is most important is to continue placing the question of the linguistic rights and autonomy on agendas of academic research, especially philosophical research, and by extension on the agenda of everyday discussions.

Dr. Margaret Somerville (1942-) provides us with another reason for studying philosophy. Dr. Somerville is a scientist, law professor and author who examines the

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[92] Audi, Robert (ed.) (1999). 40-42.

[93] Dworkin, Andrea (1982), 121.

ethics of some of the technological decisions we are making in this modern world. She is often controversial and has elicited a fair amount of protest but her thinking invites and provokes much thought. In her recent book *The Ethical Canary*[94] Dr. Somerville uses the analogy of canaries taken into mine shafts long ago to guard against death by toxic mine gases. The small birds were used because they would be the first to succumb to the mine's toxic gases, and would act as a warning to the miners that there was danger. Just as miners needed the canaries long ago to provide an early warning of danger, so we need such ethical canaries today to alert us to the potential danger of acting unthinkingly or unethically. The small decisions we made, when taken to their logical conclusions, may have far reaching ramifications.

She writes that with our ever expanding scientific knowledge, how do we know where to stop? Just because we have the knowledge and skills to do certain things like cloning humans, performing euthanasia, or aborting foetuses based on their sex, should we carry out these actions? And what are the ethical criteria on which we would base our decisions to act? In the past, there would generally be common beliefs to guide our thinking but with globalization and global communication, we are exposed to increasingly varied, differing and sometimes contradictory belief systems. Somerville presents two principles which she thinks could guide us in an age where there is no general agreement on values. What she considers inherently wrong are actions that do not have as their base a profound respect for all life, especially human life; secondly there must be a deep respect for the human spirit. Although she has received a lot of criticism for her second principle as being imprecise, she has also drawn a great deal of praise from those who write and talk about such things as the *secular-sacred* and the need for a

[94] Sommerville, Margaret (2000).

sense of something beyond ourselves and of the metaphysical to guide our ethical progress.

With the technology provided by television, internet i-pods and instant communication, we begin to have a fairly uniform world civilisation. We can all see the same Hollywood movies and listen to the same music in English no matter where we live in this world. But should we passively allow this to happen, should we encourage this trend, and if we do so, what is the implication of this move towards global unilingualism and uni-culturalism? Taken to its ultimate conclusion, we need to ask ourselves if there is a possibility that English or some other language could become the common global language? Will we lose not only our minority languages, but also substantial other languages as we value efficiency of communication more highly than some other values. Will language become homogenized, perhaps with one major language predominating and borrowings from other languages, until a new "global" language is created? It is as we address these broader questions with respect to language and communication, that the value of the philosophy of minority language rights also becomes apparent. By being able to take a more detached and historical view, the philosophy of minority language rights becomes the *ethical canary* for all language rights. How we treat minority language rights may be a harbinger of how language rights in general may be treated in the decades to come.

Philosophy also allows us to state clearly our views of society and humans and human nature and these views will colour and influence most of what we think, say or write about the rights of linguistic minorities. My views about human nature are basically guardedly optimistic. Despite our frequent lapses into stupidity and cruelty, humans are fundamentally not evil, and it is our basic nature to try to care for our fellow humans and our world. My views about human nature are examined later in this essay

when I comment on the work of Willard Gaylin and others, and discuss Social Darwinism. Willard Gaylin, Hans Selye and others believe that humans are not primarily consumers and appropriators of possessions and nature, but that they aim to develop their potential as fully as possible and to enjoy life, this world, and their fellow humans. This echoes John Stuart Mill's view of humanity.

There is an opposite, and intellectually very respectable view, that all animals, except humans, know limits, and in this sense, humans are the greatest danger to our planet and to all life.

I am much less clear about my fundamental views on society. I come back to this question in different contexts. For example, there is a question about whether society's development is linear, progressive, as is often the case according to modern Western thinkers. Or is it circular, repeating itself, as was the view of many medieval thinkers and is the traditional view of Canada's aboriginal peoples. There are all kinds of possible combinations of our views of society, such as upward spiral, downward spiral and, unless we change, straight line to disaster. I would like to believe in an upward spiral and in some improvement of the lot of linguistic minorities.[95]

Alternative definitions and discussion of accommodation

This section contains some of the terms used in this work, with some background material and discussion on how a certain term was developed, how it is used and what is the philosophical background of these terms.

[95] This tentative optimism is a little like the optimism of the former commissioner Linda Chaplin of Orange County in Florida where Disney World and the city of Orlando are situated. People came here to escape the cold, crime and the large cities of the Northern United States. They destroyed the wilderness, cut down the orange groves, put in suburbs and strip malls and Orlando grew five fold from 1971 to 2001. Along with growth came violent crime and drug abuse rates that match or surpass that of other large cities. Linda Chapman was one of the principal architects of this growth. What former Commissioner Chaplin said is that just because we've ruined 90 percent of everything doesn't mean we can't do wonderful things with the remaining ten percent! *National Geographic Magazine* (March 2007). Washington, D.C., 112-113.

In ethics, as in many other areas of philosophy, there is often not general agreement on some fundamental questions by those we acknowledge as truly great philosophers. As an example, the philosophical explanations for the source of Evil and suffering can range from Augustine's or Aquinas' Christian Biblical philosophy to Schopenhauer's Will, the main force in the cosmos beings irrational, blind and meaningless, to many explanations in between. Not one philosopher or philosophical system has all the answers to all of our questions. However, their writings are like brilliant fragments that at various times in our history illuminate our thinking.

An example of different viewpoints regarding our topic is Richard Rorty's (1931-2007) position concerning human rights. Rorty writes that human rights (and by extension, minority rights) need passion and courage rather than reason and theory. He argues that the quest for secure philosophical foundations for human rights is doomed to fail and is practically useless.[96]

If I agreed with Rorty, I would not have worked for years on this topic, but Rorty is a well known and respected philosopher and we have to consider his views. While I acknowledge that there is a place for courage and passion, and they are good qualities, they must be balanced by theory and reason in order to be effective. Socrates' philosophy was based on reason and logic. At his trial, even though he was given opportunity to avoid it, he was prepared to face death with courage in order to underscore the passion of his beliefs. His courage and dignity served to enhance his beliefs which were based on reason and logic.

[96] Rorty, Richard (2006). 112-30. Quoted by Andrescu, Gabriel, 278, in Kymlicka, Will and Opalski , Magda (eds.) 2001.

Ronald Dworkin acknowledges that equality is a complex and unattainable ideal[97] but nevertheless he continues to work to approximate equality, especially for people of colour.

Similarly, there are disagreements about the meaning of words. We can look at the same word differently at different ages, from different places and from different individual or societal angles. I do not agree with Bernard Russell's view that all basic words have meaning by standing for a corresponding entity. I think that Wittgenstein is more correct when he writes that our language is *in*adequate to precisely define certain concepts and ideas, but rather are meant to mark *family resemblances* between the things labelled and the concepts.[98] The words that I try to define designate complex concepts or ideas.

Words such as freedom, *language, patriotism* and *nationalism*, *melting pot* and *assimilation, projection, positive* and *negative identification, philosophy, equity*, *individual* and *collective rights, myths* and *nation* often have a specific meaning, or at least their meaning has a distinct feeling when they are applied to linguistic minorities. For this reason, it is important to define and discuss the value-laden, ever changing, ever evolving meanings of these words as they relate to linguistic minorities. Some of these discussions are almost like mini-essays however this discussion is essential for the clearer understanding of the complexity of these terms as they relate to linguistic minorities.

Accommodation

One of the characteristics of a truly civic society is not only the acceptance of, but the wish to accommodate others. One definition of ***accommodation*** is to be "willing to

[97] Dworkin, Ronald (1985).
[98] For example "Den knur an die Worte, die Liebende zu einander sprechen!Sie sind mit Gefühl „geladen". Und sie sind nicht –wie Fachausdrücke- durch beliebige andere Lauteauf eine Vereinbarung hin zu erzeten. Letzte Schriften Über die Philosophie der Psychologie, §712f. Quoted in Schulte, Joachim (2005)., 105.

adapt oneself to other people's convenience *(fr. L. accommodare (accommodatus), to fit*."[99] I am using ***accommodation*** in the sense used by Beverley McLachlin, Canada's Chief Justice and head of the Supreme Court of Canada in her 4th Annual Lafontaine-Baldwin lecture in 2003. "Accommodation….. means more than grudging concessions. Accommodation, in the strong sense in which I wish to use it, means ending exclusion, encouraging and nourishing the identity of the other[100], celebrating the gifts of difference."[101]

It is in this sense that in Canada, and in other countries, we are expected and often required by law, to accommodate handicapped people in our public places, in stores or in the workplace. For example, we may *accommodate* someone who returns to work after a physical illness by reducing some of the heavy physical tasks they are required to perform, replacing them with more clerical work. It seems logical that a similar expectation or obligation to *accommodate* might be justified in the case of significant linguistic minorities, for example with respect to education, health, social services and in daily life. In 2007, there was a large scale public consultation in Québec, chaired by Lucien Bouchard, a well known Québec academic and by the philosopher Charles Taylor on what is meant by "reasonable accommodation."

Noam Chomsky writes that "a ***democratic society*** is one in which the public has the means to participate in some meaningful way in the management of their own affairs and the means of information are open and free."[102] If we accept a definition something like the above, linguistic minorities often cannot fully participate in a meaningful way in the management of their own affairs because their affairs are often managed by the linguistic majority, and information is often only available to these minorities in a foreign

[99] Cayne, Bernard S. and Lechner, Doris E. (eds.) (1988), *Webster Encyclopaedic Dictionary*, *Canadian Edition*. 5.
[100] Jean-Paul Sartre wrote of the *Other* as the concept by which we define ourselves.
[101] Griffiths, R. (ed.) (2006), 107.
[102] Chomsky, Noam (2002), 9.

language. Therefore, unless these obstacles are eliminated or reduced, we cannot claim that linguistic minorities are fully participating members of a democratic society.

Based on the principles in Joel Feinberg's book, *Social Philosophy*[103] ***freedom for linguistic minorities*** is defined as the situation when its members are free to use their own language, generally their mother tongue, not only in private life but also in education, health and social services and in social and public life. In ideal circumstances, this would also include the workplace. The optimum freedom occurs when members of a linguistic minority are not forced to use the language of the majority in any situation, and they, as a community, enjoy significant autonomy.

Freedom means that people have choices. Freedom inevitably means change. Free people will alter themselves and their surroundings. Senator Jacques Hébert quotes former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau on freedom as follows: "The first visible effect of freedom is change....for change is the very expression of freedom." [104] In East-Central Europe, political freedom in 1989-90 with all its difficulties also meant a resurgence of hope for minority linguistic rights.

Language**,** as defined by the Webster Dictionary is *the organized system of speech used by human beings as a means of communication among themselves.* At the "Language, Culture and Mind" Conference in Paris in July 17-20, 2006, a more complex definition of language was used. "Human natural languages are biologically based, cognitively motivated, effectively rich, socially shared, grammatically organised symbolic systems. They provide the principal semiotic means for complexity and diversity in human cultural life. As long has been recognised, no single discipline or methodology is sufficient to capture all the dimensions of this complex and multifaceted

[103] Feinberg, Joel (1973), 4-19. (Hungarian Translation and comments by Krokovay, Zsolt (1999).
[104] Quoted by Senator Jacques Hébert, "Legislating for Freedom", in Axworthy, T. S. and Trudeau, P. E. (eds.) (1990)., 131 . See also former Canadian PM Pierre Elliott Trudeau's views on this subject (Canadian prime minister from 1968-1984, with the exception of nine months in opposition) .

phenomenon, which lies at the heart of what is to be human".[105] There are many other good and legitimate definitions of what language is. There is also a rich literature on the function of language as a means of communication and of identity and how these two can be identical or be different.

For this work ***linguistic minorities*** does not mean ***recent immigrants***. Recent immigrants, meaning those who have been in a country for less than a generation, often have very similar challenges and face similar discrimination as those faced by minorities who have lived in an area or in a state for many generations, for hundreds, or in some cases, such as the Basques, for thousands of years. There are however, some very important differences. Immigrants generally make a choice to come to a certain country. They are often willing to give up their language in one or two generations in exchange for better living conditions or they are only temporary residents, hoping to go home or to go to a third country. There are many exceptions of course, refugees of wars and tyrannical regimes, and economic poverty, being obvious examples. However, for the most part, immigrants have some choice about where they choose to live. Long established linguistic minorities generally do not have such a choice. Their condition is imposed on them. An example would be that of an elderly person in the Carpatho-Ukraine who, while never once leaving the small village where she was born, has yet in her lifetime lived in six different countries (Austro Hungarian monarchy, Czechoslovakia, Ruthenia, Hungary, Soviet Union, Ukraine).

Another reason for the choice to generally not include recent immigrants is to make our topic a manageable size; the third is the extreme complexity of immigrant populations. Even long term immigrants can be extremely complex. One would think, for example that Canadians of Hungarian descent, a relatively small group in Canada,

[105] From ptephilophd@googlegroups.com on behalf of garai@mail.comptephilophd, 1.

would be somewhat homogeneous. They are anything but that. Of the 145,000 Canadians of Hungarian descent living in Canada in 1988, about 8,000 emigrated before 1914. They were mostly peasants who primarily settled on the prairies of western Canada. Some of them were also Hungarians who came to Canada after a stay in the United States, whose ideas were sometimes different than those who arrived directly from Hungary. Eventually, however, the generally common culture and common language bound both of these groups together.[106] The next group that emigrated between 1925 and 1930 was much more heterogeneous and the largest number settled in the province of Ontario. After the WWII, in the period 1945 to 1950, came about 12,000 "displaced persons" and for such a relatively small group they were the most varied of all the four major groups. This group included left wing intellectuals, professionals and trades people of Jewish origin who were persecuted during the war by right wing governments, police and army and the German occupation forces. Shortly afterward their persecutors had to flee from the Russian armies or from the post war democratic government of 1945-48, and finally many members of this progressive government and its supporters had to, if they could, flee from the totalitarian Communist government that the Russians imposed on Hungary in 1948-49. It is evident, even from such a short summary, that the 12,000 Hungarian immigrants who arrived in this short five year period were anything but homogeneous

There does not seem to be a strong common bond between a right wing officer of the wartime gendarmerie, the Jewish intellectual who fled from this gendarmerie, or the upper class landowner and the socialist politician of 1946. Some members of this group decided to abandon their Hungarian-ness, while others made great sacrifices to pass on

[106] For a thorough discussion of Hungarian immigration to the United States, see Puskás, Julianna (1982). 640.

their language and culture to the children and grandchildren and were most helpful when the next group of Hungarians came in 1956-57.

The last and the largest group of Hungarians to be considered were the refugees of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. 37,000 of them came between 1956 and 1957.[107] They were mainly young, often single males and although they were also a diverse group in their social origins or in their occupations, the experience and purity of the revolution gave then a common ideal to hold on to. Workers, people from collective farms, a few members of the former upper and middle classes, and members of the Communist party who turned against its injustices had more in common than what divided them.

We will not discuss post 1989 immigrants to Canada as they fall into the category of recent immigrants which we have chosen not to include in this study. However, between the four major waves of Hungarian immigrants into Canada, there were significant political, educational, economic and cultural differences. Of course linguistic minorities are not homogeneous either but they have a common oppressor, generally the majority, and they have similar hopes to gain more rights and autonomy.

The complexity of the situation is similar for other minorities. Such groups are often incredibly varied. Canada's Jewish minority is larger than the Hungarian one but it is still relatively small, 280,000 to 300,000 persons, just under one percent of Canada's population. In her book *Putting down Roots*[108] Elaine Kalman Naves, a writer of Hungarian origin, refers to Montreal's Yiddish literature as still alive and well. Writing about the ultra-orthodox branch of Judaism which includes the Hassidic community, she

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[107] The numbers and the fourfold grouping are from Dreisziger, N. F. (1988)., 1028.

[108] Kalman Naves, E. (1998). 55-56. Kalman Naves devotes a whole chapter to Montréal Hungarian poets and writers such as László Kemenes Géfin and György Vitéz, poets who also publish fairly extensively in Hungary. For some of Vitéz' and Géfin' poems, that were published in Hungary, see *Béládi, M.*(1982*).* 216-231 and 361-373.
or *Pomogáts, Béla* (1992). 247-249 and 275-278. Both of the above books are collections of Hungarian poetry by poets who live outside the borders of present day Hungary, in Transylvania, Slovakia, the Carpatho-Ukraine, Serbia, and in Western Europe, North America and Australia.

notes that Yiddish "is the language of daily life of all generations, not only of elderly people". Because of the high birthrate in these communities, there has been a slight increase in recent years among Yiddish speakers in Montréal, and Yiddish is spoken in nearly 10,000 families in the city, an island of East European, pre Second World War life in a Canadian metropolis.

Phillip Solsky is a Toronto radio and television producer. When writing his childhood in Montréal in the 1950's and 60's, he describes a group in the Jewish minority of just one city as follows. "My father associated with the 'Bundists. They were left wingers but not Communists. They were anti-Zionists. They were not religious. When someone died, the coffin was draped in a red flag and the eulogy was Yiddish songs because the Bundists were Yiddish."[109] From the non-religious to the ultra-orthodox, one relatively small minority group within a single city can have a large number of sub-groups that are very different from each other.

As another example, a similar, well defined, relatively small community is that of Estonian immigrants to Canada. The immigrant generation would generally call themselves Canadian-Estonians, and their children would call themselves Estonian Canadians. There are just under 20,000 Estonian speakers in Canada, 8,000 of whom live in Toronto. In 1984 this relatively small community in Toronto had a college (Tartu College), a community centre (Estonian House), 109 non-business societies, 9 church congregations, many of them with kindergarten and supplemental language schools, a 474 bed old people's home, 3 camps outside Toronto for children, a summer community of 200 cottages and many other organisations and services.[110]

[109] Scher, Len (1992). 243 – 244.
[110] Aruia, Endel (1984). 110-112. or http://www.tgmag.ca/magic/mt51.html. I am indebted to Linda Tiido, a Canadian born Estonian-Canadian for this information. Linda spoke only Estonian until she went to school at age six.

There are similar linguistic and cultural islands in rural Canada, such as Low German speaking Hutterites, Amish and some Old Order Mennonites who have been in Canada for many generations and who try to live as their forbears lived in the 18th and 19th centuries, not owning modern conveniences such as cars, radios and television and owning their land as a community. There are hundreds of such immigrant and ethnic groups in Canada. I will not deal with them further in this paper, except to mention that they exist and that linguistic minorities, like any other human group, are anything but homogeneous. What often holds these groups together is language but culturally, politically and in other ways, they can be very different. If smaller groups, such as the Canadian Hungarians, Jewish Canadians or Estonian Canadians are so complicated and diverse, the case is similar or even magnified in larger groups such as Canadians of Chinese, Ukrainian or German origin. Their identities and loyalties are very interesting and well deserve further study, but they are not the topic of my work.

Nevertheless all linguistic minorities are in need of individual rights and in most cases also in need of group rights and autonomy. We will discuss group rights and the right to autonomy in more detail later in this paper.

For the above reasons we define linguistic minorities as larger groups of people who live in a country where they have been a minority for several generations and have a relatively common culture and history, which is often different than that of the majority.

Patriotism and nationalism are terms that are often confused. One definition is provided in 1945, by English writer George Orwell who defines the difference between the two words in the following way. He wrote that patriotism involves a "devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force upon other people". [111] In this sense, the concept was

[111] Henderson, Gerard (April 2003). 1-3.

essentially defensive. Not so, however, *nationalism*, which Orwell maintained, was "inseparable from the desire for power." The abiding purpose of every nationalist was to achieve more power for a nation. He gives as examples, Nazi Germany, the communist Soviet Union, or movements where Orwell mentions "political" Catholicism, Zionism, Anti-Semitism and Trotskyism.[112]

The second definition of acceptable nationalism and set of criteria I am using comes from the "fourfold ethical proviso" used by the Québec Catholic bishops, criteria that was partly based on the work of the Canadian theologian and philosopher, Jacques Grand'Maison's two volume work *Nationalisme et Religion*. Grand'Maison published a summary of his conclusions in 1969 in the distinguished Montreal newspaper, *Le Devoir*, listing ten criteria which the bishops summarized to four points, the "fourfold ethical proviso".

The year 1969 was at the height of the Québec nationalism and séparatiste /souverainiste era. This was a period of time when many Québécois, living in the primarily French language province of Québec in Canada wanted to establish their own state, separate and apart from Canada. Grand'Maison wrote at that time that nationalism and all the activities it entails are judged as human and Christian only if one can reply positively to ten questions. The first two questions have a special relevance for the particular situation in which French Québécois found themselves in the 19th and in the first sixty years of the 20th century, but all ten questions have universal relevance to nationalism and linguistic minorities. His ten questions are as follows:

1. Does this nationalism open the door to a cultural and human renewal following upon an antecedent stagnation, and does it have a realistic chance of success?

[112] Ibid. 1-3.

2. Has this nationalism developed as a reaction to oppression or alienation that has over a considerable period of time harmed a fundamental human right?
3. Does it favour human equality and redistribution of wealth?
4. Does it favour healthy economic development and a stable form of human life?
5. Does it help the people involved in it to discover their true identity and freedom?
6. Will it attempt to open the nation to better relations with other cultures and with the whole of humanity?
7. Does it respect the rights of minorities, even while asking them to participate in the whole?
8. Does it recognize the legitimate autonomy of groups within the national community, respecting the rules of democracy and representation?
9. Will it attempt to integrate immigrants, offering them the same changes of equity and development?
10. Will it support the creation of an authentic culture as the context in which the human vocation can find its development?[113]

The Catholic bishops of Québec offered four criteria, a fourfold ethical proviso partly based on Grand'Maison's ten questions. The proviso asks "Is nationalism creating a more just society, is it respecting the rights of minorities, is it co-operating with neighbouring countries and is it refusing to make the nation the highest value?[114]

[113] Baum, Gregory (2001). 107.
[114] Baum, Gregory (2001). 10, 83, 104 and 108.

How patriotism and nationalism are defined is at the heart of much of how linguistic minorities are treated and what kind of rights and autonomy they can hope for from the majority. In contrast to the 19th century definition of nationalism which, crudely defined, meant one country, one flag, one language, Grand'Maison's questions explore a much more inclusive nationalism.

Jean Vanier, in his 1998 Massey Lectures and published in the book *Becoming Human*, defines three reasons for conflicts between groups: the certitude that one group is morally superior, possibly even chosen by God; a refusal or incapacity to see or admit any errors or faults in our group and a refusal to believe that any other group possesses truth or can contribute anything of value.[115] If we substitute the word *nation* for *group* in Vanier's definition, we arrive at reasons for the main difficulties with extreme nationalism.

In communist Hungary of the fifties and sixties there was a somewhat schizophrenic political view of what nationalism was. As an example, in his introduction to *Existentialism*, a book with selections from the works of existentialist philosophers, Béla Köpeczi writes "nationalism, which at the beginning of capitalism, was a progressive ideology (and is still progressive today in those countries that are fighting for their liberation and independence), from the second half of the 19th century serves more and more the bourgois reactionaries."[116] This contradictory definition may have been one of the *prices* required in 1966 to be able to publish the works of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, Camus and others. The introduction to the book had to be written from a Marxist point of view, and hence is an example of how definitions change to reflect the political atmosphere in which they are written.

[115] Vanier, Jean (1998). 47.
[116] Köpeczi, Béla (ed.) (1966). 9.

Melting pot is a term referring to the merging of different substances into a *new* brew. ***Assimilation*** on the other hand refers to absorbing various new subgroups into the mainstream culture.[117] However in most public dialogue, there is a tendency to equate these two terms.

Projection involves attributing unacceptable attributes, feelings and desires to others in order to deny that we ourselves possess them. In nationalist circles, all kinds of unacceptable characteristics that we don't want to acknowledge in ourselves, or in our nation, are attributed to other, often neighbouring peoples, who ironically are often most like us. Some of the anti-British and anti-American sentiments in Canada belong to this category. Some projections are close to self-deception. Jean-Paul Sartre would call it *mauvaise fois*, a contradiction of the self by itself which, according to Philip Mairet "is very near to the religious description of sin"[118] However we look at it projections are generally untrue or at least exaggerated and often are quite destructive. Like myths, projections are generally an integral part of nationalism.

Positive identity and negative identity are essential parts of our socialization as individuals and as groups. "We are like them, but are not like those." With linguistic and other minorities such as people of colour or native peoples, members of the minority often internalize the negative image that the majority and the media have of them. A positive self image is essential for a full and satisfactory life. Linguistic and other minorities have the right to an undistorted, positive self and group image. That is one of the reasons why a free, independent and well-developed minority media have to be part of the rights of linguistic and other minorities. Once again, depending on the size and resources of the minority, certain compromises are necessary as our resources of time and money are always limited. Another reason why positive identity is so important is the

[117] Etzioni, A. (1996). 295.
[118] Sartre, Jean-Paul, Mairet, Philip (trans.) (1990), 16.

close association between identity, personality and individuality, and a negative or ambivalent sense of identity is detrimental to a person's sense of self image and to their sense of self worth. A person with a poor self image and a sense personal worthlessness is unlikely to have a happy, fulfilling life.

There are literally hundreds of different answers that people have given during the last two and a half thousand years to the question "What is ***Philosophy***?" They range from relatively simple definitions such as "the love and pursuit of wisdom and the search for basic principles"[119] and a "general intellectual approach or attitude"[120] to long and complicated definitions. The Oxford Dictionary defines philosophy as "seeking after wisdom or knowledge, especially that which deals with ultimate reality, or with the most general causes and principles of things, physical phenomena (natural philosophy) and ethics (moral philosophy).[121] There are two ways of studying philosophy. One is the study of the writings of great philosophers, the other more ancient way is to study philosophy by doing it, by trying to live ethically, morally, by living and letting others live in freedom.[122]

Georg Christoph Lichtenberg's (1742-1799) and Samuel T. Coleridge (1772-1834) provide two definitions of philosophy that are interesting and unusual. In his *Aphorisms,* Lichtenberg writes: "Philosophy is ever the art of drawing distinctions, look at the matter how you will. The peasant uses all the propositions of the most abstract philosophy, but wrapped up, embedded, tangled, *latent,* as the physicist and chemist say; the philosopher gives us the propositions in their pure state.[123] (Original "Philosophie ist immer Scheidenkunst, man mag die Sache wenden, wie immer will. Der Bauer gebraucht

[119] Cayne, Bernard S. and Lechner, Doris E. (eds.) (1988), *Webster Encyclopaedic Dictionary*, *Canadian Edition*. 755.
[120] Snow, Charles P. (1963). 19.
[121] *The Oxford Handy Dictionary* (1987). 663.
[122] Scruton, Roger (1999). 11-12. Scruton is one of the thinkers who follows this older way of teaching philosophy in his academic writing.
[123] Berlin, I. (ed.) (1984). 277. Original in Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, *Aphorismen*.

alle die Satze der Abstrakten Philosophie, nur eingewickelt, versteckt, gebunden, latent, wie die Physiker und Chemiker sagt, der Philosoph gibt uns die reinen Satze."[124]) May we live up to Lichtenberg's ideal and not be embedded and tangled but pure and clear. Samuel T. Coleridge was not only a poet and writer and thinker, but according to the Coleridge scholar, Kathleen Coburn, knew and read more about Continental philosophy "than anyone of his time in England".[125] According to Coleridge, the great questions of philosophy are "Where am I? What and for what am I? What are the duties, which arise out of the relations of my Being to itself as heir of futurity, and to the World …. ?[126]

Joel Feinberg writes of *equality* "the principle of perfect equality obviously has a place in any adequate social ethic. Every human being is equally a human being …. And that minimal qualification entitles all human beings equally to certain absolute rights: positive rights to non-economic "goods" that by their very natures cannot be in short supply, negative rights not to be treated in cruel or inhuman ways, and negative rights not to be exploited or degraded even "humane" ways." [127] John Rawls writes "Inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone's advantage.[128]

Louise Arbour, at various times a professor, chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, judge of the Supreme Court of Canada and until recently United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, has an interesting and valid explanation as to why ***equality*** is so difficult to achieve. The real challenge, she writes is "whether we are serious about empowering others who are basically claiming something we have, our land, for instance. That is where our rhetoric of equality and inclusion is very seriously challenged … equality, it's the willingness to share wealth, to

[124] Lichtenberg, G, Ch. 52-53.
[125] Coburn, Kathleen (1979). 70.
[126] Coburn, Kathleen (1979). 71.
[127] Feinberg, J. (1973). 109.
[128] Feinberg, J. (1973). 111, quoting Rawls, John (1958), 165.

share power, and to articulate it as a matter of right and entitlement, which will imply surrendering something we already have." [129] As difficult as it is to do so, we must as individuals be prepared to give up and to share some possessions and rights in order to achieve equality.

All humans have both ***individual and group/collective rights.*** In most democratic states all citizens have inalienable human rights. These include a right to equality before the law and a right to vote. Children have a right to care, protection and education. If we accept that all humans have certain inalienable rights, it is quite likely that, because we are social beings and define ourselves and achieve our full potential only as part of a group, as part of society, that in order for all to achieve these inalienable rights, linguistic minorities have to have certain group rights too. The most practical way to achieve this is through various degrees of territorial autonomy. Individual human rights are generally stated explicitly, while most of the time, group rights for linguistic minorities are implicit, if they are stated at all. *In this work, I am dealing with both individual and collective linguistic rights and the right to autonomy.*

Webster defines ***religion*** as the human expression of acknowledgement of the divine, a system of beliefs and practices relating to the sacred. I generally use ***religion*****,** and ***religious*** in its original, broader sense where it is almost synonymous with ***spiritua****l.* In its original sense, the word religion comes from the Latin word *religare*, meaning to bind together. Although I am very much aware of all the wars, cruelty and stupidity that have been justified by religion, in this original sense religion or spirituality can bind us together as humans and other living beings, in our shared fate in time and space, confined to a very short and limited existence in an infinite world full of wonders that we don't really understand.

[129] Griffiths, R. (ed.) (2006). 200.

Myth *i*s defined by Webster's Encyclopaedic Dictionary as "an old traditional story or legend …giving expression to the early beliefs, aspirations and perceptions of a people and often serving to explain …the origin of a people."[130] True myths can "also serve a function of justifying the social order and accounting for the existence of traditional rites and customs."[131] The Oxford dictionary defines myth as "traditional narrative usually involving supernatural or fancied ideas on natural or social phenomena".[132] Myths not only have great power, but as the work of Carl Jung or Joseph Campbell[133] shows, they fulfill a basic human need for archetypes, poetic explanations for things that we cannot understand or find very difficult to accept. Carl Jung writes that producing myths is common to all humans and that our "collective unconscious" consists of mythological motifs or primordial images to which he gave the name "archetypes". These archetypes influence our religious, scientific, philosophical and ethical ideas.[134] Or as Moyers said "we tell stories to try to come to terms with the world, to harmonise our lives with reality."[135]

True myths were developed and polished throughout centuries or millennia and are mostly universal. In contrast, ***pseudo-myths*** are often created in a very short time, sometimes by one person (e.g. "Ossian"), and are often created to show the superiority of one nation over the other. Of course, there are almost always exceptions. Virgil's *Aeneas* is a pseudo-myth created by one person, but it has become a universal cultural treasure that has been with us for two thousand years. Myths are indispensable ingredients of our culture. They can be beautiful and very interesting but in some cases,

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[130] Cayne, Bernard S. and Lechner, Doris E. (eds.) (1988), *Webster Encyclopaedic Dictionary*, *Canadian Edition*. 660.
[131] Whittaker, Clio (ed.) (2002). 8.
[132] *The Oxford Handy Dictionary* (1987). 578.
[133] Campbell, J. with Moyers, B. (1991). *The Power of Myth.*
[134] Storr, A. (1988). 16.
[135] Campbell, J. with Moyers, B. (1991). 2.

especially in the case of pseudo-myths, they can also be destructive. National socialists used pseudo-myths extensively to enhance and justify racial superiority.

As the universal Greek, Latin and Biblical literature that used to be part of everyone's education becomes less known, nationalist myths seem to have gained importance. Pseudo-myths, often reflecting questionable or false information, are an essential ingredient of nationalism and other ideologies. We tend to hang on to our myths for deep human and psychological reasons even when the facts speak otherwise.

Myths reflect human thinking before philosophy, before the supremacy of reason and logic or, as in the time of romantic nationalism, a reaction to the cold reasonableness of the Enlightenment.

Before philosophy, before critical, abstract, and methodical thought came into being, when humans faced the problems of explaining self and the universe, their thoughts were expressed in myths.[136] It seems that even today emotionally we often like myths better than facts, and myths often become convictions, even though they are not based in fact. If such convictions are not critically and regularly re-examined, they can be dangerous as there is a hazy border between fact on the one hand and pre-conceived ideas and prejudices based on feeling on the other. As Nietzsche wrote in his book *Human, All Too Human* "Convictions are more hazardous enemies of truth than lies".[137]

There are many possible definitions of what a ***nation*** is. The definitions change depending on the historical and cultural context. Jenő Szűcs'posthumus book *The Development of Hungarian National Identity*[138] has an interesting summary of the three possible *meanings of* ***nation*** in medieval Hungary, definitions which were probably valid up to the middle of the 18th century.

[136] For a more thorough discussion on myths and reality see Frankfort, H. and others (1963), 11-39.
[137] Strathern , P. (1996). 58.
[138] Szűcs, J. (1997)

1. Hungarian (*Hungarus*) or "*gens hungarica*" was anyone who was a subject of the "*regnum Hungarie*", the Hungarian Kingdom.
2. However, this notion of ***nation*** readily accepted the separate identity of all of those who had a different national origin (*natione)*, or were different in their language and customs (*lingua et moribus*), something that today we would call a separate national identity,
3. The most important and powerful ***nation*** was the third definition. It consisted of all those who belonged to the privileged nobility, the *natio Hungarica*, and as a body (*corpus*) represented a political elite (*communitas regni*) regardless what their origin or language. Mediaeval Hungary was in many ways a multilingual and multiethnic state.[139]

I am quoting these definitions mentioned by Szűcs to demonstrate how definitions can change in time and cultural context and to show how relatively tolerant and inclusive mediaeval Hungary was with respect to its minorities.

Another interesting use of the concept ***nation*** is that of Canada's native peoples. In the past they were referred to as *Indians* and their communities as *Indian reserves*, however in this generation they call themselves *First Nations* or *First People*. Some first nation could be as small as a community of 150 or 200 people.

There are many definitions of what a ***nation*** is, however in this paper I am using the definition of nation in the general, traditional sense, as "a body of people recognized as an entity by virtue of their historical, linguistic or ethnic links".[140] *To this we have to add that the definition of a nation should also include members of a nation being conscious of a sense of community and a sense of belonging together.* Increasingly we are also using

[139] Szűcs. J. (1997). 337.
[140] Cayne, Bernard S. and Lechner, Doris E. (eds.) (1988), *Webster Encyclopaedic Dictionary*, *Canadian Edition*. 666.

nation as "a body of people united under a particular political organisation, and usually occupying a defined territory".[141] The Oxford Dictionary defines nationality as "a race forming part of one or more political nations."[142] As I am mostly writing in a historical context, I am generally using the first definition.

The 1996 Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights approved in Barcelona states "this Declaration takes **language communities** and not states as its point of departure, and it is to be viewed in the context of the reinforcement of international institutions capable of guaranteeing sustainable and equitable development for the whole humanity."[143] This definition of language communities is better suited for the rights of linguistic minorities than the term nation states.

[141] Ibid. 666.
[142] *The Oxford Handy Dictionary* (1987). 581.
[143] MOST Phase ii website at http://www.unesco.org/shs/most/lnngo 11.htm, 3.

IV

The developmental process of minority language rights

Contributions to a brief summary of the development of minority language rights

After reviewing the contributions of many different thinkers, some of whose work is summarised in the following pages, my hypothesis is that their philosophies can be placed into three broad groups.

There are those who see life mainly as a competition and survival of the fittest. Although Hegel is far too complex to place completely in any one category, we might place him here. Much of Nietzsche, Hannah Arendt, Ayn Rand and the Social Darwinists, such as Herbert Spencer, could be included in this category. Nationalist ideologies frequently refer to the work of these philosophers.

The second group contains the intellectual successors of the philosophers of what is the best in religious traditions and that of the Enlightment, with its tolerance and emphasis on freedom, equality and the communality of all humans. Most Canadian and Hungarian thinkers who seriously study the question of the rights of linguistic minorities belong to this group.

The third group is a smaller, more recent group of thinkers, many of whom come from the sciences. Their approach is that empathy, reciprocity and conflict resolution are what drives evolution, allowing life to evolve and progress and that empathy and cooperation and conflict resolution predates humanity. Willard Gaylin, Frans de Waal, Joachim Bauer, and Jean Vanier are examples of this group.

Minority language rights

Minority language rights are generally based on fundamental human rights. Human rights have only been enshrined in international law relatively recently, but their origins go back to at least Greek and Roman times when natural laws were recognized.

Citizens of many of the Greek city states and those of the Roman Republic could appeal to natural laws against unjust and unreasonable state laws. An example is the Stoics' conception that the universe is governed by logos or rational principle, and that human beings also had logos, reason in them, and therefore were aware of the natural law. These citizens would not necessarily obey a foolish or unjust state law because, at least intellectually, they had an acceptable choice between obeying the state law or a natural law.

During the 16th and 17th centuries there were successful attempts to protect religious minorities from persecution by the state or by the adherents of the majority religion. Many of the Hungarian princes of Transylvania safeguarded a fair amount of religious freedom. The 1557 Diet (Parliament) of Torda in Transylvania asserted the religious freedom of Catholics and three Protestant denominations, the Lutherans, Calvinists and the Unitarians. This was unique in Europe at that time. It was only a generation later that a similar act of tolerance occurred when Henry IV's Edict of Nantes (1598) guaranteed a certain amount of religious freedom for the Protestant Huguenots in France. There are many other examples of attempts to try to provide some measure of protection to religious minorities. This fact is relevant to the rights of linguistic minorities because it was often the case that a certain linguistic minority also corresponded to a religious minority. For exemple, in the Habsburg Monarchy someone who was Unitarian or (Calvinist) Reformed was also most likely Hungarian. Much of the philosophy of the Enlightenment was built upon a belief in the rights of the individual that restrained the rights of the Monarch or the state.

The first, and for a long time only law that protected linguistic minorities in Europe was passed by the Hungarian Parliament, granted at the eleventh hour of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-49, on July 28, 1849 in Szeged. This law was designed to

guarantee national, linguistic and religious freedom for all the peoples who lived in Hungary. Paragraph 7 guaranteed that the language of instruction in all elementary schools would be the language of the municipality (község) or language of the church of the village. Paragraph 14 stated that for any office the best person would be appointed, without any consideration of the language or religion of the candidate.[144]

During the 19th century principles of humanitarian law resulted in the development of organisations to protect those who could not reasonably be expected to protect themselves. These would have included the wounded, civilians, prisoners of war, victims of shipwrecks, and aliens in foreign countries. One such organization would have been the International Red Cross. Many of these 19th century developments culminated in discussions and written agreements at the two Hague Conferences.

After the First World War many ethnic and linguistic minorities ended up, involuntarily, in neighbouring states. Minority treaties or declarations were enacted by most European states after the war. This topic was more fully discussed earlier in the previous chapter. There were also a number of bilateral treaties.[145] These agreements, declarations and treaties were often quite progressive and sometimes implicitly even acknowledged certain minority language rights. However these declarations and treaties were often not enforced *and very few, if any*, *contained references to collective rights.*[146] After the Second World War, in 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. Influenced by the sufferings caused by fascist dictatorships, this declaration emphasised individual rights over those of the state and society. There was less emphasis on group rights than there was after the First World War.

[144] Kovács István (1983). 264-65. (265 quotes this law in full).
[145] For a much more complete discussion of this topic please see the Hungarian book of Andrássy, György (1998), especially 48-163. Also several articles by Andrássy, both in English and in Hungarian.
[146] Ibid. 40-41.

The Helsinki agreement on *Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion, or Belief* came from the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It was signed by 33 European states, the USA, and Canada in 1975.[147] The *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* and the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* both entered into force in 1976. These Declarations and Covenants seem to concentrate more on individual human rights and, unlike the pre-Second World War declarations and treaties, not on minority language rights.

It was not until the late 1980's and early 1990's, with the collapse of Communism and the resurgence of nationalism in Central East and Eastern Europe, that minority language rights became once again more important. This resulted in the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, which was adopted by the General Assembly in December 1992. It came into force on March 1, 1998. This Declaration, in Article 1, defines regional or minority languages as those languages "traditionally used within a given territory of a state by nationals of that state who form a group numerically smaller than the state's population."[148] It expressly excludes the languages of migrants.

The Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights (1996) defines a "language community as any human society established historically in a particular territorial space, whether this space is recognised or not, which identifies itself as a people and has developed a common language as a natural means of communication and cultural

[147] Miller, A. O. (ed.) (1977). 183-187.
[148] Macedo, S. and Buchanan, A. (2003). 167.

cohesion between its members. The term language specific to a territory refers to the language of the community historically established in such a space."[149]

Presently minority language rights and the question of autonomy are receiving more attention from both scholars and politicians than a generation ago however the subject is still relatively neglected.[150] With minorities, the emphasis seems mostly to be on individual rights and not on collective rights.[151] Even when there is an attempt to grant minority rights in international law, it is very weak. An example is the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. In order to overcome the resistance of signatory states, the Convention leaves it to each signatory state to specify whether there are minority groups in its territory that are protected under the convention. Similarly the older 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not offer any criteria by which groups qualify as linguistic minorities deserving state recognition.[152]

It is possible to legalize minority language rights and linguistic diversity. György Andrássy in his paper *How to Legislate Linguistic Diversity*[153] distinguishes four types of language rights. In descending order, they are legal institutionalised rights, recognised and protected rights, recognised rights, and situations where the use of a language is finally forbidden. He concludes that if languages are not treated equally, their speakers

[149] Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights, Article 1. http://www.unesco.org/most/Inngo11.htm p.2-4 Interestingly the Modern Language Teachers in Pécs, Hungary had an influence on the establisment of this declaration.
[150] From Barcelona to Pécs there is a marked increase in the interest and in the number of publications regarding linguistic minority rights. Examples that were published in Hungary are the *Studia Europea*, especially volumes 7, 8 and 9. For example Volume 8 is entitled "Minorities in Europe 2000", (Kisebbségek Európában 2000). There are many other examples.
[151] Andrássy, Gy. (1998). 40-41.
[152] Macedo, S. and Buchanan, A. (2003). 167.
[153] Andrássy, György (2007). "How to Legislate Linguistic Diversity"' http://www.uta.fi/laitokset /isss/monnetcentre/peripheries3/Andrassy.pdf .

are not treated equally either.[154] Andrássy advocates the universal recognition that "everyone has the right to use his/her own language."[155]

For this study I choose a fairly eclectic approach that is often based on social and political philosophy, with a generous use of social sciences, history and literature. One of the reasons for this is personal, for although I received my first degree in philosophy, my graduate degrees are in history and in social sciences. The other reason is more objective and more important. During the last generation, more and more of the important research and scientific work is multidisciplinary. I am convinced that this is the case with many areas of philosophy, especially with such topics as the rights of linguistic minorities.

Throughout this study, I will try to state those assumptions that colour my work and conclusions with respect to this topic. Some of these important assumptions relate to the nature of humans and the nature of society, the others to compromises and shades of grey.

We seem to like to think as if the world were operated on a binary system. Light and darkness, good and evil, spirit and body, nature and culture, organic and inorganic, left and right, before and after, affirmation and negation, Hungarian or Canadian. Real life is much more complex than binary definitions. In all of us there is a whole rainbow of emotions and thoughts, from very unselfish and caring to envious and hateful. The real battle between good and evil is primarily not between nations, races or even individuals; it almost always starts off as a daily fight within each of us. Of course, this internal fight is strongly influenced by external pressures and circumstances. Subjected to the right pressure and in the "right" circumstances, almost any of us could steal a loaf of bread or even kill someone. Nature and culture, heredity and environment and many other apparent opposites often struggle within us.

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[154] Andrássy, "How to Legislate Linguistic Diversity?"' 2.
[155] Andrássy, "How to Legislate Linguistic Diversity?" 6.

Definitions for words like *culture*, *nationality* or *language* are often not as clear and scientific as for words, for example, like *organic* or *inorganic,* although even some primitive life forms can be on the border. Similarly in everyday life, we seem to mix up the absolute and the continuum. There is such a physical concept as light and darkness, but under normal circumstances we most often deal with shades of grey. In non-laboratory conditions we very seldom have total darkness, and where is total light? On the surface of the sun? In a supernova? However, in everyday life, we generally seem to know and seem to agree on what we mean by light and darkness.

Similarly we seem to be able to distinguish on this continuum the difference between what is good and what is evil when, for example, we intentionally cause hurt to another person. To hurt a person without a valid reason is wrong, however if there is a valid reason (e.g. manipulating a broken bone so that it can be set properly for healing), such a hurt may be seen as a good thing. The concept of good and evil exists, in spite of what Nietzsche says, but we humans operate somewhere on a continuum between absolute good and absolute evil.

If the above is true, then we are really wrong when we constantly use binary definitions for humans. For example, a person who has one black grandparent is regarded as "black" in the United States, "coloured" in South Africa, and possibly "white" in some parts of South America. Depending on a combination of grandparents, that same person could have many identities. He or she could be black and/or white and/or Hispanic and/or native, and identity might be a matter of choice. It is similar, but even more so with language and nationality because, unlike with racial characteristics which are often visible, one often cannot tell just by appearance who is Croatian, Canadian, Hungarian or Rumanian. Once again identities might be on a continuum and vary with circumstance.

Let me give a personal example. In most circumstances I feel and designate myself with some pride as Hungarian. But at other times, for example in the midst of a heated Hungarian political argument whose nuances I don't fully understand, or when people talk about their life in Hungary in the 1960's 70's or 80's, then I would identify myself as a Canadian Hungarian. But when my Canadian born wife, children or grandchildren talk about something that is self evident to them but not to me, even after more than half a century of living in Canada, I might still designate myself as Hungarian Canadian. In all honesty, I have not yet been able to identify myself as an unhyphenated Canadian. My identity lies on a continuum between Hungarian and Canadian.

During my visits with Hungarians in Transylvania, Croatia, Slovakia, Serbia and the Carpatho-Ukraine, I observed a similar sense of multiple identity or identity on a continuum. Yes, my relatives in Transylvania or Carpatho-Ukraine are truly Hungarian, and they have with great courage and loyalty continued to think of themselves as Hungarian, but they are also different. They are Transylvanian Hungarians (Erdélyi magyarok) which is a very honourable but slightly different identity from that of Hungarians from present day Hungary.

I think that for all humans, but especially for members of linguistic minorities, it is essential that they can choose their place on a continuum, that they have the right to freely choose their identity, or multiple identities, and that they have the right never to be forced by the majority to assimilate. Some might find legitimate reasons to choose to assimilate (perhaps those from mixed marriages) but that is a very different issue.

Some important general publications

One example of the importance of the question of self-determination and secession and the relationship of these questions to the rights of linguistic minorities is

indicated by the choice in 2003 of The American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy[156] to devote its whole yearbook to this topic. The authors, Allen Buchanan, Mark E. Brandon, Jacob T. Levi, Stephen Macedo, Margaret Moore, Diane F. Orentlicher, Allen Patten and Ruth Rubino-Martin studied a variety of topics such as the nature of the relationship of democracy, minority rights and the rule of law; insiders, newcomers and natives, exploring the boundaries of language rights; how to identify which group should be linguistically accommodated and in which state, the special needs and status of indigenous peoples. They ask whether the immigration/national minority dichotomy can be defended as well as many other questions.

Some of their conclusions are that linguistic neutrality is not an option[157], that groups that do not share in the dominant culture suffer various kinds of disadvantage from their minority status[158], that it is harder and more expensive for members of these groups to maintain their culture and so to live a life they consider worthwhile,[159] and that secession is the last resort for serious and persistent injustices. Canada's issues alone merited 51 notes in this volume.

Hans Kohn's book *Nationalism*[160], although published half a century ago, is a good summary of this topic. As a German speaking Jew, born and educated in Prague, he discusses nationalism from the viewpoint of his Central European culture. Especially interesting is Kohn's collection of writings on nationalism in the second half of his book, writings from Machiavelli through Herder, Dostoevsky, Wagner and Mussolini to Nehru and Sun Yat-Sen. In this selection, Kohn demonstrates both the idealistic as well as the racist or hate-inciting varieties of nationalist thought.

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[156] Macedo, S. and Buchanan, A. and others (2003). 167.
[157] Ibid. 164.
[158] Ibid. 91.
[159] Ibid. quoting Will Kymlicka, without giving source.
[160] Kohn, H. (1955). H. Kohn's essays and readings from Machiavelli, 93-96 to Sun Yat-Sen. 184-185.

A.I. Melton's book *Human Rights* remains a good summary of what are rights, what is justice and equality and what are natural and human rights.[161]

Jean Bethke Elshtain teaches philosophy at Vanderbilt University. In her book, *Democracy on Trial*[162] she examines the complex issue of corrosive individualism, state-ism and characteristics and laws of civil society. She writes that true democracy is always fragile and can never be taken for granted. We do highly value our freedoms, equality and the rule of fair laws, but our selfishness, greed, laziness or our lack of concern can easily erode these values.[163] It is not only globalisation but the proliferation of more and more very narrow, one issue interest groups, who are only willing to accept their own viewpoint and to advocate only for their own interest, which creates a serious danger to democracy. Individually and as a society, we constantly have to work to gain and to safeguard true freedom, equality and tolerance, writes Elshtain. In my opinion, this statement is relevant with respect to rights, freedoms and equality of linguistic and other minorities.

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[161] Melton, A. I. (ed.) (1970).
[162] Elshtain, J. B. (1993).
[163] Sinclair, Donna (February 2007), 12-15. Here is an example of how fragile even such truly cherished values as freedom of speech and religion can be. This example happened in the United States where such values are enshrined in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. It is the case of the All Saints Episcopal Church in Pasadena, California, vs. the Federal Government. Shortly before the 2004 Presidential election, the Rev. George Regas preached a sermon where he, among others, said "If Jesus debated Senator Kerry and President Bush, Jesus would say, "Mr. President, your doctrine of pre-emptive war is a failed doctrine." Forcibly changing the regime of an enemy that posed no imminent danger has lead to disaster". Since 2004, the Internal Revenue Service is investigating this church's charitable status on the bases of a possible political campaign intervention. In July 2006 it requested more church documents and in September 2006 summoned All Saints to appear before an IRS officer. The church refused to comply to these requests. Presently the issue is before the courts. All Saints is a large affluent congregation (it had 1600 members in 2004, now it has 2000) and has a long and proud history that goes from its rector and some members standing in front of trains carrying Japanese-Americans to internment camps during the Second World War, to being a peace church during the Cold War, being one of the first churches to protest against the Vietnam war, and being a sanctuary for Central American refugees. The church also fought for woman's rights and formed interfaith coalitions to work for peace in the Middle East. In its present fight, at a press conference a rabbi stood up, saying, "I am a member of All Saints Church". The rabbi was followed by an imam making the same affirmation. So this is a church that has the moral courage, the financial means and the community support to stand up to the Federal Government. The point of this long example is that even for an organisation with many resources, such a challenge is quite exhausting. Where would it leave small, non profit organisations or individuals?

Similar views were expressed a generation earlier by the English law professor**, Dennis Lloyd (Lord Lloyd of Hampstead)** in his 1964 book, *The Idea of Law*.[164] Lloyd writes on minority rights and opinions: "The tendency of our mass age to produce a high measure of conformism might easily lead to a situation where minority opinions and attacks upon or criticism of the established "theology" of the age may be so severely frowned upon that independent thought and constructive criticism may be repressed. A genuine social democracy, as John Stuart Mill so cogently argued a century ago, must ensure that minority groups are not utterly overborne by the weight of majority opinions."[165]

Lloyd also examines the question of how the state can deal with those sections of the minority which deliberately aim at subverting the essential democratic values of society, for instance by inciting resentment against particular groups on account of their colour, race or religion. [166]

He comes to the conclusion that, in certain situations, however difficult it is to accept for many of us the law ultimately has to be backed up by force. He quotes the dictum of an English judge who says "the best test whether a person alleged to be insane was legally responsible for his acts was whether he would have done what he did if a policeman had been standing at his elbow".[167]

Lloyd reviews the different use of force and comes to the conclusion that in a democratic society governed by laws that are accepted by the majority, physical force should be a rare last resort. In international law, the whole problem of enforcement presents a very different picture, where whole nations and not just individuals, however

[164] Lloyd, Dennis (1963, reprinted 1987).
[165] Lloyd, Dennis, 329-330.
[166] Lloyd, Dennis, 330.
[167] Lloyd, Dennis, 5.

rich and powerful, have to be coerced.[168] He examines the relationship between habits, customs, conventions and the laws. Habits and customs can be socially obligatory, and minorities need understanding and sometimes support, as they often don't follow the habits, customs and conventions of the majority.

C.B. Macpherson's short, tightly reasoned book *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*[169] presents new and interesting insights on, among others, John Stuart Mill's philosophy. Macpherson argues convincingly that by democracy we meant something different before the beginning of the 19th century. For example, the Western philosophical tradition from Plato to the end of the 18th century was generally undemocratic or antidemocratic. Even where democracy existed, such as in 5th century BC Athens, it was democracy only for a certain class of people. It was Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and James Mill (1773-1836) who wrote that democracy can exist even when people have very different incomes and education. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) went a step further. Feeling very badly about social inequality and social injustice at the time, he proposed a democracy that would help humans to develop their powers and capabilities. Mill hoped this would eventually help to reduce social inequalities.

This philosophy remained one of the pillars of most liberal political thinking until at least the middle of the 20th century and is still alive today. Macpherson thinks that we have to move from Mill's liberal, parliamentary democracy to a model of participatory democracy. His concepts and arguments are interesting. He sees the role of elected officials as being partly supplanted by the process of decentralising legislative and economic power to civic and other organisations. This is an idea that might lead to an increase in the participation and decision making power of linguistic minorities.

[168] Lloyd, Dennis, 329.
[169] Macpherson, C. B. (1977).

There are many serious studies that deal with the life of a particular linguistic minority. For Hungarians, such books as Julianna Puskás, *Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Államokban 1880-1940* (*Hungarian Immigrants in the United States 1880-1940)*[170], *Hungarians in Ontario*[171] or *Struggle and Hope - The Hungarian-Canadian Experience*[172] are interesting.

Sándor Benamy's collection, *Amerikában éltek/They Lived in America*[173] is neither scientific nor objective but more of an historical curiosity. It is a collection of the stories of thirteen families who returned in 1950 to Hungary, mainly from Canada but some from the United States, and in the Stalinist era wrote about how terrible it was to live in North America. An example of what students were taught in Canada about citizenship and minorities in the first half of the 20th century is contained in the text *Studies in Citizenship*[174] published in 1938. This book emphasizes the British heritage of the Canadian identity.

There are also several serious studies in English, that deal with the fate of Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian Basin after World War I. A good, but older example is M. Eugene Osterhaven's book, *Transylvania*[175] which deals with the treatment of Hungarian linguistic minorities in Transylvania. *Transylvania: A Short History*[176] by István Lázár's is newer and more encompassing and was published in Hungary. István Lázár's *Hungary, A Brief History*[177] is more for the general, rather than the scholarly reader. For general works in English about Hungarian history and

[170] Puskás Julianna (1982).
[171] Bisztray, G., Dreisziger, N. F., Papp, S. and others (1980).
[172] Dreisziger, N. F. with Kovács, M. L. ,Bődy, Paul and Kovrig, Bennett (1982).
[173] Benamy Sándor (1952).
[174] McCaig, James (1938). 48, 62, 53-57, 68-70, 58-67 and 71-78.
[175] Osterhaven, M. Eugene (1968).
[176] Lázár István, DeKornfeld, Thomas J. (trans.) (1997).
[177] Lázár, István, Tazla, Albert (trans.) (1997).

intellectual development, Denis Sinor's *History of Hungary*[178] is an older, but still very useful and scholarly work. Andrew C. Janos' *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary: 1825–1945*[179] contains good statistics and a very good bibliography.

Some other important works, such as Joel Feinberg's *Social Philosophy* and the work of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin are discussed later in this paper.

Some questions regarding the rights of linguistic minorities

There has always, at least from the time and thinking of John Stuart Mill to the present, existed a tension between balancing the right of the majority to rule in a democracy and the protection of the rights of minorities. The philosophy of Joel Feinberg, István Bibó, Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, Mark Kingwell, Jürgen Habermas, and others often deals with these questions. Some of the questions they write about are as follows:

- Is it possible to protect the individual's human right to the use of his or her own language without assuring collective language rights?
- What are the limits of the rights of linguistic minorities? The resources of every society are limited. How much money, time, and other resources is the majority willing to provide to safeguard the rights of linguistic minorities?
- What type of government is more conducive to the rights of linguistic minorities; a centralized nation state such as France or Hungary, or a federal system of government such as the Germany or Canada? Are there other possibilities such as the system of Swiss cantons, or (despite its present difficulties) the example of Belgium where there exists a mixture of French,

[178] Sinor, Denis (1959).
[179] Andrew C. Janos (1982).

Flemish, and German autonomy as well as the linguistically mixed area around Brussels?

- What are our social obligations and what is the role of the individual citizen in sustaining a just and democratic society with an inclusive and participatory type of citizenship? Is this possible without legislating individual and certain group rights and territorial autonomy for linguistic minorities? The questions of social inclusion, personhood and citizenship, somewhat based on the philosophy of Mark Kingwell (1963-) are related to these questions.
- What is the role of church, synagogue, mosque and non-governmental organizations in the life and in the protection of linguistic minorities?
- What is the relationship between freedom of speech and press, and respect for the culture, religion, and sensibilities of linguistic minorities?
- How can we in an age that some refer to as "post analytic" philosophy retain the rigor and clarity characteristic of the analytic tradition and still accept the ambiguity and compromises that are essential for the accommodation of the rights of linguistic minorities? Charles Taylor discusses some of these questions
- What is the relationship between unilingual nation-states and multilingual nation-states and super-national organizations such as the European Union or the United Nations with respect to the rights of linguistic minorities? How much power can a super-national organization have on domestic national policies?

There are many other relevant questions, however the above sample is a good cross section of some of the more important and obvious ones.

Philosophical systems

Even though they may not have commented or dealt directly with the rights of linguistic minorities in their philosophical work, my approach is to examine how important philosophers might have dealt with this question, had they chosen to do so. The method that I choose is just one of many possible ways of studying this area of the philosophy of the rights of linguistic minorities.

Thinking about the role and rights of minorities goes back several thousand years but in its modern sense, it really started with the Enlightenment. Linguistic minorities were looked upon and treated very differently before the beginning of modern nationalism and nation state, thus to limit our overview to a somewhat manageable size we will concentrate our review from the end of the 18th century to the end of the 20th century. But before we proceed, some historical background will be useful in understanding later developments.

There is something basically decent and generous in all human beings. This belief in the decency of ordinary people lies at the foundation of the British and North American system of a jury, twelve ordinary women or men, who in very complex and difficult cases, will ultimately make a better and more just decision than the most learned single judge. Therefore, even without the protection of laws, because of this respect for others, some minorities have received some protection of their rights since the beginning of time.

In Greek philosophy it was not the Socratic and Platonic circles, but their antagonists the Sophists who were the first thinkers to affirm the equality of man. For example Antiphon, who was referred to by Xenophon as a rival and critic of Socrates, disparaged nobility of birth and recognised no distinction between Greeks and barbarians

in an age when even the greatest philosophers like Socrates, Plato or Aristotle never questioned slavery.[180]

Most ancient and medieval philosophers took it for granted that humans were not equal and that there were no such thing as basic human rights. For the Greeks and Romans it was us versus the "barbarians". For most religious thinkers, it was us, Jews, Christians, Moslems, etc. versus the others, the non-believers or those who believed differently. However, there were exceptions to this assumption that there were no basic human rights. One medieval notion was that of *affectio iustitiae,* which is an inclination to love things for their own intrinsic worth, as opposed to *affection commode*, a tendency to seek one's own advantage[181]. This notion stands in the background of much of our love of liberty, justice and human rights

The second exception is to take the notion of Ocham's (c.1285-1347) razor, that the simplest reason is most likely the true one. Whenever it is at all possible, it seems that it is better, simpler and more just to let people live and work in the language in which they feel most comfortable, in the language of their choice, in their language of comfort. This language will generally be their mother tongue.

Another example of relative tolerance occurs in Andalusia in the 12th and 13th centuries, where Moslem, Jewish and Christian philosophers, theologians and other scholars enjoyed a good deal of freedom and often the support of Almoravid and Almohad rulers[182]. There are other exceptions, but by and large it was not until the Enlightenment that the equality of all humans was accepted, and even then it was with some very notable exceptions. For example, the American Constitution did not condemn

[180] Stone, I. F. (1988). 43-45. In his fascinating book, Stone attempts to reconstruct the "missing case for the prosecution". The Athenian jury, in the middle of a life and death struggle with Sparta, appears in Stone's book as tolerant with Socrates but trying to safeguard the principles of Athenian democracy.
[181] Audi, Robert (ed.) (1999).*The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (*2005), Second Edition. 628.
[182] There are many works on this topic. Egger, Vernon O. (2004) 162-170., 199-205 (Science and Philosophy) and 219-226 (The Transmission of Knowledge) are good summaries of this relative tolerance.

slavery. It was silent on the equality of women and on the destruction of the lives and culture of native peoples.

An excellent example of the thinking of the Enlightenment is **Immanuel Kant** (1724-1804). If we take Kant's Categorical Imperative as a general guide for the principles of human behaviour, than we are asked to "act in such a way that the maxims of our will could at all times constitute the principles of general law", then it would be very difficult in Kant's philosophical system to justify history or historical borders taking precedence over the rights, desires and search for freedom and equality of the people who live today. Kant's view of humans is modern and inclusive. In Kant's philosophy we treat humans as ends and never only as means.

Accordingly, if the interests of individuals and nations have to be secondary to the welfare of all humanity, then compromises are essential, and the rights of one group, usually the minority,[183] cannot be arbitrarily discriminated against in order to satisfy the wishes of the majority. Ultimately the nation state is not the best social organisation to accomplish the welfare of all humanity, including the rights and welfare of minorities. The best organization might be some sort of supranational, world government, something that Kant envisaged in his book, *Eternal Peace*.[184] Kant holds that it is only the acceptance by humanity to act in the interest of all humanity, in opposition to our individual interests, that makes us truly human.[185]

This is very different than the somewhat cynical and perhaps often realistic assessment of Kant's contemporary, **Edward Gibbon** (1737-94) who wrote in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* that personal interest is often the standard of our

[183] Kant, Immanuel, Paton, H. J. (trans.) (1964). 90.
[184] Kant, Immanuel, Székács György (trans.) (1943). *Az örök béke (Zum Ewigen Friede/Eternal Peace).* Budapest: Pen.
[185] Jacoby, Edmund (2005). 173.

belief, as well as our practice.[186] If our philosophical beliefs could approach those of Kant, then our practices with regard to linguistic minorities would also become more tolerant and inclusive.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) had an important role in the development of post-Kantian philosophy. His transcendental idealism, the Wissenschaftlehre, and his influence on German nationalism and on the early Romantics, especially on Novalis and on Schlegel make Fichte an important figure in the development of German idealism and German nationalism. His "Reden an die deutsche Nation" (address to the German nation), delivered in 1808 during the French occupation of Berlin, advocated German patriotism. He also hoped for the development of a truly national state from the purely economical state ("geschlossener Handelsstaat"). He believed that to be truly human, we have to accept that we are only a small link in the eternal chain of a people (Volk),[187] an interesting idea from someone who was accused of being an atheist. This mystical, semi religious view of a people as being eternal, foreshadows Hegel's view of the s tate. Such 19th century nationalism often equated a people with a state, a language and a culture; and this made the acceptance of linguistic minorities more difficult.

If we look at the philosophy of the rights of linguistic minorities from the viewpoint of **G. W. F. Hegel's (**1770-1831) dialectics, where each thesis calls for an antithesis, and these are then resolved, subsumed (*aufgehoben*) in a new synthesis, then we can take the following view and examples.

What the philosophers of the **Enlightenment** regarded as the most important human characteristic was not, as in the previous century, our station, whether we were

[186] Gibbon, Edward (1999). I am not saying that Gibbon approved this statement, just that he wrote that this is how we often think and act.
[187] Eucken, Rudolf (1904). 446-47. Quoted by Rudolf Eucken without giving further information about his source.: *"die besondere geistige Natur der menschlicheren Umgebung, aus welcher er selbst mit allem seinen Denken und Tun und Glauben an die Ewigkeit desselben hervorgegangen ist, das Volk, von welchen er abstammt, und unter welchem er gebildet wurde, und zu dem, was er jetzt ist, heraufwuchhs."*

royalty, aristocrats, nobles, or peasants. Neither did they regard religion, skin colour, native tongue or religion as the most important characteristic. The kind of human beings they were, especially their intellect, the talents they possessed, and how enlightened they were was more important than all the above.[188] The best minds of the Enlightenment fought against superstitions, prejudices and fanaticism. In this way, the age of Enlightenment was favourable to minorities. For example, religious tolerance became an ideal to strive for that led to the relative emancipation of Catholics in Ireland, Protestants in the Habsburg Empire and of the Jews in Western Europe. There were great social and economic injustices and life was very hard for most people, but nevertheless it was a more favourable climate for linguistic minorities than the age of romantic nationalism of the early 19th century.

From the Hegelian philosophical viewpoint, we could regard the romantic nationalism of the early 19th century as an antithesis of the Enlightenment. For people of the Romantic period, it was very important that they regarded themselves first and foremost as French, German or Hungarian. Descent, race and relationships through blood were also very important because, by the 1830's, Romanticism and nationalism were closely tied together.[189] This romantic nationalism often regarded the nation and the state as something that comes from God, something that is the ultimate value in our lives, a kind of *summum bonum.* Hegel's view of the importance of the state is characteristic to Romanticism.

G. W.F. Hegel (1780-1831) wrote "it is God's way in the world, that there is a state whose foundation is the power of the Will that comes from a realised Intellect". (My translation, original "Es ist der gang Gottes in der Welt, dass der Staat ist, sein Grund ist

[188] Berlin, Isaiah (ed.) (1984). 27-29.
[189] Talmon, J. L. (1967).

die Gewalt der sich alls Wille verwirrklichenden Vernunft.")[190] At times Hegel seems to have little use for democracy. He wrote that the great men of history, such as Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar or Napoleon knew best what we have to do, and the majority felt it their duty to obey. In his opinion, the speech and acts of these great men are the best. In the original: Sie "wissen am besten, um was es zu tun ist, und was sie tun, ist das Rechte. Die Anderen Müssen ihnen gehorchen, weil sie das fühlen. Ihre Reden, ihre Handlungen sind das Beste, was gesagt, was getan werden konnte". [191]

A contemporary German philosopher wrote ironically "Führer, give us orders, and we will follow. If only Hegel would have realized where his writing might lead" ("Führer befiel, wir folgen dir! Wenn Hegel das geahnt hatte"). Hegel is such a complex thinker that generations of his followers and other philosophers have continued to disagree on the interpretation of his work, and the above viewpoint is just one of the many possible interpretations of Hegel's thinking.

Hegel's Objective Spirits (morality, culture) are the "whole cultural heritage of a people" which has an objective reality that the Subjective Spirits (individuals) lack, since the human ideas and the human mind are fundamentally social products. According to Hegel, the nation state is the ultimate and best realization of this Objective Spirit.

Hegel's ideas about the Nation-State profoundly influenced 19th and 20th century nationalism and are detrimental for the well being of linguistic minorities. In the chapter on the terms used in this work I present some alternate concepts to Hegel's Nation-State, both what a nation and what a state can be. However brilliant Hegel's ideas might be I think his idealised nation state is very much the product of pre-unification German Romanticism and Idealism.

[190] Derstroff, Hans Josef (2004). 114.
[191] Derstroff, Hans Josef (2004). 114.

In this Hegelian sense, on the more negative side we can regard globalization as an antithesis of the ideal of the nation state. In my opinion, on the more positive side, a multicultural and multilingual society is an antithesis of the romanticized unilingual, nation state.

Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) likens Hegelian thought to building a magnificent palace, a wonder to behold, but continuing to live in a hovel next to it. This suggests an interesting analogy to those who advocate that philosophy and social sciences should remain completely objective and not involved in questions of social justice. To achieve rights for linguistic minorities, we need both a solid philosophical foundation and a personal willingness to work to change injustices.

It is interesting to compare the role played by churches in North America on the one hand, in other countries where the church and the state are closely allied, for example in Russia or in Germany. , In a letter to Adolf Harnack in 1906 Max Weber writes about "the lack of self questioning, scepticism about political authority of German Lutheranism in its historical manifestations."[192] Similarly, Reinhold Niebuhr, writing about Dietrich Banhoeffer in 1945 notes the fateful error of German Protestantism "the complete dichotomy between faith and political life".[193] The deeply religious Kierkegaard is an exception to this reverence to political authority of Lutheranism, or to the Orthodox Church.

This failure of many churches, particularly established state churches to question political authority and social injustice and to concentrate on individual piety and salvation bodes ill for minorities who are oppressed by the majority and the state.

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[192] Sifton, Elizabeth (2003).123.

[193] Sifton, Elizabeth (2003.) 283. Sifton is a writer in her own right, but she is also the daughter of Reinhold Niebuhr, the American born theologian of German descent who was engaged in a life long struggle against social injustices, both in the United States and in National Socialist Germany. For many people, the Serenity Prayer, written by Niebuhr in 1943, seems a centuries old depository of wisdom. ("*God give us grace to accept with serenity the things that cannot be changed, courage to change the things that should be changed, and the wisdom to distinguish the one from the other*").

The Hungarian Reformed Church, with all its faults, is still in the tradition of non-establishment Protestant denominations, such as the Methodists, Quakers or the Salvation Army in Britain, Canada and the United States. It has a long tradition of being in opposition, and often persecuted by the state. For linguistic minorities, whether they were Catholic Poles in the Russian Empire, Catholic or Protestant Hungarians in Transylvania, the non state sanctioned church was often the last and only refuge in their struggle to survive.[194]

John Stuart Mill's (1806-1873) philosophy is briefly discussed in other parts of this thesis in connection with the discussion of *On Liberty* and of C.B. Macpherson's book, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*. Mill completed the development of the liberal democratic doctrine which was started primarily by **John Locke (**1632-1704**).** Locke advocated rule by the majority of the people, government by promulgated laws, and the doctrine of natural rights.

Mills presents three main reasons for the importance of freedom of speech. The minority opinion might be right. Even if it is not wholly true, the minority opinion might contain elements of truth. However, even if we believe that the minority opinion is wrong, facing that opinion will force us to re-examine and understand our own position better. His thinking about liberty and the rights of minorities is absolutely crucial to any discussion about freedom, minorities and democracy. For example, Mill saw that any minority, even in a democracy, can ultimately only have those rights which the majority will grant and tolerate. Mill tried to develop some intellectual safeguards for minorities. One major principle was that in any legal issue between an individual and the state, the

[194] A recent example is the role of Transylvanian Hungarian minister, now Bishop, László Tőkés. In the resistance to the dictatorship of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu, Tőkés' quiet courage and the five thousand Hungarian, Romanian, German people in Timisoara (Temesvár) who supported Tőkés in his church, was the first spark that lead to the revolution which resulted in Ceausescu's fall. I am not sufficiently familiar with Tőkés' recent political role to comment on it, but his role in the 1980s, especially in 1989, is in the best tradition of prophets and to some extent martyrs. Bailey, J. Martin (1991). 102-111.

burden of proof for showing that the individual's behaviour is undesirable, will always rest upon the state, not upon the individual. This principle which might seem self evident for us today originated in Mill's philosophy.[195] On the other hand, Mill, in his writing on The Representative Government regards linguistic and cultural homogeneity as something desirable and as a vital part of a strong political unit.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) not only could not stand Hegel as a person, but his ideas about the role of the state were the opposite of Hegel's, and for that matter Kant's. The philosophers of the Enlightenment did not regard the state only as a necessary evil that was essential to prevent life from being, in the words of Thomas Hobbes, "solitary, poor, nasty and brutish", but that the state helped enlightenment and progress. In contrast, Schopenhauer feared that the state might try to impose the collective will, or for that matter, the will of a tyrant or a fanatical minority, on society and thus there would be little or no room for individuality.[196]

Schopenhauer had no use either for the right wing authoritarian Prussian state that Hegel supported, nor the left wing Hegelians of the 1848 revolutions. He wrote: "The state …..arose through egoism and exists only to further it. This egoism is well aware of where its best interests lie. It proceeds methodically, forsaking the narrowly individual point of view, thus becoming the common egoism of all."[197] This role of the state can be hard on any citizen who does not want to conform, but the "common egoism" is almost always the egoism of the majority and without constitutional and democratic safeguards can be devastating for linguistic minorities.

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[195] For further discussion, please see Popkin, R. H. and Stroll, A. (1956). 60-64.
[196] In existential terms there is always a small room for choices. As the German song says "*Die Gedanken sind frei*" to which the Hungarian poet Gyula Illyés might reply in his poem, *One Sentence on Tyranny* "*nothing you think is fair.....because, where tyranny is, everything is in vain.....because it is standing from the start at your grave, your own biography branding, and even your ashes are its slave.*" Makkai, Ádám (ed.) (2000) 768- 771. In Hungarian "*mert ahol zsarnokság van, minden hiában,..... mert ott áll eleve a sirodnál, ő mondja meg ki voltál, porod is neki szolgá*l." Illyés Gyula (1993). 456.
[197] Strathern, Paul (1999). 72-73.

Schopenhauer has concerns about the misuse of the state's role in encouraging better citizenship. The role of the state as an educator became a brutal reality in the twentieth century in the fascist and communist states. Illyés' poem *One Sentence on Tyranny*, partially quoted in the footnote is a chilling example of what it means to live and try to think freely in such a state.

Hegel's ideal of the great and strong men of history is somewhat similar to that **Friedrich Nietzsche** (1844-1900) but Nietzsche not only admired the great and often ruthless rulers of "lesser men", the worthless masses (Unwürdige Masse), but he admired these supermen even more than Hegel. In Nietzsche's nihilism, in his later state of physical and mental decline these supermen were everything that Nietzsche wanted but could not be. I think some of his writing in this regard is as much drama as philosophy.

Both Hegel and Nietzsche have many brilliant and humane ideas. Nietzsche also wrote some beautiful poetry. It is just that they admired strong, often ruthless leaders, and that side of their philosophy bodes ill for the treatment of minorities. Nietzsche's thinking, particularly his collection of brief aphorisms, is sometimes contradictory, but also subtle and complex and has been interpreted quite differently by different commentators. Nietzsche returns to the question of leaders and ordinary people in many of his works, approaching this issue from different angles. The above view is my attempt to understand the implications of his view for minorities.[198] Discussions of Nietzsche's philosophy also appear under different topics in this paper, for example in the discussion of myths and the discussion of the work of the Hungarian thinker István Bibó.

The philosophical underpinning for this admiration of the strong and ruthless is often connected to Darwin's notion of natural selection and the survival of the fittest. I think there are two possibilities to deal with this misconception. The first is that Darwin

[198] For further discussion of this topic see Richard Schacht writing in Honderich, Ted (ed.) (2001). 175-187.

was wrong and it is cooperation and not competition that has helped us evolve from simple to more complex life forms; the second possibility is that Darwin was misrepresented by the theorists of **Social Darwinism** in their narrow interpretation of his ideas. The term "survival-of-the- fittest", often attributed to Darwin is, in fact, a term introduced by the philosopher Herbert Spencer. Darwin was also much less definitive about terms such as "war of nature" and "struggle for life".

Very different from Hegel and Nietzsche, are the philosophy and writings of **Hannah Arendt** (1906-1975). Similar to Hegel and Nietzsche, she does seem to admire the individual who is apart and is in opposition to most of his/her fellow humans and the state. What is unusual in this similarity to Nietzsche is that so much of Arendt's work is in opposition to; one could almost say the direct result, of communism and National Socialism. Both of these political ideologies misused the philosophy and ideas of both Hegel and Nietzsche. We might disagree with much of what Hannah Arendt wrote. It is often difficult to distinguish in her work what is philosophy and what is literary fiction; however I think that one of her central themes is valid, that the majority of people can lose their identity. According to Arendt, as we lose our uniqueness, our own identity, it becomes much easier to manipulate us. As the saying goes, five hundred university professors together still can act as a mob. Arendt, like many others, struggled with questions as to why we lose our identity and lose our faith in scientific truth and in the liberal ideas of the Enlightenment. How could we, as decent and thinking humans, become the fanatical masses of the communist and national socialist states?

A similar philosophical system to Arendt's is **Objectivism,** a system that was developed by the Russian born American writer **Ayn Rand** (1905-1982).[199] Like Arendt, Ayn Rand mixes philosophy and fiction in her work, such as *The Fountainhead* (1943) or

[199] For a list of Ayn Rand's writings and for a summary of Objectivism, please see Peikoff, Leonard (1982).

Atlas Strugged (1957). Objectivism celebrates "rational self interest", one man's mind in the service of one man's interest. It rejects collective interests, collective wisdom, religion and it does not accept idealistic philosophical systems such as Platonism or Kantian philosophy. It accepts many of Aristotle's principles. Objectivism uses the term "objectivism" differently than most other philosophers. It advocates laissez-faire capitalism and the separation of the state and economics and rejects the welfare state.

As such, both Arendt's and Rand's thinking is welcomed by thinkers at the political right, but it bodes ill to collective rights and freedoms and for the rights and interests of minorities.

I have discussed Arendt and Rand in some detail, not because I regard them as great philosophers (I do regard their philosophical views and contribution as questionable) but because in North America they have influenced more people than most well respected philosophers of their time. Arendt's and Rand's views are diametrically opposed to the notion that we are responsible for those who are in need in our society. In a sense they are social Darwinists.

Acknowledging that such extreme individualism exists and is popular with many people in North America makes it easier to understand our Oriental (especially Buddhist) compatriots' bewilderment about what they consider our selfishness. One of the ultimate aims of Buddhism is to see the "I" and the rest of the world as one. Like the inside and outside of a cup "I" and the rest of the world are not separate and distinct.[200]

One of the many challenges of a multicultural society is how we balance the rights of the individual with collective rights and traditions. How do we deal with many people and politicians who, like Rand, see altruism as both a personal and political weakness?

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[200] There are many good books on Buddhism. I found the summary in Low, Albert (1994). 11-47 is useful.

William van Orman Quine (1908- 2000) makes many interesting observations about languages. In one that is particularly relevant to linguistic minorities, Quine states that exact translation between languages is impossible "because the designation of any two words or phrases as synonymous is impossible to justify completely."[201]

Even within one language the same word, for example *mother*, *husband*, *profession* etc. has a slightly different meaning for each one of us. Not only is a totally exact translation between two languages difficult where two similar words exist, but sometimes there is no corresponding word in one or the other language. For example, there are over thirty words in the Inuit languages for different kinds of snow, but there is no Inuktituk word for the concept of war. There are many similar translation situations. For example recent research discovered that a butterfly in Costa Rica wasn't one species but ten. Yet the local Tzeltal people had already identified and named the caterpillars by different names, because they attacked different crops.

Professor David Harrison tells us that "the knowledge that science thinks it is discovering about plants, animals and weather cycles has often been around for a long time. It is out there; it is fragile and it is rapidly eroding."[202] Every time a language dies, we lose irreplaceable scientific knowledge and cultural treasures. Of the estimated 7,000 languages in the world, half are threatened and some are only spoken by a few elderly people.

The American philosopher, **John Rawls** (1921-2002) writes that there are two principles of justice. The first is that certain liberties, such as liberty of conscience, freedom of thought, and freedom of association are basic and cannot be negotiated away and that an equality of opportunity is essential. The second principle is that a just

[201] Crofton, Ian (2006). 170.
[202] David Harrison, professor at Pennsylvania's Swarthmore College and Director of Research with the Living Tongues Institute, quoted by Calamai, Peter (2007). 1,5.

economic system distributes wealth and income in such a way that the least advantaged persons will be better off than they would be under any other economic system. Freedom for all is the basic principle against which all political institutions and actions should be judged, including the treatment of minorities.

Rawls' theory of the "veil of ignorance" is an ingenious, imaginary political system, in which those in power and those who make major political and economic decisions do not know to what economic or social class they belong. Thus they will make their decisions in such a way that it will benefit all, but especially the least advantaged persons, just in case they happen to belong to this last group of people. It is similar to the situation when two people divide a cake in two pieces, and one will do the cutting and the other will make the first choice. In this way, the result will most likely be just and equal. According to some political philosophers, such as Will Kymlicka, Rawls' veil of ignorance is not a political system.

As elaborated in his two major works in political philosophy, *The Theory of Justice* (1971) and in *Political Liberalism* (1993), Rawls' system would result in linguistic minorities enjoying the fundamental basic freedoms that should be available for every person. Following Rawls' theories, because linguistic minorities are generally disadvantaged, economic policies would have to be developed that would leave linguistic minorities economically better off than they would have been under any other system.

Rawls, in his recent book *The Law of Peoples*[203] advocates that "public reason" can be supported by both religious and nonreligious people; and that the idea of the social contract can be extended to the *society of peoples*. It examines under what conditions liberal constitutional democracies can cooperate and assist non-liberal societies which are underdeveloped and facing poverty. Like most of Rawls' philosophy, *The Law of*

[203] Rawls, John (1999).

Peoples is a work that helps to build bridges between different states, cultures and societies.

It may be difficult for many of us to accept that a constitutional, liberal democracy is not the only form of government that can bring freedom, peace and prosperity to people. Rawls can see another possibility. He suggests that under certain circumstances it is possible for liberal constitutional democracies and other autocratic forms of government to cooperate in a way that leads to compromise, peace and possibly to freedom. The Roman Emperor, Marcus Aurelius is an example of one kind of absolute ruler with whom it might have been possible for a liberal democracy to cooperate. Over eighteen hundred years ago, Aurelius, writing about all the people he learned from and is grateful to acknowledges "From my brother Severus … I received the idea of a polity in which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard to equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed."[204] Not bad from an absolute ruler.

Rawls advocates an economically just "property owning democracy", a kind of liberal socialism that would guarantee rights to all of its citizens, including minorities.

Like John Stuart Mill, Rawls would not accept the legitimacy of any censorship of the content of what we think or write.

Joel Feinberg (1926-2004) worked in social philosophy, especially from the viewpoint of ethics and political and legal philosophy. His four volume work *The Moral Limits of Criminal Law (Vol. 1, Harm to Others, Vol. 2, Offence to Others, Vol. 3, Harm to Self, Vol. 4, Harmless Wrongdoing*) published between 1984 and 1988 is regarded as one of the definitive works on this topic. For those of us who are not legal philosophers,

[204] Charles W. Elliott (ed.) (1980). The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. 195.

his book, *Social Philosophy*[205] is a good introductory summary to some of his thinking. Feinberg would regard freedom, legal rights, human rights and social justice as basic rights that have to apply to both linguistic majorities and linguistic minorities. Feinberg would actually even argue that unborn generations and animals have certain rights. I have looked at Feinberg's philosophy in more detail in the review of literature. In contrast to a defined right, the more universal a right (such as the right to life, freedom and the right to seek happiness, or the right to possessions), the more complicated it may be, and there is a greater likelihood that the right will lead to a clash of needs and desires from different people. His thinking here has a direct connection to the philosophy of the rights of linguistic minorities, since universal rights should apply to all, majority and minority. Feinberg also discusses what true freedom is and how it can be defended. On the other side of the coin, he also examines justifiable restrictions of freedom.

Existential philosophers, with their commitment to individual choice and responsibility, generally support freedom and equality for minorities. One such existential philosopher from France is **Albert Camus** (1913-1960). Writing about Europe and Hungary and in particular about the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Camus observes an example of this dedication to freedom, cooperation, solidarity and creativity. He writes in 1957 "it would be difficult for us to be worthy of such sacrifices. But we can try to be so, in uniting Europe at last, in forgetting our quarrels, in correcting our own errors, in increasing our creativeness, and our solidarity. We have faith that there is on the march in the world, parallel with the forces of oppression and death which is darkening our history, a force of conviction and life, an immense movement of emancipation which is culture and which is born of freedom to create and of freedom to work."[206] Camus was

[205] Feinberg, Joel (1973).
[206] Camus, Albert (1966). 10. The original French is on p. 11-12, the Hungarian translation, 7-8.

committed to a united Europe and wrote with guarded optimism about the power of progress and culture.

C. P. Snow (1905-1980), a noted British novelist, scientist, politician and civil servant, in his essays entitled *Two Cultures: and a Second Look*[207] comes to the conclusion that those thinkers and scientists who don't necessarily believe in an after life or in a god will find, like many others, that the individual condition of each person is tragic, that each of us is alone. Sometimes we escape from solitariness through love and affection, or perhaps creative moments, but most of the time we are alone and we die alone. However, this tragic personal condition does not have to be the social condition. Society survives the individual and we can work to change social conditions from generation to generation. One of those social conditions, which Snow suggests is obvious, is hunger and related early death.

Like Snow, Richard Rorty (1931-2007) writes that a belief in God is not essential for living a committed moral life. Rorty actually thinks that organised religion is a hindrance to freedom and progress. Neither does he believe in objective truth, and he is sceptical, not only of dogmas, but also of objectivity, reason and common sense.[208] Although he has no use for multiculturalism,[209] Rorty believes in social progress and works for a society where other people and ourselves become "we"[210]. He also believes in the power of human action, creativity and solidarity and mutual respect. This part of Rorty's work has a relevance for minorities.

According to **Jürgen Habermas** (1929-) the *life world* (*Lebenswelt*) is where people communicate sincerely about something. It is present in the privacy of the family and in public politics. This *life world* is under constant attack by money and power, the

[207] Snow, Charles P. (1963).
[208] Rorty, Richard (2006). 48.
[209] Rorty, (2006). 156.
[210] Rorty, (2006). 32.

"system". Linguistic minorities are in much greater danger of being swallowed up and annihilated by the system because money and power and the mass media are generally in the hands of the majority. I think that Habermas would agree with the above statements, as he seems to do in his contribution to the book *Multiculturalism* in his essay *Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State.*[211] He writes that linguistic minorities need a *life world* where they can have their own identity and where they can freely communicate. Such free communication is best achieved in one's own language. As Habermas wrote "The identity of the individual is interwoven with collective identities and can be stabilised only in a cultural network that cannot be appropriated as private property any more than the mother tongue itself can be. Hence the individual remains the bearer of the 'right to cultural membership' in Will Kymlicka's phrase."[212]

In the review of relevant literature we have looked at some aspects of **Will Kymlicka**'s political philosophy and how he regards linguistic minorities. Kymlicka's philosophical contributions are quite recent and he often compares the Canadian and the Central and East-Central European experiences. His philosophy is discussed in more detail in the chapter on selected Canadian philosophers

These are just a summary of a few of the possible philosophical viewpoints we could have chosen as guides for our search for a philosophy of the rights of linguistic minorities. Although by necessity oversimplified, what is clear from the summary overview is that most social and political philosophers, at one point or other in their work, have had to confront the question of the rights of minorities. I am convinced that this will remain the case in the future too, because globalisation and nationalism will continue to force the question.

[211] Gutmann, Amy (ed.) (1994). 105-148.
[212] Ibid., 129.

The driving force of evolution is cooperation and not competition

One of the leading American psychiatrists, **Dr.Willard Gaylin**, in his book *Caring* shows that caring is a biologically programmed impulse that is essential for the survival of our species. Gaylin argues convincingly that human infants are so incredibly helpless for such a long period of time that we as a species would not have survived "the hundreds of thousands of years from its inception to a point of organised civilisation where such codes of conduct (protective impulse of the adult for the young) might have been imposed and transmitted via cultural heritage, unless there had been from the beginning an innate genetic response of caring and loving for the helpless newborn".[213] Such caring is absolutely essential for the survival of the human infant. Even though a day old colt can stand or a day-old duckling swim, the adult animals still care for their young. In the case of human infants, who are helpless for much longer, this characteristic is even more evident.

In his chapter on "Attachment" Gaylin quotes Plato at some length in his re-examination of the myth of Aristophanes[214] in which primeval man was round and had four hands and four feet and was cut into half, and each half person continues to search for the missing half. Gaylin regards this as the ultimate parable about caring and its relationship to future love and attachment. His conclusion is that human nature was originally one and we were whole, and the desire and pursuit of that wholeness is called love.[215] Even the story of the tower of Babel reflects this view of human nature, that what is normal and essential to our survival is that we look at the other persons', the other

[213] Gaylin, Willard (1979). 35-51. Also in Moyers, Bill (1989), 119-127. Gaylin is a practising psychiatrist and the President of Hasting Centre, an institution devoted to studying the relationship between biology and ethics.
[214] Gaylin, Willard (1979). 69-70.
[215] Gaylin, Willard (1979). 69-71.

nations' differences, since it is that other part that we are missing and that is necessary to make us whole.

A similar view of the necessity of cooperation for evolution is expressed by **Hans Selye,** the well known scientist and developer of the theory of stress. In his definition of the principle he identifies as *altruistic egotism,* he writes that "single cells combined into multi-cellular organisms and these into larger groups on the basis of this principle, although they were not aware of it. Similarly individual people formed the cooperative 'mutual insurance' groups of family, tribes and nations within which altruistic egotism is the key to success".[216] Many people would say that this is an idealistic and unrealistic view of humans and society. If cooperation and not competition is the wellspring of progress, why are there wars, murders, neglect and suffering. I think that the answer is similar to the relationship between parents and children. It is natural and normal that parents love and care for their children, however there are tens of thousands of children in the world who are neglected, beaten, abused, raped, even killed by their parents. This is a reality that in no way negates the basic premise that parents look after their children. Similarly, despite the awful things that humans inflict on one another, this in no way negates the statement that cooperation, not competition, drives survival and progress.

If we look at minorities this way, minorities are the essential 'other' part of the majority that is missing but is necessary to wholeness. They are not enemies but the missing part that would make us whole. The neurobiologist Joachim Bauer goes further in his book, *The Principles of Humanity: Why we by nature cooperate*[217]. He writes that the research, especially that of the last ten years, clearly indicates that the evolutionary force is cooperation, mirroring and resonance, and that life even at its very beginning needed phenomenal cooperation to built cells from molecules from simple to more

[216] Selye, Hans MD (1974). 34-136.
[217] Bauer, Joachim (2006). 256.

complex life forms. He says all researchers agree that this could not happen through 'selfish genes' or the 'war of nature' ("Verdrangungskapf und Auslese").

From the above reasoning we can conclude that our humanity, our very survival as a species is based on cooperation and on the principle of caring for the weaker ones in our society, and therefore it should be unnatural that we would want to extinguish minority groups and languages. As in biodiversity, the world and our life is healthier, more interesting and is richer if we cooperate and at the same time safeguard our diversity.

Former U.S. Vice-President and 2007 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Al Gore, in his 2007 book *The Assault on Reason*[218] discusses and quotes new neurochemical brain research that utilises functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) of the healthy brain. From this research we are gaining a new understanding of the brain. These new findings enhance our understanding of *fear*, including collective and historical fear and the role of "mirror neurons". This can have far reaching implications for linguistic minorities. Gore writes that the use of the printed word toward reaching general agreement has declined. Now we rely more heavily on electronic images that can elicit emotional responses, often without requiring reflective thought.[219] The parts of the human brain that are central to the reasoning process are continually activated by the very act of reading printed words. "Words are composed of abstract symbols-letters that have no intrinsic meaning themselves until they are strung together into recognisable sequences. Television, by contrast, presents to its viewers a much more fully formed representation of reality without requiring creative collaboration that words always demanded."[220] New York University neuroscientist Joseph Le Doux describes how disturbing images go straight to

[218] Al Gore (2007).
[219] Al Gore, (2007). 11-12.
[220] Ibid. 19-20.

a part of the brain that is not mediated by language or reasoned analysis.[221] Emotions have much more power to influence reason than reason does to affect emotions, particularly the emotion of fear. Le Doux writes that fear can interfere with reason including the realms of memory because those regions of the brain that give us our capacity for fear have their own memory circuits. Through our evolution, this trade off of speed for accuracy, this crude but instantaneous warning system has helped us to survive. However, our capacity to experience fear through the electronic media, when the average U.S. citizen spends two thirds of his free time or about four and half hours every day in front of a television screen, is vastly expanded. In a news clip, we have 30 seconds to absorb images which evoke emotions, but we have no time to reason or reflect on what we have seen before we are bombarded with the next series of images.

Gore also quotes neuroscientists on why the constant movement on the television screen makes us to be glued to television set. For our ancestors, every movement in the trees or in the grass meant either potential food or potential danger, and those who ignored these movements did not pass their genes on. The electronic media exploits these evolutionary adaptations.

In post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which is common with rape victims, child abuse victims and combat veterans, the amygdale part of the brain is activated and long ago traumatic events can feel "present".[222] Therapists who work with these victims through long periods can also experience the same fear as the victims through "mirror neurons". But what is more disturbing is that through television images, large populations who identify with the victims can be traumatised through vicarious traumatisation. Throughout the world, past injustices or horrors, real or exaggerated, can be passed on even centuries after they occurred to people "who feel linked by identity to

[221] Ibid. 28-29.
[222] Al Gore (2007). 29.

the victims of trauma –whether the shared identity is ethnic, religious, historical, cultural, linguistic, tribal or nationalistic."[223] As examples, Gore cites his visit to Greece that coincided with the Pope's visit in 2001. Thousands of angry Greek demonstrators greeted the Pope. Their anger was about the Fourth Crusade that conquered Constantinople eight hundred years before. Another example in 1989, Slobodan Milosevic came to the plains of Kosovo and "revivified the battle of six hundred years earlier (against the Moslem Turks/sh). Over a million people came (and heard him/sh) and the immediate aftermath of that collective traumatisation was a brutal campaign of violent expulsion against Croats, Bosnians and Kosovars."[224]

In the past too, demagogues often tried to whip up hatred against outsiders and minorities to gain power and popularity. But the electronic media has greatly increased their reach. Hitler, Goebbels and their contemporaries used the radio. Today's demagogues and dictators make effective use of television and the internet.

Gore, quoting one of the world's leading neuroscientists, Dr. Vilayanur S. Ramachandaran, writes that "our mental life is governed mainly by a cauldron of emotions, motives and desires which we are barely conscious of. And what we call our conscious life is usually an elaborate post hoc rationalisation of things we really do for other reasons."[225] We are not nearly as reasonable as we would like to believe.

Some conclusions relevant for the philosophy of linguistic minorities from these biological neurological and biomedical researches are that:

- through millions of years of evolution, our brain has evolved circuits to quickly respond to danger and these responses to danger generally bypass our more recently developed ability to reason;

[223] Ibid. 31.
[224] Ibid. 32.
[225] Ramachandran, Vilayanur S. (1991). 28.

- electronic media, especially television, that presents pictures instead the written words further reduces our ability to reflect and to reason;
- we often equate the outsider, "the other", the minority with the enemy, and in this age of the electronic media pictorial, non-reasoned messages about danger from those on the outside can instantly reach millions of people.

These conclusions reinforce our choice of why philosophy, a relatively abstract, reasoned and a relatively non pictorial branch of knowledge is the right discipline to study linguistic minorities.

In my opinion, an opinion that is supported by many scientists, evolution is not moved forward solely by brutal competition where the weak and "unfit" are eventually weeded out, but by cooperation. Nature does not guarantee equal treatment for the weak, but humans and proto-humans, like some other animals, seemed to care for the weak among them.

In addition to examples of caring by animals, there is a 1.7 million year old example for this caring and cooperation even by proto-humans such as Homo erectus. At Lake Turkana (formerly Lake Rudolf) the remains of a 1.7 million year old woman were found (KNM-ER 1808). The woman's bones were "deformed and covered with coarse growth, the result of an agonising condition called hypervitaminosis A"[226], a condition that can only come from eating the liver of carnivores. This woman, though quite ill, survived for weeks or possibly months with this disease, something she could not have done without the help of other proto-humans looking after her and providing her with meat which she could not possibly have hunted on her own. Even proto-humans cared for those who were ill and weak, something that also supports the theory that caring and tenderness is very much part of our genetic make-up.

[226] Bryson, Bill (2004). 450 and 464.

The Dutch born primatologist, Frans de Waal, who is presently professor at Emery University in Atlanta, came to a similar conclusion. In his eighth book, "Primates and Philosophers" he focuses not on competition but on what brings us together: reciprocity, empathy, conflict resolution. He concludes that morality is not a recent trait but one that it is etched into our instincts from early times. Of course we don't always behave morally but de Waal writes that even among chimps, for example, there are Machiavellian leaders. He thinks that there is a straight line to be drawn from that to human politics. (The senior American politician Newt Gingrich recommended one of de Waal's previous books, *Chimpanzee Politics* for freshmen representatives in 1994).[227] The writings of Jean Vanier, especially in his book, *Becoming Human*[228], also support this view.

Rupert Ross, the Canadian jurist, writing about the traditional northern Cree and Ojibway native societies illustrates how cooperation was essential to daily survival as recently as two generations ago. He writes about small closely related groups of fifteen to twenty people, living in relative isolation and dependant on nature and knowledge handed down from their ancestors. Generally, individuals could not survive outside the group. He writes that one of the main reasons for the strength of ancient social norms was the fact of fear of starvation. In order to remain part of the group and not risk banishment and possible death by starvation, it was essential not to show anger, to respect the elders, to cooperate with one another and to do your best to help the whole group. The extended nomadic family itself was always just a few failed hunts away from starvation. Older people knew more about the animals, plants, medicinal plants and suitable camping places. The small group would not constantly search for new knowledge as modern people do. Since they moved in a largely circular motion, annually retracing the places

[227] C. Masters on Frans de Waal (May 2007). *The Most Influential People in The World,* Times 100. 60. *
[228] Vanier, Jean (1998). 98.

where their ancestors lived and hunted, accumulated ancient knowledge and cooperation helped all to survive. They all knew each other, mostly all their lives, and could count on each other.[229] Only the very old and very ill, those who could no longer participate in the nomadic journeys, were left or helped to die.

Historically most humans lived in such small closely knit hunting and gathering groups throughout most of human development. The Neolithic agrarian revolution with its possibility of food surpluses has only happened in the last ten thousand years. This time is negligible compared to the millions of years in smaller cooperative groups. Hence, we are still more genetically imprinted for cooperation.

As evolving humans, it is in these small groups where humans learned and through genetic selection were programmed that without cooperation we would not survive. As humans who now can destroy each other and our environment with relative ease, we have to remember that without cooperation we cannot survive. This rediscovered knowledge is especially important in our thinking about minorities. If the majority and the minorities are not able to cooperate, society is less stable, and there is a heightened risk of destruction, violence and armed conflict which could result in death.

The second important new intellectual trend of our time is connected with the science of space exploration and the ecological movements resulting in the green shift philosophically, politically and in our daily livin. The new view of the Universe[230] and the view of the Earth in the popular press as "a beautiful, endangered and very fragile spaceship" that we picture through the now familiar image of the blue planet in space reinforces our sense that all life forms are completely interdependent. This changing

[229] Ross, Rupert (1992). 41-44, 88-96.

[230] In the 1920's the known universe was less than 200,000 light years in diameter and consisted of the Milky Way galaxy and two small galaxies, one on each side. In the 1990s the Hubble telescope confirmed that our Milky Way galaxy ….. is only one of perhaps a hundred billion. The Earth, moon, planets, Sun, and stars are nothing but tiny specks of matter floating in an unfathomable immensity of space- miniscule, insignificant plankton floating on an infinitely deep cosmic ocean. 2003, Robin Kerrod, Hubble, 14.

world view emphasises our commonality, not our differences, and thus we will have to begin changing our view of the "other", of the minorities. Our world view is getting similar to the view of marriage, where if one partner says, "this is your problem, not mine" it is like saying "your end of the boat is sinking." Climate, air, rain, pollution, winds, know no national borders.

In a way, this new scientific research reinstates reason and universal standards. From Wittgenstein through Rorty and pos tmodernism, relativism rejects the very possibility of universal standards, while positivism, neo-Marxism, and reductionism claim that ideas simply reflect their social base.[231]

Accepting the strong evidence that our present lifestyle is unsustainable and using Feinberg's phrase, we will, in the short run, leave a used up garbage dump for our grandchildren, and in the long run humanity will not survive. The change of lifestyle that is critical and which can save our environment becomes a universal standard for all humanity, regardless of what culture or social structure we live in.

Both principles, that the force of evolution is cooperation and not competition and that all life is totally interdependent could lead to a more tolerant, more cooperative philosophy and world view that could bode well for linguistic minorities.

Some observations

I think that as a population loses its language and culture and religion, there is an even greater danger to the minority group than to the majority group that its members will attach themselves to any fashionable ideology that fills the void left by the loss of a group identity and the sense of belonging to an identifiable group. For example, young Muslims born in Western Europe often do not feel that there is a valid alternative culture

[231] Alexander, Jeffrey (1995). 234.

for their romanticised idea of what an Islamic culture is. Just as their non-Muslim contemporaries often do, many young Muslims feel that material possessions alone do not satisfy their fundamental need to belong, to do something that matters, and to have a meaningful life.

Obviously we need to search for alternatives to material goods and the supposed happiness that a consumer society promises but does not deliver. We have to ask ourselves some fundamental questions. What ideals and what kind of society can we work towards? Under what circumstances can we give our best, and to what cause? One possible area is that in a world that is multicultural and multilingual, we need to respect and know the culture and a little of the language too of our neighbours. We also need to safeguard our values and culture in such a way that we are willing to engage in a constant dialogue with small and large cultures around us, and possibly change and accommodate without abandoning our own identities. Such an ideal is worth giving our best. This respect for the unique cultural treasures of large and small peoples is closely tied to the respect we show for our environment.

For linguistic minorities, their group identity and their society is bound up by their membership in a linguistic minority. If we deny them the possibility of association and meaningful autonomy, then we also deny them this long term more optimistic view of human achievement through cumulative building on the previous generation's achievements.

Next, we might want to investigate the idea of multiple identities and multiple loyalties. There is a possibility, not only would they be acceptable, but they might lead to a more nuanced, tolerant and peaceful world. Our identities as individuals or as a country or nation are not fixed but are continuously evolving. To accept this view of evolving identity is somewhat easier in a country like Canada where there never was a national

group that had overwhelming dominance. Even among the people who spoke English there were fierce loyalties to different countries and different ethnic origins, be it Scottish, Irish, English, Welsh, or American Empire Loyalists. People who came from France and spoke French are the other founding nation, but they suffered a defeat at the hands of the British. Native peoples and later immigrants also often kept their languages and identities, but none of these people ever held an overwhelmingly dominant position within the whole of Canada. This has resulted in the present day overlapping ethnic mosaic in Canada.

However, multiple ethnic identities are not completely foreign to Hungary either. Good examples are the Transylvanian Székely or Transylvanian Hungarians, who regard themselves as both Székely or Transylvanian[232] and Hungarian. There are very few persons, families or nations that are purely of a single origin. I think my own family's history is typical of this varied ethnic history. The reality is that we are all of different ethnic and linguistic origins, and it seems somewhat artificial that since the 19th century we seem to require or expect people to choose one identity and then we expect them to be exclusively loyal to that one identity. We seem to say to people that you might be one quarter Scot, one quarter French, one quarter aboriginal and one quarter Irish, but you must choose one of these identities as your only identify and loyalty.

The second idea is that we also have identities that are not based on language or ethnicity, and these identities may help to bridge the gulf between individuals and nations. Until the late 18th century, religion was more important than language and this continues to be so in some parts of the world today. For example friends from Sri Lanka tell us that in the civil wars there, Tamils who are Hindi and Singhalese who are Buddhist are divided by both language and religion. However, for the 1% of the population that is

[232] Some examples can be found in are Kós, Károly (1934). Page number? and Makkai, László (1989). especially 245-248.

Christian, the common religion is a strong uniting force between Tamil and Singhalese. A first class sport team or orchestra might have people of different language or ethnic origin, but often their common love for their sport or for music or their commitment to the environment or other common cause is a strong unifying force. That is one of the important reasons why a civic society and civic organisations within it are so important. Here minorities can often get the respect, inclusion and accommodation that is generally more difficult to achieve on the national level.

Respect and tolerance for minorities is more difficult to achieve in a centralized state rather a federal form of state. However, even in a federal state, there can be difficulties. In Canada, as Canada's Chief Justice, Beverley McLachlin writes, *The natural inclination of the majority and the more powerful (is) to see the minority and less powerful as less worthy and less entitled to share in all aspects of community life*[233]. The ultimate dark side of extreme group identity is to regard ourselves, our culture and our language, as the best and to dehumanize those perceived as different. McLachlin continues saying about minorities that *they are no longer perceived as human beings, but as some lesser species whose rights may be denied with impunity*.[234]

Our next important conclusion is that individual and group or national identities are not static or fixed, but are continuously evolving. This gives us hope that in the future we will further evolve to the more inclusive, more tolerant, accepting ways of looking at ourselves and our nation or group, and that in the future we will not only accept but welcome multiple identities and multiple loyalties.

Minority languages as irreplaceable cultural treasures

[233] Chief Justice, Beverley McLachlin writing in Griffiths, R. (ed.) (2006). 130.
[234] Ibid. 109.

In most parts of the world in the last century and in many parts of the world today, one could tell from the way a person spoke his/her education, social standing, geographic origin, gender as well as many other characteristics. With television, e-mail and other types of mass media, this is less and less the case. What we see and do will shape our values and actions. Some of this levelling of speech differences is good, but some of the change is dangerous. In an e-mail chat room a middle age male pedophile can pose as a pre-teen girl with no difficulty.

Also these increasingly uniform languages lose much of what was colourful and unique in the regional languages. This is of course even more the case if the speakers choose to use English as a common language of communication.

Minority languages can provide an alternative, more intimate and often more safe way to communicate. The increasingly uniform mass media , advertising, pornography, spam and other undesirable publicity finds it more profitably to target at hundreds of million, instead of a few hundred thousand or less potential customers. In this sense, minority languages can provide an alternative, and often more interesting and sometimes more peaceful and thoughtful environment not so punctuated by mass advertising. If I receive a monthly magazine in a minority language from another continent, the emphasis is different and there is likely less superficial filler and news in it which, after 24 hours, has little or no value or interest, than if I had picked up one of the local boulevard papers. I make a point of almost always listening to the news on the French Radio Canada in an English environment. One gets a different viewpoint. This is one of the small freedoms gained, similar to watching very little television, but having a choice what one reads instead. In this sense, minority languages can be an alternative, or a peaceful island for families or individuals or communities.

A language carries historical and social traditions that otherwise might not be known at all. Finnish, Estonian Hungarian and other Finno-Ugrian people might not know that they are related to each other were it not for their language. There is a very interesting relationship between language, nationality, history and literary tradition that could be the topic of another study. As just one example, Seamus Heaney, who in 1995 received the Nobel Price for literature, follows the history of one Germanic/Anglo-Saxon word *tholian*, "to suffer". In his introduction to the translation of the early medieval elegiac poem, Beowulf, he follows the history of this word *tholian* from Scandinavia to England, then north to Gaelic speaking Scotland, across into Ulster and then into the American South in the 18th century. Behind the travel of this one word, there is the conquest of Britain by Germanic speaking tribes, centuries of peaceful or armed interaction between English speaking people from what is now England and Gaelic speaking Scots, the arrival of the "planters" in 17th century Ireland and finally the arrival of the American colonists in the southern United States from Ulster.[235] Each move is full of history, emotion and literary traditions. There are thousands of words in minority languages that carry similar literary and historical traditions. If they cease to be spoken and eventually disappear, hundreds of such traditions and history will completely disappear with the word and the language. Historical languages such Sumerian, Etruscan or Illyrian have disappeared, but also in the recent past, European languages once widely spoken, have ceased to be spoken. The last speaker of Cornish died in 1777, and the last speak of Dalmatian died in 1898.

Sigmund Freud assumes that in mental life nothing which once was formed can perish – that everything is somehow preserved and that in suitable circumstances it can be once more brought back to life. He uses the interesting analogy of the City of Rome,

[235] Heaney, Seamus (trans.) (2000). XXV-XXVI.

where somehow everything from the oldest Rome, the fenced in Roma Quadrata on the Palatine, through the Republican and Imperial Rome, the medieval and Renaissance city to the modern metropolis in a sense is present. One of Freud's examples is that we know that under where now the Palazzo Caffarelli stands are the remains of the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, first in the shape how the Romans of the Empire saw it, and under it the earliest one, that still showed the Etruscan forms and was ornamented with terracotta antefixes.[236]

In many other cities too one can go from Stone Age settlements through many thousands of years of settlement to the present. Each layer has its unique history. It is similar with languages. What is common in our Finnish, Estonian and Hungarian vocabulary can tell us about the foods, lifestyle, even the area, where the long ago ancestors of these people lived. If an unprotected minority language becomes extinct, with it disappears the whole storehouse of knowledge that it carries.

In Canada, as elsewhere, the culture, world view and life philosophy of Native Peoples and their languages form one organic system. In the language of Northern Inuit people there is no word for the concept of war. In Ojibway (*Anishinaubeaeg*) languages[237] there are no words for such judicial terms as "the accused" or "the offender". The words "offender" or "accused" in the ears of the Ojibway are labels or classifications which are foreign to their society. When a native woman wanted to speak about her abuse, she asked to speak in Ojibway, because it was a "softer" language, a language of comfort, one that was familiar to her, not just in words but in social and cultural values and traditions. The Ojibway terms "she told me (a crown attorney), would not amount to labels like our (English) words would, for they would not characterize the

[236] Freud, Sigmund, Strachey, James (ed., and trans.) (1961). 16-17.
[237] Ojibway is one of the three largest Canadian native languages. It is spoken in the provinces of Northern Ontario, Northern Québec, Manitoba and to a lesser extent in northern Michigan and Minnesota in the United States.

person, but describe, in gentle terms, what he or she had done".[238] In Ojibway culture, a human being is seen as a "thing–which-is becoming", not a "thing-which-is". In response to the "thing which is becoming" concept, the Ontario Native Women's Association did not recommend jail terms. Rather than jail sentences, they recommended "healing houses" for the women, their children and for the men who abused them. The native philosophy is that a dysfunctional person will almost always remain part of the community.[239]

What is important is that words have a cultural connotation. There is no Ojibway word for "saving" but there is one for "hoarding", complete with all its negative implications. Such words or lack of words, express the views of a traditional hunter gatherer society, but more particularly Ojibway society where in small closely knit extended family groups food and most possessions were shared. The Ojibway language has words that describe the world as cyclical, circular, revolving, not linear, progressive, evolving with the focus on being, not doing. This is very unlike the European focus which concentrates on linear progress, rather than cyclical unchanging events.

Translation, from one language to another, from one age to another, is often very inexact. One example would be the German word "Geisteswissenschaften" which we translate as "human sciences". [240] Philosophy belongs to human sciences. "Geist" of course does not mean "human" but rather "spirit". And "Wissenschaft" is not only "science" but also means "wisdom", "knowledge" and "expertise", as did "sciencia" in Latin. How much poorer, how much more inexact our definitions would be, if suddenly we would only have "human sciences", and not "sciencia: or "Geistteswissenschaft".

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[238] Ross, Rupert (1992). 163. Rupert Ross is an Assistant Crown Attorney in Northern Ontario (Kenora) who works closely with Ojibway and Cree people to make the court system more responsive to their native communities. He has written extensively on Native justice issues.
[239] Ibid. 89, 134, 162, 163.
[240] Scruton, Roger (1999). 157-58.

This is just one example from the many thousands. If we lose a language, we also lose much of the philosophy and the unique cultural view it represents.

How then do we safeguard minority languages? We have discussed some legal and rights protections, through legislation. In addition to these, philosophers and other thinkers today have to reach people not only through the printed media, but also though the electronic mass media, to make people aware of the issues of minorities. The majority of people today do not get their information or ideas from books, but from the electronic mass media. During the last two generations society has talked about the need to humanise power, but we also have to work to humanise national sentiments and attitudes so that society never advocates hate, one nation respects other nations, and we all focus on our common humanity instead of our differences.

IV

A Comparison – Hungary and Canada

Preliminary remarks

It is important to state again that I do not believe that there is such a thing as Canadian or Hungarian philosophy. There are Hungarian philosophers and Canadian philosophers who see universal philosophical and universal human questions from a particular viewpoint because they live in a particular milieu and in a particular time

Canadian thinkers are influenced by their environment. Historically, they lived in a vast, sparsely populated land with a harsh climate and a stark beauty, where people won't survive if they don't help each other. Of those who currently live in urban areas in Canada, many will have been influenced by family stories of struggle and hardship which will temper their outlook and thinking. Another influence is the overwhelming population size and power of its neighbour to the south, the United States. These are common experiences that influence the way Canadian philosophers view linguistic minorities.

For Hungarian thinkers, tragic experiences such as almost half of Hungary's population being killed or taken away during the Turkish and German occupation and wars in the 16th and 17th centuries, and the feeling of being caught between the giant powers of Germany and Russia are ever present feelings which give Hungarian philosophy, literature and historical writing a very different colour and perspective from that of large and powerful nations.

What I hope also becomes clear from this overview is that most of Hungary's neighbours share a similar history. Hungarians often seem to concentrate on their differences with neighbouring nations. We say that we belong to Western Roman Christianity; some of our Serbian or Romanian neighbours are Orthodox Christians. We experienced the Renaissance and Reformation, while our Serbian or Romanian

neighbours did not. However judging from thousands of miles away in Canada, it seems that Hungarians have much more in common with other East Central Europeans than what divides them.

For example what has happened and what is happening to Serbia during the last ten to fifteen years is as painful to the Serbs as Trianon was and is to the Hungarians in 1920 and even today. Losing historical parts of one's country is heartrending, whether it is Kosovo, the birthplace of Serbia, or Transylvania with its ancient Hungarian culture and religion which gave refuge to Hungarian literature and thinking in the time of the German and Turkish occupations.

As Hungarians, we are quite familiar with Austrian and German philosophers, but we know little of the philosophers from Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Ukraine, or Slovakia, and do not regard them with the same sympathy and understanding that we seem to give, for example, to Austrian thinkers. To a large extent we share a common past and most likely a common future. It seems however, that studying the philosophy of rights of linguistic minorities in Hungary is incomplete without an understanding of the philosophy of its neighbours. My own inadequacy returns again and again. I lived worked and studied in Hungary, Canada and Germany and speak Hungarian, English and German well and get by in French, but know so very little of the languages and cultures of Hungary's close neighbours. I wish that I could speak at least one of their languages and know their culture better. In Budapest, we have Bulgarian, British, Croation, Czech, Estonian, French, Italian, Russian, Austrian, Armenian, Swiss, Rumanian, Spanish, Slovak and Taiwanese Chinese cultural centres, but not Serbian, Croatian or Ukrainian ones.[241] As the economic situation of these last three countries continues to improve, we can only hope that they will someday also establish cultural centres. Such interchange

[241] Hungarian Writers' Union (2004). 63-71.

and understanding is beneficial and essential for greater understanding between neighbours.

With this limitation in mind, I will continue looking at the Hungarian and Canadian philosophies relating to linguistic minorities in Hungary and in Canada.

Hungarian thinkers

We cannot speak of nationalism and linguistic minorities in the modern sense before the end of the 18th century. Before that time, loyalty to a ruler or a religion was more important than loyalty to a nation state. However, Hungary, being a relatively tolerant multilingual and multiethnic society since it's founding at the end of the 9th century, has a long history of tolerance and relationships with those who speak different languages. The Hungarians, who were a majority until the Turkish conquest in the middle of the 16th century, got along with others who spoke different languages. After 150 years of being a battlefield between Turks, Austrians and other belligerents, Hungary's population, originally the same as England's at the end of the 15th century, was reduced from 4.5 to 2.5 million. The ruling Habsburg monarchy, for a variety of reasons, encouraged large scale emigration from Germany and from Hungary's neighbours, especially Serbs, Croats and Rumanians, into Hungary as a means of repopulating the country. As a result, the Hungarians became a minority in their own country. This history is almost always in the minds of Hungarian thinkers from the time of the Turkish conquest to the present day. In particularly difficult times Hungarian writers, poets and thinkers thought and wrote about the extinction of Hungarians as a people.

The other intellectual result of the disasters and devastation of the wars and occupation of the 16th and 17th centuries was that while during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance Hungary was intellectually and scientifically often at par with the Central

and Western European states, by the end of the 16th century the best Hungarian minds, such as Szenci Molnár Albert (1574-1634) or Márton Szepsi Csombor Márton (1595-1622) (in *Europica varietas* 1620), were painfully aware of how fast and how far behind Hungary had fallen.[242] This feeling of underdevelopment and of being left behind remained a strong intellectual current for centuries to come.[243] Of the little Hungarian history Canadians were taught in Canada, one of the most significant facts was that at one time the Hungarians under King Matthias had a magnificent library, one of the best in Europe, and that it completely disappeared. That this should be the most significant historical fact taught about Hungarians reflects the significance of this decline in the eyes of non-Hungarians.

Both of these intellectual currents, the feeling of loss and fear of extinction; and the feeling of having been left behind by Central and Western Europe strongly influenced Hungarian thinking, including Hungarian thinking about linguistic minorities.
At its best, it made Hungarian philosophers and other thinkers work very hard to bridge this gap, often seeing Hungary as a bridge for progress and ideas between Western Europe on the one hand, and the Balkans and Eastern Europe on the other hand. At its worst it made a virtue out of underdevelopment, "we are different, better than the rest of the world". This sometimes led to advocating forced assimilation of linguistic minorities living in Hungary.

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[242] For further discussion, see Szakály, Ferenc (1990), especially 324-25.

[243] The best minds of Hungary in the 20th century and at present continue to work very hard on closing this gap, a work that is being helped by Hungary's membership in the European Union. Hungary's progress might be measured by six government indicators by the *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series for 2006 Measuring Freedom (Political Rights and Civil Liberties), Political Stability, Human Rights, Government Effectiveness*. Hungary is not very far behind Canada. Under the category of Freedom, where 1 indicates "most free" and 7 "least free", both Hungary and Canada are in rank 1. Russia, on the other hand, has a rank of 6. For the other indicators -2.5 is very bad, +2.5 is perfect. Under Stability Hungary 0.85 and Canada 1.13; Human Rights Hungary 1.16 and Canada 1.38; Government Effectiveness:Hungary 0.68 and Canada 1.96 (big difference). But on the whole, Hungary is no longer among the "bad" countries. Source: Canada Foreign Service Institute (2007). 27-48.

There was one notable exception to this decline and that occurred in the second half of the 16th and the first half of the 17th century in the Hungarian principality of Transylvania (Erdély). While the Turkish conquest of Hungary, coinciding with the Reformation, suppressed the flowering of intellectual life in most of Hungary, the Hungarian principality of Transylvania remained relatively independent and safe, and intellectual thought flourished. Modern Hungarian thinkers often go back to the late 16th and 17th century writers and thinkers of Transylvania, especially to the writings of such Transylvanian princes as István Bocskai (1557-1606), Gábor Bethlen (1580-1629) or György Rákóczi I (1593-1648). Trying to safeguard the relative peace and prosperity of their subjects, yet caught between Turks and Germans, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the general tone of these Protestant Hungarian princes was one of religious and ethnic tolerance.[244]

Diary writing was a well developed literary form in 17th century Transylvania, which continued to be practised well into the early 18th century. There are many philosophical notes in these diaries, some of which relate to linguistic minorities.

Miklós Bethlen's diaries show a wide cultural and philosophical knowledge, but even less sophisticated writers such as Count Mihály Teleki, a high ranking officer in Prince Ferencz Rákóczi's (1676-1735) service, supply very interesting contemporary information. I found Teleki's descriptions of his diplomatic mission to the area of Southern Hungary (Banát), which was still at that time (1709) under Turkish rule informative. It was a multilingual and multiethnic society where Turks, Hungarians, Germans, Serbs and others intermingled. Whether they were loyal to the German Emperor or Prince Rákóczi was much more important than their nationality. Such writings give an interesting view of the daily life in a pre-nation state society. High

[244] Tarnóc Márton (1979). 9-23, 104-120, 133-138.

ranking Turkish officers and dignitaries, who often seem to have adopted some Hungarian customs, are entertained with wine and brandy[245] and people seem to cross borders with relative ease.

For the 18th century, András Mészáros' book, *A filozófia Magyarországon, a kezdettől a 19 század végéig*[246] (*Philosophy in Hungary from the beginning to the end of the 19th century)* is a summary that presents some interesting new ideas about philosophers in Upper Hungary, now Slovakia. However, as a general outline of the whole of Hungarian philosophy it is not quite satisfactory. The book is in Hungarian, but has Slovak and German summaries.

Tanulmányok a magyar és Európai politika történetéből [247] *(Studies from Hungarian and European Political History*) written by Kosáry Domokos, *Magyar filozófia a XX században (Hungarian philosophy in the 20th century)*[248] by Hell Judith and others provide better and more balanced summaries of Hungarian philosophy. Philosophers such as Pauler Imre (1845-1930), Böhm Károly (1846-1911) Palányi Mehyhért (1859-1924), Halasi-Nagy József (1885-1976) are relatively well known among Hungarian philosophers but in these books there were, at least for me, some interesting additions of philosophers which I had previously not known. One of them, Zalai Béla(1882-1916 or1917) who studied in Paris and Leipzig and died as a prisoner of war in Russia (Omsk) and whom Lukács György described as the only original Hungarian thinker,[249] was totally unknown to me and even today I am not familiar with his work.

[245] Teleki, Mihály (1960). 75-89.
[246] Mészáros, András (2000).
[247] Kosáry Domokos (2001).
[248] Hell Judith, Lendvai F. Ferenc, Perecz László (2000).
[249] Hell, Judith (2000). 62.

A XX század politikai filozófiája (*The Political Philosophy of the 20th Century)*[250] by Lánczi András has an interesting observation that is relevant to national minorities. He writes that in the pre modern world there was usually just one dominant ideology (világnézet). The fight for power was inside this dominant world view. On the other hand, in modern politics, there is the everyday fight of many different ideologies and ideas to gain power.[251] This idea is interesting for the safety and survival of linguistic minorities because if there is just one accepted world view this might be restrictive and boring, but it is also safe for both the majority and the minority if they both can accept it. In medieval central and Western Europe, there was a universally accepted concept of God and the Church, accepted by most people, whether they were linguistic majorities or minorities. The first objection to Lánczi's theory is that the situation was different for Moslems, Jews or heretics who did not accept the Church and were discriminated against. As Justice Louis D. Brandeis wrote "men feared witches and burnt women".[252] The other reservation to Lánczi's one dominant ideology theory is that any one dominant ideology is seldom if ever monolithic. For example, in the Communist world, Marxism had many interpretations and schools. In medieval Christendom there were serious controversies over whether the natural laws were the dictates of an eternal reason grounded in God but unalterable even by God, or whether they were the commands of God.[253] In the modern world, where nationalism, as embodied by the idea that *my* language, *my* culture, *my* country is the dominant ideology, this kind of rigid ideology bodes ill for linguistic minorities.

[250] Lánczi András (2000).
[251] Ibid. 20.
[252] Al Gore (2007). 28.
[253] Walter Lippmann (1955) in his book, *The Public Philosophy*, in the chapter on the "Limits of Accommodation" quotes at length Otto von Gierke's 1927 book, *Political Theories of the Middle Ages* on how despite serious controversy about natural laws, all philosophers, theologians and lawyers agreed that natural law was above all mortals, even the Pope or the Kaiser, and their laws, 132-33.

It is an aside, but an interesting one, that when Kenneth McRobbie writes about Karl Polányi, he looks back with nostalgia at the 1920's and 30's, when Polányi's generation had many ideological choices. They could be believers in the free market, or in socialism, or in communism or in other ideologies, while today, according to McRobbie, there is just one dominant ideology which is the rule of the marketplace and globalization that "leads through a ravine on whose walls flicker garish images of consumer appetites; in its ditches lie the carcasses of ever more powerful computers that can calculate everything, except putting a world productively to work."[254] My opinion is that we need a free marketplace of opinions, ideas, and world views, instead of just one dominant ideology, but we constantly have to be on our guard and work hard to avoid ideologies of hatred and intolerance. Such ideologies do not include patriotism, but might include many kinds of nationalism.

During the first sixty to seventy years of the 18th century in Hungary there was some mistrust of philosophy, especially if it was related to the Enlightenment. Even writers such as Baron Lőrinc Orczy cautions his readers not to get too involved in philosophy, which he refers to as unfaithful, unreliable ("*csalfa*") merchandise.[255]

Beginning in the 19th century, the age of Romanticism and Nationalism, there is a group of eclectic Hungarian thinkers who were active in politics, literature, economics and philosophy. Romanticism often used the novel to reach audiences with historical or philosophical messages, readers who might not be reached with pure scientific presentations. Sir Walter Scott's tongue in cheek introduction to his famous medieval romance, *Ivanhoe,* contains a "Dedicatory Epistle to The Rev. Dr. Dryasdust"[256], which illustrates just such an approach. As it is obvious from Scott's invented name for the good

[254] McRobbie, Kenneth (1994). Ix.
[255] Barta, János, Ifj, (1984). 213.
[256] Sir Walter Scott: "Dedicatory Epistle", *Ivanhoe*, in Halsted, John B. (ed.) (1969). 239-250.

reverend, the author himself felt that many of his contemporary academics frightened away potential readers by their "dry as dust" writing styles.

The Hungarian writer and literary critic Antal Szerb, in his *History of the World Literature*[257] also quotes Walter Scott in connection with this discovery of a love and commitment for one's native land and historical past, a feeling that found an enthusiastic acceptance at the beginning of the 19th century, both in Britain and in continental Europe. Antal Szerb reviews Kemény, Eötvös and others who were part of this intellectual movement which conveyed historical, philosophical and political ideas through literature.

In Hungary, the first half of the 19th century saw the general renewal and modernisation of the Hungarian language ("*nyelvújitás*"). The second quarter of the 19th century, the "Reform Period" also saw the development of a Hungarian philosophical language.[258] An early result of this process was the publishing in 1834 of the first Hungarian philosophical dictionary.

Because of Hungary's feudal structure at the beginning of the 19th century, among the most important thinkers four were aristocrats and the others generally belonged to the nobility. What makes this origin interesting is that one of their common characteristics is that they were all willing to abolish most of their hereditary privileges and to free the serfs.

In Hungary the age of reforms (Reformkor1820-1849) produced dozens of first rate writers, philosophers, poets and politicians. Most of them shared a belief in progress, a love of country and of the people of Hungary. The majority of them lived by high

[257] Szerb Antal (1992). 462-463. Szerb quotes Scott's first tales in verse as an illustration for this feeling for a native land: "*Breathes there a man with soul so dead, Who never to himself hath said, This is my own, my native land?*" Walter Scott's novels also made the history, culture and traditions of Scotland, especially those of the Scottish Lowlands and of the Scottish-English borderlands, very popular in early 19th century Scotland and England, and continues to make them accessible for millions of readers throughout the world today.

[258] Mészáros András (2000). Chapter 3, A filozófia nyelvének magyarítása" *(The Hungarianisation of the language of philosophy*). 117-130.

ethical standards, both in their personal and in their public lives. Széchényi, Eötvös, Kölcsey, Kemény, Deák, Madách, Gyulai and others belonged to this idealistic reform generation. My brief overview can in no way do justice to the breadth and quality of their thinking, their lives, and their work. The Hungarian readers might find my brief overview too short and unsatisfactory, however, if any English speaking readers get a taste to further explore the life and philosophy of these thinkers, they will be richly rewarded for their efforts. The intellectual and practical achivements of this reform generation are among the truly hidden treasures of European civilization.

Two of the aristocrats, Count Széchenyi (1791-1860) and Baron Eötvös (1813-1871), found it easier to speak and write in German, but with great determination wrote most of their books in Hungarian. In a sense they were a linguistic minority with multiple identities who chose Hungarian as their primary identity. In an age when social status and most identities were a given and carved in stone so to speak, they were fortunate to be in a position where they were able to choose their linguistic identity.

Széchenyi's accomplishments are so multifaceted that his philosophy seems to be scattered everywhere. From helping to fund The Hungarian Academy of Sciences, to writing books, to regulating the river Tisza and initiating and supervising the construction of the first bridge, the Chainbridge, below Vienna over the Danube, to serving as minister in the first elected Hungarian Government, Count Széchenyi's influence is evident. Apart from his three monumental works (*Hitel, Világ* and *Stádium*), it is his diary which holds so many philosophical treasures which are relevant to minorities.[259] Most histories of Hungary in English, such as Denis Sinor's *History of Hungary*[260] or István Lázár's *Hungary a Brief History*[261] would give a summary of Széchenyi's many

[259] Széchényi István (1978).
[260] Sinor Denis (1959).
[261] Lázár István, Tezla, Albert (trans.) (1997).

accomplishments, but for Széchenyi's thinking and writing, István Nemeskürty book *Széchenyi*[262] in Hungarian is a good summary. Throughout his life Széchenyi was a builder who gave impetus to Hungary's modernisation, so it is not suprising that he saw the relationship of family, nation and humanity in a sense of a building. He wrote in a letter that the road to a people is through its families and to all of humanity through the nations that make it up.[263] I think such a way of looking at peoples and nations emphasizes their common characteristics and not their differences.

Széchenyi István and Wesselényi Miklós got to know each other in 1820. In 1822 they travelled together in Western Europe. They were particularly influenced England, and impressed by Paris and London. Their difficult friendship lasted for three decades until Széchenyi was admitted to a mental hospital in 1848. Although they differed politically, they were united in their fierce love of Hungary and in their desire to bring a feudal Hungary into the world of Western Europe. In his book, *Feleselő naplók (The Dialogue of Diaries*)[264], Meller Sándor uses the diaries of these two reformers to look at the same events from 1820 to 1848. The authors of the diaries look at the same events from two very different viewpoints, yet both are good examples of the idealism and tolerance of this generation of reform writers and politicians who often strongly disagreed, but continued to be friends and to respect each other.

Baron Zsigmond Kemény (1814-1875) studied philosophy in his youth in the famous college of Nagyenyed in Transylvania. Like Eötvös, his philosophy is often embedded in his novels and political writings. In his novel, *Harsh Times* (*Zord idők*)[265] he realistically sees that being located between Russia and Germany, Hungary's independence is unlikely, and a compromise with Austria probably affords the best

[262] Nemeskürty István (1993).
[263] Domokos János (2007), in his article "Az erény a lélek egészsége" (*The health of the soul is virtue*) quoting Széchenyi without giving further information about Széchenyi's letter.
[264] Meller Sándor (1986).Széchenyi István, Wesselényi Miklós, Feleselő naplók. Budapest, Helikon.
[265] Kemény Zsigmond (1975).

possible future for Hungary. Many nationalist Hungarians condemned Kemény for these views.

His faith in the power of ideas is clear from his well known statement that "the ideas that are put down and defeated, mostly revenge themselves on those who triumphed over them with other means than ideas".[266] Kemény's historical and philosophical writing is almost free from the theatrical, picturesque, pseudo romanticism that was so popular by the middle of the century. Aladár Schöpflin, writing of Kemény in his book *The History of Hungarian Literature in the 20th Century*[267] says "romanticism in Hungary required its writers to portray tall, handsome men in their Sunday best, with weapons studded with jewels, and beautiful, sentimental women in picturesque surroundings.....National vanity also played its part. The past had to look beautiful, great and inspiring. .. That is not how Kemény wrote. He looks at his protagonist's feelings, moods, struggles. The protagonist is generally not even a great hero of history. What brings Kemény's protagonists to ruin, and what can we learn from their history, even from their faults, is not attributable to national or Hungarian characteristics, but to those that are universally human. Kemény never became popular".[268]

This honesty of Kemény is so important because he portrays the past realistically and not romantically. As we will see in the case of family myths, we humans love to embellish the past and look at the past through rose coloured glasses. We want to believe that the past was great, that people were more honest and more heroic. We say wishfully, if only we could go back to the good old days.

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[266] "az eszmék, melyek leveretnek, többnyire megboszúlják magukat azokon, kik rajtuk nem az eszmék által diadalmaskodtak." Quoted in Nyíri Kristóf (1980). 43.
[267] Schöpflin Aladár (1990).
[268] Ibid. 116. The above is my somewhat free translation. "*Hősöket ábrázolt, hatalmas, szép férfiakat, pompás ruhákban, drágaköves fegyverekkel és diszekkel, szentimentális szép nőket, festői, pompázó környezeteket……Nemzeti hiúság is hozzászól, hogy a múlt szépnek, nagynak, lelkesitőnek tünjék fel……Kemény nem ilyennek rajzolta a történelmet, lélektani elmélyedéssel vizsgálta alakjainak – többnyire nem is hősies, nagy szereplőknek- lelki életét, indulatait és szenvedélyit, melyek tragédiába rántják őket, s ami tanulságot levon történeteiből, az nem hazafias, hanem emberi tanulság*."

There is much that was beautiful in the past, but also much that was horrible. If we continue with the myth, that Canadians did not always treat native people, Acadians, Japanese, Chinese, German , and Italian Canadians (among others) in insensitive or even cruel ways; if we continue with the myth that Hungarians always treated their minorities in the late 19th and early 20th century in an exemplary way, then we will not learn anything from our pasts. By ignoring the facts of the past, by remembering only the sweet things of the past, our chances of coming up with a just and progressive philosophy for the rights of national minorities is unlikely.

Eötvös József (1813-1871), like Széchenyi and Kemény, was also a universal man, a poet, novelist, philosopher and statesman. His poetry, his literary works, especially his two volume novel, *The Notary of the Village (A falu jegyzője)* is often his vehicle for reaching a larger audience with his political and philosophical message that contain liberal and humane views. His major philosophical work *The Influence of the Major Ideas of the 19th century for the State"*[269] is political philosophy that achieved for Eötvös international fame . His emphasis on the tension between freedom and equality raised this idea more than a century before John Rawls' 1971 book *A Theory of Justice* made it part of our philosophical tradition. Eötvös, as minister of education (1867-1871) in the liberal government of Gyula Andrássy after the Compromise of 1867 was able to realise many of his liberal and progressive ideas in education and in the treatment of linguistic minorities. Under Andrássy's government, Eötvös was able to put into practice and into progressive laws his and his liberal and tolerant generation's ideas regarding the rights of linguistic minorities. As Eötvös wrote in his poem *Last Will,* "raise not a marble dome to keep alive my name, the triump of my thoughts will assume my fame."[270]

[269] Eötvös József (1851).
[270] Kuntz Egon F. (ed.) (1955). 56. *Végrendelet "Márvány szobor helyébe, Ha fennmarad nevern, Eszméim győzedelme Legyen emlékjelem.*

Antall József, the Hungarian statesmen and thinker summarised one of Eötvös' achievements as follows: "Hungary, thanks to Eötvös' steadfast determination ("szivós makacssága következtében") was among the first nations, (1868 S.H.) even before Austria and Prussia, to legislate universal public education in a constitutional way. England only passed its laws of public education in 1870, united Italy in 1871, and France only made public education compulsory in 1882.[271] In the Habsburg and after 1867, in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy people had an opportunity to learn about each others language and culture. In many cities of the Monarchy, such as Lemberg/Lviv/Lvov or Chernivtsi/Chernovtsy, there was no absolute linguistic majority, and thus there was a rich interchange of ideas and cultures. This occurred in many parts of historical Hungary and in other parts of the Monarchy. For example, Hungarian statesmen and revolutionary leader, Lajos Kossuth and others were members of a Serbian cultural society and spoke there several times. Historian Denis Sinor writes that "despite its weaknesses, the Habsburg Monarchy was the only form of government capable of maintaining a measure of concord among the heterogeneous peoples of the Danube valley."[272]

One seldom mentioned achievement regarding the treatment of national minorities in Hungary, and also in the whole of the Habsburg Monarchy, is the treatment of the Jewish minority during the second half of 19th century. Since 1867 the Jews were fully emancipated in Hungary. In 1848 the Jewish population of Hungary was just over a quarter of a million. By 1914, to a smaller extent through natural growth, but mainly through Jewish immigration from present day Poland and Ukraine, Hungary's Jewish population was close to a million.[273]A large part of this new Jewish population was

[271] Antall József (1994). 203-204.
[272] Sinor Denis (1959). 272.
[273] Ibid. 276.

initially also a linguistic minority because it generally spoke Yiddish, Polish, often German, but very little or no Hungarian. [274]

Despite some very ugly anti-Semitic incidents, such as Tiszaeszlár, the treatment of this large, newly arrived Jewish population in Hungary was relatively tolerant. Jews made a very significant progress in commerce, industry and in the learned professions.[275] For example, by 1900 almost half the Hungarian doctors were Jewish.[276]

The German linguistic minority in Hungary also had an above average education and income.[277] There were certainly tens of thousands of very poor people who were members of the German or Jewish minorities, but they were not poor because they were members of a minority, but because in 19th, and in most of 20th century Hungary, there were millions of poor people. The relative affluence of many members of the German and Jewish minorities is a good example of the relative tolerance of the pre-First World War Hungarian society.

The high point of nationalism in Hungary, as well as in Canada, occurred at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. In Hungary at this time, the tolerant, progressive and enlightened linguistic laws of Eötvös and his generation were not always followed and there were attempts to Hungarianise some members of linguistic

[274] My grandfather was born in Mármaros in 1871, one of the main routes of Jewish immigration from Galicia. He remembered Orthodox Jews arriving wearing kaftans and side locks, at first looking out shyly from their relatives' doorways, and a few months later trading on the streets, looking like members of the Hungarian lower middle class. In connection with my grandfather and languages, he could also remember his grandfather and uncles (his father died early) still speaking in Latin when they did not want the servants or women to understand something.

[275] A personal example of this early progress and assimilation is the story of my favorite aunt's, my paternal uncle's wife's family. Her greatgrandfather probably came from Galicia. Her grandfather converted to Christianity, changed his name, acquired nobility and large estates and ended up in the Hungarian Upper House. The situation in the mid 20th century was very different. For example, although her brother started the war as an officer of the Hungarian Army, he continued in forced labour battalions (munkaszolgálatos), ended up in Auschwitz. Although he survived, he seldom spoke of this part of life. .

[276] Sinor, Denis (1959). 276.

[277] Bellér(1981). 106-107.

minorities.[278] Although I personally believe this statement to be true, it is one which is strongly contested by many respected Hungarian historians, jurists and philosophers. However, these attempts to Hungarianize were greatly exaggerated by anti-Hungarian, Central European and Balkan politicians, an exaggeration, which lead to some loss of sympathy for Hungary and the Hungarians prior to the First World War, and might account for the sensitivity of Hungarians to this issue.

Many thinkers and politicians at this time were less tolerant of linguistic and national minorities than the generally more liberal and less nationalistic generation that preceded them. Two Canadian examples of the same period could be seen in the treatment of the Métis and the revoking of constitutionally guaranteed French language rights in Manitoba. These injustices were mostly remedied in Canada in the second half of the 20th century. After the fall of Communism, the treatment of Hungarian minorities generally improved, but it is still quite uneven. In 2008, it is better in the Ukraine and Rumania than in Slovakia or Serbia. We hope that the European Union will result in a similar or even better concord among the people of the Danube valley than was possible in the dual monarchy.

The writings of Baron Miklós Wesselényi (1796-1850) are as progressive as those of Eötvös and Széchényi. His father was instrumental in the establishment of the second Hungarian theatre in Kolozsvár (Cluj-Napoca) at the end of the 18th century.[279] The first theatre was established in Pest. The younger Wesselényi accompanied Széchenyi on his

[278] Antall József, (1994). 171. A Földvidékről…"*a mostoha föld, a nemzetiségi elnyomás és a nagy népszaporulat nem hagyott más vállasztást"* mint a kivándorlást.(In Upper Hungary (present day Slovakia, S.H.) an unfertile land, oppression of nationalities and a high birthrate left little other choice but immigration. Similar views are expressed by Zinkewych, Osyp and Sorokowski, Andrew (eds.) (1979), 179, where they write that "*the Hungarians imposed cultural assimilation (Magyarization) upon their Slavic subject peoples, the Ruthenians(Ukranians) Slovaks and Croatians*." These are just two examples of the hundreds that could be found in Romanian, Slovak, Czech or Serbian works, that often vastly exaggerated the problem of assimilation. The influence of these works in Western Europe and in North America often overshadowed the very humane and progressive nature of the 1868 language laws of Eötvös and Deák.

[279] Szerb Antal (1972). 203.

second voyage to England in 1822, and in the 1830's Wesselényi was the leader of the parliamentary youth (Országgyűlési ifjuság vezére). After being accused of political treason, he was convicted and imprisoned, however he was released after as year's imprisonment because he was going blind.

Wesselényi, in his book *Szózat a magyar és szláv nemzetiseg ügyébe (Appeal in the Cause of Hungarian and Slav Nationalities*)[280] not only advocates an alliance with the serfs, but also wants European constitutional rights to be extended to all of the nationalities who live in Hungary. He corresponded with Deák Ferenc and Kossuth Lajos. At the conclusion of a recent publication of Wesselényi's *Szózat,* Deáks letter on the same topic is also reprinted.[281] Wesselényi was conscious that the lack of understanding between Hungarians and other nationalities within Hungary might eventually result in the dismemberment of Hungary. To force other nationalities, who by the middle of the 19th century also were awakening to national consciousness, to assimilate, would further strain the relations between Hungarians and other ethnic nationalities within Hungarian borders.[282] Wesselényi was keenly aware of Russia's territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe and its dangers to the territorial integrity of Hungary.

He, like Széchenyi, hoped that a common liberal constitution, common interests, commerce and living in the same area would bind people together in such a way that they would be willing to make sacrifices for each other and for the common good.[283] I don't think that such a notion was an example of 19th century unrealistic idealism.

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[280] Wesselényi Miklós Báró (1843/1992).
[281] Ibid. 283-292.
[282] For a good discussion and summary in English of Széchenyi's and Wesselényi's views regarding national minorities in Hungary see Hitchins, Keith (1969). 165-169.
[283] Wesselényi, 188. In Hungarian *"álladalmi szövetségek melynek tagjai alkotmányi rokonság s tehát közös érdekek s életfeltételek csatolnák össze, bizonnyal kölcsönös áldozatokkal is készek lennének egyik a másik egyes érdeke iránt szintúgy tekintettel lenni, mint a közös álladalom nagy egésze javát előmozditani."*

The most memorable experience of my life was the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in which I participated as an inexperienced and almost untrained (we had less than two hours of training on how to use our WW I rifles) eighteen year old member of the National Guard. Unlike so many others, I did not perform any heroic deeds. But one of the most beautiful experiences of the Revolution was my six month stay in Jugoslav refugee camps that followed my brief imprisonment and escape from Hungary. This was the coming together of people of very different backgrounds, former Communists, lifelong Socialists, I, a ”class alien”, people of Jewish. German and other origins. We were welded together in the common task of fighting for freedom and human dignity and for a better future for Hungary, and our differences became relatively unimportant. I think that kind of common binding together of people for a common goal is what Wesselényi is writing of.

Wesselényi advocated constitutional rights for linguistic minorities (*nemzetiségek*) living in Hungary and in the Habsburg Empire. If such meaningful and extensive constitutional rights had been legislated in the 19th century, it is conceivable that the loss of two thirds of historical Hungary at Trianon might not have happened or would have been less extensive than it was.

The well known Hungarian poet and thinker, Kölcsey Ferenc (1790-1838) was working on Wesselényi’s defence when Kölcsey suddenly died. Kölcsey’s advice and encouragement to his young, orphaned nephew, Kölcsey Kálmán (1825-1849) *”Parainesis Kölcsey Kálmánhoz*”[284] is a good example of the idealistic thinking of this, ”Reform generation.” Kölcsey, like others of this generation, had a thoroughly classical education, and even in very difficult circumstances, a faith in humanity and in the future. He had a difficult life. He became orphaned and lost the sight of one eye as a result of an

[284] Kölcsey Ferenc (1995).

epidemic. The year before he died, his peasants revolted against him. For a time (1832-34), Kölcsey was a member of the Hungarian Parliament. He wrote the words of the Hungarian National Anthem (1826). In his poem, *Vaniatum Vanitas,* an important philosophical element appears in Hungarian poetry for the first time.[285] He writes that although he had suffered a great deal, still he safeguarded his love of humanity and trust in the eternal.[286] The thinkers, writers, poets and politicians of Hungary in the reform period were generally known each other personally and they often were philosophers, writers, poets and politicians in one person.

Ferenc Deák, (1803-1876) , a wise jurist and patient politician, the architect of the 1867 compromise with Austria, who helped Count Andrássy Gyula form the Hungarian government of 1867. He belonged to the same enlightened, liberal and tolerant group of thinkers, politicians and writers as the Reform period thinkers previously mentioned. During 1839-40 he was the leader of the opposition in the Hungarian House of Commons (alsótábla). In 1848 he was Minister of Justice in the reform government of Count Batthyány Lajos. In the time of the oppression following the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-49, in the decade of the 50's, he embodied the principle of passive resistance. From 1865 to 1868 he was the leader of the Deák party, but would not accept the post of Prime Minister on principle. He did not want those who opposed the compromise to be able to say that he had agreed to it in order to become the head of the government. Deák had close friendships with many writers and poets, such as Arany János (1817-1882), Kemény Zsigmond (1814-1875), Gyulai Pál(1826-1909) and Vörösmarty Mihály (1800-1855) . After Vörösmarty's death, Deák became guardian of

[285] Szerb Antal (1992). 169-170.
[286] Kölcsey, Ferenc (1995). 68. "*szerelmemet az emberiség s bizodalmamat az örök sors iránt hiven megőrizni törekvém*".

Vörösmarty's children. In 1865 he published a book on law, *Adalékok a magyar közjoghoz (Contributions to Hungarian common law).*

Deák's amendment of the 1868 XLIV law[287] dealing with the rights of nationalities illustrates the very progressive individual rights that existed in Hungarian law in the second half of the 19th century, but at the same time betrays its weakness, in that it did not acknowledge the collective rights of other than Hungarian nationalities. It stated that "all the citizens of Hungary…in a political sense, constitute one nation, the undividable united Hungarian nation, of which every citizen of the country is an equal participant, regardless to what nationality s/he belongs."[288] The philosophical background of this concept of an undividable united Hungarian nation that is made up of many different nationalities, is partly based on the medieval notion of "*natio Hungarica*", where all nobility, regardless of their ethnic origin, were part of the body, "*corpus*" of the ruling political union "*communitas regni*",[289] partly influenced by the notion of the French Revolution's definition of the French *nation*, and was partly a 19th century romantic ideal.

Although the language of law and all higher courts was Hungarian, lower courts and much of local municipal political life, education and religious life might function in a minority language. The language laws were to be publicised (*közzé kell tenni*) in the languages of the minorities. This law also prescribed the obligation of the state to provide schooling in the mother tongue of its citizens (par.17) and to establish university chairs or departments (*tanszék*) for minority languages (par.19).

This was a very progressive law, but as mentioned in connection with Eötvös, at the end of the 19th century there were problems with how it was applied. Bellér Béla

[287] From photocopies of Hungarian laws supplied by Prof. György Andrássy. Also mentioned in Bellér (1981),102.
[288] From photocopies of Hungarian documents supplied by Prof. György Andrássy.
[289] Szűcs, J. (1970). 337-38.

writes in his *History of the Germans of Hungary* that "these laws, in their application, became much worse than what its original intentions were." [290]

After the Second World War and before the communist takeover of 1948/49, Hungarian lawmakers returned to this liberal and tolerant tradition. For example, the 1946/vii law forbade the propagation of hate against groups, nationalities or races.[291]

Imre Madách (1823-1864) differed from the five previous thinkers in that his political life was not nearly as important as his literary and philosophical masterpiece, *The Tragedy of Man.*[292] In this work, Madách presents many of his philosophical ideas in a poetic drama. In its fifteen scenes, he portrays his Adam and Eve in a variety of situations, ranging from the time of Creation to the time when the frozen earth is almost dead. Pertaining to our topic, in scene twelve Madách presents through Adam his view of why a native country belonging to a smaller, more intimate group of people is beneficial and necessary in even the most enlightened and egalitarian society. Madách writes: "Man's breast ….distrusts the Infinite, And loses interest as it broadens. It clings both to its past and to its future. I fear it cares far less for the whole world. He who would shed his blood to save a brother, May have a tear, at most, to give a friend."[293] Madách also practised his philosophy of responsibility and caring. After the collapse of the 1848-49 Hungarian Revolution, he was jailed for sheltering political refugees and spent a year in jail, during which time his wife deserted him. From then on, he lived in seclusion. This could be one of the reasons why Madách's view of Eve throughout history is somewhat ambivalent. As he writes in *The Tragedy of Man* "women, what an amalgam of good and bad".

[290] Bellér, Béla (1981). 104.
[291] Mezey Barna (ed.) (1996). 327.
[292] Madách, Imre, Meltzer, Charles Henry and Vajda, Paul (trans.) (1957).
[293] Ibid. 238.

The literary critic, writer and poet Pál Gyulai (1826-1909), although less of a philosopher and more a literary person than the others, belongs to the same honest, progressive, liberal generation as those mentioned above. At the end of his long life he had become a little more conservative, but he continued to look at the past and the present in an honest, non theatrical way. His short novel *The Last Owner of an Old Manor House*[294] is a good antidote to the very romantic views about how everything was just so nice in the mid 19th century.

In the 19th and early 20th century Hungary followed the philosophical trends of Europe, particularly those in Austria and Germany. There were heated arguments about the interpretation of Kant's and Hegel's philosophy, and slowly theology and philosophy became quite different disciplines. By the end of the 19th century, Hungarian translations of famous philosophers first begin to appear. *Filozófiai Irók Tára* (*Collections of Philosophical Writers)* was published in 1881, and a year later the first philosophical magazines began to appear. *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle (The Hungarian Philosophical Review)* was followed in 1885 by the Catholic and Thomist *Bölcsészeti Folyóirat (Philosophical Magazine).*

The co-editor of the *Hungarian Philosophical Review* was Károly Böhm (1846-1911). He was the developer of the first independent philosophical system in Hungary. Although his language can sometimes be difficult and archaic, Böhm is an interesting and original thinker.[295] Böhm's philosophy does not deal with linguistic minorities in any direct way but his life is typical of many of the thinkers of Hungary. His father is of German origin, his mother Hungarian origin; he himself was born in Upper Hungary, now Slovakia, and was professor of philosophy and died in Kolozsvár, now Cluj-Napoca, in Transylvania, then Hungary, now Romania.

[294] Gyulai Pál (2004).
[295] Ungváry Zrínyi Imre (2002).

József Halasy-Nagy (1885-1976) is one of the Hungarian university professors who could make philosophy interesting and accessible to high school students and lay people. In his book The Great Systems of Philosophy"[296] published in 1929, he presents the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche in 77 pages in such a clear way, that his book is still used by many today.

The next thinker, István Bibó (1911-1979) is in many ways similar to his 19th century predecessors, Kemény, Széchényi and Eötvös. He is also a statesmen, writer, historian and philosopher, and in some ways his thinking was influenced by Eötvös' work, *The influence of the leading ideas of the 19th century for the State.* Of course Bibó lived in very different times and had to face different problems, such as living in totalitarian state, but his decency, liberalism and tolerance make Bibó a natural successor of the previously mentioned 19th century thinkers. Like Eötvös and John Stuart Mill, Bibó also struggled with the relationship of freedom and equality and with the question of of possible despotism of the majority in their treatment of minorities. As a politician, Bibó opposed both the persecution of Jews and later that of ethnic Germans. He paid the price for his convictions with prison sentences. [297]

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[296] Halasy-Nagy József (1929, reprinted 1993).

[297] Bibó's life is a good example of how, even in the 20th century in East and Central Europe, many thinkers paid dearly for their convictions. Bibó was born in 1911 and graduated from the University of Szeged. He studied on state scholarships for two years in Vienna and Geneva. During the German occupation of Hungary in 1944 he used his position as a jurist in the Interior Ministry to provide false papers for people of Jewish origin. He was imprisoned by the Hungarian Nazis and when released, lived underground without papers. After the war he held different government and judicial positions where, in opposition to official government policy, he opposed the deportation from Hungary of citizens of German ancestry. From 1946 to 1950 he was a university professor and a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. From 1950 to 1956 he worked as a librarian. In 1956 he was a minister in Imre Nagy's reform government and after the Soviet invasion on November 4th 1956, was the last minister to remain at his post. From 1957 to 1963 he was imprisoned, at times in solitary confinement. After his release he worked again as a librarian. His funeral in 1979 was the first open manifestation of the opposition to Hungary's communist government. One of the speakers at the funeral was the famous Hungarian poet, Illyés Gyula. The poet Petri György was at Bibós' funeral and his poem about the funeral conveys feelings that may be difficult to understand for people who have not lived in a totalitarian state. When describing who attended the funeral, he writes of those who have earned the right to be present and those who had the audacity to be present, and that at least it was not a phony state funeral with ordered out functionaries. [Tóbiás Áron (ed.), (1989). 493-495)]. Bibó is regarded as one of the greatest Hungarian thinkers of the 20th century.

In a study, attributed to Bibó, that appeared in Vienna on September 8, 1957,[298] Bibó makes an interesting observation regarding the philosophy of the Stalinist period. He writes: "We can't speak of a new ideology of Stalin. It is more accurate to speak of Stalin's political practice where, instead isolated tactical or technical mistakes, there was a system that used without exception and scruples a well integrated system of cruel means .... This way the decisions were based on the whim of the leaders or the leader, and were subject to all kinds of mistakes and passions and moods (*indulat*), but were presented as objective ethical standards."[299]

Bibó was also thinking about the question of geographic areas where the population is ethnically and linguistically mixed. Instead of the Swiss solution of cantons, Bibó preferred the solution proposed by two Austrian socialist thinkers, Bauer and Ronner, that supported the coexistence of linguistic communities within the same geographic area. Based on very special circumstances that were present in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy at the beginning of the last century, it is an open question how practical this proposed system would be today, but philosophically it might be an interesting and tolerant solution.

One of Bibó's greatest contribution to Hungarian and general human thinking is his commitment to finding a way to make power more human.[300] One of his other good qualities is honesty, both with himself and with others. For example, he opposed anti-Semitism and the persecution of Jews with word and deed, but after the war, like Schindler, he had troubles with his own conscience. He wrote that he could have done more.

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[298] Tóbiás Áron (ed.) (1989), See: "The Situation of Hungary and the World" (*Magyarország helyzete és a világhelyzet*), 381-402.
[299] Tóbiás, Áron (1989). 382. My translation.
[300] Dénes Iván Zoltán, (ed.)(1993). For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see collected studies in this book.

Similarly, in an age when mass hysteria and the cult of the "Übermensch" dominated so much of Central European thinking, Bibó's philosophical thinking remained clear and objective. His book on Nietzsche is a good example of this. He writes that as Nietzsche's physical and mental health deteriorated, and as he was losing some of his ability to generate and develop independent ideas, people often with little education (Bibó said it in a much more elegant way "the less exalted members of the general public")[301] became more and more enthusiastic about Nietzsche 's more extreme views. Bibó writes about the genius with all his terrible shortcomings with the same objectivity and honesty with which he approached the questions of linguistic minorities.

In an age when Richard Wagner and mythical national origins were very popular with both governments and the general public, Bibó is similarly objective when he discusses the intellectual relationship between Nietzsche and Wagner. He writes that Wagner's music is at the border of music and myth.[302] Bibó, in an extremely nationalist age says, Wagner's librettos are not facts, they are myths.

When we study the philosophy of the rights of linguistic minorities, we have to keep in mind constantly that our values, feelings and thinking are prououndly influenced by the myths of our culture, myths about who we are as a people, and how we regard the language, history and culture of our neighbours.

The Hungarian Philosopher Ágnes Heller (b. 1929), a pupil of György Lukács (1885-1971) also wrote how Lukács, the most important Marxist philosopher of that time, never taught Marxism in Hungary. Heller said "To teach Marxism was the most dangerous thing you can imagine because you had to teach Marx according to the official version of Marxism given by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. There was also a

[301] "a nagyközönség és annak nem csupán exaltátabb része, mind mohóbban kapott Nietzsche legextrémebb tanain". Bibó István (1992). 86.
[302] Ibid. 37.

department of Marxism-Leninism in every university. It was their job to teach Marx, not the philosophers."[303] This kind of Marxism followed unquestioningly the ever changing twists and turns of the interpretations that came from Moscow.

For the above reasons, I am not writing about the offical philosophy of the rights of linguistic minorities in Hungary during the Stalinist period. What was presented as philosophy was an ever changing practice that was made in Moscow. To their credit, philosophers and others in the humanities and social sciences in Hungary after 1954 to 1956 and in the sixties, seventies and eighties were generally fighting for the de-ideologization of social disciplines. Political leaders however required that the Party's interpretation of proletarian ideology be accepted as social science.

Milovan Djilas book *The New Class*[304] provides a good summary of Communist nationalism or National Communism ("*Nationalkommunismus"*). National Communism became the leading ideology first in Yugoslavia in the 1950's, then in Romania and other East and Central East European regimes. It is questionable how much better or freer some of these regimes were than their Stalinist predessesors. Hungary was certainly freer in the 1970's and 80's than in the early 50's, but in Romania, for example, the 1980's under Ceaucescu's National Communism were some of the least free, most brutal times. Djilas conclusion is that the thin layer of party leaders and bureaucrats under either kinds of Communist system brought tremendeous suffering and terror to the people of their countries. Communism and other totalitarian ideologies and nationalism are a deadly combination.

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[303] Heller, Ágnes (1999). 2.

[304] Djilas, Milovan (1963), especially 198-200.
Milovan Djilas (1911-) General Secretary of the Communist Party, Minister in the Yugoslav Government, and Tito's friend. Broke with Tito and the Party in 1954. He was imprisoned, wrote *The New Class* in prison and received a further prison sentence for his book. After being released for a year, he was again imprisoned for his book, *Conversations with Stalin*.

Outside Hungary, apart from Lukács György (1885-1971), the two Polanyi brothers are the best known 20th century Hungarian thinkers. Karl Polanyi (Polányi Károly - 1886-1964) had a very distiguished career as an economist, journalist, professor and author. He started his adult working life as a lawyer. During the First World War he was a cavalry officer, and late in life, he and his wife, Ilona Duczynska, living in Canada near Toronto, jointly edited the collection, *"The Plough and the Pen, Writings from Hungary 1930-1956*", a publication that helped to introduce Hungarian literature to English speaking audiences. His younger brother, Michael Polanyi (Polányi Mihály,1891-1976), after a successful career in physical chemistry, turned to the study and teaching of the philosophy of science, especially economics.[305] The Hungarian sociologist Endre J. Nagy wrote that "I learned from György Lukács' historical and aesthetic works that the ideas of philosophers could turn into ideologies, becoming intellectual weapons with which opposing classes fought out their all too real battles"[306]. Both Polany brothers were conscious of this and tried to avoid it. The writings of Lukács and Karl and Michael Polányi do not concentrate on the philosophy of linguistic minorities, but their lives, like that of the writer Arthur Koestler (1905-1983), are living examples of the fate of linguistic minorities. All of them were born in Hungary, from families of Jewish origin, wrote in Hungarian, German and, except for Lukács, also in English. Koestler also wrote in Hebrew and French. They all moved in many different cultures. Koestler wrote his best known books in three different languages, Hungarian, German and English. His journalism was in Hungarian, German, Hebrew, French and English. He spoke some Russian and, according his biographer David Ceasarani, also spoke some Yiddish. They lived and worked in Hungary, Austria, Germany, and again

[305] His son, John Polanyi, was born in Berlin in 1929 but came to Canada as a small child. He, along with two others, was awarded the Nobel price for chemistry in 1986. During my student years at the University of Toronto, I remember him as a young lecturer in chemistry. He became a full professor in 1974.
[306] Nagy, Endre J. (1994). "After Brotherhood's Golden Age: Karl and Michael Polányi", 83, in McRobbie, Kenneth (ed.) (1994).

except for Lukács, in England and North America, Koestler also in Palestine. The Polányi brother's father was called Polacsek. Their mother came from Odessa, at that time Russia. The common trend of all these thinkers is that they regarded themselves as Hungarian, even if some of them, for example, Karl Polányi, had been away from Hungary from 1919 to 1963, the year before he died. Multilingualism and multiculturalism does not seem to be a detriment, but rather an asset to philosophical thinking and the search for truth and freedom in the context of national identity.

Observations

However painful it might be, and however unjust past national boundaries are, if we are working for peace and understanding, freedom and equality for all people, we have to accept that present linguistic realities are more important than past historical boundaries. We have to find other ways than the revision of unjust boundaries by force to safeguard the rights and survival of linguistic minorities. Meaningful local autonomy, regional loyalties and governments, and super national forms of government, such as the European Union, offer more hope than the revision of borders by force.

Present day Hungary's treatment of its linguistic minorities is exemplary, although their number and concentration in present day Hungary seldom justifies local territorial autonomy. On the other hand, the large and often territorially compact Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian basin, such as the close to two million Hungarians in Transylvania, many of whom are concentrated in the Székely counties or the predominantly Hungarian speaking areas of southern Slovakia cannot receive justice or fair treatment for its linguistic minorities and therefore cannot achieve lasting peace without granting extensive autonomy to these minorities.

The best of Hungarian thinkers, even in an age of extreme nationalism, generally remained tolerant and objective, part of the long-standing European philosophical tradition of tolerance and respect for intellectual freedom .

Canadian thinkers

This is a brief review of the work of a few selected Canadian philosophers and thinkers whose works, in my opinion, are representative of their era as it relates and can be applied to linguistic minorities. This is a selection and not a complete overview.

In Canada, there are two differing philosophical traditions. They differ linguistically and, until the middle of the 20th century, the difference had a religious basis as well. French Canadian philosophy is written in French and until the 1950's was generally based on Roman Catholic theology. The other philosophical tradition is English Canadian, written in English, and until the 1950's predominantly Protestant. Thereafter, philosophy becomes more secular, and religious influence, if any, comes from a far wider base of world religions.[307]

Both philosophies are influenced by history and by Canada's particular geography and climate. The well known Canadian historian W. L. Morton writes about the geographic formation known as the Canadian or Precambrian Shield that it is as central to Canadian history as it is to Canadian geography, and to all understanding of Canada. It is almost one half of all Canadian territory. While the heartland of the United States is one of the world's most fertile regions, that of Canada, is one of the earth's most ancient wildernesses and one of nature's grimmest challenges to man and all his works. No Canadian has found it necessary seriously to revise Cartier's spontaneous comment as he gazed on the Labrador coast of the Shield. It was, he said in awe, "the land God gave to

[307] Trott, Elizabeth, A. (1988). "Philosophy Before 1950" in Canadian Encyclopedia, 1658-1659.

Cain". The main task of Canadian life has been to make something of this formidable heritage."[308] We will review the historically older French Canadian thinkers first.

French Canadian Philosophy

During the whole of the 19th century, French Canadian philosophy remained *ancilla theologiae*, the handmaid of theology. Early French Canadian philosophers were generally priests. A good example is the Abbé Jerome Demers, who compiled and wrote the first Canadian philosophy book, a textbook in Latin published in 1835 entitled *Institutiones philosophicae adusum studiosae juventutis*. Throughout the 19th and the first third of the 20th century these priests who worked in philosophy generally followed the extremely conservative, *ultramontane* thinking of the Québec bishops. Among other ideas, they taught that power comes from the will of God, not from the wishes of the people.[309] A good representative of such thinking is that of Monsignor Ignace Bourget, the powerful 19th century Bishop of Montréal, who held that both the Church and the clergy had authority above that of government and the law.[310]

There are strong historical reasons for the extraordinary power which the Catholic Church, clergy and bishops held for a century and a half after the British conquest. When England conquered Québec in 1759-60, almost all of New France's elite, many of its administrators, civil servants, officers and seigneurs returned to France, deserting the *habitants,* the poor and frequently illiterate peasants of New France. The only educated people who remained in any significant numbers were the clergy and some seigneurs, as the large land owners were then called. The church safeguarded not only the Catholic

[308] Morton, W. L. "The Canadian Identity", in Littlejohn, Bruce and Pearce (eds.) (1973). 7.
[309] Lafrance, Guy (1988). "French Canada" in Canadian Encyclopedia, 1660-61.
[310] Berton, Pierre and others (1978). 331.

religion but also the French language. There is a well known French Canadian saying that states *the faith guards the language and the language guards the faith*.

This situation remained almost unchanged well into the 20th century. The journalist, politician and playwright Andréé Larendeau (1912-1968), writing an introduction in 1960 to Frére Untel's (or Un Tel) book, states that this "Little Brother " is a voice for all those who work in the silence and darkness, those we never listen to, those we never hear."[311]

This Brother writes of his father: "My father could neither read or write. He was not any less intelligent that other people. Here in Québec, we are just the second generation that can read or write."[312]

In Canada, the British were soon to face the revolt in 1776 of their thirteen colonies in North America. Soon after, the French Canadian Bishops faced the radical anticlericalism of the French Revolution. The Catholic bishops and the British Crown were united in their opposition to any ideas of revolution or any radical ideas, but this alliance, although it provided a fair amount of protection to the French speaking minority, also kept Québec very conservative for the next one hundred and fifty years.

When, in the second half of the 19th century, some thinkers dared to espouse the ideas of secular European philosophers in the more cosmopolitan, partly English speaking city of Montréal, they faced tremendous opposition from the Catholic Church.[313] Wilfred Laurier, himself a French Catholic and Canada's Prime Minister from

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[311] Desbiens, Jean - Paul (1960). 15-16. My translation of "*Il était une voix pour tous qui travaillent dan's l'ombre et le silence, ceux que nous n'entendrons jamais."*

[312] Ibid.10. My translation from the dedication to *Les insolences du frére Untel* of "*Mon pére aussi ne sait ni lire ni écrire. Il n'est pas moins intelligent pour autant. Ici, au Qébec, nous ne sommes guére que la deuxiéme géneration á savoir lire et écrire."*

[313] An example of the pressure which the Church could exert on French Canadians involves Joseph Guibord, a Catholic and a member of the L'Institute Canadien. The Institute, founded in 1840, admitted both Catholics and Protestants. It had published some liberal books and tolerated debate on church-state relations. In 1858 Ignace Bourget, Bishop of Montréal, wrote a pastoral letter stating that no Catholic could belong to the Institute under pain of excommunication. Joseph Guibord who was a member of the Institute did not obey the Bishop's directive and was excommunicated. He died shortly afterwards without making

1896 to 1911, speaking of some of these disapproving clerics said, "they use the censer as if it were a club." Robert de Roquebrune, an otherwise kind and genteel writer of the old school, described Monsignor Bourget, Bishop of Montreal, as someone who "had the soul of an inquisitor."[314]

How unquestioningly the orders of the clergy were carried out, especially in rural areas of Quebec is well described in *Testament of My Childhood*"[315] by Robert de Roquebrune in an incident which takes place at the end of the 19th century in one of the St. Lawrence Valley manor houses, the name used for the seigneurial dwelling. In de Roquebrune's family home was a library started by his grandfather, books lining the shelves "in their lovely, fawn-coloured eighteen-century bindings and the miniature format of the post-Napoleonic period." The books of Voltaire, Diderot, Jean-Jacques and the Encyclopaedists had stood for many years undisturbed in their handsome bindings, until one day the parish priest, noticing them for the first time, told de Roquebrune's father to burn the books for their liberal and sinful ideas. How readily Seigneur de Roquebrune had followed the priest's wishes "and many were the books reduced to ashes that were afterwards buried in a hole in the garden."[316] In such an atmosphere, it was difficult for independent philosophical thought to exist.

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peace with the Church. He and his wife had a plot in a Catholic cemetery but his burial there was forbidden. After five years of legal battles which went all the way to the Privy Council in London, the courts decided in favour of the widow Guibord. This was not the end of the matter. The reinterrment from a Protestant cemetery was prevented by a mob. Two months later, on the same day that the Mayor of Montréal, a judge, and 1,235 soldiers and reinforced cement finally achieved Guibord's burial in a Catholic cemetery, Bishop Bourget deconsecrated the ground in which Guidbord was laid to rest. (Lapierre, Laurier L. (1996). 61-63.)

[314] Roquebrune, Robert de (1964), Walter, Felix (trans.), 68.

[315] Ibid. 68-69.

[316] Ibid. 69. The milieu of these manor houses was very similar to the Hungarian "*Udvarház*". There was a pride and preoccupation with ancestors, dead for generations if not for centuries, whose portraits were hung on the walls and whose old letters were cherished. All the while the real power and wealth had shifted from the owners of the manor houses to the English in Canada, not unlike in Hungary, where a similar shift often took place to families of German or Jewish origin. When reading French Canadian books such as the *Testament of My Childhood*, one has the feeling of being in the world of Turgenyev, Krudy, Margit Kaffka or Eliza Orzeszkowa (e.g. *On the Banks of the Niemen*)*. In this milieu there is romanticism, historical nostalgia, but seldom is there clear logical philosophical thinking. *The world of the Polish

A very notable and influential thinker of enlightened liberalism was Wilfred Laurier (1841-1919), Canada's Prime Minister from 1896-1911. A French Canadian Catholic, extraordinarily, he was absolutely committed to British Parliamentary democracy and to the notion that the Catholic Bishops and clergy were not above the law. As well, he was committed to free discussion, freedom of conscience, tolerance, and to compromise.

Laurier's thinking regarding the clergy's role is well accepted today, but was revolutionary in 19th century Québec. He wrote "Let the priest speak and preach as he thinks best; this right, however, is not unlimited. We have no absolute rights among us. The rights of each man in our state or society end precisely at the point where they encroach upon the rights of others."[317] John Stuart Mill himself could have written that statement. Laurier knew well the writings of the 19th century British liberals.

Laurier eventually paid for his tolerant and non-partisan approach to the linguistic and cultural battles of the British Imperial Age just before the First Word War. After winning four straight elections, he lost in 1911. In one of his speeches during the 1911 election he said, "I am branded in Québec as a traitor to the French, and in Ontario to the English. In Québec I am branded as a Jingo, in Ontario as a Separatist. In Québec I am an Imperialist, and in Ontario an anti-Imperialist. I am neither. I am a Canadian."[318]

In the 1950's, there was a change in French Canadian philosophical thinking. Well educated clergy, working in academic or intellectual circles no longer unquestioningly accepted the authority of the Church and its Bishops on intellectual and political matters. At this time, much of the early opposition to the arch-conservative, highly corrupt Union Nationale government of Maurice Duplessis (1936-39 and 1944-

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society in Lithuania after the 1863 Polish uprising had a similar romanticism and siege mentality as did much of the French Canadian thinking in the late 19th century.

[317] Bliss, J. M. (ed.) (1966). 192.

[318] Ibid. 220.

1959) came from the Catholic clergy. Just after the 1956 elections, Fathers Louis O'Neil and Gérard Dion, faculty of Laval University wrote a then sensational article entitled *L'Immoralité politique dans la province de Québec*. The article was not repudiated by any member of the Church hierarchy.[319] Similarly, it was a young teaching brother, Jean-Paul Desbiens, also known as Brother Pierre-Jérome, who wrote in 1960 *Les Insolences du Frére Untel*, a book that exposed the serious shortcomings of the Québec education system and religious life and was the start of Québec's Quiet Revolution.[320] Briefly, the Quiet Revolution began when the French majority in Québec no longer accepted domination in work, education, or commerce by the English minority; the Québecois wished to be "maitre chez nous" (masters in our own house). This was also the beginning of the philosophical change. Political change came in 1960 when the Union Nationale government lost power to the Liberals.

A good example of the progressive, scholarly theological thinking of our time is the philosophy of Jean Vanier (1928-). His book *Made for Happiness, Discovering the Meaning of Life with Aristotle*[321] makes the thinking of a classic, antique philosopher relevant to everyday life and to contemporary problems. In *Becoming Human*[322], Vanier advocates an inclusive view of humanity where oppressed minorities, especially people with intellectual handicaps, are accepted as full members of our society. Although Vanier's books and life work are on behalf of a different kind of minority, that of people

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[319] Ibid. 36-339.
[320] Bliss, J. M. (1966). 339-342.
[321] Vanier, Jean (2001), Spink, Kathryn (trans.) Jean Vanier's life, like that of Gregory Baum's, is as interesting as his philosophy. The son of the former Governor General of Canada, General Georges Vanier, he himself was a Captain in the Canadian army. He left the Army, wrote his doctoral thesis on Aristotle and taught philosophy at the University of Toronto. Simultanously, he founded the l'Arche community where people with intellectual limitations live in family settings. Now l'Arche communities exist in many countries. Vanier presently lives in one such community in France and lectures internationally. His family established and endowed the Vanier Institute, a centre of studies on the family and human development and progress.
[322] Vanier, Jean (1998). *Becoming Human: CBC Massey Lecture Series.* Don Mills Canada, Anansi Press.

with intellectual limitations, his philosophy has relevance for how we think about linguistic and other minorities.

Contemporary Québec linguistic philosophy, like so much of Québec society, is dominated by the question of Québec's sovereignty. As a population of 6 million French in a North American population of 300 million English speaking people, the issue of maintaining their distinct language and culture is significant. The question is whether, in order to maintain its distinct culture, Québec must become a separate state, or can it remain part of Canada? More recently, questions relating to claims for power by Canada's indigenous peoples are becoming important. Very often the question of the rights of linguistic minorities is seen as a side issue of the above two main issues.

After its clerical past and facing an uncertain future, a search for new ways seems to characterize current French Canadian philosophy. As Fernand Dumont of Laval University wrote, "*nous chercherons endefiniment de chemin*."[323] Claude Lévesque of the University of Montréal and Charles Taylor of McGill University are the best known representatives of today's Québecois philosophers. Taylor, who writes in both English and French, has contributed much to the philosophical foundations of multiculturalism. Taylor's contributions are discussed in another part of this work.[324]

English Canadian Philosophy

In English speaking Canada during the 18th and early 19th century, as in Quebec, philosophy was closely related to theology, and most of the early philosophers were

[323] Quoted in Leroux, Georges "La philosophie au Québec depuis 1968", 568-587, 572, in Hamel, Reginald (1997).
[324] On February 8th, 2007 Charles Taylor was appointed by the Prime Minister of Québec to co-chair a commision to come up with recommendations on what constitutes reasonable accommodation in multicultural matters and in the safeguarding of minority cultural heritages. In the announcement he was referred as "the well known philosopher, Charles Taylor."

either clergyman or had a theological education. The students of philosophy generally became clergymen, teachers, circuit preachers or civil servants.

This religious orientation was, however, much more varied that the one in French speaking Canada. It is said, that Canada at that time was an amalgam of five defeated peoples: the native peoples defeated by the French, British and American settlers, the French Canadians defeated by the British, the United Empire Loyalists the losers in the American Revolution, the Scottish who started to emigrate in greater numbers after their defeat at Culloden by the English, and the Irish who suffered a series of defeats by the English. These groups comprised a mixture of Catholics and Protestants, including Methodists, High Church Anglicans and Scottish Presbyterians. Although the Anglicans claimed that they were the "state" religion, after the mid 19th century, the reality was that no single religion was dominant in English Canada. These two factors allowed for a great deal more philosophical freedom than was possible under the often monolithic and conservative rule of Catholic bishops in Québec. Canadian society was developing, but was still mainly rural and it was accepted that in Canada's often harsh climate and pioneer conditions, community, tolerance and cooperation were key for survival.

We will look at the philosophical contribution to the rights of linguistic minorities of three representative thinkers of the last century and a half, each being at least one generation removed from the other. They are John Watson, Gregory Baum and Will Kymlicka.

John Watson [325] (1847 b. Glasgow, Scotland, d. 1939, Kingston Canada), is credited with introducing the study of economics, political studies and psychology at

[325]John Watson graduated from the University of Glasgow with the highest honours and came to Canada in 1872 to teach logic, metaphysics and ethics at Queen's University in Kingston. He became head of the Philosophy Department, where he remained for 52 years. He was the first Canadian philosopher to achieve an international reputation and was appointed Gifford Lecturer at the University of Glasgow from 1910 to 1912. He was awarded an LL.D degree from the University of Glasgow and honorary degrees from the

Queen's University. He was a strong advocate of admission of women and poor students to Queen's University. In philosophy, he was an idealist and generations of Canadian university students learned about the philosophy of Plato, Kant and Hegel from Watson's books and articles. His work is widely recognized as one of the great influences on university education in Canada. Little wonder generations of students at Queen's regarded him as their best teacher. To his students' commitment Watson responded by staying at Queen's all his life, despite a low salary and offers from larger universities, both in Canada and abroad.

Near the end of his teaching career, the horrors of the First World War made the 72 year old Watson committed to tolerance and in his book *The State in Peace and War* he called for a world federation of states.[326] This book is typical of the conscientious, scholarly and visionary work of Watson.

He reviews the notions of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle's, Thomas Aquinas, Hobbes, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, John Stuart Mill and many others on the subject of war and peace and the philosophy of the system of rights. Writing at the end of a victorious war for Britain and Canada, in the last chapters of his book he comes to conclusions that continue to be valid today.

He writes that even in wartime, rights and free activity can only be suspended in very exceptional circumstances[327]. War is not inevitable but it is internal troubles that most often make leaders go to war, "that the privileged class…seeks to prevent the extension of rights, while the suffering class attracts the sympathy of the citizens of other states."[328] He reasons that if we remove these anomalies, then the normal co-operation of the states will be allowed free play. Behind these old fashioned words, we could

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University of Michigan and Knox College in Toronto. Watson retired from teaching in 1924 at age 77 but continued his work as a well respected philosopher. He died in Kingston in 1939.

[326] Watson, John (1919).

[327] Ibid. 231.

[328] Ibid. 249.

paraphrase that in today's democracies, the majority is the privileged class, and the minorities are the suffering class. In the case of linguistic minorities, it is the sympathy of the citizens of other states who could be their linguistic brothers and sisters beyond the borders which could cause conditions which lead to war. If my interpretation is correct, this would be the logic for the German intervention on behalf of ethnic Germans in Sudetenland. That it was done by a fanatical totalitarian German government is another issue. In contrast, Swiss Germans who felt free at home in Switzerland never felt any temptation to join with the rest of Germany.

Watson's other ideas clearly stand up today as well. He writes that the will and conception of the state is not to be identified with the government, but rests upon the will of the people as a whole[329] . Outside Canada, Watson advocated fair treatment of the defeated Central Powers otherwise, as he wrote in March 1919, "we should have all the old conditions back again that lead to war"[330]. His conviction is that if the Central Powers were excluded from the post war world order and were forced back upon themselves, then "there will be a high probability of renewed war, intensified by the building of armaments more destructive then ever"[331]. He also wrote about how "a very great change of mind" was essential by all nations if we want to avoid wars which are "destructive and divert the energies of the nation." Watson died in January 27, 1939, at age 92. One wonders how aware he was that his unheeded warning was to become a horrible reality eight months later.

Watson's early philosophy moved from the Scottish form of Common Sense Philosophy to Absolute Idealism, an intellectual current that, unlike in Britain or Continental Europe, remained the intellectual home, not only Watson, but of most

[329] Watson, John (1919). 202.
[330] Ibid. 267.
[331] Ibid. 286.

Canadian and many American philosophers.[332] Watson's was a Christian belief with an idealist foundation. Reality is a manifestation of the Divine Mind (Reason). God is immediate in reality and can be found in the whole of life; God acts by progressive change and natural law. Consciousness is not isolated from the real because, in a variant of Hegel's phrase, "the real is the Rational and the Rational is the Real."[333] Mind and reality are not fundamentally different.

Watson's view of reality was that there is a common being that connects self, others, and the world, and that the individual is not a natural phenomenon, but a social product. Time and change are modes of reality that are timeless and changeless, and it can only really be understood from the viewpoint of absolute and eternal reality. Things in time are very real. Nature and self are intimately interrelated. In this sense Watson's philosophical view reconciles the everyday and the mystical.

This absolute idealism gave Watson strength and courage to embrace and work for change, and in many ways he was a strong supporter of the Social Gospel. After the First World War, the Canadian Methodist Church accepted a report that demanded social reforms after the war. This report contained statements like: "The present economic system stands revealed as one of the roots of war." or "the 20th century found that political democracy means little without economic democracy" and that "the war is a sterner teacher than Jesus and uses far harsher methods."[334] By this time Watson's writing, especially in *The State in Peace and War*, shows that he feels comfortable with the Social Gospel and an ecumenical church. In the United Church which he joined as a Presbyterian, the largest founding group was to be the Methodists.

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[332] Elder, R. Bruce (1989), especially 63, 109, 171, 182-83, 254 and 325, present ideas about Watson that I used in my discussion.
[333] Watson, John (1919). 171.
[334] Bliss, J. M. (ed.) (1966). 258-59.

When Watson writes about the horrors of war and conditions in less developed countries, he takes a universal, world wide view. For example, he writes that if changes are "not made, we shall have a continuance of the system of exploitation with its enormous evils, and the danger that an ambitious and unscrupulous power should employ natives in its battles."[335]

At university Watson showed himself to be progressive in his practices as well as his ideas. In his church, he first worked to change and open up to new ideas his very conservative Presbyterian church, a church which clung to its 16th century Scottish ideas. Later in his life, especially in the period from 1918 to 1925, he moved to even more liberal ideas and was one of the main thinkers to lay the intellectual foundations of a church union. In 1925, half of the Presbyterians, along with two other generally more liberal Protestant denominations, the Methodists and Congregationalist, formed the United Church of Canada. The United Church of Canada has a long history of opposing wars and discrimination. On the whole, it is weak in enforcing a common dogma and orthodoxy, but very strong on advocating social and economic justice. Watson was one of the intellectual fathers of the United Church.

He moved from tolerance and working for liberalizing and making more socially progressive the thinking at his own, Presbyterian Church and at Queens University to religious tolerance and understanding in an ecumenical context, to urging world government based on tolerance and multicultural integration.

Philosophically and theologically too it was a significant, lifelong movement from Watson's Presbyterian roots, with is dogma of divine predestination and God generally rewarding the hardworking, virtuous men with material prosperity to not only religious and cultural tolerance, but the embracing the Upper Canadian and Prairie

[335] Watson, John (1919). 286-87.

Methodist interpretation of Wesleyan teaching. This view of Wesley's teaching held that it was possible to establish the Kingdom of God and attain near perfection on earth, and was a foundation of the Social Gospel Movement. The Canadian socialist movement has its roots in this interpretation of Methodism and the Social Gospel. The first leader of the first federal socialist party (Canadian Commonwealth Federation) John S. Woodsworth (1874-1942), and the first premier of a socialist province in Canada, Tommy .C. Douglas (!904-1982), were both clergyman.[336] Adherents to the Social Gospel included Douglas, Woodsworth, Watson and most other progressive thinkers in English Canada in the 1920's and early 30's .

In an interesting way, **Gregory Baum** (1923 -)[337] is the thinker I think best represents the post World War Two generation[338] in Canada. He has much in common

[336] Woodsworth, for example spent spent two years as a Methodist circuit rider in the 1890's. He was arrested during the Winnipeg General Strike following the police charge on "Bloody Saturday" in 1919, and subsequently elected to the Canadian House of Commons in 1921 under the slogan "Human Needs before Property Rights". He held a seat in government until his death in 1942. T.C. "Tommy" Douglas, a Baptist minister, had a similarly socially committed and sometimes difficult life.

[337] Gregory Baum was born in Berlin, a German of Jewish origin, came to Canada in 1940. After obtaining a B.A. degree in Mathematics and Physics, and an M.A. degree in Mathematics from McMaster University, he became a Catholic priest and obtained his doctorate from the University of Freiburg. He was professor at the University of Toronto and at McGill University, and is presently associated with the Jesuit Centre "Justice et foi" in Montreal. He published eleven books. Some of his important books are: *Truth beyond Relativity; Karl Manheim's Sociology of Knowledge (*(1977) Marquette University Press, *Solidarity and Compassion* (1988), Anansi Press, *Karl Polanyi on Ethics and Economics* (1996), McGill University Press, *Nationalism, Religion and Ethics* (2001), McGill-Queen's University Press. He lectures and publishes articles extensively, holds nine honorary doctorates, and is an Officer of the Order of Canada. Baum remained very much involved with the Roman Catholic Church, and he has so to speak flourished during and after Vatican II (he was a *peritus*, theological adviser at the Council) but as his studies in relation to the Catholic Church indicate, he is a liberal thinker. Some of his representative studies are Religious Liberty, The Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions. The subject of his studies and his being from 1962 to 2004 editor of *The Ecumenist*, a review of theology, culture and society would indicate his philosophical, social and theological sympathies. His relation with the more conservative Church hierarchy must sometimes have been difficult during the last generation. Later in life he was laicized but he remains a prominent Catholic thinker.

[338] There could have been others. For example Charles Taylor who is mentioned in other parts of this work and who just recently (March 15, 2007) won this years U.S.$1.5 million Templeton Prize, is better known than Gregory Baum, but it is Baum's view of nationalism, and especially his ideas about *dialogue*, that I think makes Baum's thinking and work so important to linguistic minorities. According to many, George Grant (1918-88), the author of such books as *Philosophy in the Mass Age* (1959), *English Speaking Justice*, (1974) and *Technology and Justice*, (1986), is Canada's leading political philosopher, but I think he is not characteristic of the new, post World War II generation of philosophers of non-English descent. Grant, described by Charles Taylor as a radical Tory, is the grandson of the legendary "Principal Grant", George Munro Grant (1835-1902) of Kingston's Queens University and of Sir George Parkin (1846-1922) and is a

with John Watson, although at first their philosophies appear to be entirely different. Watson was born a Scottish Presbyterian, Baum a German Jew. Watson had a distinguished career at the same university for fifty two years, Baum changed universities and languages.

But it is ultimately in their philosophy common themes emerge. Pacifism, religious and ethnic tolerance and his liberal ethics led Watson at age seventy eight to be one of the founding thinkers of the United Church of Canada. Similarly Baum's ethical and philosophical convictions played a large part in his becoming a Catholic priest.

The first idea that makes Baum's thinking important for our topic is his insistence that words, sentences or paragraphs cannot be understood without knowing their social, historical and cultural milieu.

Language is not just a sequence of words and sentences that can be exactly defined or translated into another language, writes the trilingual Baum, whose first two degrees were in mathematics and physics. It is unlike an objective, scientific term, such as *distance* or a chemical formula. Forget about each sentence, often each word of each sentence has its own history and moods that can change with each speaker, each social setting or the historical period in which the word was spoken or written. Baum uses the example of how the words of *Deutchland, Deutchland über Alles* meant very different things as the years passed. In the revolutionary days of 1848, the words conveyed the the idea of a United Germany that was more important than the feudal rights and traditions of

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most interesting thinker with implacable pessimism of the future of the whole Western World, but his work is only marginally related to our topic.
George Grant is an uncle, and George Monro Grant is a great-grandfather of Michael Ignatieff, writer, philosopher, former Harvard professor, novelist, who is presently the leader of the federal government's official (Liberal) opposition. Michael Ignatieff's philosophy is briefly discussed elsewhere in this work. George Monro Grant was a friend and a close associate of John Watson. Watson's work is discussed at length in this dissertation. Monro Grant inherited a small, financially unstable denominational college and as Principal (1877-1902) helped to make it a great University. Before his university teaching career Monro Grant, a Canadian with a Scottish University education, was a missionary, a minister and before the railways, took part in Sir Sanford Fleming (1827-1915)'s expedition from the Atlantic to the Pacific, overland. One of his books, *Ocean to Ocean* (1873) describes this epic journey.

the many small German feudal states. In the Victorian, Imperial ("Wilhelminische") times of 1900, it had a strong imperialistic message, while in the National Socialist times it had very sinister connotations.

A whole branch of scientific study, Sociolinguistics, is devoted to the study of speech in its social and historical contexts. As this is not the topic of our work, we can just mention a few examples in connection with Baum's thinking. Even a language, such as Highland Scots or Irish Gaelic, not spoken or understood by most people who now live there, can live on in the speech patterns or sentence structures of the English spoken in these areas of Scotland and Ireland. Similarly, Latin had an even stronger influence on philosophical and scientific writing for many centuries after it had no native speakers. However, if a minority language becomes extinct, often a historical and social dimension of that culture is diminished or disappears.

Baum's second important contribution is his writing on nationalism, religion and ethics. Baum studies and comments on the work of Martin Buber, Mahatma Gandhi, Paul Tillich and the French Canadian theologian and philosopher, Jacques Grand'Maison from the viewpoint of ethics, nationalism and the relationship between the two.

Nationalism at times has brought self determination to some people and to some nations, but it can bring suffering, deportation and death to large numbers of people, especially to minorities. Baum, who himself experienced this kind of extreme nationalism, is attempting to come up with some guidelines as to when nationalism is acceptable, or perhaps even beneficial, or when it is ethically acceptable or when it is unacceptable.

Baum concentrates on Buber's speeches before the First World War and in 1921 (Reden über das Judentum), on Gandhi's writings from 1909 to after the First World War, Rabindranath Tagore's religious humanistic writings, his championing justice and

peace and his denouncing nationalism as the great evil doer of the world, Tillich's book *Die socialische Etscheidung*, published a few weeks before Hitler came topower, and Grand'Maison's two volume work *Nationalisme et Religion*, published in 1970. Baum's views on when is nationalism acceptable, based particularly on Grand'Maison's writings, is discussed elsewhere in this work. His analysis of Canadian nationalism is particularly relevant. Baum's language is beautifully simple and his conclusion of tolerance, accommodation and of trying to understand the other offers hope for the future.

Baum examines what these five very different thinkers have in common. He considers Buber's difficulties with Zionism, Gandhi's struggle with the idea of a future Indian state that would bring an end to social exclusion, bring equality before the law, protect the poor, but its power could be still somehow restrained; Tillich's ideas about the myth of political romanticism, the myth of demand and socialism; and finally Grand'Maison's notion of acceptable nationalism all have some things in common.

The common theme seems to be a willingness to look honestly at the shortcomings of our own people, to look at the good in our adversaries, to reject war and violence as means to achieve our goals and never to consider nationalism as the ultimate goal or the ultimate good.

One concept that is critical to Baum's thinking is the idea of a true form of dialogue. Baum's ideas about the importance of *dialogue* are based, he writes, on the work of such philosophers as Franz Brentano, Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel. The traditional starting points in the past were generally about what is right and wrong, what is truth. In *dialogue*, Baum writes, we begin by bracketing the issue of truth and start by trying to understand what the other person has to say, from his or her point of view. Mutual understanding is the aim of dialogue, a process that changes all partners. This process is equally applicable to interfaith dialogues, or dialogues between people of

different ethnic or national origins, or between people who hold different political or economic views. It is also very applicable in everyday life. When people don't agree and start to argue, most often after a few minutes they stop truly listening and start to think about and formulate their response, their rebuttal. In a true dialogue, our response is first to paraphrase in our own words what the other person has said to make sure that we have really heard and understood, including at times indications of how we think the person feels. In dialogue we suspend for a time our own beliefs, thinking and feeling. Only after we have done this do we present our own ideas, counter-arguments and feelings.

Baum writes that dialogue is a form of love, because you are willing to shut up, put your convictions into parentheses, and listen carefully to what the other has to say. Such dialogues are essential between linguistic majorities and linguistic minorities, and the resulting understanding might be the best hope for near equality for linguistic minorities.

Although not Canadian**,** Simone Weil **(**1909-1943), the renowned French philosopher and political activist, advocated a similar, non judgemental, universal approach half a century before Baum. It is interesting because both Baum and Weil were born Jewish, and became very devout (Weil almost mystical) Catholics. Both are critical of the nationalism of some of Judaism and the conservatism of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, and their ecumenism is a good example of an appreciation of the differences of others, whether it is ethnic, linguistic or religious. Weil, for example writes "If therefore salvation is possible outside the Church, individual or collective revelations are also possible outside Christianity." [339]

This might sound fairly tame, however I think what is revolutionary in both Weil's and Baum's thinking is that we are asked to admit that it is quite possible that

[339] Weil, Simone (1951). 46.

people who are thinking very differently than we do, who are often very different than we are, can be as right or perhaps more right than we are; and that we don't have to give up our values or culture to accept this. This thinking means that I can remain truly Hungarian or Canadian, yet still understand and often accept the points of view, thinking and feelings of Romanians, Serbs or Americans. At least that is how I understand what Baum and Weil are writing.

There is also something quite Canadian in the way Watson and Baum interpret ethics, morality and social obligations. What seems to be typically Canadian in their thinking is that they seem to take it as given that life is hard in a land that can be harsh, cold and at times life threatening. As humans we are often small and weak and physically isolated from each other in these Northern lands, but it is self evident that we have to help each other if we want to survive, and then perhaps we will even thrive. In regard to my assumptions about human nature and society I argue that it is in human nature to help those who are weaker than we are, so there is nothing particularly Canadian about the willingness to help others, however it seems to be more self-evident to Canadians that this is essential. Both Watson and Baum felt that philosophy has to be relevant to daily life, and to the questions that are important to ordinary people. During their lifetimes they both seem to have moved, both intellectually and politically to the left. Baum writes about "the profound ethical commitments of my friends (on the left), their selflessness, their concern for others, their generosity and their compassion for the disadvantaged and marginalised."[340]

He also writes about liberation from the many prisons we humans have created for ourselves. This is one indispensable purpose of philosophy. Despite both being quite

[340] "An Interview with Gregory Baum" as in footnote #8, p.3

realistic about all that is wrong in this world and with us humans, the world view of both Watson and Baum is ultimately quite optimistic.

As the Hungarian poet Babits wrote "among murderers, the silent one is an accomplice",[341] or as the South African Archbishop and 1984 winner of the Nobel Peace prize, Desmond Tutu wrote "when two persons are engaged in a conflict and one of them is considerably stronger than the other, to be neutral is in fact to side with the powerful."[342] This solidarity with the weak is or should be universally human.

It is the emphasis that this essential interdependence receives that is an integral part of the Canadian identity, rooted in a not so distant and often still remembered pioneer past.

Michael Ignatieff (1947-)[343] is better know as a professor, publicist, filmmaker and politician than as a philosopher, but he has made some important contributions to the philosophy of group rights and civil liberty. He is also an elected member of the Canadian Parliament and currently Deputy Leader of the Canadian Liberal Party. In his book *The Rights Revolution*[344] Ignatieff examines group rights. In relation to Québec language rights and collective aboriginal rights he comes to the conclusion that "apart from New Zealand, no country has given such recognition to the idea of group rights as

[341] "*Mert gyilkosok közt cinkos aki néma"*
[342] Taped message to the All Africa Church Conference in Nairobi, Kenya, that Tutu was unable to attend because the South African Government had withdrawn his passport. Tutu, Desmond (1986), 39.
[343] Michael Ignatieff's family history is an exception to the rule that most immigrants from East Europe to Canada in the 1920's were workers or peasants. He connects East European and Canadian intellectual currents. His paternal grandmother was Princess Natasha Mestchersky, his grandfather Count Paul Ignatieff, Czar Nicolas II's last Minister of Education. His father, George Ignatieff (1913-1989) was Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia and later Chancellor of the University of Toronto. His maternal great-grandfather George Grant (1835-1902) and maternal uncle, also a Grant, are very well known Canadian thinkers. It is hard to talk or write about Queen's University without mentioning the Grants. Michael Ignatieff obtained his Ph.D. from Harvard University. He worked and taught at Oxford and Cambridge for twenty years while also working for the BBC, the Observer and for films in London. From 2000 to 2006 he taught at Harvard. In 2006 was elected to the Canadian Parliament. His wife is of Hungarian origin.
[344] Ignatieff, Michael (2000).

Canada."[345] In "T*he Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*[346] Ignatieff, after September 11th struggles with questions about whether we must fight terrorism with terror, and whether a liberal democracy is entitled to use force or even violence. His answer is a reluctant "yes", force at times being the lesser of two evils. Force has to be measured and appropriate, not a program for torture and revenge, otherwise we lose our democratic souls. He writes "terrorist emergencies open up the fissure between democracy defined as majority rule and democracy defined as minority rights. When a national community is attacked, it naturally favours majority interests over minority rights."[347] His distinction between civic elements (pride in constitutional rights and culture) and ethnic elements (pride in language, culture, history and common ethnic or racial feelings) in a national identity is also important.

The third thinker whose work in respect to linguistic minorities is representative of his generation is the contemporary philosopher, **Will Kymlicka**.[348] By the time Kymlicka's generation had graduated as Kymlicka did from Queen's University in 1984 and from Oxford in 1987, bilingualism and multiculturalism were fairly well accepted in Canada. There were many scholars in Canadian universities who were of neither English nor French descent. It is also interesting that by the time Kymlicka's generation arrived to hold full academic positions, the intellectual and academic climate had become somewhat more conservative than during the previous generation, and in many ways Kymlicka is defending the liberal tradition.

Between the two World Wars and during the Depression, as we have seen from the discussion about Watson's later years or Baum's footnote biography, the majority of

[345] Ibid.
[346] Ignatieff, Michael (2004).
[347] Ignatieff, Michael (2004). 74.
[348] Will Kymlicka graduated from Queen's University and got his PhD from Oxford University in 1987. He was formerly visiting professor of Philosophy at the University of Ottawa and Carleton University, and is now Professor of Philosophy at Queen's University, Kingston. He also was visiting professor in the Nationalism Studies Program at the Central European University, Budapest.

Canada's intellectual elite was sympathetic to socialist ideas. This social consciousness survived the Cold War years which were not as harsh in Canada as the McCarthyism period in the United States.[349]

However when I started my university studies in 1958, the general academic climate was, small "c" conservative. The majority of the professors were of British descent but there were an increasing number of European born and trained academics. I had two professors who were of Jewish-German descent. Among my other professors was a former Russian Prince who had escaped with the retreating white armies from Russia as a teenager, completed his university studies in Paris, and immigrated to Canada. I graduated after four years from the fairly traditional British model University of Toronto in 1962, and went to study with a scholarship in Germany. When I returned to the same University six years later, in 1968 to do graduate work, it was hard to recognise that it was the same university.

Like other universities in non-Communist Europe and in the United States, it was in ferment, in rebellion. By the mid 1960's the Vietnam War brought ten's of thousands of war resisters, draft evaders, and deserters from the U.S. Army, and their families, to Canada. In 1951 the three leading source countries of immigration to Canada were Britain, Germany and Italy. Beginning in the 60's and 70's, we see a change in this trend as United States begins to be a major source of immigrants of the category described above. In 1960 it was Italy, Britain and the United States, in 1968 Britain, United States and Italy, and in 1976 Britain, United States and Hong Kong.[350] These American immigrants to Canada were mostly young, often well educated and generally anything but conservative. As their arrival coincided with the academic explosion, due to the first

[349] A good collection of the stories of academics, musicians, radio and television personalities and ordinary people who resisted the trend to blacklist suspected left wing sympathisers is published in Scher, Len (1992).

[350] Source: Department of Manpower and Immigration, Ottawa, Information Canada. Quoted in Li, Peter. S. (ed.) (1990). 24-25.

wave of the baby boom generation entering university, these well educated young Americans were hired in large numbers by the faculties of the newly established Canadian universities. My anecdotal observations are supported by official statistics. This was also the period of "flower power" and "flower children", and the "make love not war". It was an idealistic, often unrealistic, age full of hopes and plans for a better future.

Today the academic climate is more conservative than it was in the late 1960's, in the 1970's and early eighties. As in the rest of the Western world, as the Canadian baby boomers aged, they are more conservative. As the saying goes, it went from "don't trust anyone over thirty" in the 60's to "you can't trust anyone who earns under thirty (thousand dollars)" at the present.

After this aside, we return to Will Kymlicka and his generation of academics. Kymlicka writes in 1995 that "socialists traditionally felt hostile toward minority rights"[351] and goes on to explain why. This hostility toward minority rights is mainly on the basis that it contradicts the principle of equality. He presents an interesting discussion on how Marx and Engels, as well as John Stuart Mill and later Lenin and Stalin, accepted the right of "the great national subdivisions of Europe", and supported in principle the unifications of France, Italy, Poland, Germany and Hungary, but not the smaller "nationalities" such as the Czechs, Croats, Basques, Welsh, Bulgarians, Slovaks, Romanians or Slovenes.[352] This perspective seems to support Gregory Baum's view that we, great thinkers and sleazy dictators alike, are very much children of our age and that it is often difficult to truly understand a thinker without understanding his/her age and social milieu.

[351] Kymlicka, Will (1995). 69.
[352] Ibid. 70-72.

Kymlicka also writes that decentralisation by itself is not the answer; that members of a linguistic minority have not only individual rights to the use of their language and culture, but they also have group rights and rights to autonomy. These group rights and autonomy are not necessarily irreconcilable with the freedom of the individual, the equality of all and they don't necessarily have to threaten the unity of states.

He advocates a similar view in his 1989 book, *Liberalism, Community and Culture* where his position is that liberal neutrality is reconcilable with the rights of current or endangered languages, especially as this relates to the languages of Canada's indigenous populations.

The arguments, pro and con, are here similar to the arguments about affirmative action policies for people of colour, women and minority groups that have experienced discrimination. This topic has, especially in the United States, an extensive philosophical literature.

A controversial point that Kymlicka advocates is that affirmative action does not have to be time limited in order to correct past historical wrongs, but it can also be permanent, indefinite. He writes that without such policy many of Canada's and the world's indigenous languages would not survive. To some extent this is happening in Canada, where native/First People communities receive a significant amount of state monies to safeguard the survival of native languages.

Kymlicka supports the Canadian policy of nation wide bilingualism, even in the Western provinces where the proportion of Francophone population can be as low as 2% to 6%. He also advocates that the protection of minority languages be extended to the territory of the whole state, not just to the areas where significant numbers of the minority live.

In *Finding Our Way, Rethinking Ethno-cultural Relations in Canada*[353] Kymlicka concludes that Canada, while it has succeeded in multiculturalism, it has failed in satisfying the aims of minority nationalism, of either of the French Canadian/Québec nationalism (about 32% of Canada's population), or that of the Canadian native peoples (about 3.5% of Canada's population). He writes that this is not because we don't know what to do, but it is because we lack the political will to do it.

Kymlicka's next book, *Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?*[354] co-edited with Magda Opalski, has fourteen other contributors from many different countries and contains some interesting discussions.

Here Kymlicka's conclusion is that multilingualism and multiculturalism in a democratic East Central Europe is both beneficial and is attainable in the medium term. This presupposes peace and a certain ongoing progress in living standards and in the development of civic institutions. He lists five criteria for "minority nations" or national minorities. They were present at the founding of the state, have prior history of self government, have a common culture and a common language and finally they have to some extent governed themselves through institutions. According to this definition the Quebecois and Aboriginal peoples in Canada and most minorities in the Carpathian basin (historical Hungary) would qualify as "minority nations."

Kymlicka's five criteria for minority nations are by no means universally accepted. For example, in Canada according to his criteria, the people of Quebec would qualify as minority nations, but the two hundred and fifty thousand French speaking Acadians of the Maritime provinces would not.

Life is generally more complex than our definitions. Canada's native people belong to three main groups, First Peoples (also called Native Americans in the United

[353] Kymlicka, Will (1998, reprinted 2004).
[354] Kymlicka, Will and Opalski, Magda (eds.) (2001).

States and Indians in Central and South America), Inuit and Métis. Some First People, such as the members of the Iroquois confederation, had permanent settlements and highly developed governments, while others such as the Northern Ojibway and Cree, lived in small, nomadic family groups. Some native people of native and European ancestry regard themselves as First People, others as Métis.

In addition to living in Canada, the Inuit also live in Siberia, Alaska and Greenland. Approximately 55,000 Inuit living in Canada form the majority of the population in about a third of Canada's land mass. There are 53 Inuit communities ranging from populations of more than a 1,000 to as small as 200. Unlike many First People communities, Inuit do not live on reserves. They chose municipal status within two Canadian Provinces and two territories.[355]

Some First People had close contact and have intermarried with Europeans for centuries. For the Inuit, changes came very recently. Mary Simons, quoted above was born in the late 1940's of an Inuit mother and a father of European descent. She was Canada's Ambassador to Denmark, Ambassador of Circumpolar Affairs, Chancellor of Trent University and is presently President of Canada's national Inuit organisation, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami. She writes that she was born in the Arctic in a small village and continues "I spent my adolescence in the Artic, living a very traditional lifestyle. We camped, lived on the land, hunted and gathered food, made our own clothes."[356] Further she writes "Inuit have a very short modern history. There are many people still alive in Inuit communities who began life as I did…in camps…among a small group of families…who valued contributions of individuals, and shared their contributions for a higher purpose…sustaining our families. ….There are two root words in Inuktituut *ilira* and *kappia* that were used by Inuit to describe the combination of fear, respect and

[355] Mary Simon 2008 http://www.itk.ca/Creativity -and-Innovation-are-Key-to-Government-Leadership, 2
[356] Simon, 5

nervous apprehension we felt about the southerners that came to the Artic. These feelings permeated our lives and our relationships with southerners and southern institutions"[357] In such situations as the above two words describe, it is hard to tell where language and culture ends and where history and sociology begins. A woman, ten years younger than I, moved in a single lifetime from a very traditional nomadic lifestyle to being Canada's Ambassador and Chancellor of a University. The challenge for her generation, the move from the land, moving with the seasons to settled communities, was enormous, and not everyone succeeded like Mary Simons. I am also mentioning her example, because others in her mother's generation spoke very little English, and the generation of her grandchildren often find English or French easier to speak than Inuktituk. Without protection, languages such as Inuktituk could disappear within a few generations.

With ethnic and racial diversity being on the increase in most societies, and with modern forms of transportation and communication resulting in an increasing interconnectedness of nations, countries and societies, it seems that an international scholarship is developing where we learn from each other. Whether it is the Romanian, Czech, the Canadian or the Hungarian experience, the fourteen contributors to *Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?* or the twelve contributors to *Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada* are good examples of this developing international scholarship, as are the often yearly international gatherings from Barcelona to Pécs to Helsinki, studying the challenges and rights of linguistic minorities.

There are two conclusions, one about identity, the other about religion that apply fully to Canada but only very partially to Hungary. The first is that Canadian identity is still a work in progress which makes the tolerance of multicultural and to certain extent multilingual diversity somewhat easier. Generally, in Hungary and in Europe, national

[357] Simon 8

identities are often regarded as something already formed many generations, if not centuries ago, and minorities are generally expected to fit into these well defined identities. In Canada and in the United States, there is a fear among many liberal philosophers, and even more so among feminist thinkers, that traditional group rights are often conservative, and will diminish individual rights of certain members (mainly female) of the minority. For example, in 2007 three was proposed legislation in the province of Ontario to accept Islamic Sharia Law as a culturally appropriate alternative for dealing with some domestic disputes of Ontario Moslems. The proposed legislation was dropped, mainly due to the strong opposition of feminist groups who saw the proposed legislation as a threat to women's individual rights.

Western Europe, Canada and most of the United States have become increasingly secular societies during the last thirty to forty years, most Scandinavian countries even earlier. New arrivals to Canada and to a much lesser extent to Hungary come from societies where religion is a very important, if not the determining part of one's identity.[358] This difference is one of reasons for the tension regarding values between the majority and the minority. It is why religion is such a contentious part of reasonable accommodation. For example, the law in Canada requires that a helmet be worn by all motorcyclists. An observing male Sikh is required by religion to have a turban as a head covering. The turban will not accommodate a helmet. There is a clash between safety and religion. This case is before the Canadian courts at this time in early 2008. There are similar issues about to what extent Moslem, Hindu, Jewish or other religious holidays, clothing customs, and marriage customs should be tolerated. The question here is what is reasonable accommodation?

[358] In November 2007, Radio Canada, the French language national broadcasting system had an interesting program on these issues, but as I heard it on the car radio and was driving at night in a snowstorm, I did not write down the names of the participants in the discussion panel.

In the Hungary of my childhood or in the Canada of my arrival fifty years ago, intermarriage generally presumed one religious identity. One partner or at least the couple's children assumed the religious identity of the other partner. Today, religious identities are much less important and multiple religious or totally secular identities are quite acceptable. It is more the norm than the exception. It is conceivable that in forty or fifty years time, in a united Europe where English might act as a lingua franca, linguistic identities will became less important, however I don't think that they will, or that they should disappear. As we demonstrated in other parts of this work, a great deal of our cultural heritage is tied to languages.

In North America reverse discrimination is a hotly debated topic; in the United States, since the late 1950's, especially in regard to black people, in Canada, in regard to native people. I believe that in Hungary some Roma people also benefit from reverse discrimination. As mentioned in regard to Will Kymlicka's work, he believes that indefinite reverse discrimination could be justified in the treatment of Canada's native people. Ronald Dworkin argues elegantly, for example in the Chapter on Reverse Discrimination in his book, *A Matter of Principle*[359], that reverse discrimination, and certain kind of quotas are not only justified, but can be "the most effective measures of securing ..justice".[360]

Linguistic minorities at the present generally are not asking for reverse discrimination, but just their fair share of national resources that will help them to survive linguistically and culturally. It is an interesting question whether linguistic minorities should be thinking about some form of reverse discrimination, to compensate for generations or centuries of negative discrimination against them; however this large topic is better left for future studies.

[359] Dworkin, Ronald (1985). 293-303.
[360] Ibid. 303.

V

Limits and loyalties

Some of the legitimate limits to the rights of linguistic minorities

Clearly, no right can be absolute. Even the most liberal of philosophers, such as John Stuart Mill and his followers, would acknowledge that there could be a collision of linguistic rights, not only in the areas of education, public administration and the provision of health services, but also in everyday life. Is my radio or the shouting of my children in a language that another person cannot understand annoying? When does such an annoyance become an interference with the rights of others? These are legitimate questions, although it is much more likely that the majority will interfere with the rights of the minority, than in the other way around.

Patrick Devlin, a critic of John Stuart Mill in his book *The Enforcement of Morals*,[361] goes much further and claims that society as a whole has a right to use its limited resources in the most efficient way, even if this puts members of some minorities at a disadvantage.

Currently under the *Official Languages Act*, Canada is an officially bilingual country. This means that Canadians have the right to get federal government services in English or French, no matter what part of Canada they are living in. New Brunswick is the only province that is officially bilingual. New Brunswick residents receive services in both official languages from all of their provincial government departments and agencies. In Quebec, French is the official language and in most cases, provincial and municipal services are provided in French. In the other provinces and territories, English is the official language, and the availability of provincial services in both official languages

[361] Devlin, Patrick (1969).

varies. At the municipal level, the availability of services in both official languages varies greatly.[362]

Some question that need to be asked and answered

If a town has only a handful of people who speak a certain language, is it realistic to demand a full range of educational, health, social and other services for such a minority? Does it make a difference if the minority, such as the speakers of native languages in Canada or some Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian basin, has been in certain localities for centuries or even thousands of years? What is a reasonable number to justify services in a minority language? 7%, 10%, 20% of the population? It seems that we can discuss what a just percentage is, but at least two other principles have to apply. One is that linguistic minorities of a certain percentage and size are entitled to services in their own language because it is a basic human right and generally leads to peace and a just civic society. The other is that if the linguistic minority constitutes the majority in a sizable geographic area, such as the French in the province of Québec in Canada or the Hungarians in the Székely parts of Transylvania or the Catalans in Spain, they are entitled to a certain autonomy. In Canada, all French speaking Canadians are entitled to a number of services in French, regardless of where they live. However, in the province of Quebec, where they constitute a majority of the population, they have a great deal of autonomy through the legislated powers of the provincial government. This is the aim of Hungarian minority in Transylvania, that all Hungarians are to receive certain services in Hungarian, and that the Székely majority in the three counties where they live would have a certain legislated autonomy.

[362] http://www.cic.gc.ca/EnGLIsh/resources/publications/guide/section-07.asp#5

A society or state can only function if its members can communicate with each other. Can a state demand a certain basic ability to function in a common language? In many states one of the requirements for citizenship for immigrants is that they have a basic knowledge of the state's, or one of the state's official languages. This is not the case with native people who have lived in Canada for thousands of years, although most of them speak English or French fluently or as their mother tongue. Can other sizable linguistic minorities, such as the Métis in Manitoba, or the Acadians in New Brunswick, linguistic minorities who have lived in an area for centuries demand the right to be able to live and work in their own language? Historical rights present philosophical, ethical, political and practical problems of their own, but compromises are possible.

One of the achievements of Québec's Quiet Revolution was just that. The Québécois who previously had to work in English in most workplaces today conduct their work in French. In fact, as employees, those who speak both languages fluently are in great demand.

When do linguistic and cultural rights and autonomy lead to segregation and when do these same characteristics result in a more democratic and inclusive society? How can we understand our fellow citizens if we cannot communicate with them? Once again, the answer lies in dialogue, accommodation and compromises and the development of regional autonomy and loyalties that are acceptable to both the majority and the minority.

If a minority once owned or ruled a territory for a very long period of time, but now is a minority there, do they have special rights because of the situation centuries ago? For native communities in Canada, the answer seems to be "yes". For most linguistic minorities in Europe, such as Hungarians in some parts of historical Hungary or Serbs in Kosovo, the answer seems to be a "no".

It is much more difficult when present day borders clearly don't correspond to present day linguistic realities, as in Kosovo, or with the largely Hungarian speaking areas of Southern Slovakia, north of the Hungarian border. If the linguistic minorities who live in these areas do not receive extensive cultural, political and economic autonomy, their obvious alternative is to work for independence in the case of Kosovo, or for a revision of borders in the case of Hungarian minorities in Slovakia. One hopeful fact is that if the European Union works well, national borders became less important than they were in the 20th century. However the European Union is not a cure for all, as the present, 2007, crisis in Belgium between French and Flemish speakers shows. The answer has to be based on the acknowledgement of the individual and collective rights of linguistic minorities. As it is stated before, we seriously neglected the study, acknowledgement and protection and codification of linguistic rights and the right to autonomy.

Regions can be defined in the economic and political, but even more so in a cultural and linguistic context. There is a movement from the supremacy of the idea of the national state to super-national entities like the European Union on one hand and to regional units on the other. For example, loyalty to Britain diminishes somewhat as Scottish or Welsh national identities and local loyalties gain momentum. There are even inter- and trans-national regions such as one created by Oresund Bridge between Copenhagen in Denmark and Malmo in Sweden. In thirty minutes one can get from the centre of Malmo to the centre of Copenhagen. With large immigrant populations in both cities, people increasingly communicate with each other in English, rather than Swedish or Danish. What opportunities and challenges do these trans-national regions present for linguistic minorities?

Is English increasingly becoming the language of communication, not only for commerce or computer technology, but also for entertainment, higher education and even daily life? Where is the justified dividing line between freedom of speech on one hand and the protection of language on the other? In Poland, Iceland, or France, the laws try to protect the language from the intrusion of English by officially finding an equivalent word for each English expression. In Quebec, a province of Canada, all signs must be in French, and if English signs are allowed, the signs or the lettering must be smaller than French signs or lettering. Are such laws justified to preserve a majority language? If they are, then what laws can be enacted to protect minority languages?

We could raise dozens of similar questions, but perhaps it is more useful to look at some general philosophical principles and at some possible solutions.

Observations

Based on the philosophy of general human rights and on the tradition and philosophy of rights, liberties and obligations, then present day human rights should take precedence over historical rights. We acknowledge that we have certain basic rights and obligations, so it is morally difficult to justify a thinking that would lead to the return of historical borders of the past without present day justifications. In the case of Canada, we cannot ask the over 96% Canada's population which is non-native to give up the homes and lands that they have possessed for centuries, sometimes for over four centuries, particularly in Québec and in the Maritimes. Even if the non-native population were to return to their ancestral homes, because of the nomadic culture of the previous inhabitants, particularly in northern Canada, it is difficult to know who would have owned the land. However, without displacing people, we can do all that is possible to deal justly with the land claims and to preserve the language and culture of First Peoples.

In Hungary where fairly accurate written records exist for at least seven or eight centuries, the situation is, I think, not significantly different. If we accept that every human being has certain inalienable rights and obligations, certain situations which might restore historical rights would then result in injustices to the present day majority who lives there. For example, if it were possible to restore Hungary to its historical borders, millions of Romanians, Serbs, Croats, Slovaks and Ukrainians would become minorities in areas in which they are now majorities. The same situation would prevail if Kosovo would be returned to Serbia; the Albanian majority would become a minority. People have certain basic rights to their language, culture and civic institutions but we cannot trample the language and culture of one group in the name of the historical rights of another. Philosophically and ethically the return to some historical past borders, when it is not justified by the wishes of the people who presently live there, and when this would result in the majorities who now live there becoming minorities again, is untenable. If we accept the premise that we cannot restore the historical past because it would result in discrimination against the majority who now lives there, then intellectually on the same basis it is difficult to deny the rights of linguistic minorities living there now to their language, culture, civic society and autonomy. Thus dialogue, compromise and accommodation and where justified, regional autonomy, are essential. The revision of borders could be justified based on present day populations in some cases, such as in southern Slovakia. However, based on the negative history of border revision, generally done by force, such revision should be only considered as a last resort if minority rights or autonomy are consistently denied.

To accept this is very painful and difficult. It was heart wrenching for five and a half million Germans driven from their homes in 1945 to accept that the Oder-Neisse was now the Polish border and lands that were German for seven or eight hundred years are

now Polish. It was hard to accept also Emmanuel Kant's Königsberg had become the Russian Kaliningrad. It was hard for the Poles to accept that one of the centres of medieval Polish culture, Lwów had become the Ukrainian Lviv. However unjust these borders might have been originally, after several generations, a revision on purely historical grounds would only result in more pain and injustice and would not contribute to goodwill among different nationalities. Many present day governments acknowledge this fact.

I say these things with some sadness because my family has experienced such losses and I have struggled with these questions most of my life. My mother's family are Hungarians who have lived in Transylvania ever since we have family records in the 16th century. My father's family are Hungarians from the Carpatho-Ukraine where the family records go back to the 17th century. Renouncing claims to the historical thousand year old Hungarian borders is personally very painful for me. Nevertheless I believe that one has to deal with the present situation, not try to reconstruct the past, but to move forward and find new solutions.

Prime Minister Pál Teleki was one of the most respected Hungarian politicians and thinkers. He was also a university professor who in 1941 ended up paying for his convictions with his life. On September 4th, 1940, right after a large part of Transylvania was returned to Hungary, Pál Teleki, as Prime Minister in the Hungarian Upper House said "As I have told leading statesmen in the past, if you ask me as an individual human being what part of (historic Hungary) do I demand to be returned, then I can only respond with one word - everything! … However if you ask me as a responsible politician and a responsible head of state, then I know that for the sake of Europe, perhaps even for the sake of Hungary, and in the interest of neighbouring states, I have to think of

compromises and I am ready to compromise."[363] We could add to Teleki's statement that for the sake of peace and human and ethical decency, compromises are the only realistic alternatives to enable linguistic majorities and linguistic minorities to live together in relative peace. Once again, we are back to the conclusion that, when regarding minority linguistic rights, a compromise is not a dirty word but the preferred alternative.

Multiple identities and multiple loyalties

Identity is defined as who a person is, or what a thing is[364]. Defining and accepting one's identity is a daily experience for anyone who lives as a linguistic minority. Each time such a person speaks in his or her native tongue, the majority reacts negatively or indifferently, but very seldom positively. To hold on to a minority identity often entails personal hardship and sacrifice. Therefore it is important to examine the idea of *identity*, *negative identity, multiple identities* and *multiple loyalties*.

There is a tendency to regard identity as an unchanging label that accompanies an individual through his or her life. This is not necessarily so. Identity is complex, multi-faceted, and could be constantly changing throughout our lives. To a certain extent, we have a choice about what identity we choose.

Anthony Wilden[365] writes about a theory called ***negative identity.*** This theory holds that if a people or a minority is being oppressed or dominated by an "Other", it will choose as its identity everything that is different than the "Other". But such an identity achieved through the process of negation is only an imaginary identity and not a real one. Minorities, including linguistic minorities, often find themselves in this situation of choosing negative identities. In Canada, we say we in most aspects different from the

[363] Teleki, Pál *Beszédek,* II. In "*Trianon és a magyar politikai gondolkodás, 1920-1953* (Trianon and the Hungarian Political Thinking, 1920-1953). (1998) Budapest, Tanulmanyok, Osiris, 283.
[364] *Websters Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language (1988).* , 481.
[365] Wilden, Anthony (1979). 148.

Americans[366]. In Hungary we are reluctant to accept commonalities with our neighbours to the south and east. These are examples of negative identity.

Presently one out of seven persons in the European Union is a member of a linguistic minority. Within Canada 40% of the population is of British descent. It is accepted that at 30% of the population, the French speaking Canadians are a minority[367]. However it can be argued that the remaining 30% of Canada's population, which includes native Canadians and later immigrants who are of neither English nor French descent, are mostly in different stages of assimilation into the English, or in Quebec, into the French community, but as yet are often in the position of being a linguistic minority. Thus it can be argued that with 40% of the Canadian population of British descent and English speaking, there is not true linguistic majority in Canada, we are all part of a minority. This is a devil's advocate argument and many people may disagree with it.

People who are members of a linguistic minority often have not only ***multiple identities***, but also ***multiple loyalties***. They can have a loyalty to both the country where they live and often to the country where they were born, and in some instances they also feel a loyalty to the country where their mother tongue and culture is the majority language and culture. Assimilation is not the same as multiple identity or multiple loyalty.

For example I was born and raised in Hungary and I am proud of my Hungarian heritage. After half a century in Canada, this is probably the main reason why I returned to a Hungarian University. I love the Hungarian language, the poetry, and its history. Despite some of our horrible blunders, most ordinary people, including some of my

[366] Elder, R. B. (1989). Chapter 1, 9-36.

[367] This point could be argued, as the 30% of Canada's population, who are neither English nor French, are mostly in different stages of assimilation into the English, or in Québec, into the French communities. The 7.4 million French speaking Canadians, although numerically a minority, have a very different status in an officially bilingual country. Nevertheless French Canadians outside Québec generally feel themselves to be a minority. It is an open question how many native languages, despite government support, will be able to survive during the next two generations.

ancestors and my family played a modest but honourable role in Hungary for centuries. A school here, a street there, named after one of my ancestors, landscapes, commentaries, houses where I or friends lived, as long as I live, all these things will be integral parts of who I am.

But I have also lived in Canada since I was 19 years old. I love its people, its tolerance, the people's quiet, understated pride, its bilingualism and multiculturalism, its unspoiled rivers and lakes where sometimes I am the only human being. My children, grandchildren, and wife were all born here. They like/love Hungary, but it would be extremely difficult for them to live there. Depending on the circumstances, sometimes I feel more Hungarian. Other times I feel more Canadian. It does not seem to make any sense that people like me should be forced to make a choice of either this culture and language or that, but not both. However, until recently, this is what we seem to demand from people of mixed heritage or of people who for whatever reason become members of a linguistic minority.

Hungarian poet, György Faludy had similar feelings. Despite having lived more than twenty years in Toronto, Canada, Faludy said in a 1990 interview following a year that was originally planned as a vacation in Hungary "Canada is a peaceful country; here (in Hungary) every day there is excitement. In each country, one longs a little for the other."[368] He was at that time 79 years old and had only spent 17 years of his adult life in Hungary. Faludy stayed on in Hungary and died there in 2006, at age 95.

This double loyalty is a viable alternative even in the most difficult and hostile situations. A good example is Saif-Alden Wattad, an Israeli Arab lawyer and presently a visiting research fellow at the University of Toronto. Wattad makes a clear distinction between nation and state. He feels part of the Arab identity through language and culture,

[368] de Sousa, Ronald (1990). "A Poet's Triumphant Return".

but is loyal to his country, Israel, and thinks that the discrimination his people face in Israel can be solved through peaceful means and he is willing to defend his country, Israel.[369]

Identities and loyalties are essential parts of who we are but our identity as a linguistic minority is more complicated. In East and East Central Europe poets and writers had a role that in many countries was filled by politicians, statesmen, philanthropists and public figures. For this reason, language and the change of language can be even more painful, and more than in other parts of the world can produce feelings of disloyalty to one's language and culture. Poems tackling the subject of identity by two Hungarian poets who have lived in North America illustrate this inner conflict. The first, by Margit Mikes (1897-1976) takes what is for Hungarians the more traditional view that "*I will always remain Magyar*".

"Identity
Without my mother tongue and my country,
Without my familiar community,
What good is my nationality?
I don't know, but still
I guard it with fierce loyalty.
That's me…but who am I?
My identity is the same.
I know I will remain
Be it foolish or brave
Hungarian to the grave."[370]

[369] Morgan, Anne (2007).
[370] Makkai, Ádám (ed.) (2000). 696-97. Mikes' biography is a summary of the bibliography by Makkai. Poem translated by Suzanne K. Walther. Margit Mikes is the daughter of Lajos Mikes (1872-1930), a

The other poem by László Kemenes Géfin (1937-) illustrates some of the ambivalence of immigrant and minority life. This is excerpt from the much longer poem *Son of a white horse* (Fehérlófia):

"Look yourself in the eye, draw your conclusions….

You have to decide why you're here…i.e.

a. have you turned into a sort-of Canadian?

b. can one still speak of your Hungarian-ness?

c. why d' you still want to go home?

d. who needs you there anyway?

e. won't they say that he couldn't make a go of it there;

so he's slunk home to take the bread out of our mouths?

f. what use to write Hungarian here?

g. are you scared to give up your freedom?

h. must you keep bellyaching?"[371]

His friend and fellow Montréal poet, György Vitéz talks about parallel universes. This is the analogy from science fiction that he uses when he tries to explain what happens when he visits Hungary today. "I keep telling my former classmates whom I meet regularly… that at one point on December 17, 1956 when I crossed the border my universe split. That was one universe and I stopped living in that universe and started living in another one. These seemed to be running in parallel tracks. And now I have the

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major figure of the Nyugat generation. Her elder sister married the poet Lőrinc Szabó (1900-1957). Margit married László Kemény, a noted post-impressionist painter. The two families lived in the same house in Buda where a great deal of Hungarian literature was happening both socially and artistically. The poet Miknós Radnóti (1909-1944) wrote of Mikes' poetry "she has a great deal to say about the feminine soul and the trials of the spirit, often with spectacular poetic solutions". Mikes and her husband joined their daughter in New York City in 1967. Mikes has published three volumes of poetry.

[371] Kalman Naves, E. (1998). 105. Géfin came to Canada in 1956 where he now is the Principal of the Liberal Arts College of Concordia University in Montréal. He has published Hungarian poetry in both Canada and in Hungary.

uncanny experience of switching from one universe to the other."[372] This is perhaps one way of describing what it feels like having multiple identities.

Age, experience, life history and many other characteristics make each poet and .each individual react differently to the question of identity. What is common to all of us is that while linguistic identity is generally a given to members of the majority, and they do not think very much about it, for members of linguistic minorities it is an existential question, a conscious choice. What we are saying here is that when a member of a linguistic minority makes this choice, one of the possible choices can be a 'multiple linguistic identity'. And this can be an acceptable and honourable choice.

How multifaceted this identity can be is perhaps illustrated by Vitéz' and Géfin' not considering themselves, after more than forty years in Canada, as Hungarian-Canadian writers. "I am simply a Hungarian writer living outside Hungary" said Géfin. "I am a Canadian citizen and in many ways perhaps I have become a Canadian, but as a writer my interests, the way I write, the audience I have in mind is only in the Hungarian-speaking area of central Europe, in other words not just Hungary but especially people living in Slovakia, Transylvania, and what is now Serbia."[373]

Why I think this quote is especially interesting is because Géfin feels that there are topics and feelings that he writes about that members of the Hungarian linguistic minority living outside of Hungary can better understand than his Hungarian readers in Hungary. It is a little like Transylvania-ism (Transzilvánizmus) on an international scale.

Identity is like marriage. We can have different ideas of what it means. What we seem to expect is that identity will be similar to an idealised idea of marriage, where one leaves his/her mother and father and clings to her/his spouse and "they become one flesh". Another interpretation is the idea that our heritage comes from both our mother

[372] Ibid. 111.
[373] Kalman Naves, (1998). 110.

and father and we can be loyal to both. Being loyal to one friend does not mean that we have to give up all other friends. So it is with identities.

The reality of life is that we all have multiple identities and multiple loyalties. It is just that our philosophy often does not reflect this reality. It is often the case that we have a primary identity or loyalty. But it is also possible to have one or more secondary identities. For example, one can have a primary vocational identity as a high school music teacher and a secondary identity as a performing artist. Or one can be a conservative business person during the week, but live a bohemian existence and identity on the weekend, as French painter, Paul Gauguin (1848-1903) did prior to 1875.

Further questions regarding the rights of linguistic minorities.

John Stuart Mill's question about how can we safeguard the rights of minorities in a democracy where the majority rules and makes the laws and the policies, is fundamental for all of society, including linguistic minorities. Such safeguarding of rights is even more difficult in a time when we no longer have general agreement on values.

Mordecai Richer, the well known Canadian writer, was asked "if every writer has just one theme, would you be able to tell me what your theme is now?" He answered that his theme had always been "how do you live with honour in a time when there is no agreement on values? What is honour? That is really what my novels are about. How do you live well without hurting other people?"[374]

A somewhat similar question is raised by the Canadian anthropologist Munir Jiwa, this time regarding the question of how we respect or don't respect the values of a religious minority in a very secular society. Speaking on the tolerance of blasphemy he writes: "What kind of society are you building if you have the right to offend and to hate? just to prove that you have the right to offend someone and knowingly do so? How do you hold on to things like respect for others, dignity, and pluralism?"[375] There is often a conflict between values, in this case between freedom of expression on the one hand and respect for values and beliefs of other people, including minorities on the other.

Here there are two interrelated questions. To what extent is the majority even conscious of how offensive something that is said or written about the minority is to the minority? The other is when does freedom of speech becomes an act of wanting intentionally to hurt someone or some group? There are some excellent writings about the issue of freedom of speech, but that is not my area of focus. What is important is that minorities are more vulnerable to be ignored or neglected when two valid principles

[374] Hutcheon, Linda and Richmond, Marion (eds.) (1990). 47.
[375] Quoted in Chung, Andrew (2006). 1, 4.

collide, in this case freedom of expression, and respect for the beliefs and values of individuals and groups.

What I think is important to consider is why someone would want to hurt or humiliate someone or some group. Is it search for notoriety, money, is it from prejudice, from hate? How can we build a society where each one of us will consider the implications of what we are saying to others before we speak or write? Censorship, which I detest, should be a seldom used ultimate tool that might be used in the case of extreme hate literature. Similar to the Four Way Test of Rotary Clubs, we might before we speak or write ask "is it true, is it fair to all concerned, and is it going to build goodwill?" or something similar. This is very important for minorities.

Being as human as everyone else, minorities will often try, especially fanatical, political or religious minorities of minorities to impose their views on the majority. The Bolsheviks were a tiny minority in Russia in 1918, as were and are the officers of the many military dictatorships all over the world. In Canada, two recent examples of a fundamentalist minority of a minority forcing its views on a tolerant majority were the closing of an art exhibit in Edmonton in 2007 by a small group fundamentalist Hindus because they did not like how the statue of the elephant God, Ganesh was portrayed; and in Montreal, in 2006, the Hassidic Jewish community forcing frosted windows on a women's exercise facility, so that the women would not tempt young Hassidic men who passed by on their way to a rabbinic school. Multiculturalism is not an absolute right. Sometimes we try to be so respectful of the rights of the minorities, that in the process we deny freedom of expression and the rights of the majority. No extreme should be acceptable.

How can we build a society where we do not want to hurt anyone? As idealistic as this may sound, it is not impossible. Let me provide an example from Sweden.

Recently someone from Canada visited a Swedish colleague who worked in a large computer factory. Although they always arrived twenty five minutes before starting time the Swedish colleague always parked at the farthest end of the empty parking lot and then walked for ten minutes to the factory gate. On the third day the guest asked his friend if he was parking so far away because he needed the exercise. Oh no, was the answer. It is just that our family is grown up. I have more time, so I come early and leave the parking places closer to the gate for those who come late because they have very little time. This may be the kind of mind set that we need when we deal with others, especially with minorities.

Canadian Louise Arbour, former chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, former judge of the Supreme Court of Canada and most recently United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has an interesting perspective with regard to conflicts of values. She says that "you could say, for instance, Canada has not abandoned any of its "family values" by embracing the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but at the same time it has embraced a *new* value, or there is a *competing* value, which is equality."[376] One might say that 'equality' is the new supreme value, but in regard to linguistic minorities, very few states practise it. In this regard, presently both Canada and Hungary give linguistic minorities better support than most countries.

Arbour's other questions relate to the legitimate limits of freedom that can be granted to minorities and the possible negative aspects of multiculturalism. She writes: "Inasmuch as we talk about multiculturalism and pluralism and embracing diversity, we are talking less in concrete terms about us embracing the ideas of newcomers, but

[376] Griffiths, R. (ed.) (2006). 185.

inviting them not to share."[377] In the eyes of many, some Supreme Court judges such Louise Arbour and Beverly McLachlin, do not necessarily represent the opinion of the majority of the population. But Arbour writes "value discourse is essentially anchored in something that is behind us. It's about looking back"[378] and her position is that sometimes judges have to advocate new and progressive interpretations of the law.

This leads us back to Plato's notion of the enlightened leaders of the Republic who do not represent the majority, but who are supposedly wiser and better educated than the majority. It also leads us back to the notion that a good ruler (for example Frederic the Great or Peter the Great) is ahead of his time and leads his people. With all its shortcomings I personally believe that democracy is better than other forms of government. However tempting it might be for linguistic minorities to trust a well educated, enlightened ruling class, the best course for all, including linguistic minorities is a well informed and reasonably well educated majority's rule.

The classical challenge in a democracy is to balance the rule of the majority with the protection of the minority's rights. I used the example of blasphemy because for many people even the word sounds old fashioned. It seems that as long as the majority of society was religious, blasphemy was not tolerated. Once the religious ones become a minority, making fun or demeaning God became acceptable.

We have to find ways to respect the values, beliefs and culture of minorities. It is said that a society's humanity can be measured by how it treats its most vulnerable members. Generally minorities are quite vulnerable.

Returning to the idea of multiple identities and multiple loyalties, perhaps we have an alternate philosophical way of looking the age old problem of how we treat the *other,* those citizens whose language, culture, religion and values are different than ours.

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[377] Griffiths, (2006). 183.
[378] Ibid.

The reality is that most people have a primary identity, but many have one or more secondary identities, and in some cases, people can choose to change their primary identity. The *other*, the minority, could possibly be our other self.

One of the troublesome things about extreme nationalism is that the ruling majority or the state often tries and sometimes succeeds in forcibly changing people's primary, including linguistic identities. As individuals, we also try to label people in preconceived ideas of identity. Perhaps a fair illustration of how we try to force people to have just one identity is the anecdote of an incident that takes place on a ferry trip from Belfast to Liverpool. Two groups of Irish, one Catholic and the other Protestant, are fighting on the deck. As neither side seems to win, they run over to a solitary figure who is looking over the railing at the sea. Asks one group "Mate, are you Catholic, can you help us?" "No" says the man, to which the Protestants reply triumphantly, "then you are Protestant and you can help us!" The man replies "I am neither Protestant nor Catholic, I am an agnostic". To which both groups retort "OK, OK but are you a Protestant agnostic or a Catholic agnostic?" We seem to love to pigeonhole people.

If we accept that multiple identities and multiple loyalties are not a character deficiency or a disloyalty to one's heritage, if we don't force people to choose a single language or culture once and for all their lives, but concede that multiple identities and loyalties are not only a reality that is here to stay, but in certain situations and in certain parts of the world might be the preferable alternative, then we often will have a radically different viewpoint when we look at minorities and the "other".

Well before written history, the "other", the outsider, the foreigner was regarded as the enemy, a threat to scare away or to be destroyed. But there were exceptions. We do have some very ancient examples of how certain people were able to be the "other" but not necessarily the enemy. Since prehistoric times people traded. In Europe amber

from the Baltic, salt from central Europe, sea shells from the Mediterranean and several other commodities travelled thousands of miles through many territories. Somehow enough traders survived to carry on trade for thousands of years. No doubt many traders were killed or robbed, however they continued to travel and trade at a time when humans had no state and lived in small and often isolated groups. There are many hypotheses about how this came about and how traders were identified and allowed to travel freely. Some theories suggest distinctive clothing or the ability to speak several languages. But for us what is interesting is that at least from Neolithic times on there were people who transcended their own very narrow identity where one was either a member of a very small tribal group or an enemy. These exceptions were most likely multilingual people.

If we accept multiple identities and multiple loyalties, then the "other" could become one of our own possible identities. For example, we can move between a Croatian identity and a Hungarian identity, and yet be the same person. It is less likely that people who feel comfortable in two or more languages and cultures and accept the idea of multiple identities will hate one side of their identity. This is one of the reasons why German and French speaking citizens of Switzerland seem to have a common bond; they generally understand each other's language and culture. They have a German and French identity, but this is usually super-ceded by their Swiss identity.

As for almost everything in life, there are plenty of exceptions for this thesis. Take for example common language. Language is just one of the many characteristics by which people are identified. The blacks and whites of the southern United States share a common language. So do the Catholic and Protestant Irish. As well, the language and culture of Jewish and non-Jewish Germans was similar or the same. Common language and culture does not necessarily unite people, but it helps in many instances to reach a better understanding of the "other".

Multiple identities and loyalties, in addition to those applying to linguistic groups and culture, are equally applicable to race, religion and a host of other characteristics. But such variations are beyond the scope of the philosophy of rights of linguistic minorities being discussed in this work.

Multiple identities and multiple loyalties do not mean no identity or a lukewarm loyalty. People have to be fairly sure about themselves and their values to function in such an environment. For example, for the young students of Munich University -"Die Weisse Rose"[379] group, their values and ethics as practising Christians were stronger than their racial or national identity as Germans. They tried to help Jews and Russians in National Socialist Germany and to expose the lies of the Nazi government. Although they had multiple identities and multiple loyalties, their values were clearer and stronger than those of the majority's values. Even though they lived under tremendous pressure, they believed so strongly that they paid for their convictions with isolation, persecution and ultimately with their lives. Jewish and Palestinian peace activists, having in common the values of tolerance, fairness, freedom and equality are presently trying to bridge divisions of race, religion and language.

My hypothesis is that multiple identities and multiple loyalties are helpful in understanding and bridging the gap between the "in" group and those on the outside. Multiple identities and multiple loyalties are by no means the only answer, nor are they applicable in all situations. People who embrace multiple identities have to be fairly certain about who they are and to balance their different identities. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the students and professor of the Weisse Rose group, and others knew German history and literature better than many of their national socialist colleagues. Although they were patriotic Germans, their identity as Christians trying to live their faith, led them into

[379] Scholl, Inge (1953, reprinted in 1961).

active opposition to the German state of their day. Their multiple identities were not hazy or wishy-washy. At a certain time of their life, in a certain period of their country's history, they chose a certain identity over an other one, and remained loyal to that chosen identity through isolation, arrest, prison and execution.

VI

Conclusions

We are living in a world where physical distance is shrinking as newer and faster means of transportation are being invented. The horse carts travelling between the villages of my childhood give way to transcontinental flights that are completed in a matter of hours. We are also living in a world where communication distance is shrinking, where the letter that took days to travel from village on one side of the country to the other is replaced by instant contact even in the remotest valleys and villages of this world through email. And I, whose grandparents were born in the 19th century and passed on stories of life at that time, I who have lived in both the 20th and 21st centuries, have been a witness to the scope and rapidity of these changes.

As the world becomes smaller and speeds up, there will be a tendency to reach for common means which will allow us all to communicate more efficiently, though not always with more understanding. A few major languages, the languages of entertainment, of business, or economics, will gain priority. We ask, even those whose languages are still widely spoken, if this is the way of the future, if this is the canary singing of the death of more and more languages. And asking this question, we wonder what it will be like if we cannot speak our native language when it is replaced, either by legislation or by usage, by another language. It is when we begin to ask these questions, when we begin to see the possibilities, distasteful though they may be, that we turn back to the subject of the rights of linguistic minorities with fresh eyes.

With increased mobility and increased immigration, in the future there will be more rather than fewer people who will live their lives as members of a linguistic minority. We know that there is much more that we, as humans, have in common, than what divides us. We also know that we have to cooperate and reach compromises if we want to survive and reach a state of sustainable development. In the past when dealing with minorities we often used force to impose the will of the majority on the minority,

and war is the ultimate brute, naked force. In an age of atomic weapons, global terrorism, climate change and environmental degradation, force alone no longer works. It is questionable whether force alone, in the long run, ever worked.

This work started to explore some of the compelling philosophical, historical, anthropological and neuroscientific reasons why and how linguistic majorities and linguistic minorities can mutually benefit from cooperation.

We also have to face the possibility that in the next century, in a highly globalized society, our own language will become a minority language, and even that minority language, unless we consciously safeguard and nourish it, will wither and die, and then what will the loss be for us. It is not just about ”them”, but also about each one of ”us”. Presently there are approximately 4,500 spoken languages and about 200 states. It is projected that by 2100, there will only be 600 spoken languages, which means that about 90% of the spoken languages will become extinct in the next one hundred years.[380] Which language will be next? Which “treasures” will we lose? And although efficiency would be served by fewer languages, what are the important reasons we would want to keep a language alive?

It is from this point of view that I began my journey of exploration. From its very beginnings, through reason and logic rather than passion and unexamined beliefs, philosophy has searched to find answers to two fundamental groups of questions. The first group of questions asks “why” and “how” and “what”. How has life evolved? Why we humans act in certain ways? Why do we die? What is the universe like? What is really important in life? I came to the conclusion that, among many other values, a linguistic identity is important.

[380] Andrássy György (2000). 17.

The second group of questions asks how we should act and behave, and are largely based on the answers we give to the first set of questions. How do we act in an ethical way? How do we have a good life without hurting other people? What are our obligations to our fellow humans, to the other forms of life, to the environment? One of the fundamental questions from the beginning of philosophy has been the question of how to treat the weaker members of our society, whether they are children, the sick, the old, and the vulnerable. A linguistic minority is vulnerable. Therefore, in this larger more ancient sense, questions about how we treat minorities have always been part of philosophy. And so I explored the writings and thoughts of many philosophers as they related or might relate to these questions

Working my way through the Hungarian writers I found that the majority of them rose above the nationalistic and selfish viewpoint. From the Canadian writers I found the situation very similar. Overall what is encouraging is that from the mid 19th century to the end of the 20th century, the period we are studying, not only philosophers and other intellectuals but society in general has become somewhat more tolerant. Segregation and discrimination by race, language, ethnic origin or religion were not only tolerated but often legally sanctioned in the 19th century. Today however such sentiments, although often expressed, are not legislated or part of official policy in most states, and certainly not in Canada or in Hungary.

The Israeli philosopher, Ezra Talmar talks about non-hierarchical moral thinking, where morality is not only the domain of intellectual elites, but the responsibility of everyone. He writes that philosophy has a “super story”, a “super plot” gripping its readers and listeners with suspense as intense as that of any successful detective story.

"This suspense, induced by the philosophical plot, is what we call the eternal search for the meaning of life".[381]

The new story that we have to tell is that we have only evolved and survived as a result of cooperation and caring for those who are weaker than the majority, and that this innate, genetic sense of cooperation and caring gives us hope for the future, despite our immense challenges.

Summary of new ideas

One of my new ideas is that dialogue, as defined by Baum and others; as truly listening to the other, trying really to understand them, while bracketing our convictions and our "truth", is one of the most productive ways for the majority to help linguistic minorities to achieve rights. This seems to be more productive than the age old attempts for each group to try, as often by force as by peaceful means, to convince or force the others to accept their truth, their interpretation of history, their religion or their language. Compromise and accommodation is also important. If we truly listen to what our partner, the "other" is trying to say, we often discover a new meaning, a new reality behind the arguments that will lead to optimum results, to a "win win " situation for both sides. One could use the metaphor two people both wanting an orange, but only one orange is available. A "compromise" is reached whereby the orange is cut in half and shared between the two. But both people are still dissatisfied. It is not until dialogue takes place that it is discovered that one person is thirsty and wants to make juice, and the other is hungry and wants to use the orange peel in a cake. Only after dialogue do they discover that, as a result of understanding the reasons for the needs, they are able to arrive at a solution that satisfies both, the "win win" situation.

[381] Ezra Talmar (2001). 228.

It is essential for both the majority and the minority that certain basic needs, such as food, shelter, medical care and education are available for all, otherwise people will do almost anything to obtain the bare necessities. As the African proverb, we quoted says, "When the water hole shrinks, the animals become meaner." Similarly, when people feel threatened, whether from terrorist attacks, from crime or the loss of their jobs or even the lowering of living standards they are used to, they are much less likely to be generous; and often use minorities as scapegoats.

Linguistic minorities need not only stable constitutional democracies as the form of government but the whole society also needs a certain amount of material well being. Much fear and anxiety favours extreme political solutions. A society that is free of such fear can better obtain and safeguard equal rights and freedoms.

We have to accept a certain ambiguity in the meaning and definition of such terms as "nationality", "identity", "nation", "mother tongue", "fatherland" and others. If we insist on just one acceptable definition, it almost always will be the definition of the majority.

We cannot define ourselves alone, but only in relationship, sometimes even in opposition, to the others around us. Therefore it is not only the individual, but the collective identity that is important. Whether there is a direct and logical road from individual human rights to collective rights and autonomy is questioned by many political philosophers. I came to the conclusion that the two are inseparable and that both individual and collective language rights and autonomy are essential for the survival and well being of linguistic minorities. Generally linguistic minorities have few collective rights and there are far fewer autonomous linguistic regions than the numbers and circumstances of language minorities would justify. It seems there is a great deal of

work to be done both by philosophers and lawmakers to study, acknowledge and rectify this deficiency.

We all have both individual and collective rights. As a broad generalization, European and North American cultures seem to emphasise the supremacy of individual rights over group rights, while for most of the rest of the world, the extended family, the community, the "we" is more important that the individual, the "I".

For many Third World societies, and for many minorities, besides social and political self-determination, economic self-determination is also crucially important.

If revised borders are fully justified on the basis of present day linguistic realities such revisions would have to be made with the commitment that the new entity would treat its linguistic minority in a democratic and tolerant manner. Such treatment would have to include the possibility of extensive local autonomy for the minority. This might be the case for Kosovo, where the new, previously oppressed Albanian majority would have to provide safeguards for the Serbian minority. Such extensive local autonomy has been achieved in Canada by the French speaking people of Quebec, by the Inuit of Nunavut and to a lesser extent by other native and francophone minorities.

Safeguarding the rights of linguistic minorities is positive for the larger society, including the majority. Like regional *identity*, if a person can belong to a linguistic minority and the larger society accepts and values such an association, then it allows people to feel unique and at the same time part of that larger society, be it a national state, the European Union or an identity of world citizenship.

In order to achieve our optimum potential as individuals and make the maximum contribution to society, we need all three approaches, that is, a unique individual identity, a belonging to a smaller, more intimate regional, ethnic or cultural group, and a sense that we are an integral part of all humanity.

This study also demonstrates that although Canada and Hungary are different in many respects, their approaches to the question of rights for linguistic minorities have more similarities than differences. There is no reason to believe that this conclusion will not hold for the other countries of the world. Therefore we conclude that there are universally applicable philosophical principles relating to the treatment linguistic minorities. We have explored some of these principles, such as everyone's right to basic human rights, a principle from which certain group rights and autonomy for minorities logically follow.

Further conclusions are that conflict naturally follows from freedom and that this conflict can only be satisfactorily resolved by dialogue and by compromise. By "conflict" we mean disagreement of opinions and perspectives and not armed conflict. Therefore change, conflict as defined, dialogue and compromise are integral parts of the process that leads to "eternal peace".

Humans and other forms of life have evolved and survive today predominantly through caring and cooperation and not through competition. This conclusion, reached predominantly by natural scientists, has profound and positive implications for philosophy in general, particularly for the philosophy concerning minorities. Cooperation is not an inherent contradiction with most of our philosophical tradition, but it is essential for our generation to re-evaluate the philosophy of linguistic minorities based on these new ideas and discoveries from natural sciences. This thesis is also an attempt to begin such a re-examination and re-evaluation.

The philosophy of the rights of linguistic minorities is an increasingly important field of study that does not receive the attention it deserves and needs, either from scholars, politicians or from the general public. The study of collective linguistic rights and the criteria for autonomy is especially avoided and neglected. Fundamental

philosophical questions have to be re-examined by each generation in order to respond to ever changing circumstances. With globalisation, mass immigration and with the evolution of super-national social units, the circumstances have changed dramatically between the mid 19th and the end of the 20th century. However, the questions remain the same. Although the responses change slightly with each generation, there is still continuity in the three thousand year old tradition, because the really important questions (we mentioned some of them previously in this paper) remain the same. Even a question that seems to be new, such as how we can live a good life that is ethical and that does not hurt other people in a society where three is no general agreement on values, has historical and philosophical precedents, such as the period of the late Roman Empire, or the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation when once again, there was no general agreement on values. Therefore, the thinking and writings of great philosophers remain relevant in our modern day search for answers. They are certainly relevant as we search for the philosophical underpinnings for how we treat linguistic minorities.

What we ultimately have searched for in this study is how we can live together peacefully with each other, how we can allow all humans, members of majorities and minorities alike, to have a decent life, and on what bases can we reach compromises that will allow this to happen. We know that in the long run, war is not an answer and that the study of philosophy is an excellent means to explore the principles on which dialogue, compromise and cooperation can be built.

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Útban a kisebbségek nyelvi jogainak filozófiájához

Rövid magyar nyelvű összefoglalás

Bevezetés

Noha anyanyelvem magyar, professzoraim javaslatára disszertációmat mégis angol nyelven írtam. Remélem, hogy ez inkább munkám előnyére, mintsem hátrányára fog szolgálni, és segíteni fogja a kanadai és a többi angol nyelvű olvasót, hogy a magyar filozófiában és kultúrában tájékozódhasson. Remélem továbbá, hogy a nyelvi kisebbségekről szóló írásom közvetítő szerepet tud majd vállalni a horvát, osztrák, román, szerb, szlovén vagy ukrán szomszédainkkal folytatott dialógusokban.

Magyarországon születtem és nőttem fel. Tizenkilenc éves korom óta, pontosan fél évszázada, azonban külföldön élek. Ebből – három év kivételével, amelyet Nyugat-Európában töltöttem – negyvenhét évet Kanadában éltem. Úgy vélem, identitásom e kettősségéből, olyan sajátos perspektíva adódik, amelyből talán, sok más érdekes téma mellett, a nyelvi kisebbségek jogainak filozófiai kérdéseihez is fontos adalékokat szolgálhatok.

Összefoglalás

A világon több mint nyolcszáz millió ember él valamelyik nyelvi kisebbség tagjaként. E szám természetesen a be- és kivándorlásokkal évről évre növekszik. Munkám kizárólag a kanadai, és a Kárpát-medencében élő magyar nyelvi kisebbségek jogainak filozófiai problémáit vizsgálja a 20. században. Talán nem egészen magától értetődő, és az olvasóban joggal merülhet fel a kérdés: igen ám, de mindennek mi köze a filozófiához? Azt gondolom, hogy ha e kérdést, vagy a két konkrét vizsgálati horizontot, a morál-, jog- és politikafilozófia perspektívájába állítjuk, meg tudunk szabadulni az elemzések partikuláritásától és regionalitásától. A filozófia ugyanis

lehetővé teszi számunkra, hogy általános érvényű (morális, szociológiai és politikai) alapelveket kövessünk, vagy azoknak legalábbis az igényét jelezhessük.

Dolgozatom elején arra tettem kísérletet, hogy egy olyan alapvető fogalmi szótárt alkossak meg, amelyre a későbbiekben bátran hivatkozhatok. Ebben például a „nemzet", a „nyelvi kisebbség", „hazaszeretet", „nacionalizmus" és más hasonló szavak szerepeltek volna. E kifejezések jól kivehető fogalmi kontúrjait szerettem volna élesebbre rajzolni, hogy ebből némi praktikus előnyöm származzon, de hamar kiderült számomra, hogy vállalkozásom hiábavaló. Arra a következtetésre jutottam ugyanis, hogy ezeknek a szavaknak nincs egyértelmű jelentésük, hogy ezek értelme, jelentése nyelvtől, kortól, kultúrától függően állandóan változtak és változnak, vagyis hogy e fogalmak jelentésének kontextusa, története van. Kutatásom során világossá vált, hogy talán épp azok a legizgalmasabb jelentésmódosulások, amelyek épp egy adott nyelvi kisebbség és a hozzá tartozó nyelvi többség nyelvhasználata között mutatkoznak.

Munkám következő részében az általános emberi és kisebbségi jogok kialakulásának, fejlődésének és általános filozófiájának történeti rekonstrukcióját végeztem el a felvilágosodástól a 20. század végéig. Majd ezt követően néhány, e témában releváns álláspont rövid ismertetésére vállalkoztam, elsősorban angol, de néhány magyar és német nyelvű tanulmány alapján.

Az ezt követő fejezetben vezetem be a nyelvi kisebbségek „jogfilozófiai" vizsgálatát, néhány közismert, de nélkülözhetetlen filozófiai paradigma szemszögéből. Azt vizsgáltam például, hogy mennyiben lehet releváns e témával kapcsolatban Kant morál-és társadalomfilozófiája vagy Hegel fenomenológiája. Némi könnyebbséget jelentettek számomra azok a szerzők, akik konkrétan írtak is a kisebbségek jogairól, mint például Mill, Habermas, Feinber és Rawls. A filozófia e géniuszaihoz képest kevésbé ismertek, ugyanakkor nem kevésbé jelentősek azok a gondolkodók, amelyek filozófiai

munkásságára kicsit részletesebben is kitértem írásomban. Ezek között szerepel a magyar Bibó István, a kanadai Charles Taylor, Gregory Baum vagy Will Kymlicka, akik valamennyien foglalkoztak és karakteres álláspontot képviseltek a nyelvi kisebbségek jogairól szóló diskurzusokban. Mind a magyar, mind pedig a kanadai gondolkodókról szóló elemzéseimet rövid történeti áttekintéssel egészítettem ki. Ilyen módon kellett említést tennem, a magyar gondolkodók kisebbségekről vallott gondolatai kapcsán, a Széchenyitől és Eötvöstől a múlt század végéig ívelő tartamról; amelyről persze tudom, hogy magyar olvasóimnak talán nem sok újat mondhattam, de bízom abban, hogy az angol nyelvű olvasó ebben is egy rendkívül izgalmas és inspiratív szellemi aspektust vél felfedezni. Ezzel párhuzamosan a következő fejezetben a kanadai gondolkodók munkáinak elemzése kapott szót, John Watsontól a 20. század végéig ívelő időszakban. Be kell vallanom, hogy a kanadai angol nyelvű filozófiai irodalmat jobban ismerem, mint a franciát, ennek ellenére ez utóbbinak is megkíséreltem egyfajta, témámmal összefüggő, szintézisét elvégezni. E fejezet, értelemszerűen, inkább a magyar olvasó érdeklődésére tarthat számot.

Vizsgálódásom menetében ezt követően néhány teoretikus problémát fontoltam meg. Behatóan foglalkoztatott például az a kérdés, hogy hol húzódik a kisebbségek jogainak, jogigényeinek méltányolható, elfogadható határa? Hiszen nyilvánvalóan pillanatnyi anyagi és szellemi erőforrásaink behatároltak, mégis, milyen elvek mentén kellene meghúznunk a mindkét fél érdekeit figyelembe vevő jogos, igazságos és méltányos határ optimumát?

Fontos elméleti kérdésnek tartottam az identitás problémakörét, amelyet az összetett identitás, az összetett hűség *(multiple identity and multiple loyalties)* fogalmainak analízise mentén próbáltam meg körbejárni. Úgy vélem, az ezzel

kapcsolatban mutatkozó filozófiai kérdések és lehetséges válaszok különösen fontosak a nyelvi kisebbségek számára.

Végül néhány általános tézist állítottam fel, mintegy tanulmányom gondolatainak összegzéseként: (1) A kisebbségi nyelvek és kultúrák, hasonlóan a természeti kincsekhez, állatokhoz vagy növényekhez, az egész emberiségnek és nem csak a kisebbségeknek az értékei. Ha ezek kihalnak, nyelvükkel együtt évszázadok tűnnek el nyomtalanul, vagy akár évezredek tudása és tapasztalatai. (2) Egyik félnek sem lehet teljességgel igaza, nincsenek kizárólagos álláspontok, ezért a kiegyezések, a nehezen létrehozott kompromisszumok nemcsak hogy nem jelentenek kudarcot vagy erkölcsi gyengeséget, hanem a nyelvi kisebbségek számára, és valószínűleg a másik fél számára is teljességgel nélkülözhetetlenek. (3) Olyan dialógusokat kell folytatnunk, amelyekben nem szándékunk azonnal az álláspontunk elfogadására kényszeríteni partnereinket, hanem teljes odaadással hallgatjuk, és megpróbáljuk valóban megérteni, mit akar a másik fél mondani. Ezek lennének azok a párbeszédek, amelyek eredményekhez vezethetnek, ez lenne az a nélkülözhetetlen habitus, amely lehetővé tenné, hogy a kisebbségek és a többség jobban megértsék egymást. (4) Antropológiai, történelmi és biológiai kutatások megerősítették azt a meggyőződésemet, hogy az emberi természet sokkal inkább hajlamos az együttműködésre – kiváltképp, ha az eszére és nem az indulataira hallgat –, mint a kíméletlen, másokat megsemmisítő versengésre. Persze ebben nemcsak az ész, hanem bizonyos érzelmek is szerepet játszhatnak. A másik ember szeretete, a másikért érzett felelősség, meghatározó attitűdök lehetnek. A haladás hajtóereje az együttműködés, és nem az egymás elleni harc. Ha az egyén és társadalom kapcsolatát ilyen, az együttműködés és a kiegyezésre való hajlandóság szemszögéből tekintjük, akkor a nyelvi kisebbségek jövője sokkal reményteljesebbnek látszik, mintha csak a kíméletlen verseny erejében hinnénk. (5) Az egyes csoportok regionális jogainak az általános emberi jogok

rendszerébe kell illeszkednie, ugyanakkor az általános emberi jogokat nem lehet a csoportos jogok megkerülésével gyakorolni. (6) A nyelvi kisebbségek jogainak megértéséhez a filozófiai elemzés olyan támpontokat nyújt, amelyek, nézetem szerint, elengedhetetlenek e kisebbségek történelmi, társadalmi és kulturális életének és gondolkodásának átfogóbb megértése szempontjából.

Röviden összefoglaltam a közelmult tudományos kutatásainak eredményét az idegrendszer anatómiájával, fiziológiájával és biokémiájával kapcsolatban, ahogy ezek agyunk müködését, különösképpen ahogy ez a félelem, a meggondolás, megindoklás (reason) területén egészen új fölfedezésekre vezet. Évmilliók során a veszélyre, félelemre rögtön, megfontolás nélkül kellett, hogy reagáljunk, ha élni akartunk. A sebességért pontatlansággal kelett, hogy fizessünk. Az irásbeli müveltség ebben javitott, mert a betük magukban semmit sem jelentenek, és gondolkoznunk kellett, hogy megértsük az irás jelentését. Az elektronikus média térhóditásával információink nagyrészét képekben kapjuk, és ha veszélyt látunk a képekben, agyunk ideghálózata általában a képről rögtön a cselekedetre vág át, agyunk gondolkodó részét elkerülve. Demagógok, lelkiismeretlen politikusok és vezetők ezt a félelmet, amit az elektronikus média korában jobban érzünk, mint az irásbeliség korában, könnyen használhatják gyülölet szitására, különösképpen kisebbségek ellen.

A filozófia, amely még mindig többnyire irásbeli, megfontolt és nem harminc másodperces képekben adott hirekre támaszkodik, alkalmasabb a nyelvi kisebbségek kérdését elfogulatlanabbul, türelmesebben kutatni és tárgyalni, mint például az esti hiradó.

Végezetül, szeretném kifejezni őszinte köszönetemet mindazoknak, akik – elsősorban a Pécsi Tudományegyetemen – hozzájárultak munkám elkészítéséhez. Angol nyelvű írásom végén név szerint is kifejeztem hálámat néhányuknak.

2007. április 11.

Héder István
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Abriss

Diese Arbeit ist eine Untersuchung der Philosophien zum Thema Sprachminoritäten speziell in Kanada und Ungarn von der Mitte des 19. bis zum Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Ich bespreche einige zutreffende Philosophen und ihre Arbeit im Hinblick auf ihre Aussagen zu Sprachminoritäten, anschließend folgen genauere Untersuchungen von kanadischen und ungarischen Denkern. Ich bespreche auch die neuen Forschungen und Entdeckungen von Neurowissenschaftlern über die Wirkungsweise und Reaktion des menschlichen Gehirns speziell auf Angst, Vernunft und elektronischen Medien im Hinblick auf die Auswirkungen in den Beziehungen zwischen Minoritäten und Majoritäten. Neue Erkenntnisse der Umwelt – und Astrowissenschaften zeigen auf, dass alles Leben total interdependent ist. Das wird zu einer veränderten Sicht führen, wie wir Minoritäten betrachten. Meine Methode ist eine Auswertung der betreffenden Literatur, aber ich beziehe auch die persönlichen Beobachtungen aus meiner lebenslanges Erfahrung mit diesem Thema ein. Der Zweck meiner Ausführungen ist nicht nur zu verstehen, sondern auch vorzuschlagen, wie wir unsere philosophische Sicht über Sprachminoritäten ändern können. Es werden in dieser Studie einige wichtige Fragen aufgeworfen und es wird versucht, sie zu beantworten. Was zeichnet Sprachminoritäten aus? Wie vielschichtig und mehrdimensional ist der Begriff Sprachminorität? Was ist der Unterschied zwischen sprachlicher und kultureller Identität? Worin besteht der Wert der Sprachminorität für die Sprachmajorität und warum sollte die Minorität geschützt werden? Wenn wir die Muttersprache verlieren, verlieren wir auch unersetzbare kulturelle Schätze? Mit der Globalisierung und der zunehmenden Mobilität wächst die Wahrscheinlichkeit für die Menschen zu einer sprachlichen Minderheit zu gehören. Ich plädiere zum Schluss dafür, dass man sich für sprachliche und kulturelle Identität frei entscheiden kann, sie weitergeben und wechseln kann während eines ganzen Lebens. Diese Betrachtungsweise ist nicht nur vorteilhaft für beide, die Majorität und die Minorität, sondern essentiell für die Bewahrung des Friedens. Dies ist erstrebenswert, weil nicht Kampf, sondern Kooperation die hauptsächlichen Impulse für Evolution und Fortschritt sind.

Résumé

Ce document est un examen des philosophies relatives aux minorités linguistiques, et plus spécifiquement au Canada et en Hongrie du milieu du 19^{ième} jusqu'à la fin du 20^{ième} siècle. Je passe en revue les philosophes pertinents et leurs travaux en ce qui à trait aux minorités linguistiques, et je poursuis avec un examen plus détaillé des penseurs canadiens et hongrois. Je passe également en revue la recherche récente et des découvertes par des neuroscientifiques concernant l'opération et les réponses du cerveau humain, spécifiquement en ce qui à trait à la peur, le raisonnement et les média électroniques, et l'effet que ces derniers ont sur les liens entre minorités et majorités. De nouveaux éléments provenant des sciences de l'environnement et des sciences de l'espace indiquent que toutes les formes de vie sont totalement interdépendantes, et ceci mènera également vers un changement de la façon dont on voit les minorités. Ma méthode est de passer en revue la littérature pertinente ainsi que mes observations personnelles basées sur mes expériences de vie. Mon but n'est pas seulement de comprendre, mais aussi de suggérer comment nous pourrions changer notre philosophie relative aux minorités linguistiques. Dans cette étude il y a quelques questions importantes que nous voulons poser et auxquelles nous essayerons de répondre. Quelles sont les caractéristiques des minorités linguistiques? Dans quelle mesure le concept de minorité linguistique est-t-il à plusieurs niveaux et multidimensionnel? Quelle est la différence entre l'identité linguistique et culturelle? Quelle est la valeur de la présence de la minorité linguistique pour la majorité linguistique, et pourquoi cette minorité devrait-elle être protégée? Si nous perdons une langue, ne perdons nous pas également des trésors culturelles irremplaçables? Avec la globalisation et une augmentation de la mobilité, la probabilité de devenir membre d'une minorité linguistique augmente. Je conclus que de plus en plus les identités linguistiques et culturelles ainsi que les loyautés envers elles peuvent être choisies, peuvent être multiples et peuvent changer pendant le cours d'une vie. Le traitement juste des minorités linguistiques est non seulement bénéfique pour la majorité et la minorité, mais essentiel parce qu'il contribue à la paix. Ceci est possible parce que la force principale de l'évolution et du progrès n'est pas la compétition mais la coopération.

Historic Hungary's Nationalities – 1910



Legend:

Pink	Hungarian
Yellow	German
Light Blue	Romanian
Dark Green	Slovak
Light Green	Ukrainian (Ruthenian)
Mauve	Serbian
Mid-Blue	Croatian
Grey	Slovenian
Brown	Other
White	Uninhabited

Héder István

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Sok más irásom is megjelent, még egy költeményem is angolul, de ezeknek nincs semmi közük a filozófiához.

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